CEO Age and Top Executive Pay: A UK Empirical Study

This study examines the implications that CEO age has onexecutive pay regarding data collected in a UK setting. Whereprior research has typically focused on total pay (salary plusbonus), this study offers a more complete conceptual model bysplitting pay into salary, annual bonus, and share options. Indoing so, we found that the relationship between CEO salaries andage are significantly related with this association weakeningover time. Another interesting finding not captured by priorresearch was that the relationship between CEO age and bonusappears to be non-linear in nature. Figures 2 which depicts thisnon-linear function suggest at about age 53, the proportion ofbonus as a percentage of salary begins to decrease at anincreasing rate. As a whole, these findings suggest corporate paycommittees should consider family and the financial circumstancesof the executive when designing remuneration schemes.     

媒体追捧与明星CEO薪酬

本文以2005-2010年媒体评选的明星CEO作为研究样本,实证检验媒体追捧报道的动机及其对明星CEO薪酬的影响.研究发现,一方面,CEO的经营能力并不是决定其能否成为媒体追捧对象的决定因素,相反,获得上市公司的广告收入与迎合公众的认知偏好才是媒体追捧明星CEO的真实原因;另一方面,媒体的追捧报道不但没有提高公司经营业绩与明星CEO薪酬之间的敏感性,反而进一步强化了明星CEO在公司管理结构中无形的权威和影响力,使其获得了丰厚的个人薪酬.本文研究表明,现实中的媒体可能为利益所“收买”,成为公司管理层攫取私利的“鼓噪者”,媒体的追捧报道不仅没有起到树立真正光辉典范的作用,反而弱化和降低了公司治理的有效性,引发了消极的经济后果.本文对媒体追捧报道的动机及其对明星CEO薪酬的影响分析,将有益于全面和客观评价媒体在资本市场中的作用.     

基于BP神经网络的上市公司CEO报酬实证研究

近年来的研究表明,CEO报酬不仅受公司业绩的影响,还受到其他诸多因素的影响,而且,CEO报酬与其决定因素之间往往存在着非线性关系。本文以2003-2005年沪深股市的A股上市公司为样本,采用BP神经网络对CEO总报酬、CEO年薪、CEO持股价值及其决定因素分别进行训练和学习,结果表明:(1)网络训练输出值与实际值的拟合度分别达到91.09%、97.23%和78.44%;(2)网络的预测能力相对于传统的线性回归模型分别提高了92.72%、92.08%和53.89%。因此,本文认为在分析和确定CEO报酬水平时引入神经网络模型是可行的。     

管理决断权、高管薪酬与企业绩效的实证研究

本文从企业层面上研究了管理决断权对高管薪酬的影响及两者与企业绩效之间的权变关系。论文选取2002-2007年深沪两市上市公司作为研究样本,构建了管理决断权的多指标衡量体系,证明管理决断权对高管薪酬和企业绩效具有重要的决定作用,企业绩效好的情况下高管薪酬与管理决断权的联系更为紧密。同样,在高管理决断权情况下高管薪酬与企业绩效的挂钩更加紧密,但同时企业会面临监管难题。     

Company Performance,Corporate Governance,and CEO Compensation in Norway and Sweden

This paper examines the relationshipamong company performance, corporategovernance arrangements, and CEO compensationwithin the Scandinavian countries of Norway andSweden. Our sample consists of 224 tradedcompanies, 120 of which are from Norway and 104from Sweden. The empirical evidence fromboth Norway and Sweden reveals significantpositive relationships among board size andCEO compensation, foreign board membership andCEO compensation, and market capitalization andCEO compensation. A significant negativerelationship is found between CEO ownership andCEO compensation. In addition, no significantrelationship is found between companyperformance and CEO compensation or CEO tenureand CEO compensation, except in the case ofNorwegian firms when a change in market-to-bookperformance measure is used. Despite itslimited geographical scope, the study adds toour general understanding of internationalcorporate governance issues.     

制度环境、CEO权力与企业战略风格

检验CEO权力强度如何影响企业战略风格,以及这种影响在不同的制度环境中是否存在差异.研究发现:CEO权力越大,战略风格越趋向于风险型;反之,CEO权力越小,战略风格越趋向于稳健型.制度环境负向调节CEO权力强度与企业战略风格之间的关系.即在其他条件相同的情况下,相对于地区制度环境约束性较强的公司,CEO权力强度对企业战略风格的影响在地区制度环境约束性较弱的公司中更为显著.进一步检验发现,企业战略风格越趋于风险型,企业绩效波动性越大;而企业战略风格在CEO权力与企业绩效波动性之间发挥中介作用.     

