The Role of Entrepreneurship in the Context of Career Trajectories: Moving Back into Wage Employment or into Unemployment?

This study investigates patterns of movement from self‐employment to wage employment or to unemployment in Belgium. Non‐parametric techniques and complimentary log–log analyses are used to determine the significance of stable individual traits (e.g. gender) and of time‐dependent characteristics (e.g. family and organizational context, labour market mobility) in moving back to wage employment or to unemployment. Evidence is provided on the possibility of entrepreneurship acting as a ‘steppingstone’ between long‐term unemployment and paid work. Yet, significant relationships also emerge between ex‐ante time spent in unemployment and the possibility of continued unemployment upon self‐employment exit.     

The Role of Profit Sharing in Dual Labour Markets with Flexible Outsourcing

We combine profit sharing for high‐skilled workers and outsourcing of low‐skilled tasks in a partly imperfect dual domestic labour market, which means that only low‐skilled labour is represented by a labour union. In that framework we analyse how the implementation of profit sharing for high‐skilled workers influences the amount of outsourcing and the labour market outcome for low‐skilled worker. By doing this, we use some specific assumptions, e.g. exponentially increasing outsourcing costs or the wage for low‐skilled workers will be determined by a union whereas the wage for high‐skilled workers is given. Assuming that low‐skilled labour and outsourcing are interchangeable we show that profit sharing has a positive effect on the wage for low‐skilled workers and helps to decrease wage dispersion. However, under these circumstances, profit sharing enhances outsourcing. Concerning the employment effects for high‐ and low‐skilled workers, we show that there is an employment reducing effect due to higher wages for low‐skilled work, which can be offset by higher productivity of highly skilled workers, as the domestic labour inputs complement each other.     

Price Effects of the Minimum Wage: A Survey Data Analysis for the German Construction Sector

Utilizing the link between employment and price changes as a result of minimum wages, we use firm‐level data to evaluate the effect of minimum wage introduction in the German construction sector. In East Germany we find significant positive price effects that exclude the possibility of rising employment. Rather, the results indicate the existence of a competitive sector‐specific labour market, and thus declining employment. In contrast, we cannot find any significant price reaction for West Germany. This suggests that the implemented minimum wage in West Germany is too low in comparison to the predominantly paid wages and is hence not binding.     

Impact of the Minimum Wage on Youth Labor Markets

We study the effect of the minimum wage on labor market outcomes for young workers using US county‐level panel data from the first quarter of 2000 to the first quarter of 2009. We go beyond the usual estimates of earnings and employment effects to consider how differences across states in the minimum wage affect worker turnover via separations and accessions and job turnover through new job creation and job losses. We find that a higher minimum wage level is associated with higher earnings, lower employment and reduced worker turnover for those in the 14–18 age group. For workers aged 19–21 and 22–24, we find less consistent evidence of minimum wage effects on earnings and employment. But, even for these age groups, a higher minimum wage is found to reduce accessions, separations and the turnover rate.     

The Effect of Mergers and Acquisitions on Employees: Wealth Transfer,Gain‐Sharing or Pain‐Sharing?

This paper considers whether gains made by shareholders from corporate takeovers are achieved at the expense of employees, as proposed by the ‘wealth transfer’ perspective. It analyses the contribution of employee lay‐offs, along with employment and wage changes, to the takeover premium and abnormal share price movements. The analysis draws on a unique dataset of British takeovers, combining documentary, share price and accounting data. The results show that lay‐offs planned at the takeover have either no effect or adverse effects on shareholder returns. Wages growth is positively, not inversely, related to shareholder returns from the second year after the takeover, whilst positive employment changes have a similar effect in the following year. Closer scrutiny indicates that labour and shareholders share gains when the firm does well, but share pain when it does not. There is evidence, therefore, that labour and shareholder interests can be complementary, rather than antagonistic, after takeovers.     

SEARCH INTENSITY,DIRECTED SEARCH,AND THE WAGE DISTRIBUTION

We propose a search equilibrium model in which homogeneous firms post wages along with a vacancy to attract job seekers while homogeneous unemployed workers invest in costly job seeking. The key innovation relies on the organization of the search market and the search behavior of the job seekers. The search market is continuously segmented by wage level, individuals can spread their search investment over the different submarkets, and search intensity has marginal decreasing returns in each submarket. We demonstrate the existence of a nondegenerate equilibrium wage distribution. The density of this wage distribution is increasing at low wages and decreasing at high wages. The distribution can be right‐tailed, and, under additional restrictions, is hump‐shaped. Our results are illustrated by an example generating a Beta wage distribution.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FLEXICURITY

We document the presence of a trade‐off in the labor market between the protection of jobs and the support offered to unemployed people. Different countries’ locations along this trade‐off represent stable political‐economic equilibria. We develop a model in which individuals determine the mix of job protection and support for the unemployed in a political environment. Agents are heterogeneous along two dimensions: employment status (insiders and outsiders) and skills (low and high). Unlike previous work on the political economy of labor market institutions, we emphasize the role of job protection and unemployment benefits in the wage‐setting process. A key implication of the model is that flexicurity configurations with low levels of job protection and high levels of support to the unemployed should emerge in the presence of a highly educated workforce. Panel regressions of countries’ locations along this institutional trade‐off are consistent with the implications of our model.     

