Optimal Policies for Selling New and Remanufactured Products

Because of environmental and economic reasons, an increasing number of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) nowadays sell both new and remanufactured products. When both products are available, customers will buy the one that gives them a higher (and non‐negative) utility. Thus, if the firm does not price the products properly, then product cannibalization may arise and its revenue may be adversely impacted. In this paper, we study the pricing problem of a firm that sells both new and remanufactured products over a finite planning horizon. Customer demand processes for both new and remanufactured products are random and price‐sensitive, and product returns (also called cores) are random and remanufactured upon receipt. We characterize the optimal pricing and manufacturing policies that maximize the expected total discounted profit. If new products are made‐to‐order (MTO), we show that when the inventory level of remanufactured product increases, the optimal price of remanufactured product decreases while the price difference between new and remanufactured products increases; however, the optimal selling price of new product may increase or decrease. If new products are made to stock (MTS), then the optimal manufacturing policy is of a base‐stock policy with the base‐stock level decreasing in the remanufactured product inventory level. To understand the potential benefit in implementing an MTO system, we study the difference between the value functions of the MTO and MTS systems, and develop lower and upper bounds for it. Finally, we study several extensions of the base model and show that most of our results extend to those more general settings.     

OEM product design in a price competition with remanufactured product

An original equipment manufacturer (OEM) produces new products and often faces a dilemma when determining the level of interchangeability in its product design. The interchangeability is considered as a degree to which the product can be disassembled without force, and thus an increasing degree of interchangeability would decrease the OEM's production cost, but it would also lower a remanufacturer's cost in cannibalizing used items. Decreasing the level of interchangeability to deter the remanufacturer, on the other hand, would simultaneously increase the production costs of the OEM. We thus formulate a two-period supply chain model consisting of two chain members, an OEM and a remanufacturer, to investigate the product design decision of the OEM and both chain members' competitive pricing strategies. We then characterize the equilibrium decisions and profits with regard to costs and consumers' preference for the remanufactured product. We also evaluate a strategic game in which the OEM chooses the degree of interchangeability, and the remanufacturer determines its collection strategy. We find that the product-design strategy is effective for the OEM in competing with the remanufacturer, but it is not necessarily harmful to the remanufacturer.     

Revenue and Cost Management for Remanufactured Products

This paper considers pricing and remanufacturing strategy of a firm that decides to offer both new and remanufactured versions of its product in the market and is concerned with demand cannibalization. We present a model of demand cannibalization and a behavioral study that estimates a key modeling parameter: a fraction of consumers who switch from new to remanufactured product. As we show, this fraction has an inverted‐U shape, and, thus, the underlying consumer behavior cannot be modeled using the standard methodologies that rely on consumers' willingness to pay (WTP). We find that by incorporating the inverted‐U‐shaped consumer behavior, the firm remanufactures under broader conditions, charges a much lower price, and typically remanufactures more units—leading to an increase of profits from remanufacturing by up to a factor of two as compared with making decisions based on the WTP only. Lastly, we find that the behavior of the low‐price market segment plays an important role because the firm reacts to it differently than the WTP‐based logic would suggest.     

Joint Life‐Cycle Dynamics of New and Remanufactured Products

Many products considered for remanufacturing are durables that exhibit a well‐pronounced product life cycle—they diffuse gradually through the market. The remanufactured product, which is a cheaper substitute for the new product, is often put on the market during the life cycle of the new product and affects its sales dynamics. In this paper, we study the integrated dynamic management of a portfolio of new and remanufactured products that progressively penetrate a potential market over the product life cycle. To this end, we extend the Bass diffusion model in a way that maintains the two essential features of remanufacturing settings: (a) substitution between new and remanufactured products, and (b) a constraint on the diffusion of remanufactured products due to the limited supply of used products that can be remanufactured. We identify characteristics of the diffusion paths of new and remanufactured products. Finally, we analyze the impact of levers such as remanufacturability level, capacity profile and reverse channel speed on profitability.     

