The Role of Corporations in the 1980 U.S. Congressional Elections*

The issues of whether and how corporate campaign donations affect the operation of American elections have recently become the focus of public and scholarly debate. Using Federal Election Commission campaign finance data, this analysis identifies a link betwren contributions from business PACs and candidate success in the 1980 U.S. congressional elections. Findings also confirm an association between corporate support and legislative voting for candidates re-elected in 1980. Candidates heavily supported by business PACs during the campaign did better at the polls and were more likely to vote conservatively if elected than those not so strongly endorsed by economic interests. Results are discussed in terms of various theories of the state as well as their relevance to potential election finance reforms.     

Union PAC contributions and legislative voting

Are union PACs able to affect legislative voting patterns with campaign contributions? Unlike previous studies addressing this question, this work measures the likelihood of a legislator supporting union (AFL-CIO) issues instead of isolating specific bills for study. Furthermore, the influence of union PAC money in both congressional chambers is examined. The results are mixed: apparently, organized labor has been able to influence labor legislation with campaign money in some election cycles, but in others, they are less effective.     

CONSTITUENT INTEREST VS. LEGISLATOR IDEOLOGY: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY COST

This paper applies the economic model of legislative voting to the automobile industry domestic content vote in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1982. We consider constituent interests for and against the Ml, and compare the predictive powers of alternative indicators of ideological preferences.
We also examine the role of political opportunity cost and find that lame ducks were significantly less likely to vote for the bill than were returnees to Congress. Given the political advantages of voting for the bill, this is consistent with the view that legislators were influenced by the case for freer trade.     

The impact of labor unions on the passage of economic legislation

This paper examines the political power of labor unions. A model of the decision of an interest group to contribute to a political campaign is developed and tested. The empirical evidence indicates that interest groups, and unions in particular, use political contributions in a systematic and coordinated manner. Unions give money to candidates with relatively little seniority (who might otherwise not be elected) and to candidates from districts with about the average number of union members. Such candidates might otherwise not vote as the union would desire. The influence of campaign contributions and of union membership on the voting of congressmen on issues of interest to unions is also investigated. Union membership is sometimes significant and campaign contributions are always significant in explaining voting on minimum wages, wageprice controls, benefits for strikers, and OSHA and CETA appropriations. The indirect economic effects of labor unions — those effects which occur because unions influence legislation — may be as important as the direct effects which occur through collective bargaining.     

Class struggle in campaign finance? Political action committee contributions in the 1984 elections

Pluralist and class-based theories offer alternative hypotheses about the political behavior of organized interests in the United States. Using network methods and data on political action committees' (PAC) contributions to congressional candidates in the 1984 elections, we identify interest groups with politically similar behavior in an attempt to assess these perspectives concerning elites in the United States. The analysis includes corporate, labor, membership association, and nonconnected PACs. Counter to pluralist expectations, we find just two large groups—one primarily business oriented and the other primarily labor/public-interest oriented. Our findings thus support a class-based interpretation of the nature of organized interests. These findings are framed in terms of the meaning of unity and fragmentation.     

DOMESTIC CONTENT LEGISLATION: HOUSE VOTING AND THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATION

House voting on domestic content legislation provides a rare opportunity to examine the political economy of protectionism with respect to a particular issue rather than by using the traditional interindustry approach. The results indicate that a representative's vote in favor of the content legislation and the intensity of the legislator's preferences are positively related to the importance of the auto and steel industries in the representative's district, an increasing unemployment rate, campaign contributions from labor groups, affiliation with Democratic Party, and a liberal ideology. Despite ideology's statistical significance, the results suggest this variable can be disregarded because neither the predictive accuracy nor the explanatory power of the model is improved by its inclusion. The estimates also provide insights concerning the impact of changes in the independent variables upon voting patterns.     

Electoral Context,Issues, and Voting for Women in the 1990s

Abstract

This research hypothesizes that, because of the particular stimulation provided by the focus on candidate sex and gender-related issues in the electoral environment, there was a unique set of demographic and attitudinal variables related to voting for a woman candidate for the House of Representatives in 1992. Because the environments of the elections of 1994 and 1996 were relatively “gender-free,” these variables were not related to voting behavior in these years. The analysis supports the hypothesis that the determinants of support for women congressional candidates are different in 1992 than in subsequent elections. It also suggests that the differing environments of the three elections may be a contributing factor to these differences.     