中国上市公司CEO薪酬粘性的特征研究

基于高管薪酬业绩选择性相关的观点,选取2005年至2012年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,运用固定效应面板数据多元回归分析模型和联立方程组模型,通过考察业绩提升和下降两种不同情形下薪酬与企业业绩之间是否存在显著的非对称性关系,对中国上市公司CEO薪酬粘性的存在性进行实证检验,并进一步探究CEO薪酬粘性的结构特征、行业特征和时变趋势。研究结果表明,①中国上市公司CEO薪酬存在典型的薪酬粘性现象,但这种粘性特征只在企业亏损较为严重的情况下显著存在,随着企业业绩的提升,CEO薪酬粘性程度逐渐减轻直至完全消失;②CEO薪酬粘性具有明显的行业差异性和显著的时变趋势,保护性行业上市公司CEO薪酬粘性更强而业绩敏感性更弱,并且这种偏离最优契约的薪酬粘性现象并未随时间演进而得到有效缓解,反而呈日益增强趋势。     

绩效工资强度对员工薪酬满意度影响的实证研究

以14家企业的506份薪酬满意度问卷及其客观薪酬数据为样本,以SPSS13.0软件为工具,采用曲线估计和分层多元回归分析探讨绩效工资强度对员工薪酬满意度的影响,以及职位层次对这一关系的调节作用.研究结果表明,绩效工资强度与薪酬满意度之间呈倒U型关系,职位层次对这一关系具有调节作用.最后,讨论了对企业薪酬管理实践的指导意义以及该领域未来的研究方向.     

The emerging CEO agenda

This article identifies and articulates the major challenges facing CEOs of large multinational firms. Analysis of recent surveys and interviews highlights eight challenges: 1. Developing growth avenues, 2. Raising productivity, 3. Competing for talent, 4. Managing diverse risks, 5. Tightening corporate governance, 6. Incorporating sustainability, 7. Creating new innovation models, and 8. Building out new infrastructures. This large and broad set of issues involves new twists on known challenges and the emergence of new challenges. These challenges are demanding because they require new types of non-business expertise, their rules are not yet clear, and they are interdependent. CEOs need to craft an agenda for dealing individually and collectively with these issues.     

Executive Discretion and Corporate Performance as Determinants of CEO Compensation,Contingent on External Monitoring Activities

In this paper we discuss the potential impactof managerial discretion and firm performanceon CEO compensation, contingent on the extentof monitoring activities. We argue that CEOcompensation may be positively related toexecutive discretion and corporate performancefor firms that have vigilant external monitors. We alternatively contend that CEO compensationmay neither be associated with discretion norperformance for firms with passive externalmonitors. The empirical results are supportiveof our contentions.     

Getting What You Pay For—Strategic Process Improvement Compensation and Profitability Impact

Profit‐maximizing firm owners who incentivize their managers with a bonus for process improvement create an intentional misalignment of their own objective and management attention. From the viewpoint of a single firm, such a local misalignment can never be profitable, but in this study we take a wider strategic perspective by investigating cost‐reducing process improvements of two firms competing in a Cournot market. We find that the use of a process improvement bonus (by firm A) can be profitable, by affecting the competitor's decision making. Informed about the reward structure at firm A, which provides an incentive for process improvement and thereby for increased production at that firm, the manager of the competing firm (B) is inclined to produce less if the owner of firm B only rewards profit. This leads to a higher profit for firm A. However, we also show that firm B's best strategy is to also offer a process improvement bonus, even if that firm is a cost laggard (with higher costs for process improvement), and that this leads to reduced profit for both firms in many situations unless one of them is sufficiently superior in its ability to improve processes. These results are robust for uncertain process improvement outcomes, multidimensional process improvement decisions, and information asymmetry in the owner–manager relationship.     

The Snowballing Penalty Effect: Multiple Disadvantage and Pay

This paper makes the case that the current single‐axis approach to the diagnosis and remedy of pay discrimination is inadequate in the case of multiple disadvantage. While a good deal is known about pay gaps, particularly those affecting women, less is known about those affecting people in other disadvantaged groups and those in more than one such group. This analysis of multiple years of pay data, n = 513,000, from a large UK‐based company shows that people with more than one disadvantaged identity suffer a significantly greater pay penalty than those with a single disadvantage. The data also suggest that penalties associated with multiple disadvantage exponentially increase. In other words, disadvantages seem to interact to the detriment of people at ‘intersections’. The paper considers the implications for policies aimed at reducing pay inequalities. These currently take a single‐axis approach and may be misdirected.     

