Asian Americans: growth,change, and diversity

The 1980 US census counted 3.5 million Asian Americans, up from 1.4 million in 1970. Asian Americans made up just 1.5% of the total US population of 226.5 million as of April 1, 1980, but this was the 3rd largest racial or ethnic minority after blacks and Hispanics. Asians increased far more during the 1970s (141%) than blacks (17%) or Hispanics (39%). This Bulletin examines the characteristics of Asian Americans, how their numbers have grown, where they live, how different groups vary in age structure, childbearing, health, and longevity. It reports on the kinds of households Asian Americans form and how they fare with regard to education, occupation, and income. Asian Americans are now often perceived as the model minority. As a whole, they are better educated, occupy higher rungs on the occupational ladder, and earn more than the general US population and even white Americans. This Bulletin presents the 1st comprehensive look at many important facts about Asian Americans and how the groups differ. Special tabulations of data collected in the 1980 census are provided. The 1980 census data are the latest available to give a true picture at the national level of Asian Americans and the various groups among them. The Bulletin examines the current numbers of Asian Americans and how this population is defined. The major Asian American groups are Chinese (21%), Filipinos (20%), Japanese (15%), Vietnamese (21%), Koreans (11%), and Asian Indians (10%). Except for the latest-arrived Vietnamese, the fertility of the 6 groups is lower than the white average. The following areas are also discussed: mortality and health; families and households; education; Asian youth; employment; income and poverty; and future prospects.     

Understanding Global Demographic Convergence since 1950

Is the world converging to a single demographic regime? Or are groups of countries following distinct paths through the process of demographic transition? The answers to these questions are pivotal to our understanding of the nature and mechanisms of population change. They are also key elements for deriving the assumptions that should underlie population projections. There has been considerable interest in global demographic convergence during the last decade, with most work drawing on statistical methods that are widely used in economics. This article takes a different approach to most of the existing literature, examining the fertility and mortality trajectories over time that various appropriately defned world regions have followed. The data suggest that five distinct regional histories can be traced in mortality, and three in fertility, and that global convergence has moved more rapidly and unambiguously in fertility than in mortality.     

Public policy and the total fertility rate: cross-sectional evidence from the LDCs

A framework developed by Easterlin for the analysis of fertility in developing societies is modified and then tested using a sample of 65 less-developed countries. The focus is on assessing the impact of public policy on the national fertility rate. Public policy is reflected in the average levels of education and health in the population and in the condition of the national family planning program. To test for threshold effects with respect to socioeconomic development, the sample is divided on the basis of the infant mortality rate. Fertility rates in those nations characterized by high infant mortality are likely to be determined more by conditions of natural fertility. Those nations with lower infant mortality, and hence greater socioeconomic development, are more likely to exhibit deliberate fertility control. The results of the regression analysis do suggest that different factors influence the national fertility rate depending upon the stage of development. For the least-developed nations, the secondary school enrollment rate, an indicator of the extent of economic mobility, and the ratio of school age children to teachers, a proxy for the national commitment to human capital formation, are important. For the more advanced of the LDCs, adult literacy and the infant mortality rate seem to predominate. For all the developing nations, however, the results confirm the importance of strong family planning programs. The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of the research.     

Russia Faces Depopulation? Dynamics of Population Decline

Between 1992 and 1993 Russia's population declined, as it has in every succeeding year. This has been viewed as a population disaster, related to high adult male mortality and deterioration of the health care system. Some see a substantially depopulated Russia in the future. However, the prospect of long-term population decline is completely due to recent declines in fertility. High adult male mortality, although a cause of great concern, does not contribute to the chance of long-term population decline. Projections of the future population of Russia depend upon the exact fertility assumptions used. Based on the example of fertility in the United States in the Great Depression and the Baby Boom following World War II, the future depopulation of Russia is far from certain.     

The child survival hypothesis

Summary Because of current interest in the child survival hypothesis, we have reviewed available evidence bearing upon the relationships of infant and child mortality to fertility and contraceptive behaviour. The evidence is drawn from time series data for local and national vital events, from special in-depth studies of the infant mortality-fertility relationships in family formation, and from service statistics from health and family planning programmes. As a result of this review, we suggest five clarifications which should be made in redefining the child survival hypothesis and assessing its potential programme implications. The child survival hypothesis states that improved child survival will contribute to increased family planning motivation and consequent fertility decline. The evidence presented here suggests that the effect is not automatic and probably not a necessary pre-condition for fertility decline. There is certainly not a reflexive one-to-one replacement, but a partial effect may still be important. In the clearly demonstrated reduction in inter-pregnancy intervals after a child death, the major component is undoubtedly the removal of the biological protection of lactational amenorrhoea. A separate but somewhat smaller effect has been demonstrated in situations where lactation did not seem to have been the explanation. It is expected that increased child survival will contribute to fertility decline mainly in countries experiencing rapid mortality decline and population growth. The replacement of children who die is probably not so much 'volitional' as a result of alterations in sub-conscious expectations. It is apparent that in traditional agrarian populations, few direct and manipulable means of influencing motivation for fertility limitation are available, and, therefore, it must be stressed that integrated health and family planning programmes do provide opportunities for immediate programme development. By making parents aware of improved changes of survival through health services in which they develop confidence, the spontaneous linkages between mortality and fertility can presumably be reinforced. Family planning services must be provided as an essential initial step in programme development, but they can be made more effective, as well as politically more acceptable if appropriately integrated with maternal and child health and nutrition services.     

