Effects of population policy and economic reform on the trend in fertility in Guangdong province,China, 1975–2005

An analysis of data mainly from China's 1990 and 2000 censuses and 2005 mini-census shows how fertility decline between 1975 and 2005 in the province of Guangdong has been influenced by both fertility policy and economic and social development. Guangdong's development since 1975 has been very rapid and has attracted huge numbers of migrants from other provinces. The analysis of the province's fertility trend from 1975 shows clearly the influence of fertility policy on the trend. The analysis also shows that economic development has brought about large changes in population composition by urban/rural residence, education, occupation, and migration status, which, together with large fertility differentials by these characteristics, have contributed substantially to Guangdong's fertility decline, in large part through changes in proportions currently married.     

Sex,Breastfeeding, and Marital Fertility in Pretransition China

Coital frequency is at the heart of the debate over low marital fertility in pretransition China. This study argues that coital frequency in contemporary China is indicative of sexual behavior in an earlier era. Frequency of intercourse is low in China relative to Europe, a natural outgrowth of a traditional family system and related sexual culture only partially transformed by a century of family revolution. Customary sexual behaviors and breastfeeding practices together shaped the Chinese historical fertility regime as they did the European. As explanations for China's low marital fertility, these proximate determinants leave little scope for the operation of fecundity‐reducing malnutrition on the one hand, or deliberate fertility control on the other. The fertility regimes of other pretransition agrarian societies more closely resemble China's than Europe's, seeming to confirm a pattern of European demographic exceptionalism.     

The claim that China's fertility restrictions contributed to the use of prenatal sex selection: A sceptical reappraisal

Most observers assume that China's fertility restrictions contribute to the use of prenatal sex selection. I question the logic and evidence underlying that assumption. Experts often stress that China's low fertility is largely voluntary, and that fertility restrictions are an unneeded safety valve. Others claim that China's ‘1.5-child’ loophole, common throughout rural areas, reinforces son preference or intensifies prenatal sex discrimination by hardening fertility constraints. These claims defy logic upon closer examination. Moreover, almost two-thirds of the exceptional distortion of the sex ratio in 1.5-child areas results from excess underreporting of daughters and enforced sex-specific stopping. Prenatal sex selection may explain the remaining third but probably reflects the stronger rural son preference that led to the 1.5-child loophole itself. The recent surge in sex selection of first births that has perpetuated the distortions also seems unrelated to policy. Some son-preferring parents who formerly wanted two children may now genuinely want only one.     

Closing a Sociodemographic Chapter of Chinese History

At its recent Fifth Plenary Session held in Beijing, the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to abolish the one‐child policy and allow all couples to have two children, thus closing an important chapter of China's social and demographic history. Recent fertility trends make it clear why it is urgent to abandon this policy. Census and survey data show that China's TFR had already fallen below replacement in 1991. Since the mid‐1990s, TFRs in most years have been lower than 1.5 children per woman. Since 2010, even lower fertility rates have been recorded by the annual population change surveys. Since the mid‐1990s, fertility decline has been increasingly driven by generalized ideational changes resulting from the social, economic, and cultural transformation of recent decades. In recent years many couples who were entitled to have a second child have chosen not to do so. For this reason, the termination of the one‐child policy is unlikely to lead to a major upturn in fertility, but rather to the continuation of a low‐fertility regime with more diverse fertility patterns across different sub‐populations, a pattern that has been observed in many countries.     

How Far Has Fertility in China Really Declined?

According to births in the last year as reported in China's 2000 census, the total fertility rate (TFR) in the year 2000 in China was 1.22 children per woman. This estimate is widely considered to be too low, primarily because some women who had out‐of‐quota births according to China's one‐child family policy did not report those births to the census enumerator. Analysis of fertility trends derived by applying the own‐children method of fertility estimation to China's 1990 and 2000 censuses indicates that the true level of the TFR in 2000 was probably between 1.5 and 1.6 children per woman. A decomposition analysis of change in the TFR between 1990 and 2000, based on our best estimate of 1.59 for the TFR in 2000, indicates that about two‐fifths of the decline in the conventional TFR between 1990 and 2000 is accounted for by later marriage and less marriage, and three‐fifths by declining fertility within marriage. The analysis also applies the birth history reconstruction method of fertility estimation to the two censuses, yielding an alternative set of fertility estimates that are compared with the set derived by the own‐children method. The analysis also includes estimates of trends in fertility by urban/rural residence, education, ethnicity, and migration status. Over time, fertility has declined sharply within all categories of these characteristics, indicating that the one‐child policy has had large across‐the‐board effects.     