Increasing productivity in global firms: The CEO challenge

In a highly competitive environment global firms face the challenge of increasing productivity to compete with firms sourcing production in low-wage developing countries. This paper presents a new paradigm of production which provides a solution to the productivity challenge. The new paradigm is both a philosophy of management and a set of methods that draw upon the experiences of firms employing quality management and lean production. This approach has proven to yield substantial gains in quality, productivity, and competitiveness. The methods and the requirements to successfully implement it are discussed. How to transplant these systems to developing countries is also considered. The role of the CEO in successful implementation of the New Productivity Paradigm is discussed in the final section.     

经理人权力、薪酬结构与企业业绩

经理人薪酬合约的安排,既是为了缓解代理问题,其本身也可能受到经理人权力的影响.本文实证检验了经理人权力对薪酬结构的影响,发现经理人权力越大时,越倾向于选择高额的货币化报酬,以替代在职消费.进一步看,本文结合经理人权力这一重要权变变量,探讨不同情况下,经理人薪酬结构安排对企业业绩的影响.结论表明,当经理人权力较大时,在职消费一定程度上能够协调公司的利益和经理人的私人利益相一致,对企业业绩发挥积极作用;但当经理人权力越大、同时货币薪酬对在职消费的替代性越强时,经理人越有可能滥用在职消费,降低企业业绩,导致在职消费激励效率低下的主要原因是其使用用途的不规范.不同于以往研究结论中一概而论地只关注在职消费激励的低效率,本文的研究结论部分支持了经理人权力和薪酬结构的相机治理原则.     

CEO grandiose narcissism and firm performance: The role of organizational identification

This study reconciles the positive and negative sides of CEO grandiose narcissism by examining the role that CEO organizational identification plays in moderating the effect of CEO grandiose narcissism on top management team (TMT) behavioral integration. We first distinguish between grandiose and vulnerable narcissism and we then draw on upper echelons theory and executive personality research to hypothesize and test a model in which CEO grandiose narcissism is positively related to TMT behavioral integration when CEOs are high in organizational identification. The relationship is expected to be negative when CEOs do not identify strongly with their organizations. TMT behavioral integration, in turn, predicts subsequent firm performance. Findings based on multi-source data from a sample of 97 CEOs and their firms supported the hypotheses. These results highlight the complex nature of CEO grandiose narcissism – namely, that the construct has both positive and negative aspects as it relates to top management team dynamics and firm performance and that the relationship is affected by CEOs' identification with their organizations.     

CEO humility,narcissism and firm innovation: A paradox perspective on CEO traits

We examine how two seemingly contradictory yet potentially complementary CEO traits—humility and narcissism—interact to affect firm innovation. We adopt a paradox perspective and propose that individuals can have paradoxical traits and that, in particular, humility and narcissism can coexist harmoniously, especially among the Chinese, whose philosophical tradition embraces paradoxical thinking and behaving. CEOs that are both humble and narcissistic are hypothesized to be more likely to have socialized charisma, to cultivate an innovative culture, and to deliver innovative performance. Two studies using multisource data involving 63 CEOs, 328 top managers, and 645 middle managers in Study 1 and 143 CEOs and 190 top managers in Study 2 support the hypotheses and point to new directions for studying CEO traits and their effects on firm outcomes.     

Self-Solicited Feedback: Effects of Hourly Pay and Individual Monetary Incentive Pay

The frequency of feedback solicitation under hourly pay and individual monetary incentive pay conditions was examined. A between-subjects design was used with 30 college students in the two groups. Participants attended three experimental sessions and entered the cash value of simulated bank checks presented on a computer screen. Performance was higher for individuals who were paid incentives; however, participants who were paid incentives did not self-solicit feedback more than those who were paid hourly. Rather, participants in both groups solicited feedback quite frequently. Additionally, performance was not related to feedback solicitation. These results suggest that the incentives did not make feedback more reinforcing even though the incentives were functional rewards and the feedback was correlated with the amount of pay earned: the better the feedback, the more pay participants earned. The results also support the position that it may be necessary to pair objective feedback with an evaluative component to enhance performance.