INCOMPLETE INFORMATION STRENGTHENS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL APPROVAL

We present a theoretical model of a public good game in which the expression of social approval induces pro‐social behavior. Using a laboratory experiment with earned heterogeneous endowments, we test our model. The main hypothesis is that the expression of social approval increases cooperative behavior even if reputation building is impossible. We vary the information available and investigate how this affects the expression of social approval and individual contributions. The expression of social approval significantly increases contributions. However, the increase is smaller if additional information is provided, suggesting that social approval is more effective if subjects receive a noisy signal about others' contributions. (JEL C72, C91, D71, D83)     

ENTRY COORDINATION AND AUCTION DESIGN WITH PRIVATE COSTS OF INFORMATION ACQUISITION

Auction design with endogenous entry is complicated by entry coordination among bidders due to multiple entry equilibria issue. This article studies auction design when information acquisition costs are private information of bidders. We show that this problem can be resolved by sufficient dispersion in these costs. First, we find that a simple second‐price auction with no entry fee and a reserve price equal to the seller's valuation is ex ante efficient, while a revenue‐maximizing auction involves personalized entry fees, which are determined by the hazard rates of their information acquisition cost distribution. Second, we show that sufficient dispersion in the information acquisition costs (more dispersion than a particular uniform distribution by the Bickel‐Lehman dispersive order) can coordinate bidders and implement uniquely the desirable entry. The dispersion in information acquisition costs is also necessary for this “unique implementation” result. (JEL D44, D82)     

DOING IT WHEN OTHERS DO: A STRATEGIC MODEL OF PROCRASTINATION

This paper develops a strategic model of procrastination in which present‐biased agents prefer to perform an onerous task with someone else. This turns their decision of when to perform the task into a procrastination game—a dynamic coordination game between present‐biased players. The model characterizes the conditions under which interaction mitigates or exacerbates procrastination. A procrastinator matched with a worse procrastinator may perform her task earlier than she otherwise would: she wants to avoid the increased temptation that her peer's company would generate. Procrastinators can thus use bad company as a commitment device to mitigate their self‐control problem. (JEL C72, C73, D03, D91)     

CULTURAL DIVERSITY, DISCRIMINATION, AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS

Does cultural diversity affect economic outcomes? We develop an experimental framework that complements ongoing research on this question. We vary the ethnic mix of bargaining sessions to study intercultural interactions among members of U.S. Hispanic and Navajo cultures. We control for demographic differences in our subject pools and elicit beliefs directly in order to differentiate between statistical discrimination and preference‐based discrimination. Hispanic and Navajo subjects behave differently, and their behavior is affected by the ethnic composition of the experimental session. Our experimental framework can shed light on economic behavior and outcomes in societies of mixed ethnicity, race, and religion. (JEL C78, C90, Z10)     

FRACTIONALIZATION,POLARIZATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: IDENTIFYING THE TRANSMISSION CHANNELS

In this article, we examine empirically both the direct and indirect links between ethnic fragmentation and economic growth. We find that both ethnic fractionalization and polarization are negatively associated with growth if considered in isolation; an effect that is though primarily attributed to their link to other growth‐related activities (i.e., investment, conflict, control of corruption, fertility). We study the corresponding transmission channels and calculate their relative importance in explaining a development curse based on ethnic diversity. For both measures of ethnic fragmentation, we find the corruption channel to be the most important one. (JEL C21, O11, Z13)     

LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE IN THE WEAK‐LINK GAME

We investigate the effects of leadership in a four‐player weak‐link game. A weak‐link game is a coordination game with multiple Pareto‐ranked Nash equilibria. Because the more efficient equilibria involve a degree of strategic uncertainty groups typically find it difficult to coordinate on more efficient equilibria. We wanted to see whether leadership by example, in the form of one player acting publicly before the rest of the group, could help groups do better. Our results suggest that leadership can increase efficiency but is far from being a guarantee of success. Specifically, in a significant number of groups we observed successful leadership and increased efficiency, but in most groups efficiency was low despite the efforts of leaders. We did not find any difference between voluntary leaders and leaders that are randomly assigned. (JEL C72, H41)     

OWN‐NATIONALITY BIAS: EVIDENCE FROM UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE FOOTBALL REFEREES

We examine the existence and magnitude of own‐nationality bias. Using player‐match level data from 12 seasons of the UEFA Champions League (UCL) and referee assignment policies that pair players and referees from the same country, we determine the bias that referees exhibit toward players from their native country. Players officiated by a referee from the same country receive a 10% increase in beneficial foul calls. Referees' own‐nationality bias is more pronounced for national team players, players at home, and in later stages of the tournament. Elite referees exhibit as much, or more, own‐nationality bias as their less experienced counterparts. (JEL L83, J15)     

Gender pairing bias in trustworthiness

We experimentally examine whether partner's gender information influences trust and trustworthiness behavior. We conduct an experiment where subjects make their choices, first with a completely unknown partner and then a partner of known gender (or vice versa). We find limited influence for gender information on trust behavior. Conversely, the results show a strong gender interaction with regard to trustworthiness both at the aggregate and individual levels. The proportion returned is significantly larger when the trustor and the trustee are of the same gender, bringing into light a gender pairing bias in trustworthiness.     

