Enhancing nonprofit resources through barter

This article discusses the objectives and formats that countertrade (barter) assumes as a means of expanding the financial and other resources of nonprofit institutions. Examples of the different types of agreements practiced by various types of institutions indicate the pervasiveness of the practice. The author calls for greater levels of institutional commitment to the proactive seeking and consummating of countertrade agreements.     

A MODEL OF OPTIMAL PLANT SIZE WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE DEMAND FOR COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENT AND FOR SCHOOL SIZE

A model of optimal plant size is developed which predicts that 1) plants experience increasing returns to in-plants inputs, 2) the relative price of plant output is greater in rural areas than in urban areas, and 3) plants are larger in urban areas than in rural areas. The model's predictions appear to be consistent with behavior in a number of consumer services (e. g., grocery, movie, and library services). These predictions are more rigorously tested and are strongly supported when demand functions for cognitive achievement and for school size are estimated. These regressions also lend support to the quality-quantity model of fertility.     

Investment model predictions of workplace ostracism on K–12 teachers’ commitment to their schools and the profession of teaching

The purpose of this study was to determine how the ostracism of K-12 teachers influences their commitment to their schools and commitment to the teaching profession. The investment model was used to situate ostracism as a predictor of teacher commitment. Participants were 200 full-time K-12 teachers who completed a survey assessing their experiences with ostracism at work and investment model variables (i.e., investments, quality of alternatives, satisfaction, and commitment). Results confirmed investment model predictions with teachers’ investments, quality of alternatives, and satisfaction predicting their commitment to their schools and profession. Results of mediation models also demonstrated that controlling for teachers’ investments and quality of alternatives, ostracism predicted commitment indirectly through its effect on satisfaction. This study revealed that teacher commitment is explained by investment model predictions, but after controlling for those predictions, is further explained by ostracism from teacher colleagues.     

TRANSPARENCY IN MARKETS FOR EXPERIENCE GOODS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

We propose an experimental design to investigate the role of information disclosure in the market for an experience good. The market is served by a duopoly of firms that choose both the quality and the price of their product. Consumers differ in their taste for quality and choose from which firm to buy. We compare four different treatments in which we vary the degree to which consumers are informed about quality. Contrary to theoretical predictions, firms do not differentiate quality under full information. Rather, both tend to offer products of similar, high quality, entailing more intense price competition than predicted by theory. Under no information, we observe a “lemons” outcome where quality is low. At the same time, firms manage to maintain prices substantially above marginal cost. In two intermediate treatments, quality is significantly higher than the no‐information level, and there is evidence that prices become better predictors of quality. Taken together these findings suggest that information disclosure is a more effective tool to raise welfare and consumer surplus than theory would lead one to expect. (JEL L15, C91, D82)     

HOLD‐UP: WITH A VENGEANCE

When contracts are incomplete or unenforceable, inefficient levels of investment may occur because of hold‐up. If individuals care for negative reciprocity, these problems may be reduced, as revenge becomes a credible threat. However, negative reciprocity has this effect only when the investor holds the rights of control of the investment proceeds. We explore this issue analytically, deriving predictions for hold‐up games which differ as regards assignment of rights of control. We also test and support these predictions in an experiment. (JEL C72, C92, D23, L14)     

Perceptions of Child Sexual Abuse in a Hypothetical Cybersexploitation Case: The Importance of Perpetrator Honesty,Outcome Type,and Respondent Gender

This study investigated perceptions of child sexual abuse in a hypothetical cybersexploitation case. Men were predicted to be more negative toward the victim than were women. Victims were predicted to be more negatively judged when they consented to sex than when they did not and when they were lied to than when they were not. Two hundred and seventy-six respondents read a sexual abuse depiction in which the perpetrator's disclosure about his age (being honest from the outset, lying, or refusing to disclose when questioned) and the final outcome of the meeting (consensual verses nonconsensual sexual intercourse) were varied between subjects. Respondents then completed a 17-item attribution scale. ANOVAs revealed broad support for the predictions. Results have implications for education about cybercrime.     

Response bias in the survey interview; an approach from balance theory

A balance theoretical approach to the phenomenon of response bias in survey research is developed. This approach yields a model of the survey interview, specifying the effects of a great number of interview variables. In this way, different types of investigations concerning the quality of data gathered by means of interviews could be incorporated into a single framework. In addition, it is shown how a mathematical formulation of the theory may be developed, and how predictions from the model may be deduced and verified.     

