Critical Realism and the Althusserian Legacy

This paper undertakes an historical re‐evaluation of Louis Althusser's philosophical legacy for modern Marxism. While Althusser self‐consciously sought to defend the scientific character of Marxism, many of his closest followers eventually exited the Marxian paradigm for a post‐structural post‐Marxism. We argue that this development was predominately rooted in a series of philosophical errors that proved fatal in a period of retreat for European socialism. There has always been, however, a second post‐Althusserian legacy associated with the critical realist conception of Marxism initiated by Roy Bhaskar. Bhaskar found part of his inspiration in Althusser's successful posing of the question of Marx's science and this paper sets out to excavate the proper links between Althusser and Bhaskar in order to deepen the relationship between critical realism and scientific Marxism.     

Critical Realism,Dialectics, and Qualitative Research Methods

Critical realism has been an important advance in social science methodology because it develops a qualitative theory of causality which avoids some of the pitfalls of empiricist theories of causality. But while there has been ample work exploring the relationship between critical realism and qualitative research methods there has been noticeably less work exploring the relationship between dialectical critical realism and qualitative research methods. This seems strange especially since the founder of the philosophy of critical realism, Roy Bhaskar, employs and develops a range of dialectical concepts in his later work in order to extend the main tenets of critical realism. The aim of this paper is to draw on Bhaskar's later work, as well as Marxism, to reorient a critical realist methodology towards a dialectical approach for qualitative research. In particular, the paper demonstrates how dialectical critical realism can begin to provide answers to three common criticisms made against original critical realist methodology: that the qualitative theory of causal powers and structures developed by critical realists is problematic; that critical realist methodology contains values which prove damaging to empirical research; and that critical realists often have difficulties in researching everyday qualitative dilemmas that people face in their daily lives.     

马克思主义与批判实在论的辩证法

黑格尔的绝对理念、马克思的辩证唯物主义和批判实在论都属于辩证哲学的家族。马克思敲碎了黑格尔的坚果,拣起了一些碎片,他的伟大在于发现了结构矛盾与颠倒。巴斯卡与马克思分享了三种矛盾(结构矛盾、颠倒与科莱蒂矛盾),又增加了埃奇利矛盾。批判实在论指出,辩证法的本真面目是四重缺失:使对使缺失成为缺失的约束成为缺失。     

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

This article analyses and evaluates the uses of the concept of causal power in the critical realist tradition, which is based on Roy Bhaskar's philosophy of science. The concept of causal power that appears in the early works of Rom Harré and his associates is compared to Bhaskar's account of this concept and its uses in the critical realist social ontology. It is argued that the concept of emergence should be incorporated to any adequate notion of causal power. The concept of emergence used in Bhaskar and other critical realists’ works is shown to be ambiguous. It is also pointed out that the concept of causal power should be analysed in an anti‐essentialist way. Ontological and methodological problems that vitiate Bhaskar's transcendental account of the concept of causal power are examined. Moreover, it is argued that the applications of the concept of causal power to mental powers, reasons, and social structures in the critical realist social ontology are problematic. The paper shows how these problems might be avoided without giving up the concept of causal power and the notion of structural social causation.     

The Nature of Culture. Towards a Realist Phenomenology of Material, Animal and Human Nature

In an ironic rejoinder to the postmodern politics of nature, I will adopt an anthropological perspective on culture, which is conspicuous by its absence in the latest wave of science studies, and reformulate the distinction between nature and culture as a reflexive distinction within culture that emerges with modernity. In order to countering the hypertextualism of the (de)constructivists, I will next sketch out a realist theory of nature. Combining the transcendental realism of Roy Bhaskar with the transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, I will then try to outline the contours of a realist phenomenology of the ontological regions of physical, animal and human nature. Resuming my anthropological considerations on culture, I will finish the article with a progressive account of how the opposition between regional ontologies and regional typologies could be overcome.     

Finding Bhaskar in all the wrong places? Causation,process, and structure in Bhaskar and Deleuze

This article examines the reception of Roy Bhaskar amongst some contemporary Deleuzians. It proceeds by rejecting the all too often predilection of opposing realism to ‘postmodernism’ or ‘post‐structuralism’ arguing instead for the need to bring one into dialogue with the other. To this end, the paper explores the resonances and points of departure between the work of Gilles Deleuze and Roy Bhaskar. In particular, it examines the language of causation, object‐oriented versus process‐oriented ontologies, as well as the charge by Deleuzians that Bhaskar is an essentialist. Through this engagement it attempts to develop and rethink explanation and causation in terms of a more chaotic ontology of machines, centered around the concept of structure, process, and production in an open, heterogeneous, and dynamic world. The end result is a more chaotic concept of realism.     