Migrant Assimilation in Europe: A Transnational Family Affair1

The paper advances our empirical and theoretical understanding of migrant assimilation. It does so by focusing on a very particular group of individuals who appear more likely than other migrant types to “go native.” We call these individuals “mixed nationality relationship migrants” (i.e., migrants who have committed to a life outside their home country because of the presence of a foreign partner). The paper argues that the transnational family milieus that emerge from this form of international migration are critical to the assimilation process. Empirical material from 11 in‐depth interviews with female migrants in Britain (Sheffield) and France (Paris) supports our argument. We also suggest that such “extreme” assimilation is more likely within a regional migratory system – like the EU – where the “identity frontiers” crossed in the formation of a transnational family are relatively shallow.     

THE ECONOMICS OF EMERGENCY MEETINGS

In this article, we examine the timing of emergency meetings. Meetings are critical to the success of organizations, allowing them to coordinate information, discuss strategies, and realign policies to meet their objectives. We treat the emergency meetings between scheduled meetings as real options. The optimal strategy involves time‐varying threshold values that, when exceeded, trigger an emergency meeting. The model explains why organizations need both scheduled and emergency meetings. The model also predicts more frequent emergency meetings during periods of high volatility and a hump‐shaped distribution for the timing of emergency meetings. We find empirical support for these predictions using data from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the Federal Open Market Committee of the U.S. Federal Reserve system. (JEL C44, C61, C63)     

VANISHING LEADERSHIP AND DECLINING RECIPROCITY IN A SEQUENTIAL CONTRIBUTION EXPERIMENT

We examine experimentally how and why voluntary contributions are affected by sequentiality. Instead of deciding simultaneously in each round, subjects are randomly ordered in a sequence which differs from round to round. We compare sessions in which subjects observe the contributions from earlier decisions in each round (“sequential treatment with information”) to sessions in which subjects decide sequentially within rounds, but cannot observe earlier contributions (“sequential treatment without information”). We also investigate whether average contributions are affected by the length of the sequence by varying group size. Our results show that sequentiality alone has no effect on contributions, but that the level of contributions increases when subjects are informed about the contributions of lower‐ranked subjects. We provide evidence that the so‐called “leadership effect” vanishes within rounds, and that group size has no significant impact on the average level of contributions in our sequential contribution games. (JEL C92, H41, D63)     

“I'm Not Supporting His Kids”: Nonresident Fathers' Contributions Given Mothers' New Fertility

The authors examined whether nonresident fathers provide informal support to their children and whether support stops if their ex‐partner goes on to have a child with a new man. A logistic regression analysis of longitudinal survey and administrative data for 434 women who received welfare in Wisconsin showed that fathers are less likely to provide informal support when their ex‐partner has a child with a new partner. Alternative models that control for unobserved characteristics suggest somewhat different results, providing stronger evidence of declines in support that can be shared across family members than in support that can be directed to a particular child.     

ROLE‐REVERSAL CONSISTENCY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE GOLDEN RULE

We report an experiment that asks whether people in a strategic situation behave according to the Golden Rule, that is, do not treat others in ways that they find disagreeable to themselves, a property that we call role‐reversal consistency. Overall, we find that over three quarters of the subjects are role‐reversal consistent. Regression analysis suggests that this finding is not driven by players maximizing their subjective expected monetary earnings given their stated beliefs about their opponents' behavior. We find that subjects' stated beliefs and actions reveal mild projection bias. (JEL C78, C91)     

INFORMATION ACQUISITION UNDER RISKY CONDITIONS ACROSS REAL AND HYPOTHETICAL SETTINGS

I collect data on how subjects acquire information about risky choices in both real and hypothetical settings using process‐tracing software called Mouselab. On average, there are no significant differences across settings in the amount of time subjects take to make a choice or the completeness of the information they acquire. Subjects also acquire information in sequences consistent with an integration model of decision‐making, such as expected utility theory or prospect theory. I do not find significant differences in risk preferences across settings, on average, but I do find that subjects' risk preferences are related to the completeness of the information that they acquire and where they start their information acquisition. (JEL C91, D80, D83)     