Translation Formulae for Non-repeatable Events

China's one-per-hundred population survey, conducted in mid-1987, provides the first nation-level data with which to study recent fertility change in China. Using a recently developed extension of the ‘own-children’ method of fertility estimation, period parity progression ratios are computed from the survey data. Comparison with similar statistics computed from the 1982 one-per-thousand fertility survey provides a rigorous check on the quality of the results. The level of fertility so measured rose by 13 per cent between 1985 and 1987, compared with an increase of eight per cent in conventional total fertility ratios. Nearly 90 per cent of the increase was due to rising levels of progression from first to second birth. There can be little doubt that this, in turn, was due to a relaxation in the one-child family policy. Overall levels of progression to births of higher orders have been declining since 1982, but the evidence suggests that this is so only because of stringent government efforts to control births of third and higher orders.     

China's Below‐Replacement Fertility: Recent Trends and Future Prospects

Between 1970 and 1990, China experiencoed a rapid and sharp fertility decline—from total fertility rates of approximately six births to two. The degree to which Chinese fertility has continued to fall after 1990 is controversial. We use survey data from the 1997 National Population and Reproductive Health Survey and from the 2001 Reproductive Health and Family Planning Survey to document recent trends in Chinese fertility. Our estimates provide further evidence that China's fertility is well below‐replacement level at the turn of the twenty‐first century—with TFR levels of approximately 1.5 children per woman. Trends in parity‐specific cohort fertility by age also suggest below replacement completed fertility for cohorts still in the childbearing years. In the article's second section, we identify key components of low period fertility in order to frame our discussion of two questions: 1) in what ways is Chinese low fertility different from/similar to that in other low‐fertility countries? And 2) what are the likely future trends in Chinese fertility?     

Population pressure and fertility in pre-transition Thailand

Before the demographic transition in Thailand, fertility was high, but not uniformly so. As in other pre-transition settings, Thai fertility responded to pressures and opportunities created by socioeconomic structure and land availability. Drawing upon provincial data from the 1947 and 1960 censuses of Thailand, we find a strong 'frontier effect' on Thai fertility in the 1950s. Fertility was higher in sparsely settled frontier provinces and lower in provinces with higher population density relative to cultivatable land. This finding is robust and holds up with controls for agricultural employment, land quality, and the sex ratio (an indicator of sex-selective migration). The effect of population pressure lowers the likelihood of marriage and of marital fertility. The findings from Thailand are consistent with the research of Easterlin on the nineteenth century United States and with other pre-transition societies. We suggest how demographic transition theory might be broadened to include fertility dynamics in pre-transition societies.     

Another Gendered Demographic Dividend: Adjusting to a Future without Sons

Sonless families may pose a gendered demographic dividend. As fertility declines, families with only daughters are likely to grow. In turn, patriarchal family systems may weaken when many families are unable to engage in patriarchal practices. I examine some of these theorized dynamics in India. Sonless families did grow as fertility declined, reaching 10 percent in India as a whole in 2015 and approaching 20 percent in states with earlier fertility declines. I also identify a substantial influence of children's sex on mothers’ expectations of old-age support. Using panel data from the India Human Development Survey, I compare women's expectations after they had children to earlier expectations when they did not yet have children. Women with sons kept or further embraced patriarchal expectations that a son would provide support. Sonless mothers largely gave up patriarchal expectations, turning to daughters or away from children altogether.     

Asia's demographic future: the next 20 years

Even with the decline of fertility rates in most of Asia, the problem of population growth is still very serious. It is important to stress to Asian leaders and Western researchers that the problem is by no means solved just because fertility rates have declined. In many countries the number of young people is quite substantial and when they increase their numbers, certain problems will develop. Over the next 20 years, urban areas will see a marked increase in population and the resultant problems. Unemployment, increased pollution, and overcrowding will greatly decrease the quality of life for millions of people. This will happen because of natural increases and from the migration of the rural communities. In the rural areas, because of high fertility rates, population will continue to grow in spite of the large numbers of peoples moving to the city. Asia has some of the most densely populated agricultural communities and as their numbers increase, poverty and its associated problem will follow. The solutions to these problems include continued efforts in family planning, maternal and child health, and the improvement of the status of women.     

