中国农村民主选举中的提名方式及实施绩效分析--对陕西6个县34个村调查结果的实证分析

提名方式是民主选举中的主要组成部分 ,也是选举制度有效实施的关键 ,民主选举内在地要求候选人的提名应具有不确定性。本文重点分析了中国农村基层民主选举中的3种候选人提名方式:村民公开提名、村委会提名和乡党委提名。通过设置变量以及对陕西6个县34个村调查研究结果的实证性分析 ,研究了不同提名方式与民主制度的实施绩效之间的关系。     

The shadow dance of political climate: Engagement in political behavior in local government authorities

In describing the processes of organizations as political acts, we are not making a moral judgment; we simply are making an observation about a process. Bacharach and Lawler, 1980, p. 2.This study focuses on the ways a perceived political climate influences engagement in political behavior during a national election period. By using social cognitive theory as a way to predict behavior in organizations, we study how managers' engagement in political behavior is shaped. A qualitative research methodology was used. Sixteen interviews with managers were conducted in various local authorities during the 2015 election campaign for Israel's parliament. Participants perceived an intensification of political climate during the pre-election period, which they attributed to a significant connection between electoral and intraorganizational politics. Additionally, a perceived organizational political climate intensifies engagement in a range of political behaviors throughout an organization and is connected with an administrative role. The findings suggest that managers use “political capital” that the election period provides to influence and manipulate their organization's future and their own.     

关于中国上市公司经营者持股情况的研究

本研究以中国上市公司为抽样总体,从上千家企业中随机抽取315家企业作为样本进行统计分析,对2000年上市公司经营者的持股情况进行总体考察,结果发现,2000年经营者的货币年薪比前两年有了很大程度的提高,但是,股票持有量并没有太大的变化,经营者“零持股”的现象仍然大量存在;从中美企业经营者薪酬结构的比较中可以看出,我国经营者激励形式单一,结构具有不合理性,股票期权等长期激励所占的比例非常小;我国经营者的年薪与持有的股票数量正相关;Logistic回归发现能够显著预测经营者是否获得股票的变量只有净资产收益率和经营者的年龄两个变量。但是,净资产收益率的作用却是反向的。     

Combinatorial Voting

We study elections that simultaneously decide multiple issues, where voters have independent private values over bundles of issues. The innovation is in considering nonseparable preferences, where issues may be complements or substitutes. Voters face a political exposure problem: the optimal vote for a particular issue will depend on the resolution of the other issues. Moreover, the probabilities that the other issues will pass should be conditioned on being pivotal. We prove that equilibrium exists when distributions over values have full support or when issues are complements. We then study large elections with two issues. There exists a nonempty open set of distributions where the probability of either issue passing fails to converge to either 1 or 0 for all limit equilibria. Thus, the outcomes of large elections are not generically predictable with independent private values, despite the fact that there is no aggregate uncertainty regarding fundamentals. While the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the outcome of a multi‐issue election, we provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the implementation of the Condorcet winner.     

Tall claims? Sense and nonsense about the importance of height of US presidents

According to both the scientific literature and popular media, all one needs to win a US presidential election is to be taller than one's opponent. Yet, such claims are often based on an arbitrary selection of elections, and inadequate statistical analysis. Using data on all presidential elections, we show that height is indeed an important factor in the US presidential elections. Candidates that were taller than their opponents received more popular votes, although they were not significantly more likely to win the actual election. Taller presidents were also more likely to be reelected. In addition, presidents were, on average, much taller than men from the same birth cohort. The advantage of taller candidates is potentially explained by perceptions associated with height: taller presidents are rated by experts as ‘greater’, and having more leadership and communication skills. We conclude that height is an important characteristic in choosing and evaluating political leaders.     

Cost-effectiveness and coverage policy.

Cost-effectiveness analyses have become a pervasive element of health care. But they have not had a major impact on medical coverage policy. The challenge of implementing cost-effectiveness as a medical coverage criterion is related to the following issues: (1) Contract language does not include cost-effectiveness as a coverage criterion; (2) cost-effectiveness analyses often take the societal, population-based perspective, while health care is delivered on an individual basis; (3) there is no standard methodology for cost-effective analysis; (4) there is no explicit cut-off between cost-effective and cost-ineffective; and (5) cost-effectiveness analyses are not time sensitive.     

Constraint-based model for the cyclic multi-hoists scheduling problem

This article presents a method for the resolution of a material handling scheduling problem. The case studied is a real industrial problem. It consists of finding a cyclic schedule for hoist movements in a treatment surface shop. In this kind of facility, several hoists are used for all the handling operations and they have to share common zones. Then it is necessary to control that there is no collision. The mathematical formulation of the problem is based on a combination of disjunctive constraints. The constraints describe either movement schedule or collision avoidance. The resolution procedure presented identifies all the collision configurations and then uses a branch and bound-like algorithm to find the optimal solution of a given problem. The language chosen for our implementation is the constraint logic programming language: Prolog IV, which is able to solve constraints with rational variables. It actively uses the constraint propagation mechanism that can be found in several languages.     

