Negotiating control and achieving performance in international joint ventures: A conceptual model

Adapting well-established organization theories to international joint ventures (IJVs), this paper develops an overarching theoretical model of the determinants and effects of parent control of IJVs from an interpartner bargaining power perspective. Drawing upon power dependence, transaction costs, and agency theories, we argue that the relative bargaining power between IJV partners serves as the key determinant of control structure, and that control exerts a direct effect on the venture's performance. In addition, government influence and interpartner working relationship are critical factors that complicate the linkage between control and performance but may help to explain past conflicting results. Propositions regarding these relationships are formed for future empirical test, and implications and directions for future research are provided.     

How do CEOs matter? The moderating effects of CEO compensation and tenure on equity ownership in international joint ventures

We propose that CEO compensation and tenure moderate the relationship between multinational corporations' (MNCs) R&D intensities and their percentages of equity ownership in international joint ventures (IJVs). Transaction cost economics (TCE) suggests a positive relationship between MNC R&D intensity and IJV equity ownership, but this relationship has not been confirmed consistently in prior research. We examine the moderating effects of CEO compensation and tenure on the relationship between MNC R&D intensity and IJV equity ownership, thereby bringing more nuanced explanations from agency theory and upper echelons theory into the discussion. Our proposed relationships were tested using a sample of 202 IJVs formed between U.S. MNCs and foreign partners in high-tech industries for the period 1993 to 2003. We found an overall positive relationship between MNC R&D intensity and the percentage of equity ownership in IJVs. Moreover, CEO tenure and bonus compensation each weaken the positive R&D intensity-equity ownership relationship in our sample, while CEO stock options compensation amplifies it. These findings indicate that CEO compensation and tenure influence decision making about equity ownership in IJVs, suggesting that scholars and boards of directors should consider these CEO-related factors when evaluating strategic decisions regarding IJVs.     

Legitimacy in international joint ventures: It is still needed

International joint ventures (IJVs) enable foreign firms to complement their lack of local knowledge and resources by accessing their local partners' knowledge and resource bases. However, IJV formation is not simply a means of overcoming legitimacy-related challenges that stem primarily from a local market's unfamiliarity with foreign firms. This paper proposes that foreign firms can increase the legitimacy of their IJVs to facilitate local market penetration by building interorganizational linkages through which third parties and, especially, prospective customers in local markets can infer the viability and competence of IJVs. Our empirical analyses of manufacturing IJVs in Japan support our arguments.     

European competitiveness: Bargaining between boom and gloom

The newly-renamed European Union is in crisis from economic weakness and political claustrophia. Ralf Boscheck argues that, in addition to a suggested ‘New Founding Contract’, broad-based development of the EU requires that priority is given to adjusting competitive specialization and to centralizing political power. The management of internal and external bargaining is critical. per cent, and 19 per cent respectively. EUROSTAT (1994).     

Dilution of ownership in multinational concerns

This paper examines the issue of ownership dilution of foreign operations on a voluntary or involuntary basis. Involving some 628 cases of foreign ownership dilution by British multinationals in various parts of the world, the paper highlights two main aspects: (1) the degree of dilution, and (2) the geographical spread.A framework of corporate policies on ownership dilution and foreign investment policies of host nations involved has been developed. Twenty-one cases of changes in national and corporate policies are monitored for the entire operational period of these investments. Since some of the statistics obtained during the study are still being consolidated, the findings are not wholly conclusive.     

Revisiting the relationship between ownership and control in international business operations: Lessons from transition economies

This article develops a conceptual model linking two interrelated dimensions of foreign business operations in transition economies: resources committed to the entry in terms of ownership, and resources committed to control the operations. The model outlines four types of foreign operations in transition economies: 1) arm's length contractor (low degree of foreign ownership and low level of foreign control over the operations); 2) hands-on contractor (low ownership and high control); 3) brand protector (high ownership and control); and 4) market share maximizer (high ownership and low control). These types are illustrated with examples of companies in four sectors of the Russian economy: metals, textiles, oil products, and beverages.We contribute to the literature on ownership and control in foreign operations, and their linkage to resource commitment at different stages of operations. In particular, we explicate situations characteristic of transition economies where ownership and control are not positively correlated. Moreover, we illustrate that the (financial) resources committed at the entry stage do not necessarily correlate with the managerial resources committed to the operations. For example, contractual collaborations in transition economies typically require few financial resources but more managerial resource commitment than in more developed market economies. On the other hand, operations with major commitment in the form of foreign equity investment may be managed autonomously by a local manager or a minority shareholder.     

