Ramsey's Foundations Extended to Desirabilities

In his Truth and Probability (1926), Frank Ramsey provides foundations for measures of degrees of belief in propositions and preferences for worlds. Nonquantitative conditions on preferences for worlds, and gambles for worlds and certain near-worlds, are formulated which he says insure that a subject's preferences for worlds are represented by numbers, world values. Numbers, for his degrees of belief in propositions, probabilities, are then defined in terms of his world values. Ramsey does not also propose definitions of desirabilities for propositions, though he is in a position to do this. Given his measures for probabilities of propositions and values of worlds, he can frame natural definitions for both evidential and causal desirabilities that would measure respectively the welcomeness of propositions as items of news, and as facts. His theory is neutral with respect to the evidential/causal division. In the present paper, as Ramsey's foundations are explained, several problems and limitations are noted. Their distinctive virtue – their evidential/causal neutrality – is demonstrated. Comparisons are made with other foundational schemes, and a perspective is recommended from which nonquantitative foundations are not the be all for quantitative theories of ideal preferences and credences.     

The Independence Postulate,Hypothetical and Called-off Acts: a further reply to Rabinowicz

The Independence postulate links current preferences between called-off acts with current preferences between constant acts. Under the assumption that the chance-events used in compound von Neumann-Morgenstern lotteries are value-neutral, current preferences between these constant acts are linked to current preferences between hypothetical acts, conditioned by those chance events. Under an assumption of stability of preferences over time, current preferences between these hypothetical acts are linked to future preferences between what are then and there constant acts. Here, I show that a failure of Independence with respect to current preferences leads to an inconsistency in sequential decisions. Two called-off acts are constructed such that each is admissible in the same sequential decision and yet one is strictly preferred to the other. This responds to a question regarding admissibility posed by Rabinowicz ([2000] Preference stability and substitution of indifferents: A rejoinder to Seidenfeld, Theory and Decision 48: 311–318 [this issue]).     

Intradimensional Single-Peakedness and the Multidimensional Arrow Problem

Arrow's account (1951/1963) of the problem of social choice is based upon the assumption that the preferences of each individual in the relevant group are expressible by a single ordering. This paper lifts that assumption and develops a multidimensional generalization of Arrow's framework. I show that, like Arrow's original framework, the multidimensional generalization is affected by an impossibility theorem, highlighting not only the threat of dictatorship of a single individual, but also the threat of dominance of a single dimension. In particular, even if preferences are single-peaked across individuals within each dimension – a situation called intradimensional single-peakedness – any aggregation procedure satisfying Arrow-type conditions will make one dimension dominant. I introduce lexicographic hierarchies of dimensions as a class of possible aggregation procedures under intradimensional single-peakedness. The interpretation of the results is discussed.     

The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of a Priori Voting Power

If K is an index of relative voting power for simple voting games, the bicameral postulate requires that the distribution of K -power within a voting assembly, as measured by the ratios of the powers of the voters, be independent of whether the assembly is viewed as a separate legislature or as one chamber of a bicameral system, provided that there are no voters common to both chambers. We argue that a reasonable index – if it is to be used as a tool for analysing abstract, uninhabited decision rules – should satisfy this postulate. We show that, among known indices, only the Banzhaf measure does so. Moreover, the Shapley–Shubik, Deegan–Packel and Johnston indices sometimes witness a reversal under these circumstances, with voter x less powerful than y when measured in the simple voting game G₁ , but more powerful than y when G₁ is bicamerally joined with a second chamber G₂ . Thus these three indices violate a weaker, and correspondingly more compelling, form of the bicameral postulate. It is also shown that these indices are not always co-monotonic with the Banzhaf index and that as a result they infringe another intuitively plausible condition – the price monotonicity condition. We discuss implications of these findings, in light of recent work showing that only the Shapley–Shubik index, among known measures, satisfies another compelling principle known as the bloc postulate. We also propose a distinction between two separate aspects of voting power: power as share in a fixed purse (P-power) and power as influence (I-power).     

Is the long-term reduction in occupational sex segregation still continuing in the United States?