Effects of Remanufacturable Product Design on Market Segmentation and the Environment

Despite documented benefits of remanufacturing, many manufacturers have yet to embrace the idea of tapping into remanufactured‐goods markets. In this article, we explore this dichotomy and analyze the effect of remanufacturable product design on market segmentation and product and trade‐in prices by studying a two‐stage profit‐maximization problem in which a price‐setting manufacturer can choose whether or not to open a remanufactured‐goods market for its product. Our results suggest that it is optimal for a manufacturer to design a remanufacturable product when the value‐added from remanufacturing is relatively high but product durability is relatively low and innovation is nominal. In addition, we find that entering a remanufactured‐goods market in and of itself does not necessarily translate into environmental friendliness. On the one hand, the optimal trade‐in program could result in low return and/or remanufacturing rates. On the other hand, a low price for remanufactured products could attract higher demand and thereby potentially result in more damage to the environment. Meanwhile, external restrictions imposed on total greenhouse gas emissions draw criticism in their own right because they risk stifling growth or reducing overall consumer welfare. Given these trade‐offs, we therefore develop and compare several measures of environmental efficiency and conclude that emissions per revenue can serve as the best proxy for emissions as a metric for measuring overall environmental stewardship.     

Design of the Reverse Channel for Remanufacturing: Must Profit‐Maximization Harm the Environment?

A key attribute of a remanufacturing strategy is the division of labor in the reverse channel, especially whether remanufacturing is performed in‐house or outsourced. We investigate this decision for a retailer who accepts returns of a remanufacturable product. Our formulation considers the cost structures of the two strategies, uncertainty in the input quality of the collected/returned used products, consumer willingness‐to‐pay for remanufactured product, the extent to which the remanufactured product cannibalizes demand for a new product, and the power structure in the channel. For the profit‐maximizing retailer, the differentials in variable remanufacturing costs drive strategy choice, and higher fixed costs of in‐house remanufacturing favors outsourcing. The variable remanufacturing costs and the balance of power in the prospective outsourced reverse channel are the key drivers of environmental impact, as measured by the retailer's propensity to remanufacture. While profitability and environmental goals often conflict, they align under certain conditions. These include (a) the third party has less bargaining power; or (b) the fixed cost for in‐house remanufacturing is relatively high. All else equal, when remanufacturing is outsourced, the environment fares better if the third party has leadership power. We generalize to the cases when remanufacturing achieves a quality level less than “good‐as‐new" and when used items have non‐zero salvage value. Analysis of these extensions illuminates how relative power in the reverse channel drives the firms’ preferences, as well as the end customers’ consumption experience.     

差别定价闭环供应链协调应对生产成本扰动研究

文章以一个新产品和再造品存在差别定价的闭环供应链为研究对象,考虑突发事件干扰新产品和再造品生产成本的情况,研究了集中式决策闭环供应链的应对策略,以及收益共享契约协调分散式决策闭环供应链的问题。研究表明:在突发事件干扰下,对于集中式决策闭环供应链,当两种产品生产成本的扰动程度均较小时,原稳定环境下的最优产量决策具有一定的鲁棒性;至少一种产品生产成本的扰动程度较大时,受干扰程度较大的产品应按其生产成本扰动相反的方向进行调整其原稳定环境下的最优产量决策,而另一种产品最优产量的调整方向受扰动程度较大产品生产成本的扰动程度、两种产品的替代系数以及额外单位生产或处理成本的影响。对于分散式决策闭环供应链,两种产品生产成本的扰动程度均较小时,原稳定环境下的收益共享契约仍有效;至少一种产品生产成本的扰动程度较大时,则需改进原稳定环境下的收益共享契约以再次协调闭环供应链,且改进后的契约也能够协调稳定环境下的闭环供应链。最后,通过数值算例验证了模型的合理性及契约协调的有效性。     

Models to explore remanufacturing as a competitive strategy under duopoly

Remanufacturing is a product recovery option that upgrades the quality of returns to “as-good-as-new” conditions. Remanufactured products cost less, and are sold with the same or better warranty as for new products. In this paper, we consider a duopoly environment with two manufacturers in direct competition selling their respective new products on the primary market. Specifically, we address the question: In case one manufacturer decides to remanufacture and sell remanufactured products on the price-sensitive secondary market, will it get a competitive advantage over the other manufacturer? We develop theoretical models for a single period and two periods, and show that under the stated assumptions, remanufacturing is almost always more profitable than when there is no remanufacturing. Although remanufacturing may cannibalize new product sales, the combined profitability and market share of the (re)manufacturer on account of new and remanufactured product sales improve over new product sales only. For the competitor, we get mixed results. In some situations, its profitability improves; in some others, it worsens. We also conduct sensitivity analyses with respect to the substitution parameters, price-sensitivity of the secondary market, rate of return of used products (cores), relative market shares of the manufacturers, and relative sizes of the primary and secondary markets. We conclude the paper with managerial implications and directions for future research.     