Exploring Job Satisfaction in Private and Public Employment: Empirical Evidence from Greece

Abstract. This paper analyses subjective job satisfaction (JS) responses by employees in the public and private sectors of the Greek labour market. Panel data covering the period 1995–2001 and a random effects ordered probit model are used for estimation purposes. The results of the econometric estimation show that a substantial JS differential exists between the two sectors, in every JS domain and always in favour of public employment. A typical ordered decomposition analysis indicates that about one‐third of the difference in expected JS can be explained by differences in employee characteristics and two‐thirds by unobserved sector‐specific inbuilt features. The comparison of wage reductions, which a representative employee will be prepared to endure in order to avoid employment in the private sector, reveals that the regularity of working schedules is appreciated more than any other facet of JS. The obtained results enhance the existing apparatus for evaluating government policies in the labour market.     

DO FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AFFECT FIRMS’ DEMAND FOR DISABLED WORKERS?

A number of OECD countries aim to encourage work integration of disabled persons using quota policies. For instance, Austrian firms must provide at least one job to a disabled worker per 25 nondisabled workers and are subject to a tax if they do not. This “threshold design” provides causal estimates of the noncompliance tax on disabled employment if firms do not manipulate nondisabled employment; a lower and upper bound on the causal effect can be constructed if they do. Results indicate that firms with 25 nondisabled workers employ about 0.04 (or 12%) more disabled workers than without the tax; firms do manipulate employment of nondisabled workers but the lower bound on the employment effect of the quota remains positive; employment effects are stronger in low‐wage firms than in high‐wage firms; and firms subject to the quota of two disabled workers or more hire 0.08 more disabled workers per additional quota job. Moreover, increasing the noncompliance tax increases excess disabled employment, whereas paying a bonus to overcomplying firms slightly dampens the employment effects of the tax.     

Early Labour Market Returns to College Subject

Abstract. We estimate early labour market outcomes of Italian university graduates across college subjects. We devote great attention to endogenous selection issues using alternative methods to control for potential self‐selection associated with the choice of the degree subject in order to unravel the causal link between college major and subsequent outcomes in the labour market. Our results suggest that ‘quantitative’ fields (i.e. Sciences, Engineering, and Economics) increase not only the speed of transition into the first job and employment probability but also early earnings, conditional on employment.     

The Threat Effect of Mandatory Programmes in Finland

This study focuses on the threat effect of the activation reform of the Finnish labour market support system in 2006. Mandatory programme participation may provide the incentive for some individuals to look for work in order to avoid the training programmes. The study examines whether the reform encouraged individuals in the target group to look for employment. According to the results, mandatory programme participation has no effect on the probability of finding a job or of leaving labour market support for some other reason. Conversely, long‐term recipients' participation in the labour market programmes has increased, owing to the activation reform.     

Labour Flows as Determinants of the Wage–Price Spiral: An Empirical Analysis for The Netherlands

This study presents an empirical analysis of the influence of labour market flows on wage and price formation. A system of wage, price and employment equations after Nickell (Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 49: 103–128, 1987) is estimated, including labour flows as indicators of labour market tightness in the wage equation. An impulse response analysis using this system shows how changes in the flow of layoffs (flow from employment to unemployment) may be the basis of short‐run Phillips curve effects in The Netherlands     

New Firms as Employers: The Wage Penalty for Voluntary and Involuntary Job Switchers

According to previous research, new firms pay lower wages. However, previous studies have been unable to control for the possibility that the opportunity costs of accepting employment at new firms may differ across individuals. In this paper, we investigate whether a wage penalty for being employed at a new firm exists if we take the individual employee's experience and status in the labour market into consideration. We focus on individuals who decide to switch jobs and use matched employee–employer data about all firms and employees in Sweden for the period 1998–2010. Our results show that the share of job transitions into lower wages are higher for those who switch to new firms compared with incumbent firms (40 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively). Our endogenous wage equation estimates indicate that being an involuntary job switcher has an equally negative effect on wages at both new and incumbent firms. However, the positive effect of education on wages is more pronounced for job switchers selecting into incumbent firms.     

ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH AND MORAL HAZARD

We analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on‐the‐job search. In our model, agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation. At the same time workers do on‐the‐job search. Deferred compensation improves workers' incentives to exert effort but distorts their on‐the‐job search decisions. We show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker–firm pair of on‐the‐job search is high. Moreover, the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback effects. If firms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation, fewer firms with vacancies enter the on‐the‐job search market, and this in turn reduces the distortions created by deferred compensation. These feedback effects between the incentive contracts used and the activity level in the search markets can lead to multiple equilibria: a low‐turnover equilibrium where firms use deferred compensation, and a high‐turnover equilibrium where they do not. Furthermore, the model predicts that firms are more likely to use deferred compensation when search frictions are high and when the gains from on‐the‐job search are small.     

Employment Policy,the Crowding‐out Effect and Imperfect Competition

This paper presents a macroeconomic model with imperfect competition in the commodity market, and uses it to address how the commodity market’s structure is related to the efficacy of government employment policies. It is found that job creation in the public sector may lead to a decrease in output and an increase in prices. In particular, these adverse side‐effects will be alleviated when competition in the goods market is less perfect. We also find that public‐sector job creation definitely has a positive effect on total employment, though it may crowd out private‐sector employment.     

Market Volatility and the Structure of US Earnings

This paper studies the relationship between volatility of industry‐specific shipments and real earnings. In an efficiency wage theoretical framework I show that wage premiums for the risk of unemployment depend on the value of the worker’s outside offer net of his/her mobility costs. Empirically it is shown that wage premiums for the risk of unemployment markedly vary in a cross section of workers. The main finding is that market volatility changes the return to skill such as labor market experience and education. Its impact markedly varies across occupation groups, with managers receiving returns to labour market experience that significantly increase with product market volatility.     

Job Tenure,Labour Mobility and Wage Profiles

Abstract. The features and the length of the attachment of workers to firms represent a central aspect of the labour relationship. The length of service is an important determinant of wages and of non-pecuniary benefits; it affects internal mobility in the firm, and insulates workers with long job tenure from unemployment. In this paper it is argued that the traditional “spot” labour market Characterization is difficult to reconcile with the existence of long term employment relationships. A number of alternative theories which predict the existence of an employer-worker attachment proposed, and their implications discussed. The relevance of long term employment relationships is then tested using micro-data for the Italian manufacturing industry. An appropriate methodology for the analysis of the duration of employment is developed. and separate “job tenure” equations for white and blue collar workers are estimated. A higher educational attainment - ceteris paribus- appears to increase the probability of a job separation; conversely, a higher working experience, previous to the current job, tends to reduce it. The effect of firm size is negative, as larger organizations seem to favour longer employment spells. Outside opportunities show a strong positive effect on the probability of separation. Finally, conditional on the current wage, the probability of leaving the job increases with the length of time worked. However, when the unconditional outcome is considered, separation decline with tenure; in this case. it is argued, the wage effect more than outweighs the conditional effect. This result is consistent with the predictions of both “specific” human capital and job matching theories.     

The Motherhood Wage Penalty and Its Determinants: A Public–Private Comparison

We investigate whether public and private sector employees bear a different wage penalty for having children. According to our estimates, the total motherhood wage penalty is much larger in the private than in the public sector. Nevertheless, in both sectors, we find no unexplained penalty once we control for potential determinants of the family pay gap, namely, a reduced labour supply of mothers, child‐related career interruptions, less access to management positions, and adjustments in working conditions. Finally, only child‐related career interruptions play a different role in explaining the motherhood wage penalty in each sector.     

Collective Wage Agreements and Firms’ Employment Policies

This paper provides evidence on the way collective wage agreements affect the adjustment of employment, working hours and other production factors when service‐sector firms are faced with demand shocks. The estimation results indicate that collective wage agreements significantly influence firms’ employment policies. It is shown that recruitment is a widespread instrument for service firms to cope with demand fluctuations which are negatively affected by collective wage agreements. The employment of freelance workers is also negatively affected by collective wage agreements, while their effect on using short‐term employment contracts as a reaction to demand shocks is positive.     

Risk Aversion,Collective Bargaining,and Wages in Germany

We develop an open‐shop model of trade union membership in which workers differ in their risk attitudes, and derive conditions under which the bargained wage will fall and union membership will increase with a general rise in risk aversion. Using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel we define broad bargaining units and show that wages decline as average risk aversion of union members in these units rises, controlling for individual effects of risk aversion. Given a negative relationship between wages and employment, this suggests that secular changes in risk attitudes, because of an aging workforce or greater female labour force participation, can help to explain variations in the employment performance of unionized economies.