Designing Supply Contracts Considering Profit Targets and Risk

Managers at all stages of a supply chain are concerned about meeting profit targets. We study contract design for a buyer–supplier supply chain, with each party maximizing expected profit subject to a chance constraint on meeting his respective profit target. We derive the optimal contract form (across all contract types) with randomized and deterministic payments. The best contract has the property that, if the chance constraints are binding, at most one party fails to satisfy his profit target for any given demand realization. This implies that “least risk sharing,”that is, minimizing the probability of outcomes for which both parties fail to achieve their profit targets, is optimal, contrary to the usual expectations of “risk sharing.” We show that an optimal contract can possess only two of the following three properties simultaneously: (i) supply chain coordination, (ii) truth‐telling, and (iii) non‐randomized payments. We discuss methods to mitigate the consequent implementation challenges. We also derive the optimal contract form when chance constraints are incorporated into several simpler and easier‐to‐implement contracts. From a numerical study, we find that an incremental returns contract (in which the marginal rebate rate depends on the return quantity) performs quite well across a relatively broad range of conditions.     

金融资产投资对创新投入的挤出效应研究

基于我国经济“脱实向虚”的宏观背景，文章研究了微观企业金融资产投资对创新投入的消极影响，以及融资融券制度在其中的作用。以2007-2015年A股上市公司为样本的实证检验发现，金融资产投资阻碍了企业的创新投入。其机制在于，金融资产投资不仅引入了较多的外部风险，而且加剧了创新投入面临的融资约束，进而对创新投入表现为显著的挤出效应。以融资融券制度的实施为契机，进一步研究发现，融资融券业务通过增加上市公司的风险与融资约束，最终加剧了金融资产投资对创新投入的挤出效应。因此，应防止上市公司过度从事金融资产投资，同时对融资融券制度进行优化，促使资本市场更好地服务实体经济。     

FINANCIAL FRAGILITY,LIQUIDITY, AND ASSET PRICES

We define a financial system to be fragile if small shocks have disproportionately large effects. In a model of financial intermediation, we show that small shocks to the demand for liquidity cause either high asset‐price volatility or bank defaults or both. Furthermore, as the liquidity shocks become vanishingly small, the asset‐price volatility is bounded away from zero. In the limit economy, with no shocks, there are many equilibria. However, if banks face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, then the only equilibria that are robust to the introduction of small aggregate risk involve stochastic consumption as well as volatile asset, prices. (JEL: D5, D8, G2)     

中小企业违约风险系统性和异质性测度——基于违约风险成分分析法的研究

与大中型企业相比,经济环境恶化或突发事件冲击使中小企业资产价值更易大幅下降,不仅单个企业违约风险急增,企业间的违约相关性也明显变大。然而不同类型中小企业违约风险变化特征仍有较大差异。为了更好测度中小企业违约风险、分析其相关性和差异性,本文在资产价值满足跳-扩散过程假定下,将或有权益分析法、组合违约风险分析与系统波动风险测度β相结合,把违约风险分解为系统成分和异质成分。系统成分越大,表明企业违约风险越易受外部经济环境和相关违约风险影响。异质成分越大则表明企业违约风险与自身异质性特征更为相关。实证研究表明,违约风险成分分析能较好解释中小企业违约风险的相关性和差异性,有助于违约风险分类管理。     

供应链中具有产能限制的竞争企业中的信息共享研究

本文研究由一个供货商和两个制造商组成的二级供应链中，制造商之间的横向信息共享策略和供应商的定价问题。在模型中，上游供应商同时为下游两家制造商提供价格相同的原材料，下游制造商生产具有替代性的商品进行数量竞争，并受到相同的产能限制。以Cournot博弈为研究手段，求解了制造商的均衡订货决策和信息共享策略，分析比较了在不同的信息共享策略下制造商的利润、供应商的利润和批发价格。本文在研究制造商的信息共享策略时考虑了上游供应商的批发价格的影响。研究表明，当均衡解受到产能约束时，制造商的信息共享策略会反向。在某些情况下，完全信息共享和完全信息不共享都可能成为博弈的占优策略。上游供应商通过调整批发价格可以影响制造商的信息共享决策。该模型为上游供应商提供了一种最优定价策略，也为下游制造商提供了求解自身最优订货量和信息共享决策的方法。     

Stable and Coordinating Contracts for a Supply Chain with Multiple Risk‐Averse Suppliers

We analyze a decentralized supply chain with a single risk‐averse retailer and multiple risk‐averse suppliers under a Conditional Value at Risk objective. We define coordinating contracts and show that the supply chain is coordinated only when the least risk‐averse agent bears the entire risk and the lowest‐cost supplier handles all production. However, due to competition, not all coordinating contracts are stable. Thus, we introduce the notion of contract core, which reflects the agents' “bargaining power” and restricts the set of coordinating contracts to a subset which is “credible.” We also study the concept of contract equilibrium, which helps to characterize contracts that are immune to opportunistic renegotiation. We show that, the concept of contract core imposes conditions on the share of profit among different agents, while the concept of contract equilibrium provide conditions on how the payment changes with the order quantity.     

