Managing Safety‐Related Disruptions: Evidence from the U.S. Nuclear Power Industry

Low‐probability, high‐impact events are difficult to manage. Firms may underinvest in risk assessments for low‐probability, high‐impact events because it is not easy to link the direct and indirect benefits of doing so. Scholarly research on the effectiveness of programs aimed at reducing such events faces the same challenge. In this article, we draw on comprehensive industry‐wide data from the U.S. nuclear power industry to explore the impact of conducting probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) on preventing safety‐related disruptions. We examine this using data from over 25,000 monthly event reports across 101 U.S. nuclear reactors from 1985 to 1998. Using Poisson fixed effects models with time trends, we find that the number of safety‐related disruptions reduced between 8% and 27% per month in periods after operators submitted their PRA in response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Generic Letter 88‐20, which required all operators to conduct a PRA. One possible mechanism for this is that the adoption of PRA may have increased learning rates, lowering the rate of recurring events by 42%. We find that operators that completed their PRA before Generic Letter 88‐20 continued to experience safety improvements during 1990–1995. This suggests that revisiting PRA or conducting it again can be beneficial. Our results suggest that even in a highly safety‐conscious industry as nuclear utilities, a more formal approach to quantifying risk has its benefits.     

Uncertainties in Nuclear Probabilistic Risk Analyses

There are many uncertainties in a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). We identify the different types of uncertainties and describe their implications. We then summarize the uncertainty analyses which have performed in current PRAs and characterize results which have been obtained. We draw conclusions regarding interpretations of uncertainties, areas having largest uncertainties, and needs which exist in uncertainty analysis. We finally characterize the robustness of various utilizations of PRA results.     

NIMBY, CLAMP, and the Location of New Nuclear-Related Facilities: U.S. National and 11 Site-Specific Surveys

Public and political opposition have made finding locations for new nuclear power plants, waste management, and nuclear research and development facilities a challenge for the U.S. government and the nuclear industry. U.S. government-owned properties that already have nuclear-related activities and commercial nuclear power generating stations are logical locations. Several studies and utility applications to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission suggest that concentrating locations at major plants (CLAMP) has become an implicit siting policy. We surveyed 2,101 people who lived within 50 miles of 11 existing major nuclear sites and 600 who lived elsewhere in the United States. Thirty-four percent favored CLAMP for new nuclear power plants, 52% for waste management facilities, and 50% for new nuclear laboratories. College educated, relatively affluent male whites were the strongest CLAMP supporters. They disproportionately trusted those responsible for the facilities and were not worried about existing nuclear facilities or other local environmental issues. Notably, they were concerned about continuing coal use. Not surprisingly, CLAMP proponents tended to be familiar with their existing local nuclear site. In short, likely CLAMP sites have a large and politically powerful core group to support a CLAMP policy. The challenge to proponents of nuclear technologies will be to sustain this support and expand the base among those who clearly are less connected and receptive to new nearby sites.     

Nuclear Plant PRA: How Far Has It Come?

Nearly ten years have passed since the publication in August 1974 of the draft Reactor Safety Study (WASH 1400), the first detailed attempt to apply probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques to estimate the public risks posed by commercial nuclear power plants. Now is an opportune time to look back and see how PRA has fared over these ten years. We will not attempt to pass judgement on how the Reactor Safety Study report itself has withstood the test of time, as that task is best left to others less directly involved in preparing the report. Instead, we will examine advances in the understanding, acceptance, and utilization of PRA techniques, as well as technical advances in PRA methods. Some of the significant insights gained from PRAs will be discussed. Finally, some observations on the future of PRA will be offered.     

ASME Risk-Based Inservice Inspection and Testing: An Outlook to the Future

Significant research work has been completed in the development of risk-based inservice inspection (ISI) and testing (IST) technology for nuclear power plant applications through the ASME Center For Research and Technology Development. This paper provides technology that has been developed for these engineering applications. The technology includes risk-based ranking methods, beginning with the use of plant probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), for the determination of risk-significant and less risk-significant components for inspection and the determination of similar populations for pumps and valves for inservice testing. Decision analysis methods are outlined for developing ISI and IST programs. This methodology integrates nondestructive examination data, structural reliability/risk assessment results, PRA results, failure data, and expert opinion to evaluate the effectiveness of ISI programs. Similarly, decision analysis uses the output of failure mode and causes analysis in combination with data, expert opinion, and PRA results to evaluate the effectiveness of IST programs. Results of pilot applications of these ASME methods to actual nuclear plant systems and components are summarized. The results of this work are already being used to develop recommended changes in ISI and IST requirements by the ASME Section XI and the ASME Operation and Maintenance Code organizations. A perspective on Code and regulatory adoption is also outlined. Finally, the potential benefits to the nuclear industry in terms of safety, person-rem exposure, and costs are summarized.     

