Contracts,Labor Supply and Income Targeting

In many professions and personal services, a firm offers a contract with either proportional revenue sharing of the worker’s output or a contract with 100% revenue accruing to the worker in exchange for a fixed (debt) payment. Contingent on the contract, the worker chooses the mechanism to achieve the desired level of productivity. A higher revenue split induces the worker to be more productive in output per hour resulting in a higher wage. The relevant price of effort is the after-split, after-tax wage controlled for after-tax household income. Incentives through a higher split raise productivity and the return to effort. The sample is 1,559 U.S. real estate sales professionals paid on contract splits in 2007 and choosing their hours and effort. The compensated labor supply elasticity is positive and between approximately zero and 0.3 suggesting the absence of income targeting for these workers on split and 100% revenue contracts. But the inclusion of contractual income split provisions in the model substantially increases the labor supply elasticity.     

I am getting tired: Effort and fatigue in intertemporal decision-making

Evidence on effort-demanding tasks suggests that exerting effort is fatiguing and that the accumulation of fatigue negatively affects the performance on both simultaneous and sequential tasks. This paper introduces the notion of fatigue by assuming that a worker has a limited amount of renewable resources that are depleted when effort is exerted. As multiple equilibria and thresholds can emerge, the optimal intertemporal allocation of effort depends both on the fatigue accumulated by the worker and on the wage rate chosen by the firm. A principal should take this into account, because choosing a wage rate that equals the marginal product value is, in general, suboptimal. This holds even if the worker is expected to exert constant effort over time.     

Wage inequality and team production: An experimental analysis

Numerous survey studies report that human resource managers curb wage inequality with the intent to avoid detrimental effects on workers’ morale. However, there exists little controlled empirical evidence demonstrating that horizontal social comparisons and wage inequality have adverse effects on worker behavior. In this paper, we present data from a laboratory experiment that studies the impact of wage inequality on participation and effort choices in team production. Overall, we do not find evidence that wage inequality has a significant impact on either participation or effort choices.     

Contracts, Individual Revenue and Performance

In some jobs individual workers have control over revenue, effort and productivity. These jobs include professional firms for law, medicine and consulting. They include personal services in areas from hair styling to taxi driving. The firm offers contracts that allow for a sharing of risks and rewards. These incentives include a split of output between the firm and worker and employee ownership. For U.S. real estate agents, a choice is available between splitting revenue with the firm or retaining 100?% above a fixed prepaid minimum. These are equity and sequential debt contracts. Under the sequential debt contract, effort increases but output per hour declines. Separately, agents increase effort and productivity if offered ownership in the firm, effectively a claim on others?? performance.     

Workers’ participation in wage setting: A gift-exchange experiment

This study analyzes the consequences of workers’ participation in the wage setting process on effort exertion. The experimental design is based on a modified gift-exchange game with firms specifying contract alternatives and workers deciding about the finally implemented alternative. The experimental data reveals that workers with participation rights are more sensitive to differences in wage offers: Low wage offers trigger negative reciprocity which dominates the positive incentive effects from high wage offers. On average, participation in the wage setting process leads to a decline in effort exertion.     

Learning and the Form of Compensation

Using data from the PSID and an empirical setup similar to the one used in Altonji and Pierret (Q J Econ 116(1):313–350, 2001)’s paper on wages and employer learning, we find that the coefficient of a hard-to-observe correlate of productivity—parents’ educational attainment—in a wage regression increases more rapidly with experience in performance pay jobs than in nonperformance pay jobs. This result is driven entirely by bonus pay jobs as opposed to commission/piece rate jobs. In the latter, there is no evidence that the importance of parental education in the wage determination process increases over time. This is consistent with the notion that explicit pay-for-performance compensation schemes are, by design, revealing workers’ productivities and that employers need not infer anything about worker productivity when the payment is ex post as is the case for commissions and piece rates as opposed to having to set pay ex ante.     

ARE WORKERS WILLING TO PAY TO JOIN A BETTER TEAM?

