Efficiency in Marriage

Economists usually assume that bargaining in marriage leads to efficient outcomes. The most convincing rationale for this assumption is the belief that efficient allocations are likely to emerge from repeated interactions in stationary environments, and that marriage provides such an environment. This paper argues that when a current decision affects future bargaining power, inefficient outcomes are plausible. If the spouses could make binding commitments–in effect, commitments to refrain from exploiting the future bargaining advantage–then the inefficiency would disappear. But spouses seldom can make binding commitments regarding allocation within marriage.To investigate the efficiency of bargaining within marriage when choices affect future bargaining power, we consider the location decisions of two-earner couples. Initial location decisions are transparent and analytically tractable examples of choices likely to affect future bargaining power, but the logic of our analysis applies to many other decisions. For example, decisions about education, fertility, and labor force participation are also potential sources of inefficiency.     

Protective service unions’ political activities and department expenditures

This paper examines how police and firefighter unions’ political activities influence departmental expenditures. Unlike prior research, we measure unions’ political activity independently of union bargaining power. Results indicate that a protective service union’s electoral activities positively affect departmental expenditures, and these effects are attributable to union political power rather than multilateral collective bargaining power. The authors thank Steve Blumenfeld, Wally Hendricks, Asghar Zardkoohi, and an anonymous referee for their excellent comments and suggestions.     

An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars

I examine a situation where a firm chooses to locate a new factory in one of several jurisdictions. The value of the factory may differ among jurisdictions and it depends on the private information held by each jurisdiction. Jurisdictions compete for the location of the new factory. This competition may take the form of expenditures already incurred on infrastructure, commitments to spend on infrastructure, tax incentives or even cash payments. The model combines two elements that are usually considered separately; competition is desirable because we want the factory to be located in the jurisdiction that values it the most, but competition in itself is wasteful. I show that the expected total amount paid to the firm under a large family of arrangements is the same. Moreover, I show that the ex-ante optimal mechanism – that is, the mechanism that guarantees that the firm chooses the jurisdiction with the highest value for the factory, minimizes the total expected payment to the firm, and balances the budget in an ex-ante sense – can be implemented by running a standard auction and subsidizing participation. Received: 6 December 2000/Accepted: 18 February 2002 I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of CNPQ (Grant no. 300065/93-0) and ARC (Grant no. A000000055). The author is grateful to the editor and an anonymous referee for many helpful comments.     

Egalitarian property for power indices

In this study, we introduce and examine the Egalitarian property for some power indices on the class of simple games. This property means that after intersecting a game with a symmetric or anonymous game the difference between the values of two comparable players does not increase. We prove that the Shapley–Shubik index, the absolute Banzhaf index, and the Johnston score satisfy this property. We also give counterexamples for Holler, Deegan–Packel, normalized Banzhaf and Johnston indices. We prove that the Egalitarian property is a stronger condition for efficient power indices than the Lorentz domination.     

The effect of collective bargaining on production technique: A theoretical analysis

A general equilibrium approach is used to model the union effect on capitalintensity of the union and nonunion sectors. Unlike earlier general equilibrium approaches, union power is assumed to be affected by the production technique chosen. The labor relations literature argues that union power is enhanced by a high capital to labor ratio. This assumption is built into a simple two sector (union and nonunion), general equilibrium model. It is found that failing to account for the effects of capital intensity on union power results in an understatement of unions’ ability to redistribute income from capital to labor. The author thanks Jan Brueckner and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Pathways of Commitment to Wed: The Development and Dissolution of Romantic Relationships

The authors used changes in commitment to wed and reasons for these changes to classify couples into developmental pathways. Using data from a random sample of dating couples (N = 376), they found 4 distinct commitment processes: (a) dramatic, (b) conflict ridden, (c) socially involved, and (d) partner focused. Dramatic commitments were defined by relatively frequent fluctuations in commitment and negative attributions about their relationships. Conflict‐ridden commitments were defined by high levels of conflict and relatively frequent decreases in commitment. Individuals in socially involved commitments reported the highest proportion of positive dyadic attributions and references to joint interaction with social networks. Those in partner‐focused commitments reported a high proportion of positive dyadic attributions and references to interaction with partners. Types also differed on important relational variables, including satisfaction, love, ambivalence, worries about marriage, and leisure. Dramatic commitments were more likely than any other type to break up and showed an increased likelihood of regression in stage of involvement.     

State homophobia? India’s shifting UN positions on LGBTQ issues

Why has India adopted contradictory policies with regard to LGBTQ rights at the UN? From 2004 to 2010, India consistently supported draft language for a UN resolution to allow a Special Rapporteur to investigate extra-judicial executions that would include the term ‘sexual orientation’. More recently, however, India has opposed or abstained from UN votes on LGBTQ rights. While India's conservative posture on LGBTQ issues was catalyzed by the Supreme Court's re-criminalization of homosexual activities in 2013 and the rise of the Hindu nationalist BJP, we argue that the state's posture is not a reflection of deep ideological commitments or a new strategic realignment. Instead, India's policy reflects a generally uncoordinated foreign policy apparatus that has been unprepared to respond to the rapid ascendancy of LGBTQ issues on the human rights agenda. It is not currently possible to predict India's future posture due to its lack of a clear policy commitments.     

