ON THE HETEROGENEOUS EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF OFFSHORING: IDENTIFYING PRODUCTIVITY AND DOWNSIZING CHANNELS

This article examines the channels through which offshoring affects employment in a representative sample of German establishments, using a difference‐in‐differences matching approach. Offshoring is measured by an increase in the share of foreign to total intermediate inputs at the plant‐level. We identify a positive productivity effect and isolate a negative downsizing effect from offshoring on employment, by exploiting differences between offshoring plants that do and do not simultaneously restructure. Furthermore, we cannot find evidence of negative indirect employment effects on domestic suppliers or competitors. (JEL F16, J23, F23, C21)     

SOCIAL SECURITY, THE FAMILY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

We show that a defined-benefits PAYG social security system distorts key family-based choices that affect economic growth. We identify human capital as the engine of growth, and the motivating forces linking the family's overlapping generations as mutually productive intergenerational transfers and/or altruism. The PAYG system is shown to affect adversely at least one of three determinants of the economy's growth path: fertility, savings, and investment in human capital. The specific effects may vary over different stages of economic development. The growth rate is expected to fall in advanced economies. Our analysis indicates that the effect may be sizeable. ( JEL 915, 111, 850)     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE GROWTH ACCOUNTING PERSPECTIVE

A positive relationship between FDI and economic growth under two economic conditions has been estimated: a sufficient level of human capital and well-developed financial markets, respectively. However, these two conditions can be fundamentally different catalysts for FDI to promote economic growth in the perspective of growth accounting. Using data from 69 countries over 1970–1989, we find that FDI promotes productivity growth only when the host country reaches a threshold level of human capital; and FDI promotes capital growth only when a certain level of financial development is achieved. ( JEL F21)     

THE CULTURE OF CORRUPTION,TAX EVASION,AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This study uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of corruption and tax evasion on fiscal policy and economic growth. The model is calibrated to match estimates of tax evasion in developing countries. The calibrated model is able to generate reasonable predictions for net tax rates, the corruption associated with public investment projects, and the negative correlation between corruption and tax revenue. The presence of corruption and evasion is shown to have significant, but not large, negative effects on economic growth. The relatively moderate effects help explain the absence of a robust negative correlation between growth and corruption in cross‐country data. The model also implies that cracking down on tax evasion before addressing corruption can be a bad idea and that higher wages for public officials can improve welfare. (JEL H3, O4)     

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: THE FRENCH CASE

This article provides a test of the secularization hypothesis, which argues that economic growth, industrialization, increased literacy, and low fertility decrease religiosity. It focuses on the elections of the secular politicians who voted in favor of the separation between Church and State in the French Parliament in 1905. If the secularization hypothesis is correct, these secular politicians should have been elected in the most developed areas of France at the turn of the twentieth century. Contrary to the predictions of the secularization hypothesis, we find that the support for secular politicians originated in the rural areas of France. (JEL Z12, D72, N43)     

THE DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL POWER, THE COSTS OF RENT-SEEKING, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Poor economic growth in many countries can be explained by the misallocation of entrepreneurial resources to activities that do not foster growth. This paper deals with the relation between the distribution of political power, the allocation of entrepreneurial resources and growth. We model growth as deriving from Schumpeterian entrepreneurs who try to increase profits through innovation. We endogenize the choice of time devoted to this activity vis-a-vis other ways of increasing income, such as obtaining government subsidies. More unequal access to the political redistribution mechanism makes rent-seeking activities less profitable, and results in higher growth.     

INSTITUTIONS, TRANSACTION COSTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This essay develops a theoretical framework which explores the historical obstacles to economic growth. These obstacles are examined in the context of the political/economic institutional framework of economies in history and consequent transaction costs that determine economic performance and growth. The essay concludes with specific suggestions for the study of economic growth.     

ENTERTAINING MALTHUS: BREAD,CIRCUSES, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Motivated by the basic adage that man does not live by bread alone, we offer a theory of historical economic growth and population dynamics where human beings need food to survive, but enjoy other things, too. Our model imposes a Malthusian constraint on food, but introduces a second good to the analysis that affects living standards without affecting population growth. We show that technological change does a good job explaining historical consumption patterns and population dynamics, including the Neolithic Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and the Great Divergence. Our theory stands in contrast to models that assume a single composite good and a Malthusian constraint. These models generate negligible growth prior to the Industrial Revolution. However, recent revisions to historical data show that historical living standards—though obviously much lower than today's—varied over time and space much more than previously thought. These revisions include updates to Maddison's dataset, which served as the basis for many papers taking long‐run stagnation as a point of departure. This new evidence suggests that the assumption of long‐run stagnation is problematic. Our model shows that when we give theoretical accounting of these new observations the Industrial Revolution is much less puzzling. (JEL B10, I31, J1, N1, O30)     