Management,productivity and risk—The way ahead

Any world in transition is not short of things to argue about and we are now in transition. How our arguments are settled, whatsoever may be the virtue of the settlements, may be important. It has recently been suggested, for example, that 10 British governments have made over thirty fiscal interventions in the conduct of manufacturing industry since the Second World War, in addition to such general economic encouragements as tinkering with the minimum lending rate and the exchange value of the currency. A few of these ups-and-downs are the result of policies argued about during general election campaigns, to be sure, but even they, as well as all the others, are largely based on the advice of experts of one kind or another. But when we ask ourselves from where these experts seek the foundations of their advice, we discover a professional world no less short of its internal dissensions; when successive governments take sides with the different schools of experts, we may expect to find our transitional world also in violent oscillation. Expert controversy then may become mere intellectual brawling; this can be noticed within the professions and even lead to some soul searching.... As Johnson observed, after his efforts to secure the reprieve of a well-known preacher had failed: “Depend upon it, Sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in fortnight, it concentrates his attention wonderfully”. There is much concentrating of the attention just now. But we need to ask what to concentrate it on; nothing is as bad as the ill-conceived plan efficiently carried out, with its insistence on answering the wrong questions rather than in identifying the right ones. In the regenerative confusion of these iron times, our first need is to recognise the most discriminating questions obscured beneath the distractions of constant change; it is a need no less imperative for a profession like operational research than for the most quick-witted and evasive of party politicians. The doubts thrown on the credentials of our trade by Russell Ackoff's two recent papers are no more than the sentiment of the music hall song: “All dressed up but nowhere to go!” It is, in other words, easy to arm oneself with technique—indeed, with an arsenal of different techniques—but much more difficult to know what to do with it. There is no general theory of search, because if you do not know what you are looking for you do not know how to sample your experience. You must therefore start to guess. Decisions about the future, whether or not taken on the advice of experts, call for intelligent conjecture (if they are to be thought out) or just for simple guesswork (if they need not be). But since experts do not like risking their reputations, they are averse to guessing; they prefer to bank on the certainties of the elapsed past rather than to grope blindfold into the future. This paper suggests that action learning may be one means of concentrating attention upon the questions dying to be asked.     

The corporate board: confronting the paradoxes

Corporate governance and the role of boards is a topic hotly debated in boardrooms, associations and media across the industrialized world. However intense, discussions are largely national phenomena due to the widespread belief that boards cannot be compared on an international plane. The authors argue the contrary: that there is a great deal to be learned from such comparisons because boards in different countries are more similar than they are different. Insights are drawn from a four-year study the authors have conducted involving boards from eight countries. The full results have been published earlier this year by Oxford University Press, as The Corporate Board; Confronting the Paradoxes.     

Estimating the Probability of Rare Events: Addressing Zero Failure Data

Traditional statistical procedures for estimating the probability of an event result in an estimate of zero when no events are realized. Alternative inferential procedures have been proposed for the situation where zero events have been realized but often these are ad hoc, relying on selecting methods dependent on the data that have been realized. Such data‐dependent inference decisions violate fundamental statistical principles, resulting in estimation procedures whose benefits are difficult to assess. In this article, we propose estimating the probability of an event occurring through minimax inference on the probability that future samples of equal size realize no more events than that in the data on which the inference is based. Although motivated by inference on rare events, the method is not restricted to zero event data and closely approximates the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) for nonzero data. The use of the minimax procedure provides a risk adverse inferential procedure where there are no events realized. A comparison is made with the MLE and regions of the underlying probability are identified where this approach is superior. Moreover, a comparison is made with three standard approaches to supporting inference where no event data are realized, which we argue are unduly pessimistic. We show that for situations of zero events the estimator can be simply approximated with , where n is the number of trials.     

Is the professional self-managing or is there really a need for professional management?

Is the professional self-managing or is there really a need for professional management? The answer to that question is in both cases: “Yes”. The professional is largely responsible for directing his own activities. Managers must take due account of this by applying rules and procedures on a modest scale and aiming to achieve maximum harmonisation of the objectives of the organisation and the personal objectives of the people working there. If they can do that then there can be said to be professional management.The difficulty in managing professionals is the difficulty in steering the force and the direction of the thinking of others who are — by nature - often differently-minded: professionals have generally followed a specialised, usually scientific education, enjoy a high social standing, like to “perform solo”, have a dislike of management both in the active and the passive sense and the output of their work is difficult for others to evaluate because there is generally no clear consensus on the definition of performance indicators.Managing professionals could be considered as managing brain capacity and that calls for more than just good sense. A manager of a group of professionals can even sometimes experience a great deal of professional pleasure in his work if he is capable of acting as a specialised generalist, pacemaker and coach for his or her team.     

Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates

In this paper we focus on strategic voting behavior when both an election and a signaling motivation affect voters' behavior. We analyze a model of elections with two candidates competing on a one‐dimensional policy space. Voters are privately and imperfectly informed about a common shock affecting the electorate's preferences. Candidates are assumed to choose policy in response to information gleaned from election results and according to exogenous factors that may lead to polarization in candidates' policy choices. We analyze a subset of symmetric equilibria in which strategies are symmetric to candidates' names and private signals (CSS equilibria). We show that signaling and election motivations pull voters to vote in different directions. We provide conditions that show the relation between the amount of information aggregated in the election and the motivation that influences voting behavior the most. Finally, we show that when candidates are responsive and polarized, all CSS equilibria are inefficient in the limit.     

Refocusing the Focus Group: AIRing as a Basis for Effective Workplace Planning

Organizations commonly make use of focus groups for planning purposes while giving little thought to the dimensions on which those groups are formed. This paper argues that the dimensions of group formation have a significant effect on the ultimate success of any planning exercise. This is because in all organizations people necessarily self‐categorize as members of groups that shape the way they think and act at work. However, there is often a lack of fit between the way organizations categorize employees and the way those employees categorize themselves. To the extent that there is a lack of fit between imposed and self‐identified categories, we argue that organizations will fail to effectively harness group resources. Any planning strategy that makes use of groups should organize people in terms of identities that are most relevant to their work in order (a) to have an impact on the way people think and act and (b) to ensure that people have (and feel that they have) the opportunity to provide input that is relevant, useful and important for the organization. The paper discusses a technique, AIRing, that allows organizations to address this issue effectively. This is the first stage of the ASPIRe negotiation‐based planning model (Eggins et al., Social Identity at Work: Developing Theory for Organizational Practice, pp. 241–260, Philadelphia, PA: Taylor & Francis, 2003; Haslam et al., British Journal of Management, 14 (2003), pp. 357–369).     

One Person,Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation

This paper shows that information imperfections and common values can solve coordination problems in multicandidate elections. We analyze an election in which (i) the majority is divided between two alternatives and (ii) the minority backs a third alternative, which the majority views as strictly inferior. Standard analyses assume voters have a fixed preference ordering over candidates. Coordination problems cannot be overcome in such a case, and it is possible that inferior candidates win. In our setup the majority is also divided as a result of information imperfections. The majority thus faces two problems: aggregating information and coordinating to defeat the minority candidate. We show that when the common value component is strong enough, approval voting produces full information and coordination equivalence: the equilibrium is unique and solves both problems. Thus, the need for information aggregation helps resolve the majority's coordination problem under approval voting. This is not the case under standard electoral systems.     

ELECTED VERSUS APPOINTED REGULATORS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues the appointing politicians are responsible for. Because voters have only one vote to cast and regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, there are electoral incentives to respond to stakeholder interests. If regulators are elected, their stance on regulation is the only salient issue so that the electoral incentive is to run a pro‐consumer candidate. Using panel data on regulatory outcomes from U.S. states, we find new evidence in favor of the idea that elected states are more pro‐consumer in their regulatory policies. (JEL: H1, K2)     

Productivity Competitiveness among Non Cooperating Integrated Economies: A Negative-Sum Game

ABSTRACT: The strategies adopted by European countries during the 1970‘s and 1980‘s have been unsuccessful in their attempt to produce more employment. These strategies have been centred on attempts to improve the international position of a country at the expense of the others through increasing productivity and competitiveness. The negative effects on employment due to higher productivity should have been offset, in the longer run, by an increasing share of exports. But the eventual result has been that relative positions of countries have remained fundamentally unchanged. This is due to the fact that all countries adopted the same strategy. Aggressive strategies do not pay in terms of employment. More effective policies, in a situation characterized by accelerated technical progress, can be more easily implemented in a more co-operative international context. Even if there is no moral solidarity between the nearly related races of Europe, there is an economic solidarity which we cannot disregard. Even now the world markets are one. This is to put the issue on its lowest grounds. There are other arguments, which the most obtuse cannot ignore, against a policy of spreading and encouraging further the economic ruin of great countries (J.M. Keynes) ¹⁸     

A spanning heuristic for the unordered and ordered matching identification problem

