Making agreements with oneself: Prelude to social behavior

Self-promises, implicitly-articulated self-agreements, and self-bargains seem to be widespread and important sociopsychological phenomena that have been little studied. As aspects of a problem-solving orientation, possibly inherent in social conduct, they may be significant as a way in which social control operates internally. The purposes, commitments, disclosures and rewards of self-agreements are viewed as mechanisms used to deal with the problematical. Individuals' testimony indicates that awareness of processes involved in articulating self-agreements vary from little to highly active internal negotiating. Findings from an open-ended questionnaire given to 313 respondents are discussed.     

The estimated cost of project labor agreements on federal construction

I estimate the cost of President Clinton’s June 1997 executive memorandum encouraging federal departments and agencies to use project labor agreements (PLAs) on “large and significant” construction projects. Based on the higher wage costs associated with PLAs, the cost of federally owned construction will rise by 1.7 to 7.0 percent annually. Over the three years for which the memorandum will apply, federally owned construction costs will increase by $844 million to $3.44 billion. If the memorandum is interpreted to apply to state and local construction projects funded with federal money, the cost could range between $3.2 and $13.0 billion. The author thanks Ken Deavers, Anita Hattiangadi, Edward Potter, and Gary Shiu for their suggestions and help in the preparation of this paper.     

Project agreements and government procurement

I discuss the recent proliferation of mandatory project labor agreements in government procurement, some of the ensuing litigation, and the effects of such agreements on contractors, workers, and the public.     

The case against union-only project labor agreements on government construction projects

Imposition of union-only PLAs in the public sector cannot be shown to serve the public interest. The government should not enter into the realm of labor management relations by arbitrarily creating a protected enclave for union work at the expense of taxpayers and to the detriment of fair and open competition. Government agencies that impose union-only PLAs in response to short-term political pressure from labor organizations will suffer long term consequences, in the form of litigation, increased costs of construction, and adverse taxpayer reaction. Mr. Baskin is a partner with the Washington, DC. law firm of Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti, LLP. He focuses on all aspects of labor and employment law representing management and serves as General Counsel of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc.     

Uncertainty and front-end loading of labor agreements

Uncertainty of future prices is offered as an explanation for front-end loading of real wages in nominal wage contracts. Exploitation of mutually beneficial gains from trade between risk-neutral employers and employees implies an expected future real wage that is lower the greater is the uncertainty of future prices, and the observed extent of front-end loading is consistent with plausible values of uncertainty of future prices. I would like to thank, without implicating, M. L. Burstein, George Fallis, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

The coevolution of trade agreements and investment treaties: Some evidence from network analysis

Regional trade agreements (RTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are expected to promote trade and investment relationships. One critical feature of such agreements is the network, so the multiplex coevolution of RTAs and BITs should be captured by the dynamics of their two networks. Although many studies have examined the roles of RTAs and BITs, most studies do not account for crucial network properties. This study explores how RTAs and BITs coevolve by applying a stochastic actor-oriented model of multiplex network evolution. In particular, we examine the roles of (i) cross-network dyadic interinfluences and (ii) within- and cross-network preferential attachments to discuss the dynamic relationships between RTAs and BITs. The results are as follows. First, our estimation supports cross-network dyadic interinfluences. Countries that sign a BIT are willing to establish an RTA, while those that sign an RTA are reluctant to establish a BIT. Second, concerning preferential attachments, countries prefer to sign BITs with partners that have more RTA and BIT links. However, countries tend to form RTAs with partners that have more BIT links but are reluctant to form RTAs with those that have more RTA links. We discuss possible justifications for these results, including arguments regarding the benefits and costs associated with the formation of RTAs and BITs.     

Sexual agreements and intimate-partner violence among male couples

Objectives: In the United States, HIV continues to disproportionately affect men who have sex with men. One promising area of research that may inform the development of behavioral interventions among male–male couples is within the realm of sexual agreements. Methods: The purpose of our analysis was to determine whether respondents who report having an open agreement or an agreement breakage also report a higher incidence of recent (within the previous 12 months) intimate-partner violence (IPV) compared to respondents who report having a monogamous agreement or no agreement breakage after controlling for demographic variables. Results: Results showed that men who have an open agreement are less likely to report recent physical IPV. Conclusions: The results highlight the need to develop dyadic behavior interventions that address sexual agreements and stress management.     

Construction doublebreasted operations and pre-hire agreements: Assessing the issues

Labor relations in the construction industry are conducted under a legal framework that is both different and more favorable to unions than is that in industry generally. Thus, construction employers are more subject to challenge than those in other industries if they operate both union and nonunion subsidiaries; construction unions, but not those in most other industries, may enter into agreements before anyone is hired (“pre-hire agreements”), require employees to join unions after ten days of employment instead of thirty, and require the contractor to notify them of job openings. Despite these advantages, construction unions represented only 22.2 percent of all construction workers in 1987, down from 40.1 percent in 1973, while nonunion, or “open shop,” construction accounted for more than 70 percent of the construction dollar volume as early as 1984. Attempting to overcome these trends, the construction unions have sponsored legislation in the current and last two congresses which would outlaw “doublebreasting,” i.e., one company owning both unionized and open shop subsidiaries, eliminate any restrictions on pre-hire agreements, and have the effect of forcing thousands of construction workers into unions regardless of their wishes. This article examines the reasons for the decline of construction unionism, analyzes the proposed legislation, discusses its probable impact, and concludes that it is lacking in justification for the common good.     

Using tribal/State Title IV-E agreements to help American Indian tribes access foster care and adoption funding

Funding under Title IV-E has historically not been available to American Indian communities, therefore, tribes have had to develop agreements with states to access these funds for child care services. This study analyzes Title IV-E intergovernmental provisions to help tribes and states strengthen Title IV-E agreements. A nationwide content analysis of existing Title IV-E documents, phone interviews, and focus groups revealed that Title IV-E tribal/state agreements vary widely, with most tribes not receiving full access to state services. These agreements focus on foster care maintenance payments and services. This article includes recommendations to help facilitate tribal access to Title IV-E funding for foster care and adoption services.     

Labour provisions in preferential trade agreements: Current practice and outlook

While the WTO and Doha Development Round do not deal with labour issues – they leave this to the ILO – the main countries that conclude free trade agreements incorporate labour provisions, which vary in terms of stringency. Sanctions are rarely used, and fears that “social clauses” would serve protectionist purposes have proved to be unfounded. Labour provisions are designed to meet a variety of sometimes conflicting goals, by means of different mechanisms aimed at improving labour practices and promoting Decent Work; the author makes a number of suggestions in this regard.