Living with Nuclear Power: A Q-Method Study of Local Community Perceptions

The issue of new nuclear power is once again high up on the public policy agenda in many countries, and candidate sites for new civilian stations are likely to include those that have existing nuclear facilities. A common assumption is that existing nuclear communities will be more accepting of new build because of the direct economic and other benefits nuclear power already makes to a local area. Surprisingly, there is a dearth of contemporary data on perceptions of the risks, benefits, and values associated with nuclear power within such communities. This study uses Q-methodology to investigate the perspectives on living with nuclear risk among people ( n  = 84) drawn from communities near to two nuclear power stations in the United Kingdom. Both stations, at Bradwell-on-Sea and Oldbury-on-Severn, had been in operation for over 40 years. The Q-analysis identified four main perspectives, or points of view, accounting for 53% of total variance. These were interpreted as: Beneficial and Safe; Threat and Distrust; Reluctant Acceptance; and There's No Point Worrying. We conclude that the "landscape of beliefs" about nuclear power in such communities is both subtle and complex, avoiding simplistic bipolar dichotomies such as "for" or "against," and that there is a need for extensive and meaningful dialogue with such communities over any new build plans. The usefulness of Q-methodology for investigating the ways in which people live with risk is highlighted, as are the implications of the results for theories of risk and trust.     

A Discourse on the Incorporation of Organizational Factors into Probabilistic Risk Assessment: Key Questions and Categorical Review

This article presents a discourse on the incorporation of organizational factors into probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)/probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), a topic of debate since the 1980s that has spurred discussions among industry, regulatory agencies, and the research community. The main contributions of this article include (1) identifying the four key open questions associated with this topic; (2) framing ongoing debates by considering differing perspectives around each question; (3) offering a categorical review of existing studies on this topic to justify the selection of each question and to analyze the challenges related to each perspective; and (4) highlighting the directions of research required to reach a final resolution for each question. The four key questions are: (I) How significant is the contribution of organizational factors to accidents and incidents? (II) How critical, with respect to improving risk assessment, is the explicit incorporation of organizational factors into PRA? (III) What theoretical bases are needed for explicit incorporation of organizational factors into PRA? (IV) What methodological bases are needed for the explicit incorporation of organizational factors into PRA? Questions I and II mainly analyze PRA literature from the nuclear domain. For Questions III and IV, a broader review and categorization is conducted of those existing cross-disciplinary studies that have evaluated the effects of organizational factors on safety (not solely PRA-based) to shed more light on future research needs.     

GIS‐Based Integration of Social Vulnerability and Level 3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment to Advance Emergency Preparedness,Planning, and Response for Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents

In the nuclear power industry, Level 3 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is used to estimate damage to public health and the environment if a severe accident leads to large radiological release. Current Level 3 PRA does not have an explicit inclusion of social factors and, therefore, it is not possible to perform importance ranking of social factors for risk‐informing emergency preparedness, planning, and response (EPPR). This article offers a methodology for adapting the concept of social vulnerability, commonly used in natural hazard research, in the context of a severe nuclear power plant accident. The methodology has four steps: (1) calculating a hazard‐independent social vulnerability index for the local population; (2) developing a location‐specific representation of the maximum radiological hazard estimated from current Level 3 PRA, in a geographic information system (GIS) environment; (3) developing a GIS‐based socio‐technical risk map by combining the social vulnerability index and the location‐specific radiological hazard; and (4) conducting a risk importance measure analysis to rank the criticality of social factors based on their contribution to the socio‐technical risk. The methodology is applied using results from the 2012 Surry Power Station state‐of‐the‐art reactor consequence analysis. A radiological hazard model is generated from MELCOR accident consequence code system, translated into a GIS environment, and combined with the Center for Disease Control social vulnerability index (SVI). This research creates an opportunity to explicitly consider and rank the criticality of location‐specific SVI themes based on their influence on risk, providing input for EPPR.     

Scheduling Updates of Probabilistic Risk Assessments: The Arkansas Nuclear One-Unit 1 Experience

This paper presents the results of a study that identified how often a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)should be updated to accommodate the changes that take place at nuclear power plants. Based on a 7-year analysis of design and procedural changes at one plant, we consider 5 years to be the maximum interval for updating PRAs. This conclusion is preliminary because it is based on the review of changes that occurred at a single plant, and it addresses only PRAs that involve a Level 1 analysis (i.e., a PRA including calculation of core damage frequency only). Nevertheless, this conclusion indicates that maintaining a useful PRA requires periodic updating efforts. However, the need for this periodic update stems only partly from the number of changes that can be expected to take place at nuclear power plants–changes that individually have only a moderate to minor impact on the PRA, but whose combined impact is substantial and necessitates a PRA update. Additionally, a comparison of two generations of PRAs performed about 5 years apart indicates that PRAs must be periodically updated to reflect the evolution of PRA methods. The most desirable updating interval depends on these two technical considerations as well as the cost of updating the PRA. (Cost considerations, however, were beyond the scope of this study.)     