“自由”与“实践”的哲学申辩与哲学观念的变革——以俞吾金教授的《实践与自由》为展开

传统的马克思主义研究认为,马克思哲学的思想来源在于黑格尔的辩证法和费尔巴哈的唯物主义.这种观点同时认为,历史唯物主义是辩证唯物主义在历史领域的推广.俞吾金教授的《实践与自由》一书则揭示了马克思哲学的真正来源——作为现代哲学典范的康德哲学.马克思从康德那里继承并推进了“实践”和“自由”两大主题,其哲学体系的本质就是历史唯物主义.     

The Place of Construction in Sociological Realism

In the contemporary epistemological debate on social reality, characterized by the crisis of post‐modern theories and the emergence of new forms of realism, are there any approaches not acknowledging some specific ontological character to the construction of social objects? The question is apparently rhetorical, but the implication of this problem are not obvious. In the sociological literature the opposition between reality and construction is not clearly defined. Sometimes it is considered a dichotomy, in other situations the synthesis of alternative theses in a dialectical horizon. The more systematic attempt considers reality and construction as analytical macro‐dimensions where the relation between social ontology and epistemology operates. From this stance, the acknowledgement of the role of social construction in a wider realist horizon is the true overtaking of postmodern philosophy. If it is true that facts exist beyond representations, it is also true that representations themselves have a specific effect on reality, who continually re‐structures itself around specific relations of emergent power. Stating that reality is socially constructed is an evident limit of postmodern theories. On the other hand, stating that only facts exist constitute an impoverishment of realism and its replacement in neo‐positivism. Social phenomena are real because they are based on specific properties of the inter‐subjective construction of social reality. This thesis represents the revitalization of an advanced, anti‐positivistic realism and the definition of the specificity of social objects. The aim of this essay is to search for a specific place of construction within the development of realist social ontology.     

SPECIAL ISSUE： IMPORTANT ISSUES IN MARXIST PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA：Historical materialism and the path to social actuality

揭示并切中当今的社会现实，是马克思主义哲学研究目前所面临的根本任务。黑格尔通过对主观意识及其外部反思的尖锐批判，第一次在哲学上揭示出理解社会现实的可能路径。马克思批判地继承了黑格尔哲学的这一遗产，其批判的成果不仅瓦解了理念与现实的思辨唯心主义联盟，而且彻底重建了社会现实的本质性向度。在这个主题上，对马克思主义哲学的康德主义解释势必意味着取消社会现实的那一度，意味着返回到主观意识的哲学，因而也势必意味着历史唯物主义的实际解体。通达社会现实的道路乃是历史唯物主义的生命线，而这一学说的真理性也只有在这条道路上方才能够持之不坠。     

解读马克思主义哲学的人学本体观

本体论不仅仅是哲学必须给予回答的问题 ,更是一种哲学解答问题的方式。作为哲学所独具的思维方式 ,本体论并没有因为马克思主义哲学的创始人立足于实践开拓的哲学新视野而消解。马克思主义哲学并没有在一般意义上去弘扬唯物主义的基本观点 ,而是攫取了一个独特的理论视角 ,将集中反映了物质与意识对立统一关系的“人”作为理论观照的焦点。正是这一理论视角的转移 ,充分展示了新唯物主义既根本区别于唯心主义 ,又完全不同于旧唯物主义的全新致思理路。基于这一全新的人学本体观 ,马克思主义的创始人从“现实的人”的活动即实践出发 ,建构起了新唯物主义的理论大厦 ,在“实践的唯物主义”的新的理论层面上更进一步地展现出了深刻的人学意蕴     

萨特道德哲学解读

萨特的自在存在和自为存在的理论不同于传统唯心主义 ;存在先于本质的命题包含有合理成分 ,但不是唯物主义命题 ;萨特的自由观高扬了人的能动性 ,但否定了自由的相对性 ;萨特的责任理论对社会生活有积极作用 ,不过夸大了个人的责任。     

