EMPLOYMENT AND DEADWEIGHT LOSS EFFECTS OF OBSERVED NONWAGE LABOR COSTS

To assess the employment effects of labor costs, it is crucial to have reliable estimates of the labor cost elasticity of labor demand. Using a matched firm‐worker data set, we estimate a long‐run unconditional labor demand function, exploiting information on workers to correct for endogeneity in the determination of wages. We evaluate the employment and deadweight loss effects of observed employers' contributions imposed by labor laws (health insurance, training, and taxes) as well as of observed workers' deductions (social security and income tax). We find that nonwage labor costs reduce employment by 17% for white collars and by 53% for blue collars, with associated deadweight losses of 10% and 35% of total contributions, respectively. Since most firms undercomply with mandated employers' and workers' contributions, we find that full compliance would imply employment losses of 4% for white collars and 12% for blue collars, with respective associated deadweight losses of 2% and 6%. (JEL J23, J32)     

THE CONSEQUENCES OF (DE)REGULATION ON EMPLOYMENT DURATION AND EFFICIENCY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

If the future market wage is uncertain, engaging in long‐term employment is risky, with the risk depending on how regulated the labor market is. In our experiment long‐term employment can result either from offering long‐term contracts or from repeatedly and mutually opting for rematching. Treatments differ in how regulations restrict the employer's flexibility in adapting the employment contract. All treatments allow for longer contract duration as well as for mutually opting to be rematched. Effort is chosen by employees after a contract is concluded. Treatments vary from no contract flexibility to no restriction at all. Will more (downward) flexibility be used in ongoing employment but reduce labor market efficiency? And will regulation crowd out long‐term employment, in the form of long‐term contracts or voluntary rematching? (JEL C72, C90, F16, J21, J24, L10)     

BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS WITH THE DIVISION OF PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT

In the mainstream real business cycle (RBC) model, labor can be viewed as temporary employment since the firm's demand for labor behaves directly in response to stochastic productivity shocks in each period. This paper provides a tractable way of analyzing fluctuations in permanent and temporary employment over the business cycle, as well as the underlying driving forces. This inclusion of heterogeneity helps reconcile the RBC model with the U.S. data given that temporary employees in general only account for a small proportion of total private‐sector employment (about 2%–3%). We draw an explicit division between permanent and temporary employment and resort to this separation to account for stylized facts that characterize a two‐tier labor market. In particular, with regard to the U.S. labor market, our benchmark model can well explain the motivating facts: (1) temporary employment is much more volatile than permanent employment, (2) the share of temporary employment (the ratio of temporary to aggregate employment) exhibits strong pro‐cyclicality, (3) permanent employment lags by two quarters on average, and (4) the correlation between temporary employment and output is stronger than that involving the permanent counterpart. The quantitative analysis suggests that our proposed channels explain the main facts well and the model further provides plausible reasoning for a firm's labor hoarding. (JEL E24, E32)     

ANTI‐POACHING AGREEMENTS IN LABOR MARKETS

We analyze competition for experienced workers among wage‐setting firms. The firms can design poaching offers with higher wages to workers who switch from rivals relative to wages paid to their own existing employees. We evaluate the profit and welfare effects of anti‐poaching agreements that eliminate poaching offers as a recruiting method. Anti‐poaching agreements increase industry profits, whereas workers are made worse off. We show that the effects of anti‐poaching agreements on total welfare are determined by the magnitude of workers' switching costs and the productivity change associated with switching employers. (JEL L41, L40, J42)     

How temporary is temporary employment in Spain?

I use a multinomial logit model and the Spanish Active Population Survey (EPA) for the period 1987–1996 to study labor force transitions of temporary workers. These workers hold fixed-term employment contracts, which Spanish labor law distinguishes from indefinite contracts. Since the EPA questionnaire allows the identification of workers with either type of contract, I use matched EPA files to analyze transitions from temporary to permanent employment and explore the extent to which workers holding fixed-term employment contracts tend