THE SWINGS OF U.S. INFLATION AND THE GIBSON PARADOX

In recent business cycles, U.S. inflation has experienced a reduction of volatility and a severe weakening in the correlation to the nominal interest rate (Gibson paradox). We examine these facts in an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with money. Our findings point at a flatter New Keynesian Phillips Curve (higher price stickiness) and a lower persistence of markup shocks as the main explanatory factors. In addition, a higher interest‐rate elasticity of money demand, an increasing role of demand‐side shocks, and a less systematic behavior of Fed's monetary policy also account for the recent patterns of U.S. inflation dynamics. (JEL E32, E47)     

UNION POWER,COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY

We study Ramsey policies and optimal monetary policy rules in a dynamic New Keynesian model with unionized labor markets. Collective wage bargaining and unions' monopoly power amplify inefficient employment fluctuations. The optimal monetary policy must trade off between stabilizing inflation and reducing inefficient unemployment fluctuations induced by unions' monopoly power. In this context the monetary authority uses inflation as a tax on union rents and as a mean for indirect redistribution. Results are robust to the introduction of imperfect insurance on income shocks. The optimal monetary policy rule targets unemployment alongside inflation. (JEL E0, E4, E5, E6)     

CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES AND MONETARY POLICY WITH LIMITED ASSET MARKET PARTICIPATION

This article explores the interaction between consumption externalities and limited asset market participation (LAMP) in the standard New‐Keynesian model. We assess the performance of simple Taylor‐type interest rate rules with respect to (a) equilibrium determinacy, (b) the model's ability to simultaneously generate output and inflation volatility similar to the pre‐Volcker era, and (c) the model's response to a technology shock. We find that when individual preferences are affected by average household consumption (Aggregate Consumption Externality), stronger externalities increase the range of LAMP for which multiple equilibria arise even if the policy rule satisfies the Taylor principle. The interaction of LAMP and externalities can generate vast inflation/output relative volatility in line with the one observed in the data in the 1970s. According to our analysis, consumption externalities also affect the responses of endogenous variables to total factor productivity shocks. (JEL E4, E5)     

CAN MONETARY POLICY INFLUENCE LONG‐TERM INTEREST RATES? IT DEPENDS

Can monetary policy influence long‐term interest rates? Studies that have tackled this question using vector autoregressions (VARs) generally find that monetary policy's influence on long‐term interest rates is small and often statistically insignificant. Other studies, however, using a single‐equation approach, have found a robust relationship. Our study sheds new light on this question by estimating the effect of monetary policy shocks on long‐term interest rates in a VAR with long‐run monetary neutrality restrictions. We find that U.S. monetary policy can strongly influence long‐term interest rates, but only when the Federal Reserve has inflation‐fighting credibility and is able to firmly anchor inflationary expectations. (JEL E43, E51, E52)     

QUANTITATIVE EASING AND THE UK STOCK MARKET: DOES THE BANK OF ENGLAND INFORMATION DISSEMINATION STRATEGY MATTER?

We use intraday aggregate stock market data and an event‐study framework to assess the UK's equity market reaction to the unexpected element of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee's (MPC) asset purchase announcements for the 2009–2017 period. We assess the reactions of equity returns and their volatility over various time frames, both preceding and following the MPC announcements. Our results show that the UK unconventional monetary policy shocks have a significant impact on domestic equity returns and volatilities. The strength of this impact depends on the Bank's information dissemination through inflation reports and the publication of the MPC's voting records. (JEL G14, E44, E52)     

LEANING AGAINST WINDY BANK LENDING

Using an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with banking, this paper first provides evidence that monetary policy reacted to bank loan growth in the United States during the Great Moderation. It then shows that the optimized simple interest‐rate rule features no response to the growth of bank credit. However, the welfare loss associated to the empirical responsiveness is small. The sources of business cycle fluctuations are crucial in determining whether a “leaning‐against‐the‐wind” policy is optimal or not. In fact, the predominant role of supply shocks in the model gives rise to a trade‐off between inflation and financial stabilization. (JEL E32, E44, E52)     

SHOULD OIL PRICES RECEIVE SO MUCH ATTENTION? AN EVALUATION OF THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF OIL PRICES FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY

This paper evaluates the potential gains from using oil prices to forecast a variety of measures of inflation, economic activity, and monetary policy–related variables. With a few exceptions, oil prices do not have any predictive content for these variables. This finding is robust to the use of rolling forecast windows, the use of industry‐level data, changes in the forecast horizon, and allowing for nonlinearities. (JEL Q43, E37, C32)     

POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL

This paper tests various political business cycle theories in a New Keynesian model with a monetary and fiscal policy mix. All the policy coefficients, the target levels of inflation and the budget deficit, the firms' frequency of price setting, and the standard deviations of the structural shocks are allowed to depend on “political” regimes: a preelection versus postelection regime, a regime that depends on whether the president (or the Fed chairman) is a Democrat or a Republican, and a regime under which the president and the Fed chairman share party affiliation in preelection quarters or not. The results provide evidence that several coefficients are influenced by political variables. The best‐fitting specification, in fact, is one that allows coefficients to vary according to a regime that depends on whether the economy is in the few quarters before a presidential election or not. Monetary policy becomes considerably more inertial before elections and fiscal policy deviations from a simple rule are more common. There is some evidence that policies become more expansionary before elections, but this evidence disappears for monetary policy in the post‐1985 sample. (JEL C11, D72, E32, E52, E58, E63)     

ESTIMATING DYNAMIC EULER EQUATIONS WITH MULTIVARIATE PROFESSIONAL FORECASTS

Dynamic Euler equations restrict multivariate forecasts and so can be estimated and tested using the predictions of professional forecasters. We illustrate this novel, empirical method by studying the links between forecasts of U.S. nominal interest rates, inflation, and real consumption growth since 1981. Using forecast data for both returns and macroeconomic fundamentals exploits the complete panel of forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, which yields 3,400 observations, many more than the 117 quarterly time‐series observations. Harnessing the full panel enhances precision in testing asset‐pricing models and may avoid aggregation bias. We find clear evidence for the Fisher effect but mixed evidence of a relationship between expectations of real interest rates and real consumption growth. (JEL E17, E21, E43)     

Asymmetric Preference and Inflation Bias in the Visegrad Four

This paper investigates the asymmetric preference of monetary policy in the Visegrad four (V-4). To this end, we estimate the nonlinear interest rate rule provided by Surico (2007). This enables us to estimate the central banker’s preference and to inference the average inflation bias. Empirical results provide some important evidence. First, the nonlinear rule and the preference are successfully estimated. This also imply that the average rates of inflation in the V-4 are set at a relatively high by their monetary policy. Second, After EU accession, the preferences of Slovakia and Poland become much lower than those in the full sample. This reflects the policy effort by these two to introduce the euro.     

EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK FOOTPRINTS ON INFLATION FORECAST UNCERTAINTY

The finding of the paper shows the relative effectiveness of the “one size fits all” policy of the European Central Bank. The paper provides strong evidence in favor of this by testing whether the monetary policy effects (footprints) found in inflation uncertainty converge to a common level. These footprints are measured as the fraction of the estimated policy‐induced reduction in this uncertainty. The testing was conducted by applying a bootstrap‐type test in a regression of the rate of growth of these fractions on their initial values, computed for 16 euro area countries. (JEL C33, E52, E58)     

MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DESIGN AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND: EVIDENCE FROM THE LAB

The global economic crisis of 2007–2008 has pushed many advanced economies into a liquidity trap. We design a laboratory experiment on the effectiveness of policy measures to avoid expectation‐driven liquidity traps. Monetary policy alone is not sufficient to avoid liquidity traps, even if it preventively cuts the interest rate when inflation falls below a threshold. However, monetary policy augmented with a fiscal switching rule succeeds in escaping liquidity trap episodes. We measure the effect of fiscal policy on expectations, and report larger‐than‐unity fiscal multipliers at the zero lower bound. Experimental results in different treatments are well explained by adaptive learning. (JEL E70, C92, D83, D84, E52, E62)     

THE CREDIT‐CHANNEL TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND THE NONLINEAR GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF INFLATION AND TAXES

With the credit‐channel effect driven by the central bank's open market operations, this paper's model easily gives rise to the nonlinear inflation‐growth nexus, which is evidenced by a number of cross‐country empirical studies. The threshold level of the inflation rate is found to be lower when tax rates are higher. The presence of the credit‐channel effect also provides the rationale for setting positive (and smaller than 1) tax rates on consumption, labor income, and capital income. The optimal tax rates rise as the inflation target declines. Under a fiscal policy rule where labor and capital income taxes move proportionally to each other, the optimal capital income tax rate could be higher than the optimal labor income tax rate. Under a sufficiently large central bank balance sheet, the credit‐channel effect will be so weak that inflation and all kinds of taxes are growth and welfare repressing. This provides a rationale for central banks that have implemented quantitative easing policies to shrink their balance sheets. (JEL E58, E62, O42)     

1979–1982: RULES OR DISCRETION IN MONETARY POLICY?

