Leverage and the performance of buyouts

In this paper we investigate the effects of debt usage on (risk-adjusted) equity returns in private equity-backed buyout transactions. We use a proprietary data set of more than 700 realized European and North American buyouts acquired between 1990 and 2006 to empirically assess theoretical predictions. Our results show a positive relationship between debt levels and equity returns indicating the return-enhancing effects related to leverage. However, our results also provide evidence that it is possible to ‘over-leverage’ a company, i.e. at very high levels of leverage (debt to total capital of approximately 90%) the increased company default risk outweighs the positive effects related to leverage resulting in decreasing equity returns. On the other side, we find no significant relationship between leverage and risk-adjusted equity returns which implies that the return increase through higher debt ratios comes along with increasing risk. In addition, we show that private equity sponsors successfully conduct debt-equity-arbitrage in times of favorable debt market conditions. This implies that these investors successfully time debt markets.     

股权收购(Buyouts)的债务估值和违约决策

杠杆收购是股权收购交易的主要形式,所以对于股权收购而言,债权和股权的价值估算至关重要。但一方面鉴于股权收购交易所需的大量资金,股权收购主要采用分层债务结构进行债务融资,另一方面囿于收购的目标公司具有显著的特质风险,传统的Leland模型无法对这类债务和股权进行定价。为此,本文基于股权收购的多层融资结构,构建数理模型研究了股权收购交易的债权和股权的定价方法,并分析了最优破产决策和违约概率。基于实证参数值,模型预测的股东内部收益率和违约概率与实证结论十分接近。当标的资产价值下降时,目标公司的杠杆比率快速提升,优先级较低的债务迅速贬值,从而解释了投资者抢购安全资产的动机。通过对比分析,本文发现采用单层融资结构会提高融资成本,使得股权受损,这为分层债务结构提供了理论依据。最后,本文比较静态分析了标的资产波动率和市场利率对估值和破产决策的影响,结论支持了实证研究中有关市场利率与股权收购相关性的结论。     

Der Einfluss der Zinsschranke auf unternehmerische Kapitalstrukturentscheidungen

In principle corporations are free to raise debt capital or equity capital. To protect tax revenues and to increase corporations?? equity ratio Germany has introduced an interest ceiling rule. From a tax planer??s point of view it is not clear whether debt or equity capital is advantageous. On the basis of Miller (J Finance 32:261?C275, 1977) we analyze whether this interest ceiling rule discriminates debt capital against equity capital. We find that investors can be indifferent towards the capital structure with and without considering the interest ceiling rule. This result does not depend on the investors?? percentage of participation or the corporation??s optimal dividend policy. The result depends significantly on the profit, the deductible fraction of EBITDA, the tax rates and when capital gains are realized. The advantage of debt capital normally decreases due to the introduction of this regulation but in some cases even increases. Nevertheless, many investors will prefer debt capital even when the interest ceiling rule applies. This result also arises in the case of external debt financing. Thus, it is an open question whether this regulation leads to higher equity ratios.     

资本结构、股权融资和企业投资行为

本文建立了一个基于资本结构和股权融资的企业投资决策模型,内生地获得了企业投资时机、破产时机和股权出售比率,克服了传统企业投资决策模型研究不考虑融资影响的不足。本文模型的仿真结果表明,企业的初始债务和投资时的股权融资对企业投资具有较强的影响:初始债务对企业投资具有推动作用,而投资时的股权融资对企业投资产生抑制作用,这两方面的共同作用会导致企业的投资不足或过度。     

双重异质信念下中国上市公司融资决策研究

投资者异质信念与投资者-管理者异质信念是我国资本市场的重要特征。本文在双重异质信念假设下,基于我国上市公司融资环境,建立融资决策模型,分析双重异质信念对我国上市公司股权债权融资选择的影响,得到结论:(1)卖空限制下,投资者异质信念越大,公司越倾向于股权融资;(2)投资者-管理者异质信念越小,公司越倾向于股权融资。以2005-2009年沪深A股再融资公司为样本,采用单变量分析和Probit多元回归方法,对模型结论进行实证检验,实证结果支持模型结论,并从双重异质信念的视角对我国资本市场融资异象进行解释。     

布莱克─肖尔斯期权定价模型在公司价值评估中的应用

公司股票、债券在本质上可看成是基于公司资产的期权,因而可用期权定价方法对其价值进行评估。本文介绍了最典型的期权定价模型─布莱克一肖尔斯期权定价模型,分析了该模型在公司证券价值评估中的应用。     

负债代理冲突影响企业投资行为的实物期权分析

本文利用实物期权方法研究了负债代理冲突下的企业投资决策问题.与现有的研究文献不同,本文不仅考虑了无破产代理下的股东投资目标异化对企业投资决策的影响机理,而且分析了破产代理冲突所导致的企业投资决策扭曲问题.研究结果表明:负债企业股东通常存在过度投资现象,这种过度投资一方面来自投资目标异化影响下的股东对税收利益的过度追逐,另一方面来自策略性违约破产对股东投资风险的庇护作用.在较低负债水平下,前者是企业投资决策扭曲的主导机制;在较高负债水平下,后者的影响则更为显著.并且,高风险项目更容易产生投资目标异化下的投资扭曲,而破产代理下的高成长项目的投资扭曲则会更加严重.     