The impact of legislator attributes on interest-group campaign contributions

Legislators possess political assets that economic interest groups may find valuable in pursuing their goals. This paper examines the effect these legislative assets have on the campaign contributions made by two large and easily identifiable interest groups: corporations and labor unions. Committee assignment, voting record, and electoral security are significant predictors of both corporate and union contributions to House incumbents, while party affiliation and years in office also influence the behavior of union political action committees.     

The paradox of multiple elections

Assume that voters must choose between voting yes (Y) and voting no (N) on three propositions on a referendum. If the winning combination is NYY on the first, second, and third propositions, respectively, the paradox of multiple elections is that NYY can receive the fewest votes of the 2³ = 8 combinations. Several variants of this paradox are illustrated, and necessary and sufficient conditions for its occurrence, related to the “incoherence” of support, are given. The paradox is shown, via an isomorphism, to be a generalization of the well-known paradox of voting. One real-life example of the paradox involving voting on propositions in California, in which not a single voter voted on the winning side of all the propositions, is given. Several empirical examples of variants of the paradox that manifested themselves in federal elections – one of which led to divided government – and legislative votes in the US House of Representatives, are also analyzed. Possible normative implications of the paradox, such as allowing voters to vote directly for combinations using approval voting or the Borda count, are discussed. Received: 31 July 1996 / Accepted: 1 October 1996     

Congressional passage of the Chinese exclusion act of 1882

The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 marked an important turning point in the history of American race relations. According to the Act, the immigration of Chinese to the United States was completely halted. Chinese were thus excluded from the possibility of American citizenship. Previous studies on the Chinese Exclusion Act have found that the act was largely successful in systematically denying Chinese‐Americans their civil rights and for decades excluding them from the shores of the United States. Prior research, however, has tended to focus on the results of the act and has neglected a systematic analysis of the congressional vote on the act. Our study will examine the events leading up to the Chinese Exclusion Act in order to achieve a better understanding of the dynamics of the vote on the Act and conclude with a quantitative analysis of the vote on the bill in the House of Representatives in 1882. Our findings indicate that the House was severely divided on the issue of Chinese exclusion on partisan and regional lines.     

Early Fundraising by Nonincumbent Female Congressional Candidates

Abstract

This study investigates the effects of early contributions by women's PACs to female nonincumbent U.S. House candidates. The results show that women's PACs give early money disproportionately to female Democrats. This advantage provides female Democrats with greater success in raising later funds and in gaining electoral support than nonincumbent female Republicans.     

Alienation,indifference and the choice of ideological position

In this paper we describe a simple model of individual voting behavior and present its implications for the candidate positioning problem under both vote and plurality maximization. Under our assumptions, some voters at the extremes of the ideological spectrum typically will not vote because they are alienated by the equilibrium location of candidates. There will also be some voters in the middle of the ideological spectrum who will not vote because they are indifferent between the equilibrium locations of the candidates. Both the abstention from alienation and from indifference arise explicitly from utility maximization. Once we allow for alienation and indifference, the two alternative candidate objective functions (vote maximization and plurality maximization) yield different outcomes. In particular, we show that under vote maximization the Median Voter (or Minimum Differentiation) outcome will not arise. On the other hand, under plurality maximization, the Median Voter outcome may or may not hold, depending on the distribution of voter preferences.We should like to thank Jerry Fusselman, Jon Hamilton, Mel Hinich, Charlie Holt and participants at seminars at the University of Virginia, Northwestern University and the 1989 Meetings of the Public Choice Society and the Economic Science Association for their helpful comments.     

Unions,corporations, and political campaign contributions: The 1982 house elections

Because legislation affects so many aspects of the labor market, unions have long considered the political arena to be a major battleground. This paper investigates fund raising, a primary ingredient of this political activity. Specifically, the pattern of campaign contributions from labor PACs (and corporate PACs) is explained as an interaction of supply and demand. The results suggest that the demand for funds depends on the tightness of the race, the tenure of the incumbent, and ideology. Contributors are more willing to support ideological allies, expected winners, and powerful candidates.     