The Effect of Competition on Recovery Strategies

Manufacturers often face a choice of whether to recover the value in their end‐of‐life products through remanufacturing. In many cases, firms choose not to remanufacture, as they are (rightly) concerned that the remanufactured product will cannibalize sales of the higher‐margin new product. However, such a strategy may backfire for manufacturers operating in industries where their end‐of‐life products (cell phones, tires, computers, automotive parts, etc.) are attractive to third‐party remanufacturers, who may seriously cannibalize sales of the original manufacturer. In this paper, we develop models to support a manufacturer's recovery strategy in the face of a competitive threat on the remanufactured product market. We first analyze the competition between new and remanufactured products produced by a monopolist manufacturer and identify conditions under which the firm would choose not to remanufacture its products. We then characterize the potential profit loss due to external remanufacturing competition and analyze two entry‐deterrent strategies: remanufacturing and preemptive collection. We find that a firm may choose to remanufacture or preemptively collect its used products to deter entry, even when the firm would not have chosen to do so under a pure monopoly environment. Finally, we discuss conditions under which each strategy is more beneficial.     

Competitive Quality Choice and Remanufacturing

We consider an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who faces competition from an independent remanufacturer (IR). The OEM decides the quality of the new product, which also determines the quality of the competing remanufactured product. The OEM and the IR then competitively determine their production quantities. We explicitly characterize how the OEM competes with the IR in equilibrium. Specifically, we show that the OEM relies more on quality as a strategic lever when it has a stronger competitive position (determined by the relative cost and value of new and remanufactured products), and in contrast it relies more heavily on limiting quantity of cores when it has a weaker competitive position. The IR's entry threat as well as its successful entry can decrease the consumer surplus. Furthermore, our results illustrate that ignoring the competition or the OEM's quality choice leads to overestimating benefits of remanufacturing for consumer and social welfare. In addition, we show an IR with either a sufficiently weak competitive position (so the OEM deters entry) or a sufficiently strong one (so the OEM is forced to limit quantity of cores) is desirable for reducing the environmental impact. Comparing our results with the benchmark in which the OEM remanufactures suggests that encouraging IRs to remanufacture in lieu of the OEMs may not benefit the environment. Furthermore, the benchmark illustrates that making remanufacturing more attractive improves the environmental impact when the remanufacturer is the OEM, while worsening it when remanufacturing is done by the IR.     

An Analysis of the Eco‐Efficiency of Remanufactured Personal Computers and Mobile Phones

Remanufacturing, long perceived as an environmentally friendly initiative, is supported by a number of governments. Yet, the assumption that remanufacturing is desirable to society has never been systematically investigated. In this paper, we examine the effectiveness and eco‐efficiency of remanufacturing in the personal computer and mobile phone industries. We investigate whether remanufacturing substantially reduces the environmental impact, as measured by cumulative energy demand (CED), generated over the life cycles (LCs) of these products, and the size of any reduction. We also examine the relative eco‐efficiency of remanufacturing compared with virgin manufacturing for these two products, where eco‐efficiency includes both willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) for the products as well as the energy consumed in producing the products. Our main findings are the following. One, remanufacturing is an effective way to reduce the total energy consumed during the LCs of personal computers and mobile phones, with one notable exception, when the life spans of remanufactured products are substantially shorter than the life spans of their new counterparts. Two, a remanufactured personal computer or mobile phone is not always more eco‐efficient than a corresponding new product. Three, the WTP for remanufactured personal computers and mobile phones, and consequently, their eco‐efficiencies, are a function of the prices of the correspondent new products at launch and years elapsed between launch and remanufacturing. Four, remanufactured units are sold at a discount relative to the price of new personal computers and mobile phones. Five, on the whole, the market for remanufactured mobile phones is more eco‐efficient than the market for new mobile phones. Six, the market for remanufactured computers is more eco‐efficient than the market for new computers. Lastly, because the group of remanufactured products is heterogeneous, not all remanufactured units are more eco‐efficient than the average new computer and mobile phone. We conclude with a discussion of the impact of our findings on European WEEE and WEEE‐like legislation.     