代理冲突下企业多元化投资行为的实物期权分析

利用实物期权的方法,本文分别建立了以股东利益最大化以及企业价值最大化为目标时的负债企业多元化投资模型.通过两种决策目标下多元化投资政策的比较,分析了负债代理下股东存在的投资决策非最优化问题.结果发现,若负债企业在投资前后都不存在债务风险,股东的投资决策将符合企业价值最大化原则;若投资能使债务由无风险变为有风险,企业将过度投资;若投资前后都存在风险,企业将投资不足.     

公司债务与内生破产的实物期权方法分析

本文利用实物期权方法在风险中性概率测试下研究公司的债务与内生破产问题。将公司破产与接管理解为股东和债权人持有的期权,在得到写在公司资产上的各种相机权益的价值后,本文详细讨论风险债务的债权人在公司破产时选择破产清算或破产营运时公司债务水平与破产决策之间的关系,分析了不同杠杆水平的公司破产决策问题,发现公司债务对公司的破产决策具有重要影响。杠杆公司股东策略违约的破产时间与公司价值最大化的时间通常不一致,破产导致公司价值损失;而且由于杠杆融资,公司破产时间与纯股本公司破产时间不一致,破产带来效率损失。本文的分析对我国公司债务与破产政策的研究具有一定借鉴意义。     

上市公司资本结构影响因素经验研究

本文结合我国上市公司的融资条件、产业演进阶段及独特的股东结构建立了资本结构的三个研究假说并对其进行了检验。研究发现,股权融资与负债之间既有“互补作用”,又有“替代作用”;产业演进和公司战略对长期借款和贸易应付款有显著影响,对短期借款水平没有显著影响;国有股比例和流通股比例对上市公司资本结构和负债期限几乎没有影响,而第一大股东持股比例对短期借款率和总负债率有显著的负向影响。     

基于或有可转债的债务悬空应对方法及其定价研究

债务悬空(Debt Overhang)会导致公司陷入财务困境,阻滞其开展正常的投融资活动。现有研究表明,发行或有可转债(Contingent Convertible Bonds,简称CoCos)有望成为一种应对债务悬空的有效方法。本文以债务悬空应对方法及其定价为研究主题,通过改进CoCos债转股的触发阈值,即以债务悬空发生时公司资产账面价值作为触发阈值,以解决现有CoCos产品在债务悬空应对的适配性方面的不足。具体地,结合债务悬空发生时公司资本结构的特征,考虑转股后的破产清算,基于结构化信用衍生品定价方法进行建模,进而得到CoCos债转股及破产清算时公司资产账面价值的触发阈值,并给出了公司资产、普通债、CoCos、股权价值的解析解,据此进一步计算CoCos和普通债的信用价差及公司的财务杠杆。最后,通过数值模拟,探析了波动率、发行期限以及息票支付的税盾效应对CoCos和普通债信用价差的影响,及CoCos和普通债的发行期限和数量对财务杠杆的影响;得到了通过适当提高CoCos合约的债转股比例,可以有效降低债务悬空发生可能性的结论。     

存在应收账款条件下中小企业不足额质押融资合同设计

债权融资合同和股权融资合同都存在经营者道德风险问题,与对称信息相比都尚存在效率改进的空间。针对此问题,在中小企业质押不足、存在应收账款的前提下,基于非对称信息博弈论给出了利用应收账款进行融资的"条件合同"。研究表明:与单纯的债权合同相比,"条件合同"能有效地减少中小企业谎报项目真实收益、将资金挪为它用投资更高风险项目的激励;与单纯的股权合同相比,"条件合同"能保证中小企业经营者付出更多的努力;进一步,"条件合同"是股权合同的严格帕累托改进,并且在一定条件下也是债权合同的严格帕累托改进。最后以一个算例说明了研究结论的有效性。     

供应链视角下成长型企业融资方式选择:债权融资VS股权融资

优序融资理论从企业价值和资本成本的角度指出企业融资应遵循内源融资、债权融资和股权融资的顺序。当企业的融资与运营相结合时,成长型企业的融资方式选择与优序融资理论有何异同?文章构建了供应链视角下成长型零售商的债权和股权融资模型,探讨其在快速发展过程中的最优融资方式。核心的发现是：供应链合作、企业的成长性和估值水平均会影响企业的融资方式选择。在供应链不合作下,被高估的零售商以及被低估的高成长性零售商应选择股权融资,被低估的中或低成长性零售商应遵循优序融资理论选择债权融资;在供应链合作下,零售商的市场成长性主导了其融资方式,估值水平仅对部分中等成长性零售商的融资方式产生影响。     