MONETARY REWARDS AND DECISION COST IN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS

A survey of thirty-one experimental studies which report data on the comparative effects of monetary rewards and opportunity cost shows: (1) several studies in which increased rewards shift the central tendency of the data toward the predictions of rational models; (2) in virtually all cases rewards reduce the variance of the data around the predicted outcome. This is consistent with a model in which rewards are balanced against decision cost in agent behavior and explicates the argument that when rational models fail it can be attributed to low opportunity cost of deviations from the rational prediction.     

Wage Inequality and Performance in Nonprofit and For‐Profit Organizations

This article examines the effects of several forms of wage inequality on service quality and employee effort. We suggest that two popular theories, tournament and fair wage/equity, are not necessarily competing. Each theory accurately describes aspects of employee behavior, but because of sectoral differences in organizational objectives and employee attitudes, tournament theory's predictions are relatively stronger in the for‐profit sector, while fair wage/equity theory's predictions are relatively stronger in the nonprofit sector. Using an employer–employee matched data set of nursing homes linked to a federal regulatory database and a resident survey, we found that ownership moderates the relationship between wage inequality and service quality. Although wage inequality positively affects service quality in the for‐profit sector, the reverse is true among nonprofit organizations. We also found that overall wage inequality in the workplace has a more pronounced influence on employee discretionary effort than does the employee's place in the distribution of wages.     

PERCEIVED IMPACT OF DEFAMATION: AN EXPERIMENT ON THIRD-PERSON EFFECTS

This paper explores the intersection of libel law and communicationtheory that occurs when libel juries assess the effect of adefamatory communication on others. The third-person hypothesissuggests that people often assume others will be more affectedby potentially persuasive communications than they are themselves.An experiment was conducted in which students were exposed toa variety of defamatory newspaper articles. The results confirmedseveral predictions. First, readers estimated that others wouldbe more affected by defamatory messages than the readers themselveswould be. Second, this effect was magnified as the "others"became progressively more distant from these readers. Third,when the defamation was attributed to a negatively biased sourcethe effect was also accentuated: readers themselves discountedthe message, while assuming others would be even more influenced.It is suggested that courtroom assessments of the effects ofdefamatory communications on others may be influenced by suchthird-person perceptions.     

DO EMPLOYERS PAY FOR CONSISTENT PERFORMANCE?: EVIDENCE FROM THE NBA

In a world of uncertainty in which a worker's performance is variable over time and average performance is unknown when hiring, how will employers determine compensation? We develop a monitoring and signaling model where information is symmetric and parties are risk neutral. Monitoring costs increase with inconsistency, lowering pay for inconsistent workers. If discrimination exists, minority workers will be rewarded less than majority workers for improving consistency. Testing these and other predictions using National Basketball Association data, we find that consistent professional basketball players are paid more, but, in contrast to previous studies, there is no evidence of discrimination. (JEL J3, J7)     

Subjective well‐being in the new China: religion,social capital,and social status

We present the first nationally representative evidence on the relationship between religion and subjective well‐being for the case of China. Research on Western societies tends to find a positive association between being religious and level of well‐being. China provides an interesting critical case as the religious population is growing rapidly and the religious and socioeconomic environments are profoundly different from Western societies, implying different mechanisms might be at work. We hypothesize to find a positive association between religion and well‐being in China too, but argue social capital, for which strong evidence is often found in Western societies, is unlikely to be an important mechanism because religion in China is generally non‐congregational. Instead, we argue that the private and subjective dimension of religion matters for well‐being in China by helping adherents have an improved sense of social status relative to the non‐religious in the context of rapid social change and growing inequality. Our results generally support these predictions.     

Consumption benefits and gambling: Evidence from the NCAA basketball betting market

The utility of gambling model posits that consumption benefits lead rational agents to gamble when faced with negative expected financial returns. We analyze the determinants of bet volume and dollars bet on NCAA basketball games from three on-line sports books to test the predictions of this model. Betting action depends on television coverage, team quality, and the expected closeness of the contest. Our results support the notion that consumption benefits, not financial gain, motivate gambling. Preferences of bettors appear similar to those of sports fans, suggesting that models of gamblers as wealth-maximizing investors may not explain observed betting behavior.     

General Job Satisfaction From a Developmental Perspective: Exploring Choice—Job Matches at Two Career Stages

The authors explored predictions of general job satisfaction at early and middle adulthood and uncovered several findings about developmental processes associated with job satisfaction. Tests of life‐span career theory propositions revealed that neither choice‐job congruence nor gender added significantly to predictions of job satisfaction at 2 career stages. Earlier occupational choice and current job added to predictions of midcareer (modal age 43 years) job satisfaction, especially for men. The predictability of job satisfaction is apparently influenced by the career stage when satisfaction is appraised.     

