Unions in the 2000 election: A strategic-choice perspective

In the 2000 elections, organized labor mounted a“massive“ political effort. The AFL-CIO spearheaded a program that emphasized both grassroots and“checkbook” politics. Labor 2000, however, represented much more than an attempt to influence elections. Political action, dedicated to a“Working Families Agenda“ became a strategy of choice to elect candidates, influence lawmakers, mobilize union members, and recruit workers into the labor movement. In this paper, I examine Labor 2000 from a strategic-choice perspective. Specifically, I look at the scope and variety of labor's political effort; how labor allocated its political resources; the degree of competition it faced; and the election outcomes. In addition, I examine the effort in terms of its potential for transforming unions. Data from a variety of sources, some of which have not been previously used, are examined to put Labor 2000 into perspective as a strategy. The results indicate that labor did have some success in mobilizing union members politically. However, labor's impact proved insufficient to achieve immediate national election goals. Questions remain about the wisdom of political action as a strategy of choice, especially in terms of its viability as an instrument for institutional revival.     

Congressional support for unions’ positions across diverse legislation

Organized labor has become increasingly active in national politics. This development has encouraged research into union political activities, particularly in the area of legislative politics. But little research has been published on the basis of congressional support for union positions on diverse public policy items. This paper has examined the correlates of congressional support for unions’ positions across 33 roll-call votes taken in the first session of the 98th Congress. Empirical analyses suggest that certain factors, such as legislators’ party affiliation and constituents’ ideology, are consistent correlates of such support across diverse legislation. The authors wish to thank John Delaney and Jack Fiorito for their generous comments on a previous version of the paper. They also wish to thank the union lobbyists who granted interviews. A Faculty Research Grant from the Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh, provided partial support.     

An Analysis of Labor Union Participation in U.S. Congressional Hearings

Using both a new data set of labor union appearances in congressional hearings and archival data on union organizational resources, this article analyzes factors that determine whether a labor union will be represented in congressional hearing testimony in a given year. Consistent with the expectations of resource mobilization theory, organizational resources are important predictors of participation in congressional hearings. For example, membership is an important predictor of testimony in hearings, as is the number of lobbyists on staff and the character of a union's primary industry. However, membership in the AFL‐CIO federation is negatively related to hearing participation, and some of the benefits of having a large membership base may be diminishing over time. Implications for the study of interest group politics and organizational political strategies are discussed.     

Outsourcing and union power

The outsourcing of union work and jobs either diffuses or diminishes union membership, depending on perspective and situation. The correlation of trends in union membership to trends in union power, while less than perfect, has until recently been relatively strong over the past sixteen years. The fact that as diverse a sample of unions as AFSCME, SEIU, and UAW have chosen to make outsourcing a prominent labor/public relations issue suggests that the correlation continues to be perceived by the union movement to be significant, notwithstanding the efforts of the “new” leadership of the AFL-CIO to break that link with respect to union political power by “taxing” member unions and their members to contribute both money and militancy to the 1996 election cycle. Although outsourcing may lead only to the diffusion of union membership either within or between unions, as opposed to the diminution of union membership, this fact has not received a great deal of attention. The net effect on total union membership of outsourcing from one union employer to another union employer is unclear, although the effect on the membership of the union at the outsourcing employer is not. The redistribution of membership within a union as a result of outsourcing is likely to have little immediate impact on union power. However, as even the best case scenario presented above suggests, it may have significant long-run deleterious effects on union bargaining power by taking labor out of a sheltered market and putting it into potentially competitive market. This is particularly likely to be the case when outsourcing (1) places the outsourced work into a different industry or wage contour and (2) creates the possibility of moving from sole-source to multiplesource supplier arrangements. The redistribution of membership between unions as a result of outsourcing is unlikely to have a major impact on union power broadly defined. It can have, however, serious deleterious effects in terms of the power of an individual union, as suggested in my “competitive case” scenario. The fact that one union’s losses due to outsourcing may be another union’s gain is of little consolation to the losing union. That act, in and of itself, may make the threat of outsourcing a potential union “Achilles heel” at the bargaining table by placing it into competition with some other, perhaps unknown, union as well as possibly nonunion competition. The most obvious threat to union power comes from outsourcing that diminishes union membership overall by transferring jobs from union to nonunion employers. The willingness and ability of employers to move work/jobs entirely out of the orbit of union control constitutes, in terms of power and particularly union bargaining power, a revisitation of the phenomenon of the “runaway shop.” It may also be viewed as a proactive form of hiring permanent replacements for (potentially) striking workers. The union options in dealing with such a challenge are to endeavor to preclude outsourcing through legislation or collective bargaining or to chase the work by organizing the unorganized, hopefully with the help of the unionized outsourcing employer. Neither option may be easy, but as the 1996 auto industry negotiations suggest, the former may be less difficult than the latter. The possibility that outsourcing from union to nonunion employer may provide unions with the power to organize from the top (outsourcer) down (outsourcee) cannot be entirely ignored as the issue of supplier “neutrality” reportedly was raised in the 1996 auto negotiations. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union political and financial power, by virtue of its impact on the level or distribution of union membership, can and may well be offset by an increase in union activism—as measured by dues levels, merger activity, organizing commitment, and political action. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union bargaining power are more problematical from the union standpoint. The effect of outsourcing, whatever its rationale or scenario, appears to be to put union labor back into competition. Thus, outsourcing constitutes yet another challenge to the labor movement in its ongoing and seemingly increasingly unsuccessful battle to take and keep U.S. union labor out of competition by proving itself able and willing to organize to the extent of the market and standardizing wages in that market.     

