DYNASTIC POLITICAL PRIVILEGE AND ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CASE OF U.S. GOVERNORS, 1950–2005

This paper examines the impact of dynastic political privilege on the behavior of incumbents. Incumbents have opportunities to serve themselves at the expense of voters, but society can design political institutions to mitigate these principal‐agent problems. Dynastic political privilege may be one such mechanism. We argue that the possibility that opportunistic behavior in office may damage family members' political prospects disciplines incumbents. We test this hypothesis using data for 1950–2005 on U.S. governors, including a new data set on the family relationships of politicians, and find that dynastic political privilege increases incumbent accountability. (JEL H71, H10)     

DO BUSINESSMEN MAKE GOOD GOVERNORS?

This paper evaluates the economic performance of U.S. state governors with a business background (chief executive officer [CEO] governors). Applying a matching method, I find, first, that businesspeople tend to take office in times of economic and fiscal strain. Second, the tenures of CEO governors are associated with a 0.5 percentage points (pp.) higher annual income growth rate, a 0.4 pp. higher growth rate of the private capital stock, and a 0.6 pp. lower unemployment rate than are the tenures of non‐CEO governors. State‐level income inequality is not affected by CEO governors holding office, indicating that low‐income households benefit from the economic upswing. (JEL C21, E24, O47)     

COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN A PUBLIC GOODS GAME: A FIELD EXPERIMENT

We explore the effects of competitive and cooperative motivations on contributions in a field experiment. A total of 10,000 potential political donors received solicitations referencing past contribution behavior of members of the competing party (competition treatment), the same party (cooperative treatment), or no past contribution information (control). We first theoretically analyze the effect of these treatments on the contribution behavior of agents with different social preferences in a modified intergroup public good (IPG) game. Then, we report the empirical results: Contribution rates in the competitive, cooperative, and control treatments were 1.45%, 1.08%, and 0.78%, respectively. With the exception of one large contribution, the distribution of contributions in the competitive treatment first order stochastically dominates that of the cooperative treatment. Qualitatively, it appears that the cooperative treatment induced more contributions around the common monetary reference point, while the competitive treatment led to more contributions at twice this amount. These results suggest that eliciting competitive rather than cooperative motivations can lead to higher contributions in IPG settings. (JEL D72, H41, C93)     

THIRD‐PARTY CERTIFICATION AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF VOLUNTARY POLLUTION ABATEMENT PROGRAMS: EVIDENCE FROM RESPONSIBLE CARE

We analyze whether third‐party certification has been successful in improving the performance of voluntary pollution abatement in the Responsible Care (RC) program which made certification mandatory from 2005 onward. We use facility‐level panel data from 821 plants between 1996 and 2010, and exploit the change in the program requirements to estimate the causal impact of third‐party certification on participating facility emissions compared to non‐RC plants in the U.S. chemical industry. We address endogenous selection into RC via instrumental variables, and explore heterogeneity in the treatment effect. We find that, on average, there is no statistically discernible effect of third‐party certification on facility emissions, and that this result is robust to a variety of models that correspond to different assumptions related to identification. (JEL Q53, Q58, L60)     

THE IMPACT OF ENTITLEMENTS AND EQUITY ON COOPERATIVE BARGAINING: AN EXPERIMENT

In some bargaining situations—for example, collaborative policy making and compulsory arbitration—a third party imposes a backstop position that differs from the status quo. Axiomatic models of cooperative bargaining presume that the status quo in such cases will have no effect on the negotiated outcome, especially if it is Pareto inferior to the backstop. Recent literatures on equity and entitlement, however, suggest that the status quo may establish a focal point that acts as an “anchor” in current negotiations, affecting any ultimate agreement. In a two‐party, two‐attribute experiment, in which subjects jointly select from up to 200 options, we find evidence (1) that the status quo matters, perhaps because of “entitlement effects” and (2) that parties prefer egalitarian outcomes to the Nash bargain. (JEL C92, D74, H44, Q58)     

SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY: THE ECONOMIC COST OF INTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS

This paper extends the literature on collective rent‐seeking by introducing the possibility that a competing group may be a subset of another. We develop a model that incorporates the potential for some individuals to be party of both sides of a conflict, which creates interdependence of payoffs. Results indicate that strategic individual behavior, and the resulting rent dissipation, is affected by the relative size of the groups. We conduct an experimental test of the model and find that observed laboratory behavior corresponds well with the game‐theoretic comparative‐static predictions. (JEL C72, C9, Q5, D74)     