Future population growth: researchers in three countries quantify causes and propose policies

This article discusses Population Council analyses conducted by social scientists from India, Kenya, and the Philippines. These scientists agreed that population momentum would continue to increase population size, and that governments must strengthen and create a range of economic, health, and social programs and policies to slow population growth. Multiple approaches will be needed. John Bongaarts is credited with being the first to identify the key role of population momentum and to decompose growth into unwanted fertility, high desired fertility, and population momentum. Unwanted fertility is responsible for about 19% of projected population growth in India, 26% in Kenya, and 16% in the Philippines. High wanted fertility accounts for 20% of future growth in India, 6% in Kenya, and 19% in the Philippines. Population momentum can account for under 50% or over 90% of growth. Unwanted fertility can be addressed by fulfilling unmet need and increasing knowledge of methods, reducing the fear of side effects and disapproval, and eliminating poor service. Family planning programs need to be strengthened and integrated with maternal and child health services. Preferred and actual family sizes can be reduced by lowering infant mortality by means of increasing infant and child health services and girls' educational attainment. Population momentum can be addressed by delaying age at marriage and childbearing through improving social conditions. Investments in human development through education, training, and income generation can create the conditions for slowing population growth. Countries should decompose population growth into its components of unwanted and high wanted fertility and population momentum as a means of distributing resources most effectively.     

Child Mortality and Environment in Developing Countries

This paper studies child mortality and fertility in 61 developing countries including the Central Asian Republics (CARs). To control for simultaneity, an estimated value of fertility was used in the mortality equation and a final specification included only exogenous socio-economic, health and environmental variables. We confirm the importance of female literacy in explaining both fertility and mortality, and also find a measure of consumption for the poorest share of the population to be significant, while controlling for nutrition, health expenditure, and income distribution. Incidence of tuberculosis and female agricultural population proxy for environmental impacts, but in spite of these controls, approximately 41% additional mortality was estimated due to living in the CARs. The results fill gaps in the literature: we use a wider range of socio-economic and environmental health variables than previously in an encompassing analysis of mortality and fertility, and find evidence of excessive mortality in the CARs most likely linked to environmental degradation in the region.

On the age-sex composition of the population that would result from given fertility and mortality conditions

This article presents new formulas for calculating the eventual sex-ratio and the eventual age-sea composition of the population that would result from given fertility and mortality conditions. These formulas provide more accurate methods and are more widely applicable than earlier methods. The application of the formulas is illustrated through the use of available data on fertility and mortality conditions in the United States in 1964.     

The global and regional impact of mortality and fertility transitions, 1950-2000

During the second half of the twentieth century, world population grew at a record pace, both in absolute and relative terms, from 2.5 billion to 6 billion (or 1.75 percent annually). Demographers have long identified rapid mortality declines as the main explanation. This article finds that one-fourth of today's world population is alive because of mortality improvements since mid-century. Very rapid growth is unlikely to continue as substantial fertility declines also occurred in recent decades. This article finds that already by the year 2000, these fertility declines have almost exactly compensated for the impact of mortality declines from mid-century levels. This result may suggest homeostasis, but analyses of underlying trends contradict this impression. First, the impact of fertility declines will soon and significantly exceed that of mortality declines. Second, that mortality and fertility declines jointly affect the size of the world population by less than one percent conceals a significant impact on the population's age composition as well as on regional population sizes.     

The phoenix population: Demographic crisis and rebound in Cambodia

The study of mortality crises provides an unusual and valuable perspective on the relationship between mortality and fertility changes, a relationship that has puzzled demographers for decades. In this article, we combine nationally representative survey and demographic-surveillance system data to study fertility trends around the time of the Khmer Rouge (KR) regime, under which 25% of the Cambodian population died. We present the first quantitative evidence to date that attests to a one-third decline of fertility during this regime, followed by a substantial "baby boom" after the fall of the KR. Further analyses reveal that the fertility rebound was produced not only by a two-year marriage bubble but also by a surge in marital fertility that remained for nearly a decade above its precrisis level. Our results illustrate the potential influence of mortality on fertility, which may be more difficult to identify for more gradual mortality declines. To the extent that until recently, Cambodian fertility appears to fit natural fertility patterns, our findings also reinforce recent qualifications about the meaning of this core paradigm of demographic analysis.     