THE ECONOMICS OF EXOGAMOUS MARRIAGE IN SMALL‐SCALE SOCIETIES

Marriage is a core institution in almost every human society, including small‐scale societies based on foraging or subsistence agriculture. A crucial dimension of the marriage systems in such societies involves endogamy and exogamy, that is, the choice of a marriage partner from within one's own community or from an outside community. We develop a model in which the exogamy rate is higher when good local matches are scarce due to small community sizes, and when productivity differs across communities due to environmental shocks. These theoretical predictions are supported by econometric analysis of data from the standard cross‐cultural sample. (JEL D13, J11, N30, Z13)     

A theory of quality-related differences in retail margins: why there is a 'premium' on premium gasoline

This paper develops a theory of vertical and horizontal product differentiation to explain observed price-cost margin differentials for goods that differ in quality. The difference in price-cost margins between the high- and low-quality goods is shown to depend positively on consumers' average valuation for incremental increases in quality and positively on the distance to each competitor's closest rival. These predictions are largely supported using an extensive station-level data set of premium and regular unleaded gasoline prices from the Los Angeles Basin area from 1992–1995.     

Market entry: An experimental investigation

Experimental oligopoly markets for homogeneous products were conducted to investigate cooperative behaviors when subjects were allowed to choose whether or not to enter the market. Two types of games were designed. One was a one-stage game in which subjects were given a payoff table and asked only to make an entry decision; the other was a two-stage game in which subjects had to decide whether or not to enter and then compete either in prices or in quantities. Data indicated a significant tendency to establish entry cycles, with players entering one at a time, in the one-stage “price-setting” markets. On the contrary, this tendency was never observed in the one-stage “quantity-setting” markets. The results in the two-stage game reinforced the difference in the observed behaviors between the price- and quantity-setting markets. In the former, subjects generally behaved in conformity with the Nash equilibrium predictions, whereas in the latter these predictions were not observed.     

Exploring the Unknown: Predicting the Responses of Publics not yet Surveyed

This article argues that cultural change is roughly predictable: to a large extent, it is shaped by a few variables included in a model of cultural modernization that is presented here. The beliefs and values of a society's people are also affected by unique world events and country-specific factors that would not fit into a general model, such as a given society's political parties and leaders, so our predictions will not be precisely accurate. Nevertheless, in this article we will stick our necks out and predict the locations on two major cultural dimensions of all the countries likely to be included in the next wave of the World Values Survey, to be carried out in 2005–2006. Using a simple predictive model based on our revised version of modernization theory, we first ‘predict’ and test the positions that 80 societies should have on a two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation in the most recent wave of surveys (carried out in 1999–2001); we find that our predictions are surprisingly accurate: the average prediction for a given country falls within a small radius of the location that is actually observed on the cross-cultural map (specifically: the average prediction and the actual location fall within a circle that occupies less than two percent of the map's area). We then use this same model to predict the survey responses that we expect to find for 120 countries that are most likely to be surveyed in the next wave of surveys, in 2005–2006. Almost half of these countries have not been included in our previous surveys (and a number have never been covered in any survey of which we are aware). These are genuine blind predictions – which we believe is an important challenge for social scientists. Our predictions will not be exactly correct; in some cases, they will not even be in the right ballpark. But we are confident that in the great majority of cases, they will come much closer to the observed results than would random guesses. We are confident that these a priori predictions will be reasonably close to the results obtained from actual fieldwork, because analysis of data from more than 60 societies surveyed in previous waves of the World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys indicates that cross-cultural differences in basic values have a surprisingly consistent relationship with economic development. The values and beliefs of mass publics vary a great deal cross-nationally, but they tend to vary in a roughly predictable way that can be derived from a revised version of modernization theory.     

ON THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF CASH TRANSFERS AND SUBSIDIES

This paper considers the relative efficiency of cash grants and subsidies when society's goal is to raise the welfare of a household. When the head of the household makes all consumption decisions, a principal-agent problem is created: the head acts as the agent of the government in allocating the transferred resources. Subsidies to commodities with particular characteristics may be a more efficient way to guarantee that benefits are shared within the household. Though related to the old notion of paternalism, this theory leads to more specific predictions regarding the kinds of commodities that can be efficiently subsidized.     

DECEPTION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THEORY AND LABORATORY EVIDENCE

We model two‐candidate elections in which (1) voters are uncertain about candidates' attributes; and (2) candidates can inform voters of their attributes by sending advertisements. We compare between political campaigns with truthful advertising and campaigns in which there is a small chance of deceptive advertising. Our model predicts that voters should vote in‐line with an advertisement's information. We test our model's predictions using laboratory elections. We find, in the presence of even a small probability that an advertisement is deceptive, voters become substantially more likely to elect a “low‐quality” candidate. We discuss implications of this for existing models of voting decisions. (JEL C92, D72, D82)