This research note uses comparable data on 13 broad occupational categories from the Current Population Survey to analyze changes in job segregation between men and women over the period 1972–2002. I find that the Sex Segregation Index declined by about 10 percentage points from 43.96% in 1972 to 34.10% in 2002. The long-term reduction in occupational sex segregation in the United States continued during the period 1993–2002. However, it did so at a slower pace than in the two previous decades. I also find that the pattern of changes in the sex composition of occupations and in the occupational structure that contributed to the decline in the Sex Segregation Index over the period 1972–2002 substantially shifted during the period 1993–2002. The sex composition effect represented about 65% of the reduction in segregation during the period 1972–1983 while it accounted for only about 25% during the period 1993–2002.     

Gender role attitudes and attitudes to abortion: Are there gender differences?

This study examines gender differences in gender role attitudes and attitudes to abortion in a sample of 141 undergraduate students. Religion and religiosity were treated as covariates. Using the short version of Spence and Helmreich's (1978) Attitudes to Women Scale (AWS) taken from Spence and Hahn [Spence, J. T., & Hahn, E. D. (1997). The Attitudes Toward Women Scale and attitude to change in college students. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 21, 17–34] and the abortion attitudes scale developed by Stets and Leik [Stets, J. E., & Leik, R. K. (1993). Attitudes about abortion and varying attitude structures. Social Science Research, 22, 265–282], we found that females have more liberal attitudes to women and show stronger approval for women's autonomy in abortion decision-making. Given the low internal consistency of this three-item subscale, responses to the individual items were analyzed. More males than females feel that the father should have the right to prevent the mother from having an abortion. Most of the students indicate that the woman should have to tell the father before having an abortion and most disagree that the abortion is entirely a woman's decision. There were no gender differences on the moral acceptability and availability subscales. The overall results reflect somewhat conservative attitudes to women, and seemingly contradictory findings on the abortion issue in this sample of university students. Although they endorse the availability of abortion, at the same time they find it morally unacceptable and show weak support for women's autonomy in this decision. The implications of these findings for the advancement of women's rights in this country are discussed.     

Assimilation and discriminatory perceptions and experiences: The case of Hispanics in the United States

This paper examines the relationship between assimilation and discriminatory practices encountered by Hispanic-Americans. Theories of intergroup relations have typically assumed that as members of minority ethnic groups assimilate to a dominant group, they perceive and experience lower degrees of discrimination directed against them. In reviewing theories of majority–minority relations, we have called this the “assimilationist” model. This view has been opposed by some scholars who argue that as minority ethnics assimilate and become more knowledgeable of the larger society, they perceive and experience higher levels of discrimination against them and their group. We have termed this the “conflict model” of interethnic relations. Using data from the 2002 National Survey of Latinos, conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center, we test opposing hypotheses based on these two models. Our findings, while exploratory, largely support the assimilationist model, with a few contradictory results. We discuss these findings and their implications for understanding the current situation of Hispanics in the United States.     

Staying power in sequential games

Staying power is the ability of a player to hold off choosing a strategy in a two-person game until the other player has selected his, after which the players are assumed to be able to move and countermove sequentially to ensure their best possible outcomes before the process cycles back to the initial outcome and then repeats itself (rational termination). These rules of sequential play induce a determinate, Paretosuperior outcome in all two-person, finite, sequential games in which the preferences of the players are strict.In 57 of the 78 distinct 2 × 2 ordinal games (73 percent), it makes no difference who the (second-moving) player with staying power is, but in the other 21 games the outcome is power-dependent. In all but one of these games, staying power benefits the player who possesses it.If no player has staying power, the outcomes that result from sequential play and rational termination are called terminal; they coincide with staying power outcomes if they are Pareto-superior. Normative implications of the analysis for rationally justifying cooperation in such games as Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken, and implementing Pareto-superior outcomes generally, are also discussed.We are grateful to D. Marc Kilgour for very valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper, causing us to rethink and redefine staying power. The earlier version was presented at the Seventeenth North American Conference, Peace Science Society (International), University of Pennsylvania, November 9–11, 1981.     