Union membership,economic rents,and migration behavior

This study represents an extension of the human capital paradigm as it relates to an individual’s decision to migrate. It differs from previous studies by incorporating union membership, a labor market variable, into the model. In effect, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 granted a monopoly bargaining position to unions. The theoretical implication of a union’s monopoly bargaining position is that union wage levels will increase relative to nonunion wages. The increase of relative wages results in union membership granting a property right that possesses positive net present value and hence reduces an employed union member’s probability of migrating. Additionally, the supra-competitive remuneration of union members results in a surplus of labor supplied to union firms. Employers respond by using quality screening to hire workers from the larger labor pool. As a result, unemployed union members will on average possess higher levels of human capital, which will increase their probability of migrating above that of their unemployed nonunion cohorts.     

The community as a source of union power

In recent years, the labor movement has expressed interest in using the community as a source of union power in dealing with employers. This paper explores labor’s historical relationship with the community, examines the emphasis on more effective uses of the community in core union activities, identifies the communities with which labor aligns itself in coalitions, and discusses the strategies employed to form alliances with community groups. Finally, an analysis of some of the key barriers and limitations that affect prospects of the formation and effectiveness of union-community coalitions is presented. The author acknowledges and is grateful for the research assistance of Trudy Labovitz and Ellen Hufnagel. Also, appreciation is expressed to the following persons for valuable comments on an earlier draft: Roger Ahlbrandt, Jr., Robert Atkin, Paul Clark, Donald McPherson, Robert Perloff, Vida Scarpello, and Gerald Schoenfeld.     

The effect of collective bargaining on production technique: A theoretical analysis

A general equilibrium approach is used to model the union effect on capitalintensity of the union and nonunion sectors. Unlike earlier general equilibrium approaches, union power is assumed to be affected by the production technique chosen. The labor relations literature argues that union power is enhanced by a high capital to labor ratio. This assumption is built into a simple two sector (union and nonunion), general equilibrium model. It is found that failing to account for the effects of capital intensity on union power results in an understatement of unions’ ability to redistribute income from capital to labor. The author thanks Jan Brueckner and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Member participation in union activities: Perceptions of union priorities,performance, and satisfaction

Data obtained from union respondents of a survey using a national probability sample that is representative of the U.S. labor force revealed that members’ perceptions of their unions’ effectiveness in obtaining both extrinsic and intrinsic benefits and the unions’ responsiveness to membership were significantly related to member participation in union activities. Union satisfaction was inversely related to participation. Perceptions of union power and service and demographic variables, such as age and education, were found to have less significant linkages with member participation.     

Déjà vu for airline industrial relations

Fifteen years after deregulation, labor relations in the airline industry returned to thestatus quo ante, as union power, particularly ALPA’s, still dominates. Without a long-term shift in bargaining power between the parties, costs and productivity have not changed much. Labor accounts for 60 percent of the cost difference between strong and low-cost carriers. American, Delta, United, Northwest, and USAir would require some combination of labor cost concessions or productivity increases of $1.6 billion to match the productivity-adjusted labor costs for low-cost carriers’ flight crews. To remain competitive, strong carriers and unions must develop strategies to deal with anachronistic work rules, provisions to contract out work, and premium pay for airline employees.     

Twilight for organized labor

Conclusion The Old Unionism, organized labor in the private economy, is in irreversible decline. Economic and market factors beyond its control are principally responsible. The absence of effective leadership and its emphasis on political, instead of trade union, goals do not help. The substitution has diverted much of organized labor’s large financial resources to advancing a political agenda which has brought no material gains in membership and market share, but stigmatizes the union movement as a “special interest” group and as the Luddites of the new century: “American labor organizations ... are shaped much more basically by events of the past century than by forces of the past fifteen years” (Dunlop, 1978, p. 79). I am indebted to Ka-Neng Au, librarian at the Dana Library of Rutgers University, Newark, for his accurate and timely assistance with research information and citations of various references.     

Immigration and the Transformation of American Unionism

Does immigration hamper union organizing in the United States? The prevailing literature strongly suggests that it does and for two reasons: first, immigrants increase the labor pool and diminish union influence over the labor market. And second, immigrants may be harder to organize than native workers. In this dominant view, unions are well served to restrict immigration and have always done so. But how, then, to explain the fact that American labor has long been deeply divided over the response to immigration? Drawing on new archival research and interviews, this paper uncovers a neglected side of American labor history in which many union leaders have extended solidarity to immigrants and sought to organize them. Moreover, analysis of time series data on immigration and union density corroborates the implicit theory of this alternate account of labor history: immigration has, in fact, no statistically significant effect – either positive or negative – on union density over time. Depending on specific conditions and strategies, unions can and have been successful in organizing during periods of high immigration.     

