Trade Union Priorities and Wage Rigidity

ABSTRACT: The starting point of the paper is that trade unions engage in substitution once certain targets have been met. This implies that a priority-based or hierarchical model might be a better approximation to union behaviour. This model requires a two-part union utility function which changes when a satisfactory (or target) level of the priority variable (e.g. the wage rate) is met. After demonstrating the workings of such a model in a monopoly union framework, it is shown that there is real wage rigidity when the wage is below the target level. Employment increases only when the target wage has been achieved.     

Risk Aversion,Collective Bargaining,and Wages in Germany

We develop an open‐shop model of trade union membership in which workers differ in their risk attitudes, and derive conditions under which the bargained wage will fall and union membership will increase with a general rise in risk aversion. Using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel we define broad bargaining units and show that wages decline as average risk aversion of union members in these units rises, controlling for individual effects of risk aversion. Given a negative relationship between wages and employment, this suggests that secular changes in risk attitudes, because of an aging workforce or greater female labour force participation, can help to explain variations in the employment performance of unionized economies.     

Unionization Structures in International Oligopoly

We examine how competition in international markets affects a union's choice of wage regime, which can be either uniform or discriminatory. Firms are heterogeneous with regard to international competition. When unions choose their wage regimes sequentially, a discriminatory outcome becomes more likely when international competition increases. However, for intermediate levels a union may stick with a uniform wage regime even if the rival union adopts a discriminatory regime. When competition is sufficiently intense, both unions revert to the discriminatory regime. Paradoxically only in those latter instances all parties (consumers, workers, and firms) may be better off (each in aggregate) if all unions adopt a uniform wage regime. We conclude that union incentives to coordinate their wage regimes should then also become largest.     

Delegation,Union Leaders and Capital Allocation

This paper looks upon the effects of delegation of the bargaining process within unions. It investigates the allocation of capital when investment is sunk and there is an absence of binding contracts. Although capital investment is inefficient, capital allocation can be improved by precommitment. Strong union members precommit by hiring a weak leader, whilst weak union members hire a strong union leader. Governments can increase the efficiency of capital by reducing the intrinsic union strength, but could reduce the efficiency of capital if intrinsic internal union leader strength is reduced.     

Union Membership and the Union Wage Gap in the UK

We consider the choice of union membership in the UK and its effect on the union/non‐union wage differential allowing for the endogeneity of the union choice. We include identifying variables not previously used and find that correcting for selectivity is important and has a large impact on the estimated differential. Moreover, union choice is itself affected by the wage gap.     

The Union Effect on Wages in Chile: A Two‐Stage Approach Using Panel Data

We estimate the union effect on wages in Chile to be between 18 and 24 per cent. We follow a two‐stage procedure that allows us to correct the endogeneity of union status and to separate true from spurious dependence, by exploiting the union history of individuals using panel data. We find evidence of comparative‐advantage sorting in union status, strong true state dependence and a re‐distributional effect of union membership (i.e. wage gains from unionization are larger for lower‐wage earners).     

Wage Commitment,Signalling, and Entry Deterrence or Accommodation

Abstract. We analyse the wage choice of a monopoly union against entry threat. The wage carries information about market demand, which is crucial to an uninformed entrant, and in addition affects the entrant's post‐entry cost through labour market institutions. The union may wish to deter or accommodate entry depending on whether the entrant will hire from a different source or from the union. Equilibrium wage is distorted downwardly (upwardly) for deterrence (accommodation); but because of wage correlation a low (high) wage can also turn entry profitable (unprofitable). Therefore, separating equilibrium may not always exist, and entry outcomes may be inefficient.     

Welfare Effects of Local versus Central Wage Bargaining

The paper analyses the welfare effects of union bargaining (de)centralization in a dual labour market with a unionized and a competitive sector. We show that social welfare depends on both the structure of the union's objective function and the elasticities of labour demand in both sectors. The welfare‐maximizing employment allocation can be obtained under a high degree of centralization if the union maximizes the total wage‐bill. Otherwise, if the union is rent maximizing, welfare is higher under local bargaining. However, in that case neither central nor local wage setting yields the social optimum.     