Product Positioning in a Two‐Dimensional Market Space

This paper examines the optimal product portfolio positioning for a monopolist firm in a market where consumers exhibit vertical differentiation for product performance and horizontal differentiation for product feature. Our key results are as follows: (i) Variable costs drive vertical differentiation. In the presence of significant volume‐dependent manufacturing costs, the optimal portfolio contains a mix of vertically and horizontally differentiated products and an increase in the variable cost makes adding vertically differentiated products relatively more profitable; if fixed volume‐independent design costs dominate, the portfolio exhibits solely horizontal differentiation. (ii) Horizontal differentiation is the main profit lever, and vertical differentiation brings only a marginal benefit; this is true even when most of the consumers exhibit low willingness to pay for performance, which is often used as an excuse to offer low‐end products. (iii) There are more low‐quality products than high‐quality ones, and market coverage increases when the willingness to pay for performance increases. In summary, the model shows how portfolio composition decisions depend on the product cost structure and the consumer preferences.     

Does the Entry of Third‐Party Remanufacturers Always Hurt Original Equipment Manufacturers?

Researchers and managers broadly agree that the entry of third‐party remanufacturers (TPRs) hurts original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) because of the cannibalization problem. Thus, OEMs should always try to deter the entry of TPRs. In this article, we present a contrasting view: Competing OEMs without remanufacturing capacities sometimes benefit from the entry of TPRs. The key feature of our model is that there exists a group of newness‐conscious consumers in the market who do not buy the remanufactured product regardless of the price, whereas a group of functionality‐oriented consumers (FOCs) may buy a remanufactured one at a low price. In a steady‐state‐period setting, we investigate how the number of TPRs affects the OEMs’ profits. We find that, from the perspective of two competing OEMs: (i) The entry of one or many TPRs may lead to a higher profit; (ii) The entry of many TPRs may be better than the entry of one TPR; and (iii) The impact of the entry of one or many TPRs may be reversed as FOCs’ willingness‐to‐pay for the remanufactured product increases.     

Segmentation Opportunities for a Social Planner: Impact of Limited Resources

In this research note, we investigate segmentation opportunities for social planners such as government agencies, nonprofits, and public organizations. These opportunities arise when the potential products are vertically (quality) differentiated and the consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences toward quality. In these cases, whether to offer quality differentiated products and what quality level to choose are important decisions for a social planner. In this research note, we identify the conditions where it is socially optimal to offer either one homogenous or two quality differentiated products. We find that the resource limitations may result in a single product offering and that the quality of the product depends on the maximum surplus per unit resource consumed by the products. We also compare our findings to a profit‐maximizing firm. We find that the resource limitations may cause a profit‐maximizing firm to provide a better service to some consumers than the social planner. Contrary to common wisdom, we also show that the capacity limitations may force the social planner to act like a profit‐maximizing firm in terms of its pricing and product mix choice.     

TIME‐BASED PRICING AND LEADTIME POLICIES FOR A BUILD‐TO‐ORDER MANUFACTURER

We studied time‐based policies on pricing and leadtime for a build‐to‐order and direct sales manufacturer. It is assumed that the utility of the product varies among potential customers and decreases over time, and that a potential customer will place an order if his or her utility is higher than the manufacturer's posted price. Once an order is placed, it will be delivered to the customer after a length of time called “leadtime.” Because of the decrease in a customer's utility during leadtime, a customer will cancel the order if the utility falls below the ordering price before the order is received. The manufacturer may choose to offer discounted prices to customers who would otherwise cancel their orders. We discuss two price policies: common discounted price and customized discounted price. In the common discounted price policy, the manufacturer offers a single lower price to the customers; in the customized discounted price policy, the manufacturer offers the customers separately for individual new prices. Our analytical and numerical studies show that the discounted price policies results in higher revenue and that the customized discounted price policy significantly outperforms the common discounted price policy when product utility decreases rapidly. We also study two leadtime policies when production cost decreases over time. The first uses a fixed leadtime, and the second allows the leadtime to vary dynamically over time. We find that the dynamic leadtime policy significantly outperforms the fixed leadtime policy when the product cost decreases rapidly.     