制造商成本削减策略对风险规避型零售商信息共享策略的影响

考虑一个风险中性制造商和一个风险规避零售商构成的供应链，需求随机且受销售价格的影响。在销售季节之前，零售商对需求进行预测，获取需求信号；制造商对生产进行投资降低生产成本。基于零售商的不同信息共享策略及制造商的投资策略，考虑四种不同策略模型，分别得到最优零售价、批发价（及投资水平），并分析需求预测精确度对供应链成员决策和效用的影响。通过四种模型效用的对比分析，探讨制造商的投资策略以及零售商的风险规避态度对零售商信息共享策略的影响。研究发现，零售商共享需求信息对于制造商总是有益的，且制造商总是愿意采取成本削减策略；只有当制造商采取成本削减策略，且其投资成本系数较低时，共享需求信息对零售商才有益。最后，得到了制造商和零售商的均衡策略。     

Incentives for information sharing in duopoly with capacity constraints

We study the ex ante incentives for firms to share their private information in a Cournot duopoly with capacity constraints. In both demand and cost information sharing games, we show that the incentives can be reversed when some equilibrium solutions are binding on capacity. Especially, we identify some conditions under which partial information sharing is the dominant strategy under both games. Numerical examples are provided for illustration. In addition, we show that information sharing does not necessarily increase social welfare.     

Bounded leadership: An empirical study of leadership competencies,constraints, and effectiveness

Contrary to the previous leadership theories, which focus on specific and narrow aspects of leadership such as employee characteristics, leader’s authenticity, or boundary spanning, the bounded leadership theory is a broad and complex concept. It takes simultaneously many constraints, which are related to activities on an individual, team, organization, and stakeholder level. This study applies the bounded leadership theory to analyze the leadership constraints as the mediator of the relationship between leadership competencies and effectiveness. Our findings show that leaders’ competencies are not enough for them to be effective. Specific competencies enable leaders to overcome the set of constraints and then to increase their effectiveness.     

含有违约风险的利率风险管理

旨在解决含有违约风险的利率风险管理问题,指出了在商业银行资产负债管理中含有违约风险债券利率风险管理问题研究的必要性,获得了违约风险债券久期的一般公式,建立了含有对违约风险的控制、平均绝对离差约束、平衡表其它相关约束以及目标约束等在内的商业银行利率风险管理的目标规划模型;并在给出数值实例的基础上,讨论了违约风险的存在对银行利率风险管理的影响.     

生产能力限制下价格Stackelberg博弈模型

生产能力限制条件下,同质产品市场中两企业以价格为决策变量进行Stackelberg竞争,采取有效配给规则。两企业对称情况下,生产能力较小时模型存在唯一的子博弈精炼纳什均衡,两企业销量达到自身生产能力,得到相同收益;生产能力较大时,追随企业匹配领头企业的价格,博弈存在后动优势。分析了领头企业生产能力大于追随企业的不对称情形,并给出相应均衡。算例分析表明,企业价格竞争的前提是充分大的供给能力,追随企业应在领头企业生产能力较大时进入市场。     

Capital Mobility and Asset Pricing

We present a model for the equilibrium movement of capital between asset markets that are distinguished only by the levels of capital invested in each. Investment in that market with the greatest amount of capital earns the lowest risk premium. Intermediaries optimally trade off the costs of intermediation against fees that depend on the gain they can offer to investors for moving their capital to the market with the higher mean return. The bargaining power of an investor depends on potential access to alternative intermediaries. In equilibrium, the speeds of adjustment of mean returns and of capital between the two markets are increasing in the degree to which capital is imbalanced between the two markets, and can be reduced by competition among intermediaries.     

Channel Coordination with a Risk‐Neutral Supplier and a Downside‐Risk‐Averse Retailer

We investigate how a supply chain involving a risk‐neutral supplier and a downside‐risk‐averse retailer can be coordinated with a supply contract. We show that the standard buy‐back or revenue‐sharing contracts may not coordinate such a channel. Using a definition of coordination of supply chains proposed earlier by the authors, we design a risk‐sharing contract that offers the desired downside protection to the retailer, provides respective reservation profits to the agents, and accomplishes channel coordination.     