The Rise in Union Wage Premiums in South Africa

The earnings premium received by African, urban, male union members in South Africa, as compared to other regular, urban male employees, is explored using two national sample surveys conducted in 1985 and 1993. The historical setting of this change is of particular interest, in the light of the transformation from the apartheid regime. Union membership grew very rapidly during this interval, as earlier prohibitions on African unions were lifted. Subsequently, the high rates of unemployment and segmentation of the labor force have been issues of central concern to the new government, elected in 1994. In this context, the paper extends prior methodology, by systematically comparing possible approaches to estimation, in addition to contributing fresh empirical results. Four approaches to estimation are adopted, allowing for: a single earnings regime with union dummy variable; the possibility of different earnings regimes among union members as compared to non‐members; endogenous switching between such regimes; sample selection arising from lack of employment and from division between regular and informal work. A series of tests on nested specifications indicate the importance of recognizing endogenous switching between differing pay structures in the covered and uncovered sectors. However (as with previous research on the South African labor market), no sample selection is detected with respect to employment status. The results suggest that collective bargaining resulted in wage compression among the expanding union membership while significantly widening the gap between members and non‐members. The latter widening gap cannot be attributed to the changing composition of union membership as reflected in observed characteristics of employees.     

The Role of Profit Sharing in Dual Labour Markets with Flexible Outsourcing

We combine profit sharing for high‐skilled workers and outsourcing of low‐skilled tasks in a partly imperfect dual domestic labour market, which means that only low‐skilled labour is represented by a labour union. In that framework we analyse how the implementation of profit sharing for high‐skilled workers influences the amount of outsourcing and the labour market outcome for low‐skilled worker. By doing this, we use some specific assumptions, e.g. exponentially increasing outsourcing costs or the wage for low‐skilled workers will be determined by a union whereas the wage for high‐skilled workers is given. Assuming that low‐skilled labour and outsourcing are interchangeable we show that profit sharing has a positive effect on the wage for low‐skilled workers and helps to decrease wage dispersion. However, under these circumstances, profit sharing enhances outsourcing. Concerning the employment effects for high‐ and low‐skilled workers, we show that there is an employment reducing effect due to higher wages for low‐skilled work, which can be offset by higher productivity of highly skilled workers, as the domestic labour inputs complement each other.     

Changes in Union Membership Over Time: A Panel Analysis for West Germany

Abstract. Despite the apparent stability of the wage bargaining institutions in West Germany, aggregate union membership has been declining dramatically since the early 1990s. However, aggregate gross membership numbers do not distinguish between employment status and it is impossible to disaggregate these sufficiently. This paper uses four waves of the German Socio‐economic Panel in 1985, 1989, 1993, and 1998 to perform a panel analysis of net union membership among employees. We estimate a correlated random‐effects probit model suggested by Chamberlain (Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. II, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1984) to take proper account of individual‐specific effects. Our results suggest that at the individual level the propensity to be a union member has not changed considerably over time. Thus, the aggregate decline in membership is due to composition effects. We also use the estimates to predict net union density at the industry level based on the IAB employment subsample for the time period 1985–97.     

Non‐linear Effects of Comparison Income in Quit Decisions: Status versus Signal!

This research note utilizes German matched employer–employee data to investigate the relationship between mobility and relative wage positions within establishments for workers without university degrees. The main innovation involves the examination of non‐linear effects, because previous literature mainly analyses mean linear effects. Our random‐effects probit estimates of mobility suggest a non‐linear U‐shaped effect with respect to relative standing. This is plausible because workers in low relative wage positions might quit because of their low status and those in high relative wage positions because of their low career advancement opportunities. Consideration of non‐linearities, thus, is a major improvement for the analysis of the effects of relative wage positions.     

Endogenous Contracts in Unionized Oligopoly

We study the endogenous determination of contracts in a unionized oligopoly and the welfare implications thereof. Alternative contracts specify the sequencing in the selection of R&D and wages. They can be classified as ‘fixed’ when the unions set wages before the firms make their R&D decisions or ‘floating’ when the sequencing of these choices is reversed. If the unions are highly employment‐oriented, we find that either all firm–union pairs choose floating‐wage contracts or both contract types may coexist depending on the degree of technological spillovers. However, when the unions have stronger preference over attaining a good wage deal, then it becomes very likely that fixed‐wage contracts will endogenously emerge because they can serve as an insurance device against oppor tunistic wage increases. Our welfare analysis suggests that welfare‐improving contracts may nevertheless not always arise in equilibrium.     