Intergenerational Issues Regarding Nuclear Power, Nuclear Waste, and Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear power, nuclear waste, and nuclear weapons raise substantial public concern in many countries. While new support for nuclear power can be found in arguments concerning greenhouse gases and global warming, the long-term existence of radioactive waste has led to requirements for 10,000-year isolation. Some of the support for such requirements is based on intergenerational equity arguments. This, however, places a very high value on lives far in the future. An alternative is to use discounting, as is applied to other resource applications. Nuclear weapons, even though being dismantled by the major nations, are growing in number due to the increase in the number of countries possessing these weapons of mass destruction. This is an unfortunate legacy for future generations.     

The Repeatability of Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses for Complex Probabilistic Risk Assessments

The performance of a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for a nuclear power plant is a complex undertaking, involving the assembly of an accident frequency analysis, an accident progression analysis, a source term analysis, and a consequence analysis. Each of these analyses is, in itself, quite complex. Uncertainties enter into a PRA from each of these analyses. An important focus in recent PRAs has been to incorporate these uncertainties at each stage of the analysis, propagate the subsequent uncertainties through the entire analysis, and include uncertainty in the final results. Monte Carlo procedures based on Latin hypercube sampling provide one way to perform propagations of this type. In this paper, the results of two complete and independent Monte Carlo calculations for a recently completed PRA for a nuclear power plant are compared as a means of providing empirical evidence on the repeatability of uncertainty and sensitivity analyses for large-scale PRA calculations. These calculations use the same variables and analysis structure with two independently generated Latin hypercube samples. The results of the two calculations show a high degree of repeatability for the analysis of a very complex system.     

Decidedly Different: Expert and Public Views of Risks from a Radioactive Waste Repository

A questionnaire with items that had been used in a national survey of the general public was administered to persons attending an American Nuclear Society meeting. The items asked about risks associated with high-level nuclear waste (HLNW), trust in nuclear-waste program managers, costs and benefits of a repository project, and images of a HLNW repository. The results suggest that nuclear industry experts may have very different opinions from the general public about most of these items and their images of a repository indicate a vastly different conceptual framework within which their opinions are formed.     

Detecting nuclear materials smuggling: performance evaluation of container inspection policies

In recent years, the United States, along with many other countries, has significantly increased its detection and defense mechanisms against terrorist attacks. A potential attack with a nuclear weapon, using nuclear materials smuggled into the country, has been identified as a particularly grave threat. The system for detecting illicit nuclear materials that is currently in place at U.S. ports of entry relies heavily on passive radiation detectors and a risk-scoring approach using the automated targeting system (ATS). In this article we analyze this existing inspection system and demonstrate its performance for several smuggling scenarios. We provide evidence that the current inspection system is inherently incapable of reliably detecting sophisticated smuggling attempts that use small quantities of well-shielded nuclear material. To counter the weaknesses of the current ATS-based inspection system, we propose two new inspection systems: the hardness control system (HCS) and the hybrid inspection system (HYB). The HCS uses radiography information to classify incoming containers based on their cargo content into "hard" or "soft" containers, which then go through different inspection treatment. The HYB combines the radiography information with the intelligence information from the ATS. We compare and contrast the relative performance of these two new inspection systems with the existing ATS-based system. Our studies indicate that the HCS and HYB policies outperform the ATS-based policy for a wide range of realistic smuggling scenarios. We also examine the impact of changes in adversary behavior on the new inspection systems and find that they effectively preclude strategic gaming behavior of the adversary.     

Risk‐Informed Regulation and Safety Management of Nuclear Power Plants—On the Prevention of Severe Accidents

There are four operating nuclear power plant (NPP) units in Finland. The Teollisuuden Voima (TVO) power company has two 840 MWe BWR units supplied by Asea‐Atom at the Olkiluoto site. The Fortum corporation (formerly IVO) has two 500 MWe VVER 440/213 units at the Loviisa site. In addition, a 1600 MWe European Pressurized Water Reactor supplied by AREVA NP (formerly the Framatome ANP—Siemens AG Consortium) is under construction at the Olkiluoto site. Recently, the Finnish Parliament ratified the government Decision in Principle that the utilities' applications to build two new NPP units are in line with the total good of the society. The Finnish utilities, Fenno power company, and TVO company are in progress of qualifying the type of the new nuclear builds. In Finland, risk‐informed applications are formally integrated in the regulatory process of NPPs that are already in the early design phase and these are to run through the construction and operation phases all through the entire plant service time. A plant‐specific full‐scope probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is required for each NPP. PRAs shall cover internal events, area events (fires, floods), and external events such as harsh weather conditions and seismic events in all operating modes. Special attention is devoted to the use of various risk‐informed PRA applications in the licensing of Olkiluoto 3 NPP.     