Unveiling the black box of IJV innovativeness: The role of explicit and tacit knowledge transfer

This paper explores the relationships between the tacit knowledge, explicit knowledge, and innovativeness of International Joint Ventures (IJVs) based on knowledge-based and learning theories. In the context of IJVs, the relationship between knowledge (explicit and tacit) transfer and innovativeness is still complicated by many challenges. We conducted a survey of 199 IJVs in South Korea. A structural equation model was used to test hypothesized linkages. Our results confirm that explicit knowledge transfer is positively associated with innovativeness. The explicit knowledge transferred from the foreign parent to the IJV has a stronger impact on innovativeness than tacit knowledge does. Additionally, tacit knowledge proved to not exhibit a direct impact on the innovativeness of IJVs. The results provide strong support for the mediating role of explicit knowledge in the relationship between tacit knowledge transfer and an IJV's innovativeness. Finally, the strength of the relationship between only explicit knowledge transferred from a parent firm and an IJV's innovativeness increases with international work experience.     

Does innovation lead to global orientation? Empirical evidence from a sample of Italian firms

This paper analyses the relationship between innovation at firm and industry level, and the global vs regional strategy of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Based on data from a sample of large Italian manufacturing firms, the analysis shows that technological assets affect a firm’s ability to overcome the liability of (regional) foreignness: the extent to which MNEs can exploit their firm-specific technological advantages is greater within their home region, but they also exploit them outside it. Furthermore, the results show that a firm’s foreign (outside the home country) and global sales (outside the home region) are higher, the greater the technology intensity of the industry in which they operate. These findings suggest that, although MNEs tend to operate regionally rather than globally, their strategic orientation is contingent upon firm- and industry-specific factors. Managers need to take the potential for globally exploiting R&D investments into account, even if it may not be equally successful within and outside the home region, and may be constrained by a number of inter-regional barriers.     

A Meta-analysis of Factors Leading to Management Control in International Joint Ventures

In international joint ventures (IJVs), management control exerted by parent firms is fundamental since it can direct employees' activities to strive for the overall goals, to safeguard parent firms' idiosyncratic investments and to decrease opportunistic behaviors. Using a meta-analytic approach, we investigate the main factors influencing management control in IJVs. A search of the published and unpublished literature uncovered 45 articles that yielded 329 reported correlations between the factors and management control with a total sample size of 15,252 IJVs. Results indicate that the factors can be ordered in the following way in terms of the average size of their association with management control: resource contribution; equity share; trust; and strategic importance to the IJVs. Three moderators including operating country (China versus other countries), industry type (manufacturing versus service) and management control type (formal control versus informal control) were proposed to examine the heterogeneity issue. Our meta-analysis suggests that there is a bias of the empirical studies given that a majority of the samples are IJVs operating in the Chinese manufacturing industry, which indicates that results of this meta-analysis may not be representative of all IJVs and that future empirical research should include IJVs in other countries and in other industries.     

Managerial trust and work values within the context of international joint ventures in China

The paper reports on a study of International Joint Ventures (IJVs) in China and provides empirical evidence on how Chinese managers in IJVs, compared with their State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) counterparts, are responding to their new work environments. Changing work practices, in particular human resource management (HRM), are altering the trust dynamics between managers and their subordinates. Changed trust relations pose problems for many Chinese managers originally from SOEs but now working in IJVs. The study examines how Chinese mangers' perceptions of trust in subordinates are being influenced by the work values in IJVs. Key findings of our study suggest that for these managers, trust in subordinates is related to certain beliefs surrounding work values of centralization, formalization and group orientation.     

It’s all about culture! Institutional context and ownership concentration across Europe

It is widely recognised that the formal institutional context affects firm ownership concentration. However, the impact of the informal institutional context has received less research attention. Drawing from institutional theory, we tested our hypothesis that both the formal and informal (cultural) institutional contexts simultaneously influence firm ownership concentration. Based on a firm-level database of the largest 600 listed companies in 19 European countries for the period 2009–2015, we found that both formal and informal institutional contexts, considered independently from each other, affect the level of firm ownership concentration. However, when these institutional contexts are considered together, the significance of the formal institutional context's effect on ownership concentration disappears while the informal (cultural) institutional context remains significant. Specifically, our findings indicate that high power distance, collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, restraint, and short-term orientation favour firm ownership concentration. Overall, our findings demonstrate that the diversity in European cultures explains firms' different levels of ownership concentration across European firms, signalling that the European Union's efforts towards a common regulatory frame may not necessarily lead to a convergence of European firms' ownership structures and, consequently, of corporate governance practices.     

基于讨价还价的私募基金机制比较研究

作为私募基金的主要形式，有限合伙制具有比公司制更高的激励作用，原因可能是两者在契约设计上的不同。本文引入讨价还价模型对公司制与有限合伙制进行分析，求解了两种机制下的均衡契约。研究发现，股东(或有限合伙人)和经理(或普通合伙人)之间的博弈等价于包含外部选择的讨价还价博弈，当经理保留收益不断提高，有限合伙制将逐步取代公司制。进一步地，有限合伙制将给出更高的分成比例，进而实现更高的激励，更有效地利用人力资本。     

The increasing power of store brands: Building loyalty and market share

An important evolution in the retailing industry is the growing success of store brands. Still, their level of penetration varies widely across countries and industries. We provide an operational measure to quantify the power of store brands along two dimensions: the intrinsic loyalty of their customer base, and their conquesting power to attract potential switchers. Based on their position along these two dimensions, we classify store and national brands as ‘Giants’, ‘Misers’, ‘Fighters’ or ‘Artisans’. We use the proposed operationalization to evaluate the absolute and relative strength of Albert Heijn, the leading Dutch store brand, in 19 product categories.     

