Uncertain lifetime, fertility and social security

Investigating the effects of population aging on fertility and economic growth, we show that an increase in life expectancy lowers the fertility rate and raises life-cycle savings, and that a pay-as-you-go social security does not reverse the effect on fertility. Received: 10 March 2000/Accepted: 28 April 2000     

Population growth and social security financing

By allowing the population growth to be flexible, this paper analyzes the effect of a tax reform that involves an introduction of consumption taxation for social security financing. It is found that population growth and labor supply play an important role in determining the effect of the tax reform. If population growth and labor supply are exogenous, then an introduction of a consumption tax for social security financing, with the payroll tax rate being endogenous, decreases the interest rate and increases capital accumulation. However, if population growth and labor supply are endogenous, then an introduction of a consumption tax for social security financing increases the interest rate and reduces capital accumulation. Received: 26 February 2001/Accepted: 26 August 2001     

Time preference, international migration, and social security

This paper analyzes both the formation of long-run migration incentives and the consequences of a regime change from “autarky” to “free migration” in an overlapping-generations framework with two countries. Under autarky the countries may differ with respect to their aggregate savings rate or with respect to their pension-wage ratio. It is shown that an individual prefers to live in a country where the capital-labor ratio is close to the Golden Rule level and where his characteristics are relatively scarce. Both the migration incentives and the consequences of free migration are determined by these two effects. Received: 2 March 1998/Accepted: 10 February 1999     

Fertility rates and skill distribution in Razin and Sadka’s migration-pension model: A note

Razin and Sadka (1999) show that unskilled immigration is beneficial to all income and all age groups in society, even if immigrants are net beneficiaries of the welfare system. Among other things, this result rests on the assumptions that immigrants have the same reproduction rate as the native population and that the immigrants offspring has the same distribution of skills as the natives offspring. By relaxing these assumptions, we show that the Razin and Sadka result is no longer unambiguous.Helpful comments and suggestions from two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. Responsible editor: Alessandro Cigno.     

Assessing the effects of an early retirement program

We investigate induced retirement effects of the Norwegian early retirement program AFP and emphasize effects caused by relocations of some individuals from disability pension and unemployment to AFP. Theoretical considerations predict that AFP unambiguously induces more early retirement. Analyzing Norwegian register data 1994–96 with parametric and non-parametric methods, we demonstrate that i) economic incentives influence the retirement decision, ii) there is a significant net induced retirement effect, iii) by a conservative judgment, at least 50% of the AFP retirees would have stayed in the labor force without the scheme.All correspondence to Espen Bratberg. We are indebted to the referees for detailed remarks, which significantly improved the paper. Financial support from the Norwegian Research Council and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs is greatly appreciated. We are grateful for valuable comments from Erik Hernæs and Astrid Grasdal, seminar participants at the Norwegian School of Management in Oslo, the Institute for International Economic Studies in Stockholm, and the University of Linz, the 2000 Conference of the European Society for Population Economics in Bonn, and the German-Norwegian Seminar on Social Insurance in Berlin, 2000. Bratberg would also like to thank the Humboldt University for its hospitality during a stay in the winter of 2003. Responsible editor: Christoph M. Schmidt.     

Social security reforms and early retirement

Many reform proposals of the social security systems in various OECD economies suggest to scale down the non-actuarial parts of the pension systems. These reforms have a flavor of increased efficiency at the costs of welfare losses for low-income individuals. Assessing the economic effects, we investigate five different reform proposals by means of a numerical overlapping generations model for the Norwegian economy. The model features an endogenous retirement age and heterogeneous individuals within generations. It turns out that the various reforms, which scale down the public non-actuarial pension system, lead to increases in the retirement age and steady-state welfare gains for all income classes. Received: 7 December 2000/Accepted: 29 January 2002 All correspondence to ?ystein Th?gersen. Financial support from the Research Council of Norway (The Economic Research Program on Taxation) is gratefully acknowledged. We are indebted to Lans Bovenberg, John Ermisch, Erling Steigum and two referees for valuable comments and useful discussion. Responsible editor: John F. Ermisch.     

Demographic change, endogenous labor supply and the political feasibility of pension reform

Options for reforming unfunded public pension schemes that are now being discussed all share the feature that the burden induced by demographic change would be shifted towards presently living and away from unborn generations. Existing models of the political economy of pension reform can not explain why such reform options are being discussed at all. We present an alternative model in which the possibility of evasion of workers from payment of social security taxes is taken into account by modelling a labor supply function. It turns out that the burden of demographic change may fall completely or at least predominantly on the pensioners. Thus this type of model can much better explain recent trends in legislature on unfunded public pension systems in industrial democracies. Received: 7 January 1999/Accepted: 20 December 1999     

How does social security affect economic growth? Evidence from cross-country data

This paper investigates how social security interacts with growth and growth determinants (savings, human capital investment, and fertility). Our empirical investigation finds that the estimated coefficient on social security is significantly negative in the fertility equation, insignificant in the saving equation, and significantly positive in the growth and education equations. By contrast, the estimated coefficient on growth is insignificant in the social security equation. The results suggest that social security may indeed be conducive to growth through tipping the trade-off between the number and quality of children toward the latter.All correspondence to Junsen Zhang. We would like to thank the editor, two anonymous referees, Jim Davies, Frank Denton, Se-Jik Kim, and Mike McAleer for helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining omissions and errors are the authors responsibility. Responsible editor: Alessandro Cigno.     

