States,elites, and inequality in Latin America

In this article, I review the literature on elites and inequality in Latin America with a focus on the emergence of uneven state structures and how they came to foster the needs of elites for protection. States in Latin America are traditionally thought of as facilitating processes of top‐down modernization that transformed traditional agrarian economies into complex urban polities, while maintaining extreme inequality. The state is thus central in the genealogy of inequality and elite privilege in Latin America. The synergy between states and elites continues to mark Latin American societies, and it helps us to understand how major economic and political changes occur without significant changes in inequality. For the most part, Latin America's current uneven states emerged as the result of exclusionary projects of citizenship during the first half of the 20th century and were advanced by the advent of repressive regimes during the 1960s and 1970s. After democratic transitions during the 1980s and 1990s, Latin American states came to be characterized, on the one hand, by procedural democratic institutions and on the other, by high levels of state violence, exclusion, and segmented citizenship. The present situation is one of a problematic equilibrium between states, elites, and inequality.     

Survey mode effects on measured income inequality

We study the effect of interview modes on estimates of economic inequality which are based on survey data. We exploit variation in interview modes in the Austrian EU-SILC panel, where between 2007 and 2008 the interview mode was switched from personal interviews to telephone interviews for some but not all participants. We combine methods from the program evaluation literature with methods from the distributional decomposition literature to obtain causal estimates of the effect of interview mode on estimated inequality. We find that the interview mode has a large effect on estimated inequality, where telephone interviews lead to a larger downward bias. The effect of the mode is much smaller for robust inequality measures such as interquantile ranges, as these are not sensitive to the tails of the distribution. The magnitude of effects we find are of a similar order as the differences in many international and intertemporal comparisons of inequality.     

The effects of income inequality and income level on mortality vary by population size in Texas counties

OBJECTIVES: This study uses the counties of Texas to empirically test the predictions of Wilkinson's theory on the role of income and inequality in explaining health differentials in populations. Wilkinson predicts (1) that health is affected more by income inequality than average income in areas with large population, and (2) that health is affected more by average income than income inequality in areas with small population. We investigate how large the population of a unit must be for income inequality within the unit to affect mortality. METHODS: Measures of income inequality were computed from the 1990 U.S. census data and mortality was computed from Vital Statistics data. Poisson regressions estimated the age-adjusted relative risk of the top quintile relative to the bottom quintile for equality and for income among selections of Texas counties based on population size. County ethnic composition, educational level, and health care access were controlled for. RESULTS: Among counties with populations greater than 150,000, the risk of death was lower in counties with more equal income distribution than in counties with less equal income distribution. Among counties with population less than 150,000, median income affected relative risk in counties with less than 30 percent Hispanics, but not in those with more than 30 percent Hispanics. CONCLUSIONS: This study provides some support for the predictions of Wilkinson's theory.     

Long-run trends in top income shares: The role of income and population growth

This paper studies the sensitivity of long-run trends in top income shares to differences in top-share measures. While the standard measure fixes a share of the population, we define alternatives that allow variation in both incomes and size of the top group based on defining absolute income thresholds. In an application to United States data, we find that top income share trends over the past century vary somewhat depending on the measure used. Allowing top groups to increase in size after 1980 along with overall economic growth results in a larger increase of top income shares. The historical drops before WWII are sensitive to the choice of income deflator: using GDP inflates interwar top income shares but using CPI deflates them. Altogether, these results recommend using complementary approaches to defining top income groups when measuring long-term top income share trends.

     

The effect of education,income inequality and merit on inequality acceptance

A large number of observational and experimental studies have explored the determinants of individual preferences for redistribution. In general, inequalities are more likely to be accepted by people of higher socioeconomic status, in richer societies and when inequalities are perceived as justifiable owing to differences in productivity. Almås et al. (2020) show that in a relatively unequal society (the United States), the highly educated accept inequality significantly more than the less educated, whereas, in a relatively equal society (Norway), the less educated accept inequality more, but not significantly more, than the highly educated. Here, we replicate this finding using data from experiments conducted in four locations across three countries all distinct from the ones studied by Almås et al. However, a closer look at the data indicates that the origin of the interaction effect varies depending on which societies one compares. Data for Norway and the United States indicate that meritocratic values among the highly educated are less prevalent in more equal societies and that this is the driver of the triple interaction effect. In contrast, in our data the interaction effects have multiple drivers.     