Many Chinas? The Economic Diversity of China's Provinces

This note analyzes China's provincial diversity from two perspectives. First, the regional gross domestic products of China's 31 mainland provinces are compared with the national GDP of other countries. This demonstrates that China's most advanced provinces and urban areas have per capita GDP levels comparable to those of Sweden and Singapore. On the other hand, China's least developed provinces have a standard of living similar to those of Sudan and Honduras. The second part of the analysis demonstrates that China's economic diversity is not unique. In fact, European countries exhibit almost the same degree of income diversity as do Chinese provinces.     

Contradictions in Nigeria's Fertility Transition: The Burdens and Benefits of Having People

Nigeria appears to be experiencing a transition to lower fertility. Based on ethnographic research, this article shows how Nigerians navigate a paradoxical political‐economic and cultural context, wherein they face powerful pressures both to limit their fertility and to have relatively large families. The main argument advanced here is that Nigerians' fertility behavior must be understood in the context of the ways that parenthood, children, family, and kinship are inextricably intertwined with how people survive in a political economy organized around patron‐clientism. Despite the fact that fertility transition is widely associated with broad processes of modernization and development, ordinary Nigerians experience the pressures to limit fertility in terms of a failed economy, development disappointments, and personal hardship–even while they see relatively smaller families as essential if they are to educate their children properly and adapt to a changing society.     

The Effects of Children's Schooling on Fertility Limitation

Many theories of fertility predict that mass education reduces fertility, but this effect may be produced in a variety of ways. In this paper, microdemographic data from a rural community in Nepal, in which the spread of mass education and fertility limitation is just beginning, are used to examine these links. The analyses contrast the influence of parents' and children's educational experiences of parents' fertility preferences and behaviour. The results indicate that children's schooling has a strong influence on both fertility preferences and behaviour. The effects of parental schooling are weaker, and also inconsistent in different models. These findings provide support for theories that link mass education to the onset of fertility limitation through children's schooling experience.     

Surplus Chinese Men: Demographic Determinants of the Sex Ratio at Marriageable Ages in China

We explore the demographic factors contributing to China's unbalanced sex ratio at marriagable ages. We develop a stable population model of the sex ratio at marriagable ages, and compare a series of population projections with alternative underlying assumptions about the key demographic inputs. The stable population model demonstrates that several demographic factors interact to influence the sex ratio at marriagable ages, including the sex ratio at birth, population growth, the age gap of marriage partners, and the sex ratio of survival from birth to marriageable age. The population projections further demonstrate that policies that seek to reduce the sex ratio at birth and the age gap at marriage and, to a lesser extent, increase fertility would be most effective at alleviating the problem. But no demographic changes are likely to occur quickly enough to balance the sex ratio at marriagable ages in the near future.     

First Impressions from the 2000 Census of China

The 2000 census of China has several notable innovations, including a sample long form containing detailed items on migration, housing, and employment. Preliminary data indicate rapid urbanization and continued rapid social change in the 1990s, and apparent success in the government's drive to curtail population growth. Although a post‐enumeration survey indicates that overall data quality is good, the rise of a mobile “floating population” and pressures of the birth planning program caused problems for the enumeration of migrants and infants. Data released to date have been silent on two important issues, fertility and rising sex ratios.     

Narrating Translocality: Dagong Poetry and the Subaltern Imagination

Abstract

In Chinese, ‘dagong’ means ‘working for the boss’. Dagong migrants constitute the most populous group of China's mobile population, so knowledge of their cultural practices is crucial to understanding how globalisation and mobility rework people's sense of locality. This paper is an analysis of poems by dagong workers – a cultural phenomenon that is relatively unknown both outside and inside China. Drawing on ethnographic insights into China's rural migrants, this paper engages the concept of translocality to explore three recurring themes in dagong poetry: alienation of the body in the industrial regime; displacement and homesickness; and disenchantment with the south. The analysis shows that, for the same reason that mobility itself is a stratified process, the means of addressing translocal desires and longings are also stratified.     