On the Concept of Value-Commitments

This paper analyzes the nature of value-commitments, conceived as a generalized symbolic medium of interchange in the processes of social interaction, in this respect paralleling money, power, and influence. Commitments constitute moral obligations of units of a system of social interaction to maintain the integrity of a value-pattern and to strive toward its implementation in action through combination with non-value factors. Stability of commitments is a basic condition of the compatibility of wide moral freedom with the exigencies of social functioning. Like the other three media, commitments are not bound by a zero-sum condition, but can be expanded, especially through charismatic movements.     

Not Bound but Committed: Operationalizing the Global Compact on Refugees

The Global Compact on Refugees is not legally binding, but it gives rise to commitments by the international community as a whole. It is also rooted in international refugee law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law. This article addresses how the GCR cannot give rise to binding obligations in international law, yet provide for enhanced protection and assistance to refugees and hosting communities, and establish commitments for a fairer and more predictable sharing of burdens and responsibilities. It does this by reference to other non‐legally binding international documents and rules of law. Additionally, the use of indicators to measure states’ and other international actors’ performance in operationalizing the GCR provides a framework to measure commitments; coupled with greater humanitarian and development co‐operation, commitments can be better facilitated even if the GCR is not legally binding. Finally, the sharing of burdens and responsibilities is also fulfilled by the emphasis on solutions.     

How Will Reforms of Marital Institutions Influence Marital Commitment? A Theoretical Analysis

Many recently policy proposals are intended to alter the incentives to establish or terminate family relationships, often with the goal of encouraging marriage. This paper develops a model of family structure decisions and uses it to argue that some such reforms may actually have the opposite effect. A pro-marriage reform raises both the value of marrying ones current partner and the value of search. When the latter effect dominates, singles are less likely to form a match, and couples are more likely to separate and optimally make fewer commitments to their relationships.This paper has benefitted from conversations with Gary Becker, Robert Michael, Victor Lima, Janice Compton, Emek Basker, Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman (the editor), several anonymous referees, and the participants of workshops at the University of Chicago and the Midwest Economics Association. I also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the University of Chicago and the National Institute for Child Health and Human Development (Grant number T32HD07302). Any remaining deficiencies are solely my responsibility.     

Anonymous and neutral majority rules

In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous and neutral rules and for the existence of anonymous and neutral majority rules. We also determine a general method for constructing and counting these rules and we explicitly apply it to some simple cases.     

The positional power of nodes in digraphs

Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both local and global methods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have been proposed in the literature. We propose a new method, where the power of a node is determined by both the number of its successors and the powers of its successors. Our method, called the positional power function, determines a full ranking of the nodes for any digraph. The positional power function can either be determined as the unique solution to a nonhomogeneous system of equations, or as the limit point of an iterative process. The solution can easily be obtained explicitly, which enables us to derive a number of interesting properties of the positional power function. We also consider the Copeland variant of the positional power function. Finally, we extend our method to the class of all weighted graphs.The authors like to thank two anonymous referees for their valuable comments. The first author would like to thank the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for financial support.     

Commitments to Fathering and the Well‐Being and Social Participation of New,Disadvantaged Fathers

This study uses data on 2,494 new fathers from the Fragile Families Study to analyze why and how the arrival of a new child may influence fathers’ well‐being and social participation. Our regression results indicate that changes in commitments to fathering are positively associated with changes in well‐being, religious participation, and hours in paid labor. The one exception is that increases in fathers’ engagement activities with their new child are negatively associated with changes in their hours in paid labor. The findings suggest that increases in commitments to fathering after the arrival of a new child are generally beneficial for fathers. In addition, greater commitments to fathering seem likely to benefit mothers, children, and society at large.     

Fuzzy preferences and Arrow-type problems in social choice

There are alternative ways of decomposing a given fuzzy weak preference relation into its antisymmetric and symmetric components. In this paper I have provided support to one among these alternative specifications. It is shown that on this specification the fuzzy analogue of the General Possibility Theorem is valid even when the transitivity restrictions on the individual and the social preference relations are relatively weak. In the special case where the individual preference relations are exact but the social preference relation is permitted to be fuzzy it is possible to distinguish between different degrees of power of the dictator. This power increases with the strength of the transitivity requirement.For comments on an earlier version of the paper I am indebted to an anonymous referee, an anonymous member of the Board of Editors and to participants in the 1991 Annual Conference of the Indian Econometric Society at North Bengal University, India. However, I retain sole responsibility for any error(s) that the paper may contain.     