RELIGIOUS HOMOPHILY IN A SECULAR COUNTRY: EVIDENCE FROM A VOTING GAME IN FRANCE

Homophily—the tendency individuals have to associate with similar‐others—is a powerful determinant of social networks. Yet research to date does not allow us to determine which dimension, e.g., ethnic, religious, gender, age, or class similarity, drives association. Tests demonstrating homophily are flawed by restricting the range of dimensions in the choice set. We introduce an experimental game in which we exogenously expose subjects to diverse partners to determine which dimension dominates. We find that in a socio‐demographically diverse district of Paris, despite expectations of secularization, religious similarity significantly predicts homophily. Moreover, we provide tentative evidence that religious homophily is taste‐based. (JEL C91, D03, D72, J71, Z12)     

Multiculturalism and Cultural Issues in Online Gaming Communities

This article looks at racism, nationalism, and culture wars within multicultural Internet communities, specifically looking at Omerta, an international mafia‐themed text‐based massively multiplayer online role‐playing game (MMORPG). Omerta allows players to live and create a world of their own where groups of players, called families, interact and work together in peace and war. The text‐based aspect leads the majority of play dealing with negotiations in multi‐user chat (Internet Relay Chat), with the focus being on diplomacy and negotiation. Within the Omerta game, players of Turkish nationality have been refused admission into some families due to the perception that their primary loyalties are to other members of their own nationality, rather than members of their current family. This has led to much turmoil within the community and the creation of “Turkish Alliances”— families consisting of only Turkish players due to the lack of recruiting from other nationalities. What does this say about the functionality of multiculturalism and the possibility for success?     

GENDER MATCHING AND COMPETITIVENESS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

This paper experimentally investigates if and how people's competitiveness depends on their own gender and on the gender of people with whom they interact. Participants are given information about the gender of the co‐participant they are matched with, they then choose between a tournament or a piece rate payment scheme, and finally perform a real task. As already observed in the literature, we find that significantly more men than women choose the tournament. The gender of the co‐participant directly influences men's choices (men compete less against other men than against women), but only when the gender information is made sufficiently salient. A higher predicted competitiveness of women induces more competition. Giving stronger tournament incentives, or allowing the participants to choose the gender of their co‐participant, increases women's willingness to compete, but does not close the gender gap in competitiveness. (JEL C70, C91, J16, J24, J31, M52)     

AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THE PERSISTENCE OF GENDER‐BASED STEREOTYPES

This paper experimentally investigates the role of gender‐based stereotypes in the forecasting of risk attitudes. Subjects predict the gamble choice of target subjects in one of three treatments: (1) Visual—the predictor can only observe the target; (2) Information—the predictor has individuating information about the targets' response to two statements from a risk‐preference survey; and (3) Combined—the predictor both observes the targets and has the targets' two responses to the risk‐preference survey. Our results suggest that stereotypes play a considerable role in forming predictions about others' risk attitudes and that these stereotypes persist even when individuating information is available. (JEL C91, D8, J16)     

Knowledge and networks: An experimental test of how network knowledge affects coordination

Scholars in the social sciences use network theory to study a range of collective action problems. Often the goal is to identify how the structure of the network affects efforts to coordinate or cooperate, and research suggests that adding connections to a network can improve the performance of groups faced with such tasks. On the other hand, theory and empirics also suggest that additional connections can degrade the performance of a network. If connections can have negative effects then it is important to consider if there are alternatives to adding connections to a network that can also improve network performance. Because a primary function of connections in a network is to disseminate information, providing individuals with more information about the network may act as a substitute for adding connections to a network. We test experimentally whether providing subjects with more information about the structure of networks can improve coordination. We find that a more complete view of the network leads to faster coordination, but the magnitude of this effect depends on network structure. These results suggest that changing what actors know about a network can improve outcomes without having to add connections that may impede overall performance.     

If You Want People to Listen to You,Tell a Story

We hypothesized that (a) when people share a meaningful story, as opposed to when they share information, they make their partner listen well, and (b) that narrative-induced listening is positively associated with speakers’ psychological safety and negatively associated with their social anxiety. In Study 1 (N = 45), we showed that a meaningful story is perceived much more as a narrative and higher in narrative quality than two types of informational-discourses (telling about daily routine and describing buildings). In Study 2 (N = 52), we randomly asked participants to either share a meaningful story or tell about their daily routine. The participants sharing a meaningful story reported that their interlocutor was a better listener, d = 0.61, 95% CI |0.32, 0.92|. In Study 3 (N = 42), we compared the effect of sharing a meaningful story to describing buildings, and replicated the results of Study 2, d = 1.10, 95% CI |0.61, 1.59|. Moreover, we found that the perceived listening, which was induced by the narrative, mediated the manipulation effects on psychological safety, and social anxiety. Thus, we concluded that when speakers share meaningful stories they make their partner listen well and consequently experience higher psychological safety and lower feelings of social anxiety.