关键字广告位拍卖的收益等价性研究

拍卖是搜索引擎提供商为关键字广告位定价的新形式,实践中演化出了多种具体的拍卖操作方式.本文分析了在两种典型的不同拍卖形式-投标信息公开与不公开方式下,以及投标者具有不同的信息结构、关键字广告位和投标者人数相对数量不同等情形下,Winner-pay和All-pay支付规则下拍卖收益的大小,对比研究得出了在两种支付规则下卖方收益相等的结论.其中,投标者具有不完全信息的情况下,本文结论的两个特例分别是单物品和同质多物品拍卖在两种支付规则下拍卖收益相等,因此该研究结论扩展了已有的研究结论.     

关键词拍卖中基于广义第一价格的投标价格决策分析

在关键词拍卖中,由于广告商不能保证对关键词的估价是最优投标价格,因此如何选取最优的关键词投标价格一直是广告商急于解决的问题。基于与Friedman投标模型假设条件等价的关键词拍卖投标假设条件,计算了各个关键词广告位置的胜标概率,并在广义第一价格拍卖机制下建立了关键词投标价格决策模型。该模型可以使广告商选取最优的关键词投标价格。最后通过仿真验证了该模型的有效性。     

债券投标专利拍卖：均衡策略与期望收益

债券投标是一种操作简易的证券投标，常用于成长型中小企业参与投标的专利拍卖。在债券投标专利拍卖中，获胜企业在其产业利润实现之后支付其报价，如果其产业利润还足以支付其报价，则支付其全部产业利润。本文建立了一个存在N个投标企业的拍卖模型，研究了在债券投标专利拍卖中，一价拍卖和二价拍卖下企业的均衡投标策略和专利持有者的期望收益，并将其与现金投标专利拍卖进行比较。研究结果发现，企业在债券投标专利拍卖中的均衡投标高于现金投标专利拍卖的均衡投标，且二价现金投标专利拍卖和二价债券投标专利拍卖的均衡投标策略不随企业类型分布的变化和参与企业个数的变化而变化；专利持有者在债券投标专利拍卖中获得的期望收益高于现金投标专利拍卖的期望收益；在债券投标专利拍卖中，二价债券投标专利拍卖的期望收益高于一价债券投标专利拍卖的期望收益。     

网络欺诈环境下3种拍卖方式的投标均衡和收益分析

针对英式拍卖、首价密封价格投标拍卖和次价密封价格拍卖的特点,以及欺诈的网络环境中3种拍卖方式下最可能出现的欺诈类型,分析了诚实投标者赢得拍卖的概率和其贝叶斯纳什均衡投标策略.数值计算了这3种投标方式下的投标者期望收益和拍卖方期望收益损失.通过计算结果的比较得到欺诈环境下,分别采用这3种拍卖方式时,投标者期望收益和拍卖方期望收益损失和投标者人数、欺诈概率、投标者估价函数等关系的一般结论.同时也表明,在欺诈的网络环境下,采用英式拍卖,投标者将获得最大的期望收益,而拍卖方也将获得最小的期望收益损失,所以,英式拍卖在网络欺诈环境下仍然是一种流行的拍卖方式.     

基于演化博弈的风险投资退出歧视价格拍卖竞价系统均衡研究

本文以风险投资退出股权歧视价格拍卖为研究背景,运用演化博弈的方法研究异质投标企业的竞价策略,得出了在不同的市场供需情况下竞价策略演化的一般规律。研究表明:竞价系统最终均衡不仅与投标企业相对支付有关,而且与市场供需情况以及系统初始状态有关。最后指出通过设置竞价下限、隐藏市场供给以及信号传递可以有效地促进投标企业选择高价策略。     

品牌商主导的混合渠道OEM供应链价格折扣和收益补偿协调研究北大核心CSSCI

构建了一个由品牌商和制造商组成的贴牌渠道与直销渠道并存的混合渠道贴牌生产供应链模型,比较分析了品牌商作为Stackelberg主方时集中决策与分散决策下供应链成员的最优价格、销量和利润情况,从直销渠道与贴牌渠道合作的角度出发,研究了混合渠道贴牌生产供应链的价格折扣和收益补偿协调机制,论证了该机制能够使供应链总利润最大化并实现混合渠道供应链成员双赢的完美协调。最后,通过算例说明了渠道转移系数和品牌溢价对品牌商、制造商以及供应链系统利润增量的影响,验证了协调机制的有效性。     

基于有限理性的一级密封价格拍卖灰博弈模型研究——基于准确的价值和经验理想报价估价的最优灰报价模型

运用灰系统理论的思想[1],对目前的一级密封价格拍卖博弈模型进行检验和验证,并对其存在的一些缺陷进行了剖析,认为这些经典模型对条件的限制过于严格,与现实的吻合性较差.基于有限理性假设,设计了经验理想报价灰修正系数,建立了基于准确的价值和经验理想报价估价的有限理性最优灰报价模型.对该模型灰系数进行第一标准灰数变换,找到了投标人的威胁反应灰系数;发现了投标人的最优灰报价不仅取决于其自身的价值,而且还取决于他人的价值及其威胁反应灰系数;投标人的最优灰报价不仅仅刚好为其对被拍物品所认可价值的一半,而要视情而定,一般情况下均高于其所认可价值的一半.对该模型进行了数据仿真,得到一些与经典模型有较大差异的有价值的结论,并建议了投标人的最佳投标模式.     