STOCK OWNERSHIP AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MUTUAL FUND REVOLUTION

We find that higher stock ownership rates are linked to an upward shift in the Republican share of the House popular vote since the late 1980s, consistent with theories that property interests affect voting. To proxy for discontinuous stock ownership rates, we use equity mutual fund costs, which have fallen, are negatively correlated with stock ownership rates and the Republican vote share in the long run, and help explain short‐run changes along with midterm elections, economic conditions, and presidential popularity. Findings suggest that the major parties’ shares of the House popular vote will fluctuate around 50% until other factors trigger a political realignment. (JEL D72, G11)     

Rocking the Vote: Using Personalized Messages to Motivate Voting among Young Adults

We examined a nationwide effort to encourage young adults to vote in the 1996 U.S. presidential election. During the year before the election, individuals were given the chance to sign and self-address one of two kinds of postcards pledging to vote; these cards were mailed back to the individuals within 2 weeks prior to the election. It is important to note that some individuals completed pledge cards that prompted them to provide their own reason for voting by completing the sentence, "I will vote because ______," whereas other individuals completed pledge cards that did not contain this sentence prompt. We conducted a large-scale survey of individuals who filled out pledge cards and determined that receiving a pledge card with the sentence prompt had a positive influence on voting. Moreover, this effect was found above and beyond demographic and psychological predictors of voting. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

What Drives the Voting on Abortion Policy? Investigating Partisanship and Religion in the State Legislative Arena

Abstract

Much of the public policy debate on abortion now centers in the nation's state capitals. This research assesses the impact of partisanship and religiosity on the voting behavior of state legislators. Recent research indicates that a legislator's religious affiliation and the religiosity of their home districts can be a powerful predictor of votes on abortion bills, but this research uses a unique data set developed to analyze voting in the Florida House of Representatives to re-test those ideas and test several new ones. This work challenges the notion that member religion or district religiosity is more influential than partisanship in predicting votes on abortion. Ordered probit techniques show partisanship, gender and legislator religion (for Catholic and Jewish members only), to be the most significant predictors of abortion voting behavior. A number of district characteristics are found to be less significant. Theoretically, this suggests that legislators fulfill their party obligations as trustee on the floor of the House, more so than following constituent interests in the classic delegate role, as originally noted by Burke.     

Labor and the democratic party: A report on the 1998 elections

The nature of the relationship between organized labor and the Democratic party — still much debated among scholars —can be usefully examined through an analysis of the role of unions in the 1998 congressional elections. Evidence drawn from a wide range of sources shows that the AFL- CIO and its affiliated unions devoted considerable financial and organizational resources to mobilizing union members and allied con-stituencies to vote for Democratic candidates. Combined with the unions' direct finan-cial contributions to campaigns, this activity made unions important players in the elections and helped project an image of potency and effectiveness in the news media and among politicians. As a result, the labor/Democrat alliance remained stronger than one would expect on the basis of union density figures alone.     

Ambivalent citizenship and extraterritorial voting among Colombians in London and Madrid

In this article, we explore the nature of extraterritorial voting among Colombian migrants in the 2010 elections in London and Madrid. To address the neglected issue of why voter turnout from abroad has been so low, we take into account the views of voters and non‐voters alike to show that, while the external vote privileges the professional and well educated, this does not mean that migrants are not interested in politics back home. Drawing on Bauman (1991), we conceptualize ambivalent citizenship as the paradoxical manner in which, through the external vote, states impose hegemonic notions of citizenship from above, which people embrace in an ambivalent manner from below. We show that the workings of the state make voting a difficult process; they create structural ambivalence for migrants who, even if they practise their citizenship in other ways, exercise individual ambivalence because they find it difficult to engage with a political system back home that they do not trust. The conceptualization of ‘ambivalent citizenship’ therefore encompasses the contradictory complexities inherent in the provision of external voting rights that actively privilege and exclude migrants in mutually constitutive ways.     

AN EXPRESSIVE VOTING THEORY OF STRIKES

Union members may vote for a strike even if they do not expect to thereby increase their wages. For under majority voting any one member's vote for a strike is unlikely to be decisive. A union member who obtains a non-infinitesimal emotional benefit from the act of voting for a strike may therefore vote in its favor. This hypothesis can explain the existence of strikes and the conditions which make strikes especially likely.     

Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study

We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences, we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics (under two-round voting) or they just vote sincerely (under single transferable vote).