Badiou and the philosophy of social work: a reply to Stephen Webb

Imre R. Badiou and the philosophy of social work: a reply to Stephen Webb Int J Soc Welfare 2010: 19: 253–258 © 2010 The Author, Journal compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the International Journal of Social Welfare. Stephen Webb's recent article ‘Against diversity and difference in social work’ claims that the work of Alain Badiou has the potential to be of great use in social work practice. Webb is faced with the problem of a discourse that has eroded any practical meaning attached to notions of diversity and difference, he laments the ‘ethical turn’ in social work practice and blames post‐modernism. Webb views the work of Badiou as a way to reinvigorate social work practice. I claim that Badiou's Being and Event is exclusive to ontology. Connections between Being and Event and possible ‘uses’ of Badiou's subtractive ontology, as an instrumentalisation, are not worthwhile. Critiquing Badiou's non‐ontological philosophies and political polemics is a better way to assess the practicality of his thought outside of his ontology. Webb's conflation of post‐modernism, neoliberalism and the difference, diversity and ethics discourse is also problematic and is critiqued here.     

实践唯物主义的理解与马克思主义哲学本质的再认识

实践唯物主义是马克思对自己哲学的一种概括。实践论和唯物论的统一 ,是马克思主义哲学的基本观点 ,是马克思主义哲学区别于以往哲学的重要标志。实践唯物主义从根本上克服了唯心主义和旧唯物主义的局限性 ,但它并没有超越唯物主义和唯心主义的对立。因此 ,作为辩证唯物主义、历史唯物主义和实践唯物主义的马克思主义哲学是一个有机联系的整体 ,只有这样理解 ,才能全面地认识和把握马克思主义哲学的本质     

Signs, Social Ontology, and Critical Realism

Even though sign-systems are a crucial part of society, critical realism, as developed by Roy Bhaskar, does not yet have an adequate theory of signs and semiosis. The few suggestions that Bhaskar offers can be advanced through the semiotics of C.S. Peirce. In doing so, however, it becomes necessary to reconsider Bhaskar's ontological domains of the real, the actual, and the subjective, and expand the last domain into one of semiosis. This new understanding of ontological domains, incorporating Peireian semiotics, provides the basis for rethinking the ontology of society: the customary dyad structures/agents becomes the triad structures/agents/discourses, each of which possesses material, sociological, and meaningful aspects.     

Durkheim and realism

This article examines Durkheim's relationship to realism. I argue that there is enough prima facie evidence of realist commitments in his work that our task should be to consider what kind of realist Durkheim was. I discuss, first of all, Durkheim's epistemics and follow that analysis with a discussion of metaphysical realism in his texts. The first part of the paper covers a wide range of his work; the second part focuses primarily on The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. In a final concluding section, I go on to consider how his epistemic arguments and his philosophical realism might work together to support important parts of his general sociology. Realism is not often brought to bear on Durkheim's work. When it has been, Durkheim has been identified as a naïve realist. These interpretations of Durkheim do not recognize the sophistication of contemporary realism, which does not reduce to naïve representationalism. This paper will sort out Durkheim's realist commitments in his texts, and in light of the variety of realisms consistent with “sophisticated” (that is, non-naïve) realism.     

Elder-Vass's Move and Giddens's Call

David Elder‐Vass's “For Emergence: refining Archer's account of social structure,” is the latest of a number of papers which together constitute a family quarrel in the cognitive space After Postmodernism among realist social scientists. In the case under examination here in “Elder‐Vass's Move and Giddens's Call”, the concern is the structure and agency problem in the social sciences. The debate continuing in Elder‐Vass's paper represents the proponents of the resurrection of Durkheim's social realism under the auspices of Bhaskar's Transcendental Realism; the debate that continues here as a response to the Elder‐Vass paper, opposes the latter's attempt to advance the argument for social realism under the canopy of Harre's Immanental realism. The theme of this response is this: Elder‐Vass fails to realize the promise of reconciling social structural realism and social relational realism.     