Unions,Firing Costs,and Unemployment

Abstract. We study the effects of firing costs in unionized economies with heterogeneous workers. We consider an overlapping generations model where workers participate in the labour market both when young and when old. All workers belong to the same union that sets wages unilaterally. We find that at given wages firing costs increase youth unemployment and decrease old‐age unemployment. However, once the wage response is considered, firing costs increase both youth and old‐age unemployment. Indeed, knowing that when firing costs are higher firms refrain from firing, the union increases the wage of old workers, and, therefore, old‐age unemployment increases.     

‘Investment’ in Union Membership: A Managerial Approach

This paper concerns wage formation in a unionized economy when union membership is endogenous and determined by employment. A union is run by a leadership which has as an objective to strengthen the union’s position in the labour market. This is achieved by building up membership. Among the results, it is found that since membership is determined by employment, the inclusion of the leadership’s preferences into a union’s objective function produces lower real wages than a static version would predict. It is also shown that an increase in the union’s rate of time preference increases the natural rate of unemployment, while an increase in the speed at which workers enter/leave a union has an opposite effect.     

Union–Firm Bargaining,Productivity Improvement and Endogenous Growth

This paper presents a growth model with two sectors. In the high‐tech sector, R&D increases productivity and union–firm bargaining determines wages, but in the traditional sector there are neither R&D nor labour unions. The government is able to regulate union bargaining power. The main results are as follows. Because firms try to escape wage increases through the improvement of productivity by R&D, the increase in union bargaining power boosts R&D and growth. It is welfare enhancing to strengthen (weaken) unions when the growth rate is below (above) some critical level. A specific rule is presented for when de‐unionization is socially desirable.     

Employment‐protecting Labour Market Institutions and Inward Foreign Direct Investments

Abstract. This paper proposes labour market institutional arrangements as a strategic device to induce or deter export‐substituting inward foreign direct investments (FDI) — in either instance protecting domestic employment. In a union‐oligopoly context it is shown that, if the FDI‐associated unit costs (FC) are not high enough, then employment‐neutral (‐enhancing) inward FDI will emerge in equilibrium if the domestic wage setting is credibly centralized and the unemployment benefit is sufficiently high (low), each instance arising for a different range of — intermediate — FC values. If however the FC values are sufficiently high, then the centralized structure of wage setting along with a low enough unemployment benefit will deter employment‐reducing inward FDI.     

DO BETTER PAID POLITICIANS PERFORM BETTER? DISENTANGLING INCENTIVES FROM SELECTION

The wage paid to politicians affects both the choice of citizens to run for office and the performance of those who are appointed. First, if skilled individuals shy away from politics because of higher opportunities in the private sector, an increase in politicians’ pay may change their mind. Second, if the re‐election prospects of incumbents depend on their in‐office deeds, a higher wage may foster performance. We use data on all Italian municipal governments from 1993 to 2001 and test these hypotheses in a quasi‐experimental setup. In Italy, the wage of mayors depends on population size and sharply rises at different thresholds. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the only threshold that uniquely identifies a wage increase: 5,000 inhabitants. Exploiting the existence of a two‐term limit, we further disentangle the composition from the incentive component of the effect of the wage on performance. Our results show that a higher wage attracts more‐educated candidates, and that better‐paid politicians size down the government machinery by improving efficiency. Importantly, most of this effect is driven by the selection of competent politicians, rather than by the incentive to be re‐elected.     

Preference Change and Increasing Wage Inequality

Abstract. This paper argues that preference change could explain, in part, the growth of within‐group wage inequality in the USA and the UK in the 1980s. The absence of such preference change in continental European countries might also help explain why their wage inequality did not rise in the same way. The argument relies on evidence from the World Values Surveys and uses an efficiency wage model of within‐group wage inequality where there are differences in the degree of discretion at work across firms and workers value not just the wage but also the degree of discretion on the job.     

Macroeconomic Effects of Public‐Sector Unions

Motivated by the highly unionized public sectors, the high public shares in total employment, and the public‐sector wage premia observed in Europe, this paper examines the importance of public‐sector unions for macroeconomic theory. The model generates cyclical behavior in hours and wages that is consistent with data behavior in an economy with highly unionized public sector, namely Germany during the period 1970–2007. The union model is an improvement over a model with exogenous public employment. In addition, endogenously determined public wage and hours add to the distortionary effect of contractionary tax reforms by generating greater tax rate changes, thus producing higher welfare losses.