Sandwich generation in China: Exchange pattern with older parents and educational expenditure on young children

The sandwich generation have dual care commitments to both ageing parents and children, so balancing the distribution of resources to older and younger generations is an important issue for them. Using data from the (China Family Panel Studies, 2018, N = 1,477), we investigated the associations between financial exchange patterns with older parents and educational expenditure on young children from the perspective of sandwich generation couples. The results indicate that individuals tended to spend less on their children's education when they had obligatory financial exchange patterns with their ageing parents compared to their counterparts with independent exchange patterns. The associations between financial exchange patterns and educational expenditure on young children differed between low- and high-income families. This study contributes to understanding the complexity of fulfilling the multigenerational support commitments of the sandwich generation and calls for more social support for such individuals.     

Re‐invigorating democracy?: White middle class identities and comprehensive schooling

Recent research on social class and whiteness points to disquieting and exclusive aspects of white middle class identities. This paper focuses on whether ‘alternative’ middle class identities might work against, and disrupt, normative views of what it means to be ‘middle class’ at the beginning of the 21^st Century. Drawing on data from those middle classes who choose to send their children to urban comprehensives, we examine processes of ‘thinking and acting otherwise’ in order to uncover some of the commitments and investments that might make for a renewed and reinvigorated democratic citizenry. The difficulties of turning these commitments and investments into more equitable ways of interacting with class and ethnic others which emerge as real challenges for this left leaning, pro‐welfare segment of the middle classes. Within a contemporary era of neo‐liberalism that valorises competition, individualism and the market even these white middle classes who express a strong commitment to community and social mixing struggle to convert inclinations into actions.     

The sound of one hand clapping: the case for and against anonymous giving

The paper draws on intensive interviews with 130 millionaires to explore the case for and against anonymous giving, to indicate a number of key findings about anonymous giving among the wealthy, and to describe the potential of anonymous giving to raise both the level of careand control in philanthropic relationships. The first two sections of the paper set out the case for and against anonymous giving, emphasising the instrumental and moral rationale by which the wealthy frame both sides of the issue. The third section discusses the tendencies inherent in anonymous giving toward enhancing moral stewardship and manipulation. In the conclusion, I discuss some conceptual distinctions derived from the analysis and speculate about the value of encouraging the non-wealthy to consider at least some measure of anonymous giving. A number of the ideas contained in this paper were first presented in Schervish (1991).     

Are economists overconfident? Ideology and uncertainty in expert opinion

Economics frequently serves as an advisory discipline to policymakers, bolstered in part by its claims to a unified intellectual framework and high disciplinary consensus. Recent research challenges this perspective, providing empirical evidence that economists' professional opinions are divided by ideological commitments to either free markets on one hand or state intervention on the other. We investigate the influence of ideology in economics by examining the relation between economists' ideological commitments and the certainty with which they express their expert opinions. To examine this relationship, we analyze data from the Initiative on Global Markets Economic Experts Panel, a unique survey of 51 economists at seven elite American universities. Our results suggest that economists with ideologically patterned views report higher levels of certainty in their opinions than their less ideologically consistent peers, but this boost in confidence is limited to topics that closely pertain to the free market versus interventionism divide.     

Innovation and Crisis in Organizational Analysis*

The study of organizations has been guided by a paradigm consisting of interrelated theoretical, methodological, and practical commitments. Theoretically, a problematic of rational structuring has dominated the field. This has been coupled with positivist methodology and a practical commitment to administrative problem-solving. The paradigm has fallen into crisis as a consequence of work on several analytical problems—action, power, levels, and process. Work on the action problem emphasizes the grounding of organizational patterns in the interactions and practices of people. Patterns are also seen in recent work as the expression of power relationships. The levels problem involves the analysis of interpenetration and interdependence between distinct sectors or layers of social structure. The concern with process involves the continuous transformation of organizational patterns. The central issue growing out of the work on these analytical problems is how to handle theoretically the production and reproduction of organizational patterns.     

Gendered Cultures and Performance Appraisal: The Experience of Women Academics

This paper examines women academics’ experiences of appraisal within one English university. Adopting the Foucauldian concepts of discourse and disciplinary power, the paper illustrates how appraisal functions as a disciplinary technology within the organization. Semi-structured interviews, carried out on women academics, reveal how the power relations operating in appraisal work to ‘normalize’ the academic role as a highly competitive, productive unit focused on identifiable, quantitative outputs. The case illustrates the difficulties which women face in trying to put forward alternative discourses which accommodate domestic commitments or different career structures. The research concludes that women academics have only gained limited visibility and voice in the gendered academy through opting in to the new competitive and highly gendered macho culture. The possibilities for women in offering alternative discourses have not materialized, emphasizing the difficultues in changing gendered cultures and challenging the ubiquity of male power.