The matching identification problem (MIP) is a combinatoric search problem related to the fields of learning from examples, boolean functions, and knowledge acquisition. The MIP involves identifying a single “goal” item from a large set of items. Because there is commonly a cost associated with evaluating each guess, the goal item should be identified in as few guesses as possible. As in most search problems, the items have a similar structure, which allows an evaluation of each guessed item. In other words, each guessed item elicits partial information about the goal item, i.e. how similar the guess is to the goal. With this information the goal is more quickly identified.The unordered MIP has been studied by Mehrez and Steinberg (ORSA J. Comput. 7 (1995) 211) in which they proposed two different types of algorithms. The purpose of the present paper is to suggest an improved Spanning Heuristic algorithm. Its improvement increases as the problem size increases. Further results and comparisons are derived for the unordered and ordered cases.This research shows that when the search space is very large, it is better to inquire from items that are known not to be the goal (they have been ruled out by previous guesses), for the purpose of acquiring more information about the goal. As the search space is narrowed, it is better to guess items that have not been ruled out.     

The financial crisis,investor activists and corporate strategy: will this mean shareholders in the boardroom?

The concept of stakeholder engagement is gaining increasing attention in the mainstream media and may feature as part of a corporation’s strategy for corporate social responsibility. Not only are boards considering how they might engage with key stakeholders, but stakeholders are also pursuing greater participation in the strategic decisions of companies in which they invest. While this is an emerging concept in companies governed by unitary boards, as in North America, the issue of stakeholder engagement in various forms is also entering debate in other countries around the world. In general, however, the idea of shareholder or stakeholder representation on the boards of most UK and Commonwealth companies is anathema. Forces now influencing the development of strategies for stakeholder engagement and the rise of active investors include changing corporate governance rules which give investors more power in the election of directors, the increasing role of pension plans and hedge fund investment groups which have produced investors who keep a close eye on company performance and value, and a sluggish or turbulent stock market as a result of the financial crisis initiated by the credit crunch in the sub-prime mortgage markets. In this paper the phenomenon of stakeholder representation is examined and results of a recent survey conducted among a large sample of New Zealand directors are presented. The findings suggest that these traditionally oriented boards are increasingly inwardly focused and are without an agenda for building and managing shareholder and stakeholder relations. Accordingly, such boards are unlikely to regard stakeholder engagement as a serious strategic issue and are thus also likely to miss significant opportunities in the changed business environment to benefit from stakeholder support.     

'Management Standards' work-related stress in the UK: practical development

Research commissioned for the UK's Health & Safety Executive (HSE) supports the view that a preventative, risk-assessment based approach would be more effective than case-based methods in achieving a nationwide reduction in work-related stress. The background to this approach is described and discussed in a companion paper in this issue (Mackay, Cousins, Kelly, Lee, & McCaig, 2004). The present paper describes the development of HSE's new stress Management Standards—which offer organizations continuous improvement through a three-phase stress preventative process—and the development of a supporting 'Indicator Tool' (a two-phase questionnaire to assess employee perceptions of working conditions). The Management Standards comprise a series of 'states to be achieved', which are statements of good practice in six key stressor areas: demands, control, support, relationships, role and organizational change. For each stressor area there is also a 'platform statement' that outlines the main aims to be achieved by the organization. This statement may include a target percentage of employees finding that the organization meets the standard: this matter will be settled after the standards have been assessed in a public consultation campaign. To use the new process, an organization's state can first be assessed using the Indicator Tool; liaising with workers in focus groups enables a further exploration of issues raised; finally, there may be formulation of interventions and subsequent review. It is not intended that the standards will be legally enforceable. HSE's aim is that they and the associated methodology will enable organizations to effectively tackle work-related stress, and subsequently reduce both its incidence and prevalence.     

Competition for a Majority

We define the class of two‐player zero‐sum games with payoffs having mild discontinuities, which in applications typically stem from how ties are resolved. For such games, we establish sufficient conditions for existence of a value of the game, maximin and minimax strategies for the players, and a Nash equilibrium. If all discontinuities favor one player, then a value exists and that player has a maximin strategy. A property called payoff approachability implies existence of an equilibrium, and that the resulting value is invariant: games with the same payoffs at points of continuity have the same value and ɛ‐equilibria. For voting games in which two candidates propose policies and a candidate wins election if a weighted majority of voters prefer his proposed policy, we provide tie‐breaking rules and assumptions about voters' preferences sufficient to imply payoff approachability. These assumptions are satisfied by generic preferences if the dimension of the space of policies exceeds the number of voters; or with no dimensional restriction, if the electorate is sufficiently large. Each Colonel Blotto game is a special case in which each candidate allocates a resource among several constituencies and a candidate gets votes from those allocated more than his opponent offers; in this case, for simple‐majority rule we prove existence of an equilibrium with zero probability of ties.