The effect of tax-benefit policies on fertility and female labor force participation in the United States

This paper presents an investigation of the effects of the tax exemption for dependents and the child care tax credit on age-specific fertility rates and female labor supply for the U.S. 1948–1997. These policies are incorporated in a model that is tested within a cointegration framework for women of two age groups: 20–24 and 25–34 year olds. Tests indicate the existence of two cointegrating relations for each of the two age groups, and these are identified as a fertility equation and a female labor force participation equation, with signs and statistical significance supportive of the economic model. The tax exemption elasticity in the fertility equation for younger women is moderately large, but this policy variable is dominated by effects from changes in women's wages. The 25–34 year olds are less responsive to all economic changes, including the tax exemption, reflecting reduced flexibility in their timing of fertility.     

先秦盟誓的种类及仪程

先秦盟誓依照参加人员可分为天子与诸侯间、诸侯国间、诸侯国君与本国卿大夫间、诸侯与少数民族间、诸侯国君与国人间、卿大夫与卿大夫间等种类的盟誓 ;依照盟誓性质可分为政治性、军事性和经济性等种类 ;依照盟誓的仪式可分为血盟和非血盟两种 ;还有伪盟、重盟、强盟、改盟、和匮盟等情况。盟誓的仪程则可分为征会与定期、排序、商讨盟辞、歃血、拜盟等 11个程序     

The Value of a Statistical Life and the Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion

Individuals’ risk preferences are estimated and employed in a variety of settings, notably including choices in financial, labor, and product markets. Recent work, especially in financial economics, provides estimates of individuals’ coefficients of relative risk aversion (R’s) in excess of one, and often significantly higher. However, it can be shown that high R’s imply equally high values for the income elasticity of the value of a statistical life. Yet estimates of this elasticity, derived from labor and product markets, are in the range of 0.5 to 0.6. Furthermore, it turns out that even an R below one is difficult to reconcile with these elasticity estimates. Thus, there appears to be an important (additional) anomaly involving individuals’ risk-taking behavior in different market settings.JEL Classification: D80, G11, G12, I10, J17     

Does product complexity matter for competition in experimental retail markets?

We describe a first experiment on whether product complexity affects competition and consumers in retail markets. We are unable to detect a significant effect of product complexity on prices, except insofar as the demand elasticity for complex products is higher. However, there is qualified evidence that complex products have the potential to induce consumers to buy more than they would otherwise. In this sense, consumer exploitability in quantities cannot be ruled out. We also find evidence for shaping effects: consumers’ preferences are shaped by past experience with prices, and firms may in principle exploit this to sell more.     

The Black Regulars: Buffalo Soldiers during the Indian war era as crime fighters and peacekeepers on the Western frontier, 1866–1892

The purpose of this review of the Buffalo Soldier is to explore their peacekeeping and crime fighting duties on the Western frontier during the period of 1866–1892. The Army was called upon to play a role in a number of controversial areas of American life and society: Southern Reconstruction fighting against the Native Americans, strikebreakers; and finally the railroad strikes of 1877. Following the Civil War, while performing some of these roles, the Army faced a great deal of hostility. It is one of the ironies of American History, as historians Foner [Foner, J. D. (1970). The United States soldier between two wars: Army life and reforms, 1865–1898. New York: Humanities Press] and Jackson and Katz [Jackson, S. D., & Katz, W. L. (1969). Preface of the Arno edition in under fire with the tenth U.S. cavalry. New York: Arno Press] have noted, that the Buffalo Soldier to earn their esteemed reputation as honorable fighting men, had to assist in the suppression of the Native American people and to act as strikebreakers. However, the literature shows that they also brought peace and civilization to the West through their law enforcement and other peacekeeping duties.     

Adaptation of Tastes to Constraints

This paper examines a model in which people’s preferences adjust to changes in their relative ability to attain various goals. Preference changes are modeled as changes in the configuration of weights (or values) attached to these goals. The model permits to explain common prototype changes of preferences such as the ‘sour grapes’ or the ‘overcompensating’ phenomenon. It is found that whether the first or the second phenomenon occurs depends on whether a goal is easy or difficult to substitute by other goals. If two goals are sufficiently strong substitutes for each other, no weight will be placed on that goal which is harder to attain. The results readily apply to the standard microeconomic set-up involving goods and prices, rather than abstract goals and abilities. In this case, one implication of the model is that only a subset of the overall commodity space is relevant for everyday consumer choice, which reduces the complexity of the choice procedure. The model also permits to explain how new and unfamiliar products are incorporated into the consumer’s preference pattern.     