Member support for union mergers: An analysis of an affiliation referendum

A changing labor relations climate has caused many national unions to merge with smaller independent unions in recent years. One aspect of the merger process concerns the willingness of independent union members to support affiliation with a national union (Chaison, 1986). This article examines the determinants of indivudual-level voting behavior using data gathered from members of an independent union who rejected a proposed affiliation with a national union in a membership referendum. Logistic regression results indicate that affiliation supporters perceived the affiliation as improving union effectiveness, were influenced by social support among co-workers in favor of the merger, and perceived the saliency of the independent union’s support for the affiliation proposal. Conversely, affiliation opposition was influenced by the employer’s “vote no” campaign and by perceptions that affiliation would lead to an increased probability of strikes and to future increases in dues.     

Union decertification election outcomes: Bargaining unit characteristics and union resources

Previous analysis using aggregate data has concluded that union decertification activity is “exclusively a product of market conditions.” We employ data disaggregated by local (county) labor market which permits a preliminary investigation of the importance of potential nonmarket influences that are not measurable using aggregate data, namely, the type of bargaining unit, the type of union, the type of employer, and proxies for union resources. It also allows a more precise specification of the labor market characteristics previously found to influence decertification. Our results confirm the importance of market conditions in decertification activity and outcomes, but they also suggest that the likelihood of decertification is much greater in independent unions and in industry-county combinations in which the typical employee works part-time and has limited alternative income opportunities. Institutional characteristics of the union and employer, individual characteristics of bargaining unit members, and local economic conditions are important determinants of decertification.     

The impact of labor unions on the passage of economic legislation

This paper examines the political power of labor unions. A model of the decision of an interest group to contribute to a political campaign is developed and tested. The empirical evidence indicates that interest groups, and unions in particular, use political contributions in a systematic and coordinated manner. Unions give money to candidates with relatively little seniority (who might otherwise not be elected) and to candidates from districts with about the average number of union members. Such candidates might otherwise not vote as the union would desire. The influence of campaign contributions and of union membership on the voting of congressmen on issues of interest to unions is also investigated. Union membership is sometimes significant and campaign contributions are always significant in explaining voting on minimum wages, wageprice controls, benefits for strikers, and OSHA and CETA appropriations. The indirect economic effects of labor unions — those effects which occur because unions influence legislation — may be as important as the direct effects which occur through collective bargaining.     

Labor and the democratic party: A report on the 1998 elections

The nature of the relationship between organized labor and the Democratic party — still much debated among scholars —can be usefully examined through an analysis of the role of unions in the 1998 congressional elections. Evidence drawn from a wide range of sources shows that the AFL- CIO and its affiliated unions devoted considerable financial and organizational resources to mobilizing union members and allied con-stituencies to vote for Democratic candidates. Combined with the unions' direct finan-cial contributions to campaigns, this activity made unions important players in the elections and helped project an image of potency and effectiveness in the news media and among politicians. As a result, the labor/Democrat alliance remained stronger than one would expect on the basis of union density figures alone.     

Union activity and the decline in American trade union membership

This paper extends recent research on the determinants of the decline in union membership in the United States. Using biennial state-level data for a set of years between 1958 and 1982, my model tests “union organizing,” “structural,” “management opposition,” and “public policy” hypotheses concerning union membership and suggests improved specifications of each of these hypotheses. The paper also examines the relative importance of each factor in explaining the decline in unionization. The results support each of the hypotheses and confirm previous findings that changes in the structure of the labor force are most important in explaining union membership decline.     

Exclusive representation in public employment: A public choice perspective

Public sector unionization has grown rapidly in recent years, and research has suggested that among the reasons for such growth is legislation granting special privileges to public employee unions. This paper examines one form of legislative privilege, exclusive representation, from a public choice perspective. It is shown that exclusivity reduces employees’ freedom of choice, increases the welfare of union leaders at the expense of union members, limits employment opportunities to “outsiders,” entrenches the monopoly provision of public services, and generates conflict and instability in labor relations.     

Unions,politics, and protectionism

Conventional models of labor relations emphasize “business unionism,” that is, collective bargaining activities and outcomes. We argue that a more realistic model of behavior incorporates the union’s role as an agent of redistribution that seeks to benefit some members and union leaders primarily at the expense of other members, nonunion employees, and consumers. Union power to redistribute wealth is obtained from the special privileges that labor organizations obtain from government. This paper demonstrates how, as political entities, unions and their employers attempt to secure government-sanctioned wealth transfers through protectionism. The authors gratefully acknowledge research support provided by the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the Earhart Foundation.     

The state of the unions: United States and Canada

This study demonstrates that the Canadian labor movement has outperformed its American counterpart in terms of union growth, union density, and certification outcomes. Labor and product market factors do not appear to be major contributing factors. Public policy and increased employer resistance have played a critical role, particularly in the decline of unionization in the United States. Union-related variables — militancy, structure, and the desire and ability to organize — are also important in explaining the divergent union trends in the two countries.