The impact of macroeconomic conditions on income inequality

This paper analyzes the relationship between macroeconomic factors and the income distribution using data on equivalized disposable household income from the United Kingdom for 1961–99. We argue in favour of fitting a parametric functional form to the income distribution for each year, and then modeling the time series of model parameters in terms of the macroeconomic factors, as this better allows us to take into account non-stationarity in the time series. Estimates from models that relate income distribution parameters to cyclical variables in first differences (to account for non-stationarity) suggest that neither inflation nor unemployment have significant effects on income inequality. Compared to the commonly-used method of modelling the income shares directly, our approach indicates that there was no clear cut relationship between macroeconomic factors and the UK income distribution during the last third of the twentieth century.     

Socialist Feminism in Latin America

The women's movement around the world takes many stances, including women's rights, feminism, women's research, women's auxilaries of political and religious organizations and socialist feminism. Because of its unique political and economic history, socialist feminism is the dominant emergent stance of the women's movement in Latin America. Brazil, Peru, and the Dominican Republic are examined. Socialist feminism is related to both the international women's movement, political trends within each county and constraints of the current political situation. Women's movements in other Latin American countries are also briefly discussed.     

The impact of income inequality on values and attitudes

Scholars in several social science disciplines scholars have argued from their respective disciplinary perspectives that income inequality has a considerable impact on economic and social performance of a nation. This essay investigates the possible impact of income inequality on 290 values and attitudes in forty industrial nations from an economic perspective. The results show that inequality has a significant impact on values and attitudes especially concerning religion and the family.     

Fuzzy measurement of income inequality: a class of fuzzy inequality measures

The typical practice of income inequality evaluation is by using inequality indices. Yet there is no best measure of inequality as we know it, and hence, any conclusion based on an inequality index must be subject to some doubts. Some authors even argued that the concept of inequality, by its very nature, is vague, and thus, cannot be measured like an exact concept. Motivated by these considerations, this paper studies axiomatic fuzzifications of inequality measures. Consequently, a systematic method of viewing the conclusions of inequality comparisons in terms of truth value statements is developed. Furthermore, it is shown that this method (or in fact, any other fuzzy inequality measure) can be used to construct confidence intervals for the crisp conclusions of inequality indices.I wish to thank Kaushik Basu, Larry Blume, Gary Fields, Tapan Mitra, Maurice Salles, Anthony Shorrocks, Sinan Unur, the participants of the 1993 Midwest Mathematical Economics Conference held in University of Wisconsin at Madison and those of the 2nd International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare held at University of Rochester, and two anonymous referees for insightful comments and suggestions. Janos Aczel and Karol Baron kindly provided some help about a mathematical problem I faced, I am grateful to them. Needless to mention, however, the usual disclaimer applies.     

Status and income inequality in a knowledge economy

This paper models a market for status contained in a knowledge economy. Technological progress favours the knowledge sector and inequality of income rises with productivity. We show that the expected utility of all agents can fall while output and productivity grow; and such an outcome of “immiserizing growth” hinges crucially upon the combination of concern for status and technology-induced rises in inequality.     

Psychosocial aspects of vasectomy in Latin America

Abstract

This paper examines some of the reasons for the paucity of vasectomy programs in Latin America and some considerations which should be taken into account before such programs are implemented. Social constraints, the structure of the Latin American family, and the “machismo” cult are discussed. The authors conclude that if the processes of self‐selection, screening and counseling are employed, vasectomy programs can be just as successful in Latin America as in other parts of the world.     