India's population: second and growing

Attention in this discussion of the population of India is directed to the following: international comparisons, population pressures, trends in population growth (interstate variations), sex ratio and literacy, urban-rural distribution, migration (interstate migration, international migration), fertility and mortality levels, fertility trends (birth rate decline, interstate fertility differentials, rural-urban fertility decline, fertility differentials by education and religion, marriage and fertility), mortality trends (mortality differentials, health care services), population pressures on socioeconomic development (per capita income and poverty, unemployment and employment, increasing foodgrain production, school enrollment shortfalls), the family planning program, implementing population policy statements, what actions would be effective, and goals and prospects for the future. India's population, a total of 684 million persons as of March 1, 1981, is 2nd only to the population of China. The 1981 population was up by 136 million persons, or 24.75%, over the 548 million enumerated in the 1971 census. For 1978, India's birth and death rates were estimated at 33.3 and 14.2/1000 population, down from about 41.1 and 18.9 during the mid-1960s. India's current 5-year plan has set a goal of a birth rate of 30/1000 population by 1985 and "replacement-level" fertility--about 2.3 births per woman--by 1996. The acceleration in India's population growth has come mainly in the past 3 decades and is due primarily to a decline in mortality that has markedly outstripped the fertility decline. The Janata Party which assumed government leadership in March 1977 did not dismantle the family planning program, but emphasis was shifted to promote family planning "without any compulsion, coercion or pressures of any sort." The policy statement stressed that efforts were to be directed towards those currently underserved, mainly in rural areas. Hard targets were rejected. Over the 1978-1981 period the family planning program slowly recovered. By March 1981, 33.4 million sterilizations had been performed since 1956 when statistics were 1st compiled. Another 3 million couples were estimated to be using IUDs and conventional contraceptives.     

Mobile Internet Use and Multidimensional Poverty: Evidence from A Household Survey in Rural China

The impact of specific living conditions on the population of geographically and socially segregated Roma settlements in Eastern Slovakia is considerable. They are characterized by high unemployment, lower education, poor housing and sanitary conditions, a poor quality of life, which all affects significantly their higher mortality rates and worse health status. In this paper we try to approach the problem of adverse mortality conditions and health with a deeper demographic insight. The fundamental goal of the paper is to analyse mortality in the population from Roma settlements over the past two decades using complex demographic methods such as life tables, direct standardization with the objective of eliminating differences in the age structure, single and multi-dimensional decomposition of age, sex and causes of death. We also analyse mortality using the concept of avoidable mortality. The results obtained from Roma settlements confirmed significantly worse mortality rates for both sexes. In addition, it appears that the disparities between them and the majority population are growing over time. The primary reason is the higher mortality of the youngest children and persons at post-reproductive age. Basically, all main chapters of the causes of death shorten the life expectancy of persons from Roma settlements, but cardiovascular diseases have the greatest negative impact. Conclusions obtained from the avoidable mortality analysis point to problems related to the accessibility and quality of health care, as well as the lack of interest of population from Roma settlements in their own health, along with the need for more targeted prevention and screening campaigns in this environment. Although the answers of respondents from Roma settlements to their own health confirm the deteriorating quality of health, increasing morbidity and the degree of restriction of normal daily activities with increasing age, they also point to some problems associated with the use of this approach.

     

Estimation of vital rates by means of monte carlo simulation

Monte Carlo simulation has been used to estimate age-specific fertility and mortality rates for a small population,the French-derived isolate of Northside on St. Thomas, U. S. Virgin Islands. Estimates were based on data collected in a household census and genealogical survey and on birth, death, and marriage records for the years 1916to 1966. During this 50-year period (in which the population size increased from 202 to 657), the numbers of births and deaths were too, small to estimate age-specific rates directly, and in addition, death registration was incomplete. Mortality rates were estimated using a simulation program in which mortality was the only stochastic variable. A model mortality schedule was chosen which most accurately reproduced the growth pattern of the population over the 50-year period. To estimate fertility rates, a more complex simulation model was used in which fertility, nuptiality, and mortality were random variables with probability distributions. Preliminary estimates of fertility were made from the birth records and used as input to this simulation program. Birth probabilities were adjusted empirically from one set of simulation runs to the next, until population growth rates, as well as other demographic characteristics, were similar in the real and simulated populations. The birth rates which produced the best fit to the real population data were taken as the estimated age-specific fertility schedule. To reproduce the real population age structure more closely, secular changes in birth probabilities were applied.     