Intergenerational redistribution in a small open economy with endogenous fertility

For pay-as-you-go financed pension systems, claims may be calculated according to individual contributions (income) or the number of children of a family. We analyse the optimal structure of these parameters in a model with endogenous fertility. It is shown that for both structural determinants there exists no interior solution of the problem of intragenerational utility maximisation. Thus, pure systems are always welfare maximizing. Furthermore, children-related pension claims induce a fiscal externality that tends to be positive. The determination of the optimal contribution rate shows that the widely accepted Aaron-condition is in general a misleading indicator for the comparison of fully funded and pay-as-you-go financed pension systems. Received March 12, 1996 / Accepted January 27, 1997     

Social security policy with public debt in an aging economy

This paper analyzes a social security policy with public debt in an overlapping generations growth model. In particular, the paper considers a situation in which population aging causes a heavy burden of social security payments where public debt is issued by the government to finance the payment. In the model presented below, an economy with an aging population may achieve two dynamically inefficient equilibria. Under certain conditions, the effects of pension reform and population aging on capital accumulation are entirely different between the two equilibria. Received: 23 July 2001/Accepted: 22 August 2002 I am deeply grateful to an anonymous referee and Professor A. Cigno, the Editor of this journal, for their valuable comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to Kazuyo Tanimoto and Kiheiji Nishida for their research assistance. Any remaining errors are my own. The research reported here was conducted as part of a larger study, the “Project on Intergenerational Equity” at the Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. Financial support from Kani Hoken Bunka Zaidan is also gratefully acknowledged. Responsible editor: Alessandro Cigno.     

Pay-as-you-go financed public pensions in a model of endogenous growth and fertility

Employing an overlapping generations endogenous growth model in which parents derive utility from having children and, additionally, expect children to support them in old age, this paper explores the interrelation between growth, fertility, and the size of pay-as-you-go financed public pensions. It is shown that small sized public pensions stimulate per capita income growth, but further increases in public pensions eventually reduce it. Fertility, on the other hand, falls by an increase in public pensions if they are either small or large. Medium sized public pensions, however, may stimulate fertility. Received: 9 September 1997 / Accepted: 10 April 1998     

The macroeconomics of fertility in small open economies: A test of the Becker-Barro model for The Netherlands and New Zealand

Becker and Barro (1988) formulated a theoretical model which identified a range of macroeconomic variables which can temporarily or permanently affect fertility in small open economies. This article tests the Becker-Barro model with relevant data which covers most of the 20th century for two small open economies, namely The Netherlands and New Zealand. The results show that government subsidies for having children have a strong positive effect on fertility, while the provision of public pensions has a strong negative effect. The degree of intergenerational altruism appears to have been declining. Moreover, there is only weak support for the hypothesis that real interest rates positively influence fertility. Received: 2 March 1998/Accepted: 1 September 1999     

Changing fertility rates in developed countries. The impact of labor market institutions

During the last two decades fertility rates have decreased and have become positively correlated with female participation rates across OECD countries. I use a panel of 23 OECD nations to study how different labor market arrangements shaped these trends. High unemployment and unstable contracts, common in Southern Europe, depress fertility, particularly of younger women. To increase lifetime income though early skill-acquisition and minimize unemployment risk, young women postpone (or abandon) childbearing. Further, both a large share of public employment, by providing employment stability, and generous maternity benefits linked to previous employment, such as those in Scandinavia, boost fertility of the 25–29 and 30–34 year old women.Financial help from a CRB grant from the University of Illinois is gratefully acknowledged. I would like to thank Carles Boix, Barry Chiswick, Carmel Chiswick, Evelyn Lehrer, three anonymous referees and seminar participants at ESPE 2000 (Bonn), Illinois Economic Meetings 2000 (Chicago), Simposi dAnalisi Economica 2000 (Barcelona), 2001 Winter meetings of the Econometric Society in New Orleans, ESPE 2001 (Athens), Braga (Portugal), University of Chicago, De Paul University, PAA 2002 (Atlanta) for helpful comments; Gosta Esping-Andersen for providing some data and Cristina Mora for excellent research assistance. Responsible editor: Junsen Zhang.     