Abstracts

The concept of ‘tacit knowledge’ as the means by which individuals interpret the ‘rules’ of social interaction occupies a central role in all the major contemporary theories of action and social structure. The major reference point for social theorists is Wittgenstein's celebrated discussion of rule-following in the Philosophical Investigations. Focusing on Giddens' incorporation of tacit knowledge and rules into his ‘theory of structuration’, I argue that Wittgenstein's later work is steadfastly set against the ‘latent cognitivism’ inherent in the idea of tacit knowledge and tacit rules. I also argue that the idea of tacit knowledge and tacit rules is either incoherent or explanatorily vacuous. Scholars of the emotions maintain that all anger requires an object of blame. In order to be angry, many writers argue, one must believe than an actor has done serious damage to something that one values. Yet an individual may be angered without blaming another. This kind of emotion, called situational anger, does not entail a corresponding object of blame. Situational anger can be a useful force in public life, enabling citizens to draw attention to the seriousness of social or political problems, without necessarily vilifying political officials. In the first half of this paper I show how H. L. A. Hart's theory of rules can resolve, or at least clarify, a central methodological problem in legal anthropology that was first posed in Llewellyn and Egebel's The Cheyenñe Way In the second half I explore and develop Hart's theory (a) of rules, and apply it to problems of agency and behaviourism in legal anthropology, and (b) of legal development, and apply it to the problem of rule-scepticism in legal anthropology as it is posed in Roberts and Comaroffs Rules and Processes and elsewhere. As human beings, we share many historically developed, language-game interwoven, public forms of life. Due to the joint, dialogically responsive nature of all social life within such forms, we cannot as individuals just act as we please; our forms of life exert a normative influence on what we can say and do. They act as a backdrop against which all our claims to knowledge are judged as acceptable or not. As a result, it is not easy to articulate their inadequacies in a clear and forceful manner. However, within most of our forms of life, we have a first-person right to express how our individual circumstances seem to us. And by the use of special forms of poetic, gestural talk—talk that can originate new language-games—we can offer to make our own ‘inner lives’ public. In this paper, I want to claim that this is just what Wittgenstein is attempting to do in his later philosophy: by use of the self-same methods that anyone might use to express aspects of their own world picture, he is offering us his attempts to make the background ‘landscape’ of our lives more visible to us. These methods are explored below. Proponents of the view that social structures are ontologically distinct from the people in whose actions they are immanent have assumed that structures can stand in causal relations to individual practices. Were causality to be no more than Humean concomitance correlations between structure and practices would be unproblematic. But two prominent advocates of the ontological account of structures, Bhaskar and Giddens, have also espoused a powers theory of causality. According to that theory causation is brought about by the activity of particulars, in the social psychological case, individuals of some sort. Consistence would demand that structure be those individuals. But neither Giddens nor Bhaskar wish to reify structure to the extent that would fit it for a role as a powerful particular. If only human beings can be powerful particulars in these contexts, the only way that structures can be real must be as properties of conversational (symbolic) interactions. Human action is social just in so far as people direct themselves to engage well in joint activities with others.     

Middle‐Class Political Activism and Middle‐Class Advantage in Relation to Public Services: A Realist Synthesis of the Evidence Base

Since the late 1960s social policy scholarship has been concerned with the distribution of the resources or benefits across social gradients. This article presents a review of the literature on one mechanism by which inequity might be produced – activism by middle‐class service‐users enabling them to capture a disproportionate share of resources. The review used the methodology of realist synthesis to bring together evidence from the UK, the USA and Scandinavian countries over the past 30 years. The aim was to construct a ‘middle‐theory’ to understand how and in which contexts collective and individual activity by middle‐class service‐users might produce inequitable resource allocation or rationing decisions that disproportionately benefit middle‐class service‐users. The article identifies four causal theories which nuance the view that it is the ‘sharp elbows’ of the middle‐classes which confer advantage on this group. It shows how advantage accrues via the interplay between service‐users, providers and the broader policy and social context.     

Simmel's epistemic road to multidimensionality

Simmel's critique of historical realism constitutes the foundation of his sociological theories. Confronting the crisis of European thought at the turn of the century, Simmel extends the Kantian critique to the realm of history and society, and advocates a sociological relativism that rejects both historical materialism and historical idealism. Consequently, he arrives at a multidimensional theory of action and rationality through his epistemological critique of historical realism. This epistemological construction of multidimensionality differentiates Simmel from the functionalist attempt to base multidimensionality on the analysis of the problem of order. Advocating an epistemological definition of unity and reality, and rejecting the theory of historical empiricism, Simmel radically negates the possibility of structural-historical laws and construction of any universal history.     

What is Real and What is Realism in Sociology?

In the physical sciences a realist ontology rests on our ability to demonstrate the actual and real nature of material entities. Realist metaphysics of social entities, most influentially Bhaskar's critical realism, attempt to provide a related philosophical foundation for the social sciences. This paper examines the central issue of what is real about society it concludes that social relations and the organisations they constitute do exist and discusses the conditions of their demonstration. Realist interpretations of Bourdieu's theories are given particular attention in an argument that accepts the necessity of social realism but remains cautious about the development of methodologies able to provide effective demonstration.