Below-replacement fertility in Thailand and its policy implications

The fertility transition in Thailand has been one of the most rapid among Asian countries that are yet to attain newly industrialized country status. In the early 1960s, the total fertility rate exceeded six births per woman; currently, it stands at 1.9 or slightly below replacement level. At present, it is hard to predict the future trend in fertility as this involves several factors that need much closer study, in particular, fertility preferences, changes in marriage patterns and the wider effects of the current economic crisis in Thailand. Rapid declines in fertility and mortality have had a profound effect on the age structure of the population, notably the increasing elderly proportion. Thailand now faces new challenges and priorities for population policy. Policy responses to concerns arising from below-replacement fertility will be much more complex and involve greater government activism, improved institutional capacities and more resources than in the past. This paper reviews the fertility transition in Thailand and looks at some consequences and policy implications of low fertility, with special reference to the family and the elderly population. National Statistical Office     

Population dynamics in Germany: the role of immigration and population momentum

The effects of changes in rates of mortality, fertility, and migration depend not only on the age-specific patterns and levels of these rates, but on the age structure of the population. In order to remove the influences of the age structure and concentrate on the effects of the demographic rates themselves, a common practice is to analyze the influences of the rates for a standard age structure. This paper analyzes current and future population changes in Germany, using a stationary population equivalent model (SPE) that shows long-term effects of current fertility, mortality, and international migration patterns. Results indicate that the German population will eventually decline because of below replacement fertility, if net immigration does not counteract this decrease. This means, for instance, that the long-term stationary population levels for Germany will decrease by approximately 6.5 million during a decade in which current fertility, mortality, and international migration levels prevail. The paper also reports how various other assumptions for mortality, fertility, and international migration affect the SPE model for Germany.     

The Effect of Veteran Status on Mortality among Older Americans and its Pathways

This research examines excess mortality among American veterans age 70 years or older during a two-to-three year interval from 1993/94 to the end of 1995. Using a structural hazard rate model, we analyzed data on a sample of respondents age 70 or over from the Survey of Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD). We found that at age 70, older veterans have a slightly higher death rate than their nonveteran counterparts, implying a mortality crossover right before this age. Such excess mortality among veterans increases considerably with age, when other factors are held equal. The direct and indirect effects of veteran status on mortality by means of physical and mental health mostly perform in opposite directions, and such effects vary greatly in magnitude and direction as a function of age. The intervening effects of physical and mental health status decrease substantially with increasing age. Many of the mechanisms inherent in the excess mortality among older veterans are not captured by variations in their health status, especially among the oldest-old. A more extensive study on this topic is urgently needed.     

Kenya's record population growth: a dilemma of development

The causes and implications of Kenya's 4% rate of natural increase and fertility rate of 8.1 births per woman were examined. Attention was directed to the following: pronatalist pressures; inadvertent pronatalist impact of development; women's education and employment and fertility; population growth and pressures; mortality decline and population growth; fertility levels and differentials; fertility desires; the family planning program; and family planning knowledge, attitudes, and practice. Kenya's development success has worked to push up the population growth rate. Improved health care and nutrition halved infant mortality from 160 to 87 deaths/1000 live births between 1958 and 1977 and a marked increase in primary school enrollment may be factors in the birthrate increase to 53/1000 population. At this time fertility is highest among women with 1-4 years of education. The 1977-1978 Kenya Fertility Survey showed that only 5.8% of married women were using modern contraception, indicating that the national family planning program, established in 1967, has made little progress. Program difficulties have included shortages of staff, supplies and easily accessible clinic as well as an almost universal desire on the part of Kenyans for families of at least 7 children. Children are viewed as essential to survival and status to the rural population.     

Crossovers that link populations with the same vital rates

"In this paper, we consider crossovers of demographic density distributions from...populations that have the same fertility and mortality rates. We focus on observed populations and their associated stationary and stable models, and on proportional distributions of persons, births, deaths and reproductive values....Three different populations were selected to represent a range of demographic behavior. Those populations are Japan 1963, a low mortality, low fertility population; Togo 1961, a high mortality, high fertility population; and the United States 1919-1921, a population whose fertility and mortality are intermediate."     

Effects of Childhood Mortality and Morbidity on the Fertility Transition in sub‐Saharan Africa

Child mortality rates have fallen substantially in developing countries since 1960. The expected fertility decline has followed only weakly in sub‐Saharan Africa compared to other recent and historic demographic transitions. Disease and anthropometric data suggest that morbidity remains prevalent in Africa despite child survival improvements. The uniquely high infectious disease burden among children in Africa reduces population health and diminishes the returns to human capital investment, thwarting the quantity–quality tradeoff for children that typically accompanies the mortality transition. Individual‐level data from the Demographic and Health Surveys are used to show that persistent morbidity has weakened the positive relationship between child mortality and total fertility rates throughout the region, slowing Africa's demographic transition.