The impact of revolution on social welfare in Latin America

Conclusion The foregoing analysis assessed ways that revolutions affected the social welfare of Latin Americans. It compared differences between societies of roughly similar levels of economic development that did and did not have revolutions, revolutions ushered in by different class alliances, revolutions instituting different modes of production, and revolutions occurring in countries differently situated within the world economy. The class transformations in Mexico, Bolivia, Cuba, and Peru gave rise to more egalitarian societies than they displaced, but low income groups in each country gained most during the new regimes' consolidation of power. Subsequently, the interests of the popular sectors were sacrificed to those of middle and upper income groups. The rural masses benefited from revolution mainly in conjunction with agrarian reforms.Agrarian reforms have been promulgated in all the countries under study, but a much larger proportion of the agrarian population and a much larger proportion of the farmland has been redistributed in the four countries that had political upheavals than in the paired countries that did not. Whereas all the land reforms perpetuate minifundismo, recipients of land titles enjoy a modicum of security and the opportunity to appropriate the full product of their labor, which rural wage workers and peasants dependent on usufruct arrangements do not.Examining the countries that have had revolutions shows that peasants and workers do not necessarily benefit most when they participate in the destruction of the old order. Peasants and rural farm laborers gained land where they were disruptive, but in Mexico only after a global Depression weakened the ability of large landowners to resist expropriation. The Peruvian experience demonstrates that rural laborers may benefit even if they are politically quiescent at the time of the extralegal takeover of power, and that they may, under certain conditions, gain benefits sooner after revolutions from above than after revolutions from below. The level of development of the economy and the way the societies have been integrated into the world economy historically limit what Third World revolutions can accomplish, quite independently of how the upheavals originated. The four revolutionary governments adapted land policies to property relations under the anciens régimes, and they reorganized agriculture to profit from trade. Global constraints have also been one factor restricting labor's ability to improve its earning power and influence over the organization of production. Labor did benefit from the upheavals, but as the postrevolutionary governments became concerned with attracting foreign investment and foreign financial assistance, and with improving profits from trade, labor was marginalized. The Mexican-Brazilian comparison, however, suggests that the middle class and the small proportion of workers employed in the oligopolistic sector benefit more and the richest 5% less in societies where civilian groups have been incorporated into the political apparatus as a result of revolution than in equally industrialized societies where they have been excluded, in the absence of revolution.Revolutionary-linked forces may modify the income generating effect of capitalist industrial dynamics, though not to the advantage of the lowest income earners.The dominant mode of production instituted under the new order is the aspect of revolution most affecting patterns of land and income distribution and health care. To the extent that ownership of the economy is socialized the state has direct access to the surplus generated. Although the Cuban state has not consistently allocated the resources it controls to low income groups, because the Castro regime need not provide a favorable investment climate, it can more readily redistribute wealth downward than can the capitalist regimes. It accordingly has also been freer to redesign the health care delivery system in accordance with societal needs rather than business interests and market power. But the Cuban experience suggests that the distributive effects even of socialist revolutions can be limited. Although socialism allows certain allocative options that capitalism does not, the capacity to improve the welfare of Third World people by any revolutionary means is constricted by the weak position of less developed nations within the global economy, by investment-consumption tradeoffs, and by internal political and economic pressures.     

Poverty and psychological distress in Latin America

The objective of this paper is three-fold: first, to study the psychological distress of the Latin American poor. Second, to study differences in psychological distress between the poor and the relatively wealthy in Latin America. Third, to study how economic growth impacts the psychological well-being of the poor.This paper uses micro-level information from the Gallup 2007 Survey for 16 Latin American countries to study psychological distress of the poor in Latin America; the survey is representative at the country level. The investigation works with approximately 12,500 observations. Psychological distress is measured on the basis of a set of questions regarding a person’s emotional situation the day before he/she answered the questionnaire.The investigation finds out that the poor show greater psychological distress than the wealthy and that the gap is statistically significant. However, it would be inappropriate to attempt predicting a person’s psychological well-being on the basis of his/her poverty condition alone, since many factors affect people’s psychological well-being. The paper also shows that rapid economic growth seems to be detrimental to the psychological well-being of the poor, and that the impact of economic growth on psychological well-being differs between the poor and the relatively wealthy.     

A note on minimally progressive taxation and absolute income inequality

The Lorenz curve of income after tax is known to dominate the one before tax for all given pre-tax income distributions, if, and only if, average tax liability is increasing with income (Jakobsson 1976; Eichhorn et al. 1984). It is shown in this note that the absolute inequality of incomes (Kolm 1976) is unambiguously reduced by taxation if, and only if, tax liability is increasing with income.It is a pleasure to acknowledge the intellectual debt I owe to W. Eichhorn, H. Funke, and W. F. Richter whose result on progressive taxation and income inequality stimulated the present research. I am grateful to an anonymous referee whose comments on an earlier draft improved the paper.