DOES THE SAMARITAN'S DILEMMA MATTER? EVIDENCE FROM U.S. AGRICULTURE

The Samaritan's dilemma posits a downside to charity: recipients may rely on free aid instead of their own efforts. Anecdotally, the expectation of free assistance is thought to be important for decisions about insurance and risky behavior in numerous settings, but reliable empirical evidence is scarce. We estimate whether the Samaritan's dilemma exists in U.S. agriculture, where both private crop insurance and frequent federal disaster assistance are present. We find that bailout expectations are qualitatively and quantitatively important for the insurance decision. Furthermore, aid expectations reduce both expenditure on farm inputs and subsequent crop revenue. (JEL D72, H84, Q18)     

THE IMPACT OF FISCAL POLICY ON PROFITS

This paper investigates the impact of fiscal policy on profits using panel data for 18 high‐income OECD countries during the period 1975–1999. We estimate a profit equation allowing a consistent treatment of the government budget constraint, and we try to disentangle the effects of different spending and taxation items. As far as public spending is concerned, our results strongly suggest that capital expenditures are associated with higher profits, while expenditures on goods and services and in particular on wages and salaries deteriorate profits. In general, “productive” expenditures seem to increase profits while the effect of “unproductive” expenditures is insignificant. Transport and communication expenditures seem to have a positive impact on profits. On the revenue side, we find that both direct and indirect taxation has a negative impact on profits. (JEL E62, H32, H54)     

ALLOCATING INFECTION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SWINE FLU (H1N1) VACCINE

Previous research has isolated the effect of “congressional dominance” in explaining bureaucracy‐related outcomes. This analysis extends the concept of congressional dominance to the allocation of H1N1, or swine flu, vaccine doses. States with Democratic United States Representatives on the relevant House oversight committee received roughly 60,000 additional doses per legislator during the initial allocation period, though this political advantage dissipated after the first 3 weeks of vaccine distribution. As a result political factors played a role in determining vaccine allocation only when the vaccine was in particularly short supply. At‐risk groups identified by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), such as younger age groups and first responders, do not receive more vaccine doses, and in fact receive slightly fewer units of vaccine. (JEL D72, D73, I18)     

“NEW” PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND/OR PUBLIC CAPITAL MAINTENANCE FOR GROWTH? THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE

The article revisits the relationship between growth and public productive expenditures by investigating the growth impact of "new" public investment along with maintenance expenditures in public capital. We sketch out the importance of these components of public capital expenditures for growth and then use survey data from Canada to assess the impact of these variables on Canadian growth. We find evidence that the Canadian economy would benefit from a fall in total public capital expenditures and from a reallocation between new public investment and maintenance expenditures. We also identify the growth impact of the associated sectoral public capital expenditures. (JEL E22 , E62 , H21 , H54 )     

OPTIMAL AGRICULTURAL POLICY: SMALL GAINS?

Agricultural subsidies distort the allocation of workers across sectors, and may keep too many workers in agriculture. We use a general equilibrium model with endogenous sector selection calibrated to the U.S. economy to assess the efficiency loss and redistribution effect of the current transfer system. Eliminating current subsidies has two main effects: (1) small efficiency gains (around 4% of agricultural output) and (2) a corresponding rise in the price of agricultural goods. We find high-productivity farmers to be the main beneficiaries of the existing policies, although some of the transfers generate a redistribution effect toward low-productivity agents, which extends beyond the agricultural sector. (JEL H21, H25, H30, J24, J31, J43)     

THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SPENDING COMPOSITION ON FIRM PRODUCTIVITY

This paper exploits the unique institutional features of South Africa to estimate the impact of provincial public spending on firm productivity. In contrast to existing microeconomic evidence, we explore the effects of fiscal expenditures and remove the effects of revenue raising policies. Our identification strategy is based on differences in the effects of public spending across firms within the same industry and province. We show that public spending composition affects productivity depending on the capital intensity of firms, with less capital intensive firms being particularly affected. These effects appear to be robust. (JEL D24, H32, H72)     

LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE IN THE WEAK‐LINK GAME

We investigate the effects of leadership in a four‐player weak‐link game. A weak‐link game is a coordination game with multiple Pareto‐ranked Nash equilibria. Because the more efficient equilibria involve a degree of strategic uncertainty groups typically find it difficult to coordinate on more efficient equilibria. We wanted to see whether leadership by example, in the form of one player acting publicly before the rest of the group, could help groups do better. Our results suggest that leadership can increase efficiency but is far from being a guarantee of success. Specifically, in a significant number of groups we observed successful leadership and increased efficiency, but in most groups efficiency was low despite the efforts of leaders. We did not find any difference between voluntary leaders and leaders that are randomly assigned. (JEL C72, H41)     

Character Counts?: Honesty and Fairness in Election 2000

This article examines the impact that voters’ evaluationsof the candidates’ character had on their vote choicein the 2000 presidential election. We find that while the magnitudeof the impact of character on the vote was roughly equal forboth major party candidates, contrary to common perception,the substantive significance of character evaluations disproportionatelyaffected George W. Bush. Our results indicate the need to accountfor the influence of character in other elections, given thatcharacter issues are a recurring theme in American presidentialcampaigns.     