Using data from the Major League Baseball free‐agent market, this study is the first to show that the productivity expected of the team a worker will join produces a significant, negative compensating wage differential. The younger workers in the sample drive this result, trading 25% of their wages to join teams with an expected productivity one standard deviation higher. This investment can be recouped if a reasonable increase in human capital occurs. These results are robust to contract length‐wage simultaneity and indicate that investment in human capital motivates the observed tradeoff, suggesting a new pathway through which human capital accumulation can affect wages. Reliable measures of workers' own past productivity and the productivity expected of a worker's future team provide key advantages to identifying these effects. (JEL J31, J24, M54)     

RECIPROCITY UNDER BRIEF AND LONG-TIME DELAYS

We report the results from three experiments embedded in the same overarching design, which extends the Gift Exchange paradigm for the study of worker–employer relationships. We focus on the effect of the length of the delay, between the time at which workers learn their wage and when they choose an effort level, on the relationship between wage and effort. We compare effort choices made within a few hours with those made several weeks afterward. We find that the strength of the wage-effort relationship decreases over time, and this change appears to be driven by workers who receive low wages. (JEL C91, J33, M52)     

QUIT BEHAVIOR UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION: SEARCHING, MOVING, LEARNING

The paper provides a search ––– theoretic interpretation of a well-known empirical regularity ––– the inverse relationship between quit rates and job tenure. We consider a setting where the employed job searcher has incomplete information about non-wage job attributes at the time acceptance decisions are made; hence jobs will be accepted (or refused) without full knowledge of the value of the offers. The model implies that workers with long tenure will be less likely to quit, holding wage rates constant. We also show that a risk-neutral worker is willing to accept a wage offer that falls below his current "full" wage (in the absence of moving costs).     

Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms

In this paper, we present a cooperative model of a hierarchically structured firm to study wage differences between different levels in such a firm. We consider a class of wage functions that are based on marginal contributions to production. It turns out that the wage of a manager is always at least as high as the wage of its subordinates. On the other hand, the wage of a manager never exceeds the sum of the wages of its direct subordinates. These bounds are sharp in the sense that we can characterize for which production processes they are reached. For the class of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions this implies that the wage differences are maximal for linear production functions, and they are minimal for Cobb–Douglas production functions.     

LABOR MARKET SHARE CONTRACTS WHEN THE FIRM HAS TWO VARIABLE INPUTS

This paper extends Weitzman's analysis of share contracts. Firstly, a second variable input is introduced into a firm's production technology. Some share contracts give the firm an incentive to reduce worker compensation by manipulating the second variable input. This implies that contracts which possess this property cannot support the same long-run equilibrium as would be achieved with a wage contract. Secondly, a positively sloped labor supply curve is introduced. It is shown that while share contracts reduce involuntary unemployment, they may not reduce total unemployment vis-a-vis wage contracts. The paper identifies the factors which determine relative employment variability.     

The economics of the decision to join a union

This article attempts to bring about a synthesis of the theory of human capital and the disparate and largely empirical literature on the impact of unions on an individual worker’s terms and conditions of employment. This is done by modeling the decision of a worker to join a unionized firm or vote for a union in an NLRB election. From this model both the theoretically correct valuation and some empirical estimates of the value of the major wage and nonwage (seniority, discipline and discharge, strikes, dues) impacts of unions are presented. Extensions to risk averse workers, free rider problems, union elections and contract ratification votes are also briefly considered.     

AN INCOME-SATIATION MODEL OF EFFICIENCY WAGES

Efficiency wages are wages that exceed a worker's reservation wage. A standard explanation for such wages is "bonding": high wages increase the cost of being discharged for misbehavior and so help ensure worker honesty. A neglected alternative is "satiation": by decreasing the worker's marginal utility of income, the high wage decreases the benefit from misbehavior. Satiation, unlike bonding, applies even in a one-period model, but it relies on the misbehavior having a monetary benefit and on at least part of the punishment being nonmonetary.     