Intentional time inconsistency

We propose a theoretical model to explain the usage of time-inconsistent behavior as a strategy to exploit others when reputation and trust have secondary effects on the economic outcome. We consider two agents with time-consistent preferences exploiting common resources. Supposing that an agent is believed to have time-inconsistent preferences with probability p,  we analyze whether she uses this misinformation when she has the opportunity to use it. Using the model originally provided by Levhari and Mirman (Bell J Econ 11(1):322–334, 1980), we determine the optimal degree of present bias that the agent would like to have while pretending to have time-inconsistent preferences and we provide the range of present-bias parameter under which deceiving is optimal. Moreover, by allowing the constant relative risk aversion class of utility form, we characterize the distinction between pretending to be naive and sophisticated.

     

Hungary in transition: a computable general equilibrium model comparison with Austria

We approach the problem of Hungary's transformation from a partially centrally planned to a market-oriented economy with a cross-country comparison using two computable general equilibrium (CGE) models of Hungary, 1977 and 1986, and one of Austria, 1976. These three models represent a continuum of small open economies and allow a “quasidynamic” analysis using static CGE models. We examine two types of transformation issues: external (trade liberalization, import price reductions, and redirection of foreign trade; “Dutch Disease reversal”) and internal (decreases in subsidy levels). Overall, it is clear that with Hungary's borrowing constraints, liberalization should not be pursued in isolation; a change in the tax structure is necessary at the same time. The results for Austria indicate that liberalization brings smaller welfare improvements accompanied by smaller increases in the current account and government deficits.     

The Right to Remain Silent

The paper points out that in dynamic games a player may be better-off if other players do not know his choice of strategy. That is, a player may benefit by not revealing (or not pre-determining) the choice of his action in an information set he (thereby) hopes will not be reached. He would be better-off by exercising his ``right to remain silent' if he believes –- as the empirical evidence shows –- that players display aversion to ``Knightian uncertainty'. In this case, a player who behaves strategically, may wish to avoid revealing his strategy. This is true under various interpretations of the notion of ``strategy profiles'.     

A forecasting and policy simulation oriented small macro-model for the Indian economy

The design of macro-models for the purposes of derivation of macroeconomic stabilization policies and obtaining forecasts is an important area of theoretical and empirical economic research. This is because such a stance presents an ideal blend of skillfully interweaving the essential theoretical ingredients of the contemporary macroeconomic paradigms with specific structural features of the country under reference. The use of macro-models enables the policy makers to build alternative policy evidences and thus this approach proves to be far superior to the alternative approaches based on intuitive or judgmental criteria. It is against this background that a macro-model for the Indian economy is estimated in an error-correction framework. Based on it, some policy options are evaluated. ECM and time varying parameter based forecasts are obtained for inflation and growth for the Indian economy for the year 2004–2005.     

Measuring ambiguity attitude: (Extended) multiplier preferences for the American and the Dutch population

Empirical studies of ambiguity aversion often use measures that are not grounded in theory. This paper shows how a theoretically-founded measure of ambiguity aversion can be derived from Hansen and Sargent’s theory of multiplier preferences. Multiplier preferences are used in macroeconomics to capture model uncertainty. At the micro level, they have not been applied yet, because they do not permit ambiguity seeking, which is usually observed for a substantial proportion of subjects. We give a preference foundation for (extended) multiplier preferences accommodating both ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking and we propose a simple method to measure them using matching probabilities. We illustrate our method in two large representative samples (Dutch and American) and obtain the first micro estimates of multiplier preferences.     

Known, Unknown, and Unknowable Uncertainties

In normative decision theory, the weight of an uncertain event in a decision is governed solely by the probability of the event. A large body of empirical research suggests that a single notion of probability does not accurately capture peoples' reactions to uncertainty. As early as the 1920s, Knight made the distinction between cases where probabilities are known and where probabilities are unknown. We distinguish another case –- the unknowable uncertainty –- where the missing information is unavailable to all. We propose that missing information influences the attractiveness of a bet contingent upon an uncertain event, especially when the information is available to someone else. We demonstrate that the unknowable uncertainty –- falls in preference somewhere in between the known and the known uncertainty.