DOES A VALUE-ADDED TAX INCREASE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY?

Theory predicts that a value-added tax (VAT) is an efficient tax system, which is one of the primary reasons for its rapid adoption worldwide. However, there is little empirical evidence supporting this prediction, especially for developing countries. I estimate the efficiency gains of introducing a VAT using the synthetic control method. I find that a VAT has, on average, positive and economically meaningful impact on economic efficiency. This result, however, is driven by richer countries only. There is no significant impact of the VAT on poorer countries. The findings are robust across a series of placebo studies and sensitivity checks. (JEL H20, H25, O40, E6)     

BANKS,DEBT AND RISK: ASSESSING THE SPILLOVERS OF CORPORATE TAXES

We find evidence of tax-driven strategic allocation of debt and asset risk across group entities of European banks. We evaluate the effects that establishing tax neutrality between debt and equity finance has on systemic risk, and show that the degree of coordination in implementing the hypothetical tax reform matters. In particular, a coordinated elimination of the tax advantage of debt would significantly reduce systemic losses in the event of a severe banking crisis. By contrast, uncoordinated tax reforms are not equally beneficial precisely because national tax policies generate spillovers through cross-border bank activities. (JEL G21, G28, H25)     

EDUCATION'S GAMBLING PROBLEM: EARMARKED LOTTERY REVENUES AND CHARITABLE DONATIONS TO EDUCATION

I examine the impact that lotteries introduced to support education have on voluntary contributions to education. State lotteries, and the causes they are introduced to support, are highly publicized. This provides the opportunity to assess whether donors are crowded‐out by government spending of which they are almost certainly aware. Using donor‐level survey data and nonprofits' tax returns, I find that donations to education‐related organizations fall with the introduction of a lottery. This result is driven by donors' response to the new (highly publicized) government revenue source (rather than a decrease in nonprofit fundraising efforts). (JEL D64, H3, H75)     

SURPRISE ME IF YOU CAN: THE INFLUENCE OF NEWSPAPER ENDORSEMENTS IN U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

We here evaluate the heterogeneous effects of newspaper endorsements of U.S. Presidential candidates in the 100 days preceding the 2008 and 2012 elections on the probability that they win the election. Our identification strategy relies on daily variations in the winning probabilities (obtained from the Intrade prediction market) and the fact that newspapers decide their endorsements weeks before their announcement. Endorsements that are classified as surprising and consistent have the largest effect. An endorsement is surprising when the newspaper has not traditionally endorsed the candidate's party. An endorsement is inconsistent when the newspaper leans ideologically to one party but endorses a candidate from another party. (JEL L82, D7)     

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: SPENDING VERSUS REVENUE DECENTRALIZATION

This article examines whether the efficiency gains accompanying fiscal decentralization generate higher growth in more decentralized economies, applying pooled‐mean group techniques to a panel dataset of 23 Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) countries, 1972–2005. We find that spending decentralization has tended to be associated with lower economic growth while revenue decentralization has been associated with higher growth. Since OECD countries are substantially more spending than revenue decentralized, this is consistent with Oates' (1972) hypothesis that maximum efficiency gains require a close match between spending and revenue decentralization. It suggests reducing expenditure decentralization, and simultaneously increasing the fraction financed locally, would be growth‐enhancing. (JEL E62, H71, H72)     

HOW DOES GLOBALIZATION AFFECT THE IMPLICIT TAX RATES ON LABOR INCOME,CAPITAL INCOME,AND CONSUMPTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION?

This article analyzes the effects of globalization on implicit tax rates (ITRs) on labor income, capital income, and consumption in the EU15 and Central and Eastern European New Member States (CEE NMS). We find supportive evidence for an increase in the ITR on labor income in the EU15, but no effect on the ITR on capital income. There is evidence of convergence in terms of the ITR on consumption, as countries with higher than average ITR on consumption respond to globalization by decreasing their tax rates. There are important differences among the welfare regimes within the EU15. Social‐democratic countries have decreased the tax burden on capital, but increased that on labor due to globalization. Globalization exerts a pressure to increase taxes on labor income in the conservative and liberal regimes as well. Taxes on consumption decrease in response to globalization in the conservative and social‐democratic regimes. In the CEE NMS, there is no effect of globalization on the ITR on labor and capital income, but we find a negative impact on the ITR on consumption in the CEE NMS with higher than average ITR on consumption. (JEL H23, H24, H25, F19, F21)