Governance Structure,Innovation and Internationalization: Evidence From India

We examine the impact of firm-level governance structure on the innovation and internationalization strategies of emerging market firms. We propose that in the case of emerging market firms, governance is a response to the prevailing institutional environment and affects the innovation and internationalization strategies of firms. Based on a longitudinal sample of 16,337 firm-year observations of Indian listed firms over a year time period from 2002 to 2009, we find a positive effect of family ownership and group affiliation on R&D intensity and new foreign investments. Institutional ownership also positively affects new foreign investments, but has no effect on R&D intensity. Further, we find that R&D intensity interacts with family ownership, institutional ownership and group affiliation in affecting new foreign investments.     

最终控制、权力制衡和公司价值研究

本文基于最终产权的观点,追溯我国上市公司的控制链,研究发现我国大多数的上市公司的投票权和现金流量权并没有发生分离.考虑权力制衡对公司价值的影响,发现当控股股东的控制力和其现金流量权分离越大时,公司价值越低.股权制衡和控制权竞争程度越高时,公司价值越高.说明在目前我国对小股东保护不完善的情况下,合理安排股权和控制权结构非常重要.     

Bargaining within the Supply Chain and Its Implications in an Industry

Our main objective is to investigate the influence of the bargaining power within a chain on its industry. As a building block, we first discuss the implications of bargaining within a single chain by considering an asymmetric Nash bargaining over the wholesale price (BW). We show that both Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) and vertical integration (VI) strategies are special cases of the BW contract. We then develop the Nash equilibrium in an industry with two supply chains that use BW. We identify the profit‐maximizing (coordinating) bargaining power within this industry. We show that when a chain is not monopolistic, VI does not coordinate the chain and that the MS contract, where the manufacturer has all the bargaining power, is coordinating when competition is intense. We find that the main determinant of the equilibrium in mature industries is to respond well to the actions of the competing chain rather than to directly maximize the profit of each chain. That is, the equilibrium does not necessarily maximize the profit of the entire industry. While a coordination of the industry could then increase the profitability of both chains, such a coordination is likely against antitrust law. Moreover, if one chain cannot change its actions, the other chain may unilaterally improve its profitability by deviating from the equilibrium. Our results lead to several predictions supported by empirical findings, such as that in competitive industries chains will work “close to” the MS contract.     

The Determinants of Foreign Multinational Enterprise Firms' Board Governance in Caribbean Offshore Island Economies

Using a unique sample of 171 listed firms in the Caribbean region, this paper explores the influence of post-entry ownership of foreign MNEs on the board composition of subsidiaries. Our findings reveal higher ownership is a means of enhancing the security of property rights while simultaneously creating a liability of foreignness. This causes subsidiaries to externally contract for resources, leading to the hiring of more lawyers and fewer accountants. The opposite is true for progressively lower levels of foreign MNE ownership. Firms' adoption of shareholder rights governance amplifies these findings, while state formal institutional quality reverses them.     

Power imbalance and value creation in joint ventures

Joint ventures (JVs) often do not create expected value due to power imbalance between partners. Despite the fact that JV partners are embedded in relational constraints, prior research has largely relied on economic reasoning by focusing on equity ownership difference between JV partners as the main source of power imbalance. We extend prior research to also consider important relational factors represented by repeated ties between partners and network openness, as well as institutional status difference and network status difference as two additional dimensions of power imbalance. Our findings indicate that ownership power imbalance by itself does not have a significant effect on value creation. However, value creation is facilitated when there is ownership power imbalance between partners with more repeated ties. In contrast, value creation may be hindered when JV partners with unequal ownership are embedded in more open interfirm alliance networks. Furthermore, value creation is facilitated if JV partners that have unequal ownership also have network status power imbalance in the same direction.     

The diminishing effect of cultural distance on subsidiary control

This paper explores the diminishing influence of national cultural distance on two subsidiary control issues, expatriate staffing and parent company ownership level of the foreign subsidiary. Previous studies have produced conflicting findings: one stream of research argues that when cultural distance is greater firms increase their level of control; while the other stream suggests that greater cultural distance is associated with a loosening of control. To reconcile these discrepant outcomes we hypothesize and find that subsidiary age moderates the effect of cultural distance on expatriate staffing and ownership. Cultural distance has a significantly greater impact on subsidiary control mechanisms for newer subsidiaries than for older subsidiaries. Implications for future research are discussed.