First‐Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

We explore the impact of private information in sealed‐bid first‐price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning‐bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between their equilibrium bids and all higher bids. Our results provide lower bounds for bids and revenue with asymmetric distributions over values. We also report further characterizations of revenue and bidder surplus including upper bounds on revenue. Our work has implications for the identification of value distributions from data on winning bids and for the informationally robust comparison of alternative auction mechanisms.     

Characterization of Revenue Equivalence

The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. We give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results are immediate consequences. Moreover, revenue equivalence can be identified in cases where existing theorems are silent.     

投标与拍卖的几个数学模型

主要介绍关于投标与拍卖的几个典型的决策理论模型,包括Friedman模型、Gates模型、Nanssman—Rivett模型和Willenbrock模型,并对它们进行简短评述     

拍卖中的串通出价

本文在扩展的独立私有价值模型下,考虑第二价格和第一价格拍卖机制下的串通出价行为和卖方对串通出价的反映。第二价格串通出价机制和第一价格串通出价机制分别为在这两种拍卖机制下的激励相容、有效的直接显示串通出价机制。我们发现卖方若知道有串通行为,可以提高保留价来减少损失。由于卖方一般情况下不太可能确定是否存在串通行为及参与串通的人数k,但可以确定给定保留价时串通人数的'最优反应',在第二价格串通出价机制下,给定串通人数,增加保留价可以提高卖方的期望收益,对于确定的保留价,串通人数的增加会减少卖方的期望收益。从而存在这样的纳什均衡:所有的投标人串通,即,k=N,而卖方宣布与之相应的保留价r (N)。当然,并不是所有的串通出价对投标人都是有利可图的,在第一价格拍卖机制下,若卖方可以调整保留价,只有当参与竞投的人很多时,串通出价才有利可图。     

增价拍卖中跳跃式报价问题研究综述

跳跃式报价已逐渐成为增价拍卖中非常流行的现象.总结国外文献发现,对跳跃式报价问题的研究,主要集中在动机及其对拍卖预期收益影响效应2个方面.国外研究者对跳跃式报价动机的解释主要存在2种不同的观点:信号传递和策略性或是缺乏耐性出价.对跳跃式报价的拍卖收益效应的结论基本一致,即对拍卖方具有负效应,对投标者具有正效应.     

The Effect of Timing on Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions

We investigate the role of timing in ascending auctions under the premise that time is a valuable resource. Traditional models of the English auction ignore timing issues by assuming that the auction occurs instantaneously. However, when auctions are slow, as Internet auctions used for procurement often are, there are significant opportunity or monitoring costs to bidders, and the choice of the size of the jump bid becomes a strategic decision. We study the choice in the experimental laboratory by systematically varying the opportunity costs associated with fast bidding. When time is more valuable bidders respond by choosing larger jump bids. Surprisingly, the economic performance of the auction is not significantly affected. We develop a simple model of ascending auctions with impatient bidders that provides insights into the effect jump bids have on auction performance.     

Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1

We show existence of equilibria in distributional strategies for a wide class of private value auctions, including the first general existence result for double auctions. The set of equilibria is invariant to the tie‐breaking rule. The model incorporates multiple unit demands, all standard pricing rules, reserve prices, entry costs, and stochastic demand and supply. Valuations can be correlated and asymmetrically distributed. For double auctions, we show further that at least one equilibrium involves a positive volume of trade. The existence proof establishes new connections among existence techniques for discontinuous Bayesian games.     

A Framework for Estimating Benefits of Using Auctions in Revenue Management*

We develop a stochastic model to explore the benefits of incorporating auctions in revenue management. To the best of our knowledge the extant literature on modeling in revenue management has not considered auctions. We consider three models, namely, a traditional fixed price (non‐auction) model, a pure auction model, and a hybrid auction model and evaluate their revenue performance under a variety of conditions. The hybrid approach outperforms the other two in all 24 scenarios and yields an average revenue increase of 16.1% over the next best. A surprise finding is that there is no significant difference between the performance of the fixed price and pure auction approaches. A sensitivity analysis reveals that the relative superiority of the hybrid revenue management strategy is reasonably robust.