异质信念与公司融资工具选择——兼析中国市场股权融资偏好

本文选用沪深两市2006.1-2009.9发布融资公告的上市公司为研究对象,对投资者异质信念与公司融资工具选择的关系进行探讨。研究结果发现,当公司融资工具为股权或直接债券时,投资者异质信念越大,公司越倾向于股权融资。同时还发现,中国市场股权和直接债券融资公告发布前的投资者异质信念差异性显著高于美国市场,这可以由我国市场的投资者结构和卖空机制来解释。     

Do Shareholders Really Prefer Their Executives to Maximize the Equity Value? A Newsvendor Case*

In this article, we study how the operational decisions of a firm manager depend on her own incentives, the capital structure, and financial decisions in the context of the newsvendor framework. We establish a relationship between the firm’s cost of raising funds and the riskiness of the inventory decisions of the manager. We consider four types of managers, namely, profit, equity, firm value, and profit‐equity maximizers, and initially assume that they may raise funds to increase the inventory level only by issuing debt. We show that the shareholders are indifferent between the different types of managers when the coefficient of variation (CV) of demand is low. However, this is not the case when the CV of demand is high. Based on the demand and the firm’s specific characteristics such as profitability, leverage, and bankruptcy costs, the shareholders might be better off with the manager whose compensation package is tied to the firm value as opposed to the equity value. We, then, extend our model by allowing the manager to raise the required funds by issuing both debt and equity. For this case we focus on the equity and firm value maximizer managers and show that our earlier results (for the debt only case) still hold subject to the cost of issuing equity. However the benefit of the firm value maximizer manager over the equity maximizer manager for shareholders is considerably less in this case compared to the case where the manager can only issue debt. The Board of Directors can take these factors into consideration when establishing/modifying the right incentive package for the managers. We also incorporate the notion of the asymmetric information to capture its impact on the board of directors’ decision about the managers’ incentive package.     

基于宏观经济政策视角的我国企业负债融资研究

本文主要研究宏观经济政策作为政府调控宏观经济的手段,对微观企业融资行为所产生的显著影响。鉴于我国金融机构对国有和非国有企业存在的信贷歧视,本文剔除了产权性质的影响,把国有上市企业作为研究对象,以2003-2013年的数据为样本。首先研究宏观经济政策对国有企业负债融资行为的影响,证明了财政政策的扩张和货币政策的紧缩都能促进国有企业负债融资的增加。然后进一步研究宏观经济政策的外部因素和股权结构的内部因素对负债融资与企业业绩之间关系的影响,研究结果表明扩张性财政政策下,负债融资与国有企业绩效正相关;紧缩性货币政策下,负债融资与国有企业绩效负相关;股权结构分散程度的增加,有利于促进负债融资对国有企业绩效的正效应。     

公司的成长机会、银行债务与资本结构的选择--来自中国上市公司的证据

本文使用参数和非参数检验程序、回归分析检查了资本结构和长期银行债务使用之间的关系,分析了银行审查和监督对资本结构的影响.研究发现,长期银行债务的使用与债务比率显著正相关,且在控制杠杆的其它决定因素下,这个结论是稳健的.本文的一个隐含结论是,我国企业在公司债券融资比重很小的情况下,应减少依赖银行债务,适度增加股权融资比率,这意味着公司有更多的成长机会.     

Investment Reversibility and Agency Cost of Debt

Previous research has argued that debt financing affects equity‐holders' investment decisions, producing substantial inefficiency. This paper shows that the size of this inefficiency depends on the degree of investment reversibility. In a dynamic model of financing and investment, the paper provides an upper bound for the inefficiency produced by debt financing. The upper bound is decreasing in the degree of investment reversibility and is zero when investment is perfectly reversible.     

基于资本结构的国内钢铁企业成长性分析

公司的资本结构对于公司成长性的影响主要体现在公司通过不同融资策略,影响资本结构中的负债结构和股权结构,进一步对公司治理结构、产品竞争策略产生影响,最终影响到公司成长性.本文首先从产业的角度出发,引用资本结构理论研究成果,对我国钢铁企业的资本结构从多个角度进行了较为详细的数据分析;其次,本文试图借鉴计量经济学的思想,利用我国钢铁上市公司的财务数据,选用不同的财务变量,利用因子分析法筛选出公司成长因子,确定成长性良好的公司;最后对本文假设进行了实证分析.     

Why adding firm value with a put feature in debt contracts is better than renegotiation

In this paper, we analyze the ability of putable debt to add firm value. To stress the impact of a put feature, we compare the resulting optimal firm values and capital structures to those of a firm with straight debt that can be renegotiated. For this purpose, we consider a time-independent firm value model with tax-deductibility of coupon payments, bankruptcy costs in the case of a default, and dynamic restructuring. We find that a put right can always be designed so that a put is enforced for low asset values but the bond remains alive for high asset values. The optimal firm value arising from this type of equilibrium strategy is remarkable for several reasons: The optimal firm value under putable debt is always higher than under straight debt even under renegotiation with arbitrary negotiation power of debt and equity holders. Moreover, the optimal firm value under putable debt always benefits from higher bankruptcy costs, while the optimal firm value under straight debt suffers. Accordingly, a higher volatility of asset value returns can be favorable for a high firm value under putable debt, while it always destroys value of a firm with straight debt.