Mobility ratios and association in mobility tables

In the late 1940's a similar problem occurred in the work of three sociologists, working in three countries, on three similar sets of data. Natalie Rogoff, David Glass and G6sta Carlsson all faced the problem of making sense of data on intergenerational occupational mobility. A matrix of frequencies of occupations of respondents by occupations of fathers could be converted, in an obvious and straightforward fashion, into matrices of inflow and outflow percentages. Their joint problem arose in comparing inflow percentages across rows or outflow percentages across columns. The problem was that, as sociologists, concerned with the extent that origins in socially meaningful categories influenced destinations in the same socially meaningful categories, they were stuck with occupational categories that differed from one another dramatically in size. A secondary (though hardly trivial) problem was the fact that, in all their data, the two marginal distributions, the respondents' generation and the fathers' ‘generation’, were notably dissimilar — a consequence of both differential fertility and a general upward shift in the occupational distributions of the three countries. All sought a technique that would ‘make the two time periods comparable with respect to occupational structure’.     

The Effect of Parental Education on Marital Fertility in Developing Countries

The effects of parents' education on marital fertility are analysed with data from 38 Surveys in the WFS programme, and a two-parameter model in which the age-dependent level of fertility and a duration-dependent slope of fertility are estimated. The level parameter reflects post-partum infecundity and, in some populations, contraceptive spacing of births. The slope parameter reflects parity-specific birth control. The effects of the husband's and of the wife's education are estimated, both before and after adjustment for other socio-economic factors. The schooling of the wife emerges as a more decisive influence on fertility than that of the husband, with substantial net effects even after controlling for urban-rural residence, husband's socio-economic status and wife's employment. In Latin America and the Arab states, monotonic declines in marital fertility are found, as the level of the wife's education increases. However, in many Asian and African populations, the highest fertility is observed among women with moderate exposure to schooling, because the relaxation of traditional spacing mechanisms is not matched by increased birth control. This regional diversity cannot be explained convincingly by national levels of economic development or efforts made to popularize contraception, but appears to relect ill-understood cultural factors.     

Is There a Stabilizing Selection Around Average Fertility in Modern Human Populations?

Possibly the greatest challenge for an evolutionary explanation of demographic transition is the fact that fertility levels universally start to fall first among the well‐to‐do, well‐educated, healthy classes, which can be explained only by some voluntary or at least adaptive action. The problem of how restraints on fertility could have evolved by natural selection has been tackled with group selection models as well as with stabilizing selection models. The latter model, which is critically discussed in this article, posits that some intermediate (rather than maximal) level of fertility is optimal for long‐term reproductive success. Tests of stabilizing selection in human populations are rare, their results inconclusive. Here four sets of data are analyzed: they are samples drawn from the 'class of 1950 of the US Military Academy at West Point (cohorts 1923–29), retired US noncommissioned officers (cohorts 1913–37), and western German and eastern German physicians (cohorts 1930–35), all containing fertility data over two generations, and from European royalty (cohorts 1790–1939) containing fertility data over four generations. Deterministic as well as stochastic fitness measures are used. It is found that maximal, not average, fertility in the first generation leads to maximal long‐term reproductive success. Also against prediction, no decreasing marginal fitness gains by increasing fertility can be observed. The findings leave little space for considering stabilizing selection as a plausible mechanism explaining the course of demographic transition but indicate instead that biological evolution today is as fast and vigorous as ever in human history. Even in large populations, all people living today may be the descendants of just some few percents—a much smaller proportion than generally believed— of the people living some generations ago.     

Fertility Decline in Czechoslovakia During the Last Two Centuries

The decline of fertility in Czechoslovakia on the territory of the Czech Socialist Republic began with a rise in the age at marriage; the decline of marital fertility began only after 1860. On the territory of the Slovak Socialist Republic marital fertility began to decline after 1900 without previous significant changes in the age at marriage. The differences between the demographic behaviour in the two parts of Czechoslovakia have persisted, although they are now gradually disappearing. There are other significant regional differences in the fertility decline caused by the overall process of economic and social development. The end of the demographic transition in the Czech Socialist Republic came during the 1930's and in the Slovak Socialist Republic during the 1960's.