The Nevada Initiative: A Risk Communication Fiasco

The U.S. Congress has designated Yucca Mountain, Nevada as the only potential site to be studied for the nation's first high-level nuclear waste repository. People in Nevada strongly oppose the program, managed by the U.S. Department of Energy. Survey research shows that the public believes there are great risks from a repository program, in contrast to a majority of scientists who feel the risks are acceptably small. Delays in the repository program resulting in part from public opposition in Nevada have concerned the nuclear power industry, which collects the fees for the federal repository program and believes it needs the repository as a final disposal facility for its high-level nuclear wastes. To assist the repository program, the American Nuclear Energy Council (ANEC), an industry group, sponsored a massive advertising campaign in Nevada. The campaign attempted to assure people that the risks of a repository were small and that the repository studies should proceed. The campaign failed because its managers misunderstood the issues underlying the controversy, attempted a covert manipulation of public opinion that was revealed, and most importantly, lacked the public trust that was necessary to communicate credibly about the risks of a nuclear waste facility.     

Site-Specific Applications of Probabilistic Health Risk Assessment: Review of the Literature Since 2000

Whether and to what extent contaminated sites harm ecologic and human health are topics of considerable interest, but also considerable uncertainty. Several federal and state agencies have approved the use of some or many aspects of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), but its site-specific application has often been limited to high-profile sites and large projects. Nonetheless, times are changing: newly developed software tools, and recent federal and state guidance documents formalizing PRA procedures, now make PRA a readily available method of analysis for even small-scale projects. This article presents and discusses a broad review of PRA literature published since 2000.     

Information Specificity and Hazard Risk Potential as Moderators of Trust Asymmetry

Trust in risk managers appears to be an important antecedent of public acceptance for many hazards. However, such trust may be fragile since research suggests that negative performance information has a greater impact than positive performance information (Slovic, 1993). Closer examination of these findings suggests two potential moderators of this valence-related asymmetry-information specificity and hazard risk potential. First, we predicted that the asymmetry would be less evident for low versus high specificity information (risk management policies vs. concrete events). Second, we predicted that it would also be less evident for a low- versus high-risk hazard (pharmaceutical vs. nuclear industry). Study 1 reanalyzed Slovic's original trust asymmetry data for the nuclear industry. In line with Prediction 1, trust asymmetry was less evident for policy than event-related information. Using a new set of items with more clearly defined levels of specificity, Study 2 replicated and extended these findings for the high-risk hazard (nuclear power). In line with Prediction 2, trust asymmetry was even less evident for the low-risk hazard (pharmaceuticals). Positive policies in this industry actually had a greater impact on trust than negative ones, in contrast to previous findings. Results support an information diagnosticity account of earlier findings and suggest that trust in risk managers may be more robust than previously believed.     

External Initiators in Probabilistic Reactor Accident Analysis—Earthquakes, Fires, Floods, Winds

This article discusses the methodologies presently available for analyzing the contribution of "external initiators" to overall risks in the context of PRA (probabilistic risk assessment) of large commercial nuclear power reactors. "External initiators" include earthquakes, fires and floods inside the plant, external floods, high winds, aircraft, barge, and ship collisions, noxious or explosive gases offsite, and so on. These are in contrast to "internal initiators" such as active or passive plant equipment failures, human errors, and loss of electrical power. The ability to consider external initiators within PRA has undergone major advances in recent years. In general, uncertainties associated with the calculated risks from external initiators are much larger than those associated with internal initiators. The principal uncertainties lie with development of hazard curves (such as the frequency of occurrence of an event exceeding a given size: for example, the likelihood of a hurricane with winds exceeding 125 knots). For assessment of earthquakes, internal fires and floods, and high winds, the methodology is reasonably mature for qualitative assessment but not for quantitative application. The risks from other external initiators are generally considered to be low, either because of the very long recurrence time associated with the events or because the plants are judged to be well designed to withstand them.     

Attitudes as an Expression of Knowledge and “Political Anchoring”: The Case of Nuclear Power in the United Kingdom

Attitudes toward the use of nuclear energy pose fundamental issues in the political debate about how to meet future energy needs. Development of new nuclear power facilities faces significant opposition both from knowledgeable individuals who display an understanding of the risks attached to various forms of power generation and those who follow strict politically based ideological dogmas. This article employs data from a 2005 Eurobarometer survey of UK citizens to examine the influence of both political preferences and knowledge in explaining support of nuclear power. Findings reveal that attitudes about nuclear power are highly politically motivated while the influence of knowledge about radioactive waste is dependent upon beliefs about the consequences of nuclear energy use. Perceptions of being informed about radioactive waste and trust in sources providing information about radioactive waste management also predict attitudes toward nuclear power generation.