PAY SECRECY AND EFFORT PROVISION

Pay secrecy is often justified on the ground of concerns about the detrimental consequences of intra‐firm pay comparisons for work morale and performance. Surprisingly, however, there is only limited empirical evidence that the availability of pay comparison information is detrimental for effort provision. In this paper, I study pay comparison effects in a gift‐exchange game laboratory experiment where an employer is matched with two symmetric employees. I compare effort choices made by employees in a “pay secrecy” treatment and in two “public wages” treatments where employees are informed of the wage paid to the co‐worker. In one “public wages” treatment the employer can choose both wages she pays to the employees, while in the other treatment the wage paid to one employee is regulated exogenously. I show that pay disclosure can be detrimental for effort provision if employees are treated unequally. (JEL A13, C92, J31)     

TRANSFERS TO THE POOR AND LONG RUN SAVINGS

This paper examines the sensitivity of long run capital accumulation to income redistribution to the poor. I address this question using a simulation model composed of two classes of life cycle consumers, rich and poor, whose economic lives have fifty-five periods. The poor hue a higher marginal propensity to consume than the rich because they possess a higher rate of time preference and for because they are liquidity constrained. Considering a wide range of parameter values, I find that lump sum, intergenerational redistribution from rich to poor causes minimal reduction in long run life cycle savings.     

Minimum wages and the wessels effect in a monopsony model

The Wessels model suggests that firms respond to increases in the minimum wage rate by decreasing the level of fringe benefits — an action which produces an inefficiency effect that lowers workers’ utility and the supply of labor. Standard models of monopsony, however, argue that wage floors prevent the exercise of market power and increase employment. I show that wage floors, even with fringe benefit curtailment, may increase employment by lowering the marginal expense of labor. Employee utility and employment will rise somewhat but not as much had the firm acted competitively in setting both wages and fringes.     

PIECE‐RATE CONTRACTS FOR OTHER‐REGARDING WORKERS

When workers are paid with piece rates, inequality arises naturally. We consider workers who care about income comparisons and are either status seeking or inequality averse. We identify circumstances under which inequality attitudes lead workers to exert more effort than they would otherwise, and also circumstances under which workers’ inequality attitudes lead firms to set lower piece rates than they would otherwise. The key behavioral assumption for both of these results to hold when workers are identical is behindness aversion, the property that changes in inequality matter more to the worker when he is behind than when he is ahead. (JEL D01, J33, M52)     

EFFICIENCY WAGES AND EQUILIBRIUM WAGES

We present a labor market model that allows as special cases a market paying equilibrium wages, one paying disequilibrium efficiency wages, and a market combining the two. Our analysis indicates that industrial wage differentials are not necessarily evidence of efficiency wages. Such differentials may be explained by differences across industries in labor performance standards or in the accuracy with which worker effort can be measured. We do find, however, that the relationship between wages and dismissals can be used to distinguish a market paying equilibrium wages from one paying efficiency wages.     

Day Labourers' Work Related Injuries: An Assessment of Risks,Choices, and Policies

Literature and theory surrounding the informal economy in international contexts suggest that informal work arrangements may entail assuming various levels of risk, and that the higher the level of risk in an employment arrangement, the higher the premium paid to the worker. This study is designed to assess if a wage compensation for risk exists within the United States' day labour job market ‐ the most visible sector of the United States' informal economy. Using data from the 2005 National Day Labour Survey we find a statistically significant wage premium indicating that a risk‐wage tradeoff within the day labour informal economy exists. Ultimately, we argue that current policy interventions facilitated through day labour centres into the day labour market appear to be effective in mitigating the risks associated with this type of employment.

• Evidence of a risk‐wage premium in the day labour market suggests there is an incentive to assume higher levels of risk in work arrangements which presents significant concerns for worker safety.
• Higher levels of work related risks assumed by day labourers, may be minimized if they receive proper safety training through a formal venue such as a worker centre.
• Worker centres only serve 20 per cent of all day labourers in the United States, suggesting a need for the establishment of additional worker centres in other connected or industry based work sites, to help mitigate potential work related risks and injuries in the day labour market.