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM THE FRENCH DEMOCRACY

We provide a test of the impact of voters' political ideology on economic growth and of the role of preferences for government size as a transmission channel. We focus on France from the beginning of its stable democratic experience in 1871. A move of voters' ideology to the right increases economic growth over the total observation period. However, the growth effect of ideology is mediated by voters' preferences for government size only during the post‐World War II period. For reverse causality concerns, we use the political ideology of other historical democracies as an instrument variable for France's ideology. (JEL E6, O43, H11)     

FACTOR AUGMENTATION,FACTOR ELIMINATION,AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Economic growth theory distinguishes between reproducible and nonreproducible factors of production. In traditional growth models based on factor‐augmenting technical change, perpetual economic growth requires that each essential nonreproducible factor, such as labor, be augmented by a reproducible factor, such as human capital. Recent models of factor‐eliminating technical change deliver perpetual growth by eliminating the nonreproducible factors. Heretofore, the literature has kept factor augmentation and factor elimination separate. We analyze a model with both. The model generalizes the traditional factor augmentation approach by relaxing the usual restriction that factor elimination is absent. We obtain the striking result that factor‐augmenting technical change is a misspecification when factor‐eliminating technical change is present. The result raises several questions about technical change and endogenous growth. (JEL O41, O31, O33)     

FISCAL STRUCTURES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

Our paper systematically examines the effects of fiscal structure on economic growth. We find that for developing countries, debt-financed increases in government expenditure retard growth and tax-financed increases stimulate growth, while for developed countries, debt-financed increases in government expenditure do not affect growth and tax-financed increases lower growth. We impose the government budget constraint on the regression equations so that the precise changes in fiscal policy can be identified (e.g., the effect of a debt-financed increase in health expenditure), employing a pooled cross-section, time-series sample and fixed- and random-effect methods. (JEL 04, E6)     

RISING R&D INTENSITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Over the past decades, private R&D spending in the United States and other developed countries has been growing faster than gross domestic product. At the same time, the growth rates of per-capita and aggregate output have been rather stable, possibly declining slightly. This article proposes a growth model that can account for the observed phenomenon by explicitly describing competition among technological leaders and followers in individual markets in a way that is consistent with existing studies on firms' motivation to invest in R&D. The model shows the possibility that the unsustainable trend of rising R&D intensity persists for a very long time. (JEL O3, O4, L1)     

THE CREDIT‐CHANNEL TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND THE NONLINEAR GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF INFLATION AND TAXES

With the credit‐channel effect driven by the central bank's open market operations, this paper's model easily gives rise to the nonlinear inflation‐growth nexus, which is evidenced by a number of cross‐country empirical studies. The threshold level of the inflation rate is found to be lower when tax rates are higher. The presence of the credit‐channel effect also provides the rationale for setting positive (and smaller than 1) tax rates on consumption, labor income, and capital income. The optimal tax rates rise as the inflation target declines. Under a fiscal policy rule where labor and capital income taxes move proportionally to each other, the optimal capital income tax rate could be higher than the optimal labor income tax rate. Under a sufficiently large central bank balance sheet, the credit‐channel effect will be so weak that inflation and all kinds of taxes are growth and welfare repressing. This provides a rationale for central banks that have implemented quantitative easing policies to shrink their balance sheets. (JEL E58, E62, O42)     

POVERTY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: TRICKLE DOWN PETERS OUT

Previous studies have found that economic growth tends to "trickle down" to poor families. This study investigates whether use of a relative definition of poverty eliminates the impact of economic growth on the incidence of poverty of various demographic groups and whether a decrease in the impact of growth has occurred since 1964. With the exception of families with male heads, economic growth no longer affects poverty irrespective of whether a relative or absolute definition of poverty is used. Our findings indicate that the contribution of growth has been overstated, that much of the past success has been illusory, and that poverty will be more intractable in the future.     

IDENTIFYING THE LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EFFECTS OF MILLION DOLLAR FACILITIES

Using incentives to attract firms is the primary economic development policy for many local governments. Yet, relatively little is known about the local economic development outcomes induced by successful attraction of new establishments. The empirical challenge lies in correctly identifying the counterfactual outcome. This article tests for induced economic development in winning counties using a set of highly incentivized large plants. The article makes a methodological contribution by comparing difference‐in‐differences results from a natural experiment (in which counterfactuals are losers reported by Site Selection magazine) with a geographically proximate matching control by design strategy. Estimates are sensitive to identification strategy, with distributional and placebo tests suggesting geographically proximate matching as preferable to the natural experiment. The preferred estimates indicate successful attraction of a large new plant induces modest increases in new economic activity that does not generate fiscal surplus for winning counties. (JEL R11, R31, H71, O18)