Fusion Product Planning: A Market Offering Perspective*

Devices that integrate multiple functions together are popular in consumer electronic markets. We describe these multifunction devices as fusion products as they fuse together products that traditionally stand alone in the marketplace. In this article, we investigate the manufacturer's fusion product planning decision, adopting a market offering perspective that allows us to address the design and product portfolio decisions simultaneously. The general approach adopted is to develop and analyze a profit‐maximizing model for a single firm that integrates product substitution effects in identifying an optimal market offering. In the general model, we demonstrate that the product design and portfolio decisions are analytically difficult to characterize because the number of possible portfolios can be extremely large. The managerial insight from a stylized all‐in‐one model and numerical analysis is that the manufacturer should, in most cases, select only a subset of fusion and single‐function products to satisfy the market's multidimension needs. This may explain why the function compositions available in certain product markets are limited. In particular, one of the key factors driving the product portfolio decision is the margin associated with the fusion products. If a single all‐in‐one fusion product has relatively high margins, then this product likely dominates the product portfolio. Also, the congruency of the constituent single‐function products is an important factor. When substitution effects are relatively high (i.e., the product set is more congruent), a portfolio containing a smaller number of products is more likely to be optimal.     

Cost Allocation in Manufacturing–Remanufacturing Operations

For firms remanufacturing their products, the total life‐cycle costs and revenues from new and remanufactured products determine their profitability. In many firms, manufacturing/sales and remanufacturing/remarketing operations are carried out in different divisions. Each division is responsible for only part of the product's life cycle. Practices regarding transfer pricing across divisions vary significantly among companies, affecting the life‐cycle profit performance of the product. In this research, we identify characteristics of transfer prices that achieve the firm‐wide optimal solution. To this end, we consider a manufacturer who also undertakes remanufacturing operations and we focus on price (quantity) decisions. We determine that a cost allocation mechanism that allocates a portion of the initial production cost to each of the two stages of the product life cycle should be used. We also conclude that cost allocation should be implemented as a fixed cost allocation, where charges to the remanufacturing division should be determined independently of the actual quantity of units remanufactured.     

The Potential for Cannibalization of New Products Sales by Remanufactured Products*

The potential for cannibalization of new product sales by remanufactured versions of the same product is a central issue in the continuing development of closed‐loop supply chains. Practitioners have no fact‐based information to guide practice at firms and academics have no studies available to use as the basis for assumptions in models. We address the cannibalization issue by using auctions to determine consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for both new and remanufactured products. The auctions also allow us to better understand the potential impact of offering new and remanufactured products at the same time, which provides us insights into the potential for new product cannibalization. Our results indicate that, for the consumer and commercial products auctioned, there is a clear difference in WTP) for new and remanufactured goods. For the consumer product, there is scant overlap in bidders between the new and remanufactured products, leading us to conclude that the risk of cannibalization in this case is minimal. For the commercial product, there is evidence of overlap in bidding behavior, exposing the potential for cannibalization.     

考虑法律约束的两周期电子产品回收再制造决策研究

研究电子产品制造商面临政府回收法律约束时的再制造决策问题。第一个周期开始时,制造商生产并决定新产品的价格。当产品的生命周期到达时,面对政府制定的回收法律约束,制造商回收市场中的旧产品用于再制造。第二个周期开始时,制造商同时决策新产品和再造品的价格。研究发现：根据逆向运营成本(即回收成本与再制造成本之和)与新产品生产成本的不同组合,制造商对应五个不同的回收再制造策略;当逆向运营成本低于一定阈值时,法律强制回收不会影响企业的利润;而高于该阈值时,法律强制回收会减少企业的利润,因为较高的逆向运营成本使得企业没有意愿回收旧产品。此外,研究收集了实际数据并进行了案例分析,结果表明研究模型具有较强的稳健性。