What determined MI growth from November 1979 through October 1982? A reaction function is developed and tested which ascribes the level of M1 to two Fed motives. One is the Fed's desire to hit its money growth targets, the other is to carry out a counter-cyclical short-run monetary policy. Both motives are found to be significant during the period. This evidence is consistent with the contention of some economists that the period was not a valid test of monetarist policy rules.     

HEALTH CARE INFLATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY POLICY

Motivated by recent findings on the cyclical movement of both health and health spending, we construct a general equilibrium model that distinguishes health care demand from the demand for other goods. Using this model, we are able to generate inflation dynamics and cyclicality of health that match the US data. When the model is subjected to an expansionary monetary policy shock, it yields different output and inflation responses compared with a two‐sector model with homogeneous demand. We show that the trade‐off between leisure and health spending plays an important role in model dynamics. The model further predicts different degrees of inflation stabilization across sectors when a shift in the monetary policy occurs. (JEL E52, E31, E32, I10)     

INFLATION DYNAMICS AND LABOR MARKET SPECIFICATIONS: A BAYESIAN DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH FOR JAPAN'S ECONOMY

Which labor market specification is better able to describe inflation dynamics, a widely used sticky wage model or a recently investigated labor market search model? Using a Bayesian likelihood approach, we estimate these two models with Japan's data. This article shows that the labor market search model is superior to the sticky wage model in terms of both marginal likelihood and out‐of‐sample forecast performance, particularly regarding inflation. The labor market search model is better able to replicate the cross‐correlation among inflation, real wages, and output in the data. Moreover, in this model, real marginal cost is determined by both hiring cost and unit labor cost that varies with employment fluctuations, which gives rise to a high contemporaneous correlation between inflation and real marginal cost as represented in the New Keynesian Phillips curve. (JEL E24, E32, E37)     

ALTERNATIVE P* MODELS OF INFLATION FORECASTS

This paper reevaluates the inflation forecast performance of M2-based P* models relative to other competing models over the period of 1970–96. Included in the comparative study are newly developed monetary aggregates, including M2+, MZM, and M2*, and direct treatments of velocity changes associated with recent developments in M2. Out-of-sample rolling-horizon forecast exercises suggest that the predictive accuracy of alternative P* model specifications relative to traditional inflation models is not robust to different subsamples. The switching forecast performance between money-based and output-based models across periods highlights the extent of structural instability in the inflation generating process. (JEL E3, E4, C2)     

MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS,EXPECTATIONS, AND INFORMATION RIGIDITIES

This paper contributes to the literature by assessing expectation effects from monetary policy for G7 economies. We rely on expectation data from Consensus Economics and a panel vector autoregression framework, which accounts for international spillovers and time‐variation. We analyze whether monetary policy has changed the degree of information rigidity after the emergence of the subprime crisis and estimate effects of interest rate changes on expectations, disagreements, and forecast errors. We find strong evidence for information rigidities and identify higher forecast errors by professionals after monetary policy shocks. Our results suggest that the international transmission of monetary policy shocks introduces noisy information and partly increases disagreement among forecasters. (JEL E31, E52)     

AN EQUILIBRIUM POLITICO-ECONOMIC MODEL

A politico-economic model is developed in which rationally formed forecasts are available to all traders. Systematic government policy is neutral, but a large majority of the electorate, those who adopt rationally formed forecasts but do not know the model, hold the government responsible for the economy's performance. Real and political shocks generate novel feedback effects due to anticipated regime changes. These feedback effects may amplify or dampen the initial shocks; this depends on whether the government follows a high or low monetary growth rate rule and whether inflation or unemployment is the main concern of the electorate.     

MONETARY POLICY AND ENDOWMENT RISK IN A LIMITED PARTICIPATION MODEL

A limited participation model is constructed to study the risk‐sharing role of monetary policy. A fraction of households exchange money for interest‐bearing government nominal bonds in the asset market and the government injects money through open market operations. In equilibrium, money is nonneutral and monetary policy redistributes consumption across households. Without idiosyncratic endowment risk, monetary policy becomes a perfect risk‐sharing tool, but with idiosyncratic endowment risk, it is not. The Friedman rule is not optimal in general. (JEL E4, E5)