Social security,social welfare and the aging population

This study examines the effects of pay-as-you-go social security programs in aging economies when the middle-aged both educate their dependent children and subsidize the retirement of the old. Using an overlapping generations framework in which agents are three-period lived but timing of death in the third period is uncertain, we analyze the effects of social security tax schemes, under various demographic assumptions, on capital accumulation, education expenditures, social welfare, and economic growth. We find that in many cases social security crowds out education, and reduces economic growth and social welfare. Received: 29 April 1998/Accepted: 3 March 1999     

Education and income inequality: The role of a social protection system

In this paper we aim to understand the role a welfare state can play in stimulating risky but profitable activities like investment in education, and in reducing income inequality. We analyze how unemployment benefits may affect investment in education when the latter is characterized by uncertain returns. This is done in an overlapping generations model in which endogenous growth is introduced through human capital accumulation. We develop a numerical example of the model in order to reproduce some key differences between the European versus the North American economy; differences that, according to this model, result from the different degree of social protection characterizing both economies. Received: 02 June 1999/Accepted: 22 February 2000     

On private incentives to acquire household production skills

In non-cooperative family models, being good at contributing to family public goods like household production may reduce one's utility, since it tends to crowd out contributions from one's spouse. Similar effects also arise in cooperative models with non-cooperative threat point: improved contribution productivity entails loss of bargaining power. This strategic effect must be traded against the benefits of household production skills, in terms of increased consumption possibilities. Since cooperation involves extensive specialization, incentives to acquire household production skills are strikingly asymmetric, with the one not specializing in household production having strong disincentives for household skill acquisition. Received: 06 July 1999/Accepted: 08 June 2000     

The effects of financial markets and social security on saving and fertility behaviour in Italy

The paper aims to ascertain the extent to which saving and fertility decisions are affected by the availability and attractiveness of market-based or state-provided alternatives to the family as a source of old-age support. Subordinately, the paper aims to bring evidence to bear on the assumption that fertility is endogenous and jointly determined with saving, and to test two alternative hypotheses about individual motivations. The saving and fertility implications of two alternative models of family choice — based one on the assumption of pure self-interest, the other on that of intergenerational altruism — are first derived theoretically. Saving and fertility equations are then estimated from Italian time-series data, using as explanatory variables the market rate of interest, the social security deficit, various measures of capital market accessibility and social security coverage, and a number of income and wage variables. Particularly worthy of note is the result that a fully-funded increase in social security coverage raises saving, while an increase in the social security deficit has the opposite effect. The empirical findings appear to support the assumption that fertility is endogenous and jointly determined with saving, and to favour the hypothesis that individual decisions are motivated by self-interest rather than intergenerational altruism. Some of the policy implications are briefly discussed in the concluding section.While retaining responsibility for any errors, the authors wish to thank Carlo Casarosa, Wolfram Richter, Ed Wolff and three anonymous referees for helpful comments. Financial support from MURST 40%, under national project Capitale, Capitale Umano, Sicurezza Sociale e Dinamiche Demografische Endogene, is gratefully acknowledged.     

On the political economy of social security and public education

This paper analyzes simultaneous voting on the wage tax rate and investment in public education with three overlapping generations and ability differences inside each cohort. Wage tax revenue finances public education and social security benefits. The presence of ability differences introduces a time-consistency problem with repeated voting. This can be solved by trigger strategies, which do not punish upward deviations in the wage tax rate. If there are multiple equilibria, then higher tax rates are associated with more education. Surprisingly, the median voter may be a young citizen, even when cohorts are of the same size.

Private support and social security

The issue is addressed whether assistance to persons in need can be left to the ‘family’ and the ‘community’. In that case people depend on their social networks. The support a person receives through a given network of social ties is examined. However, ties are diverse and subject to change. By means of a model of the dynamics of social ties, the conditions for adequate private support are analyzed. The sustainability of private support over time is examined by incorporating the impact on social ties of lending and receiving support. It is shown that support is only an effective alternative in a limited number of situations. Received: 2 January 1997 / Accepted: 2 February 1998     

Does time preference change with age?

This study looks at compensating differentials in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to derive estimates of the levels of time preference for labor force participants in each of 15 waves of data from 1979 to 1994. With these estimates the evolution of time preference over the life course is described. Future utility among labor force participants appears to be valued more highly by subjects who are older, more schooled, white, or male. Controlling for schooling level, a higher IQ is associated with a preference for more immediate rewards.If social rates of time preference are correlated with individual rates of time preference then population aging could create intergenerational asymmetries in the social rate of time preference.This phenomenon could make the optimal investments of young populations appear selfish to future generations that are older.Support from Hopkins Population Center (R24) is gratefully acknowledged. I am thankful for helpful comments received from Jim Burgess, Mike Grossman, Bruce Hamilton, Fritz Laux, Athanasios Orphanides, Katie Roche, and Eric Slade. All errors are my own. Responsible editor: Alessandro Cigno.