A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default

We study, theoretically and quantitatively, the general equilibrium of an economy in which households smooth consumption by means of both a riskless asset and unsecured loans with the option to default. The default option resembles a bankruptcy filing under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Competitive financial intermediaries offer a menu of loan sizes and interest rates wherein each loan makes zero profits. We prove the existence of a steady‐state equilibrium and characterize the circumstances under which a household defaults on its loans. We show that our model accounts for the main statistics regarding bankruptcy and unsecured credit while matching key macroeconomic aggregates, and the earnings and wealth distributions. We use this model to address the implications of a recent policy change that introduces a form of “means testing” for households contemplating a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing. We find that this policy change yields large welfare gains.     

VERTICAL RELATIONS UNDER CREDIT CONSTRAINTS

We model the impact that credit constraints and market risk have on the vertical relationships between firms in the supply chain. Firms which might face credit constraints in future investments become endogenously risk averse when accumulating pledgable assets. In the short run, the optimal supply contract involves risk sharing, so inducing double marginalization. Credit constraints thus result in higher retail prices, and this is true whether the firm is debt or equity funded. Further, we offer a new theory of supplier finance arms as we show an intrinsic complementarity between supply and lending which reduces financing inefficiencies created by informational asymmetries. The model offers: a theory of countervailing power based on credit constraints; a transmission mechanism linking the cost of borrowing with retail prices; and a motive for outsourcing supply (or distribution) in the face of market risk.     

时变损失厌恶下基于动态CVaR的ETF基金最优资产配置策略研究

首先对静态线性损失厌恶下的最优资产配置策略模型及其性质进行了分析,构建了基于TGARCH-EVT-POT-GPD的动态市场风险测度方法,提出了时变损失厌恶条件下基于动态条件风险约束的ETF基金最优资产配置策略模型,并基于遗传算法进行了求解。实证研究发现：当参考收益率及CVaR置信水平固定时,随着损失厌恶系数的增大,投资者采用大幅调整资产权重的方式来获得盈利的行为将逐渐减少;当参考收益率及损失厌恶系数固定且CVaR置信水平变化条件下,置信水平越高,损失厌恶投资者更偏好风险较低的资产,其对于投资风险的估计将更加敏感,投资策略更为保守;损失厌恶系数较高置信水平固定时,随着参考收益率的增加,单项资产的CVaR逐渐减小;在置信水平较高时,随着损失厌恶系数的增加,即使参考收益率增加,但投资组合的超额损失平均水平降低。     

流动性风险、投资者流动性需求与资产定价

依据证券市场的交易特点把投资者面临的市场流动性风险分解为外生和内生流动性风险,并引入流动性需求状态变量随机化了的投资者对证券的持有期限,得出基于流动性风险调整的资产定价模型.模型能够解释实证研究发现的投资者对流动性风险中不可分散的系统性部分要求相应的风险补偿现象.而且模型揭示出,流动性水平和市场流动性风险的补偿要求是投资者的流动性需求紧张程度的增函数,解释了流动性风险溢价的时变性现象.     

考虑风险规避的资金约束供应链最优信用契约设计

本文针对零售商的资金约束问题,研究了风险规避的供应商如何通过设计信用契约影响零售商的融资结构。构建了包含供应商、零售商以及银行在内的供应链融资模型,给出了供应商的最优信用契约决策、零售商的最优库存决策以及银行的最优利率决策。进一步分析了供应商的风险规避程度对最优信用契约决策的影响。研究表明：当供应商的风险规避程度低于某个临界值时,供应商偏好提供全额信用,从而零售商的融资结构为单一的交易信用融资;而当供应商的风险规避程度高于该临界值时,供应商偏好提供部分信用,从而零售商的融资结构为组合融资。最后,通过数值算例验证了本文的结论。本研究一定程度上丰富了现有供应链金融的理论研究,为供应链核心企业与银行的决策提供了依据与参考。     

外部风险、异质信念与特质波动率风险溢价

本文将影响资产价格的不确定性划分为基本面不确定性、市场层面以及公司层面外部因素不确定性,(后二者对基本面没有影响,是非基本面因素),认为投资者对基本面和外部因素分别形成异质信念.在此基础上用连续时间的鞅分析方法,在纯交换市场均衡模型的框架下,建立了基于投资者异质信念的消费资本资产定价模型.该模型从理论上证明了除来自总消...     

“特质波动率之谜”与估计模型有关吗？

以CAPM、Fama-French三因子和五因子模型为均值方程,分别采用无条件标准差,以及GARCH、EGARCH条件方差为基准计算出中国股票市场的特质波动率,研究了特质波动率与股票收益率之间的关系。研究发现,关于高特质波动风险对应低预期收益的定价异象来源于特质波动率估计模型的差异。具体地,当使用无条件标准差方式估计特质波动率时,存在定价异象,而使用GARCH、EGARCH等条件方差模型估计特质波动率时,则不存在定价异象。该结果在改变残差估计均值方程以及控制规模、流动性等其它变量后依然稳健。本文的研究有助于解释长期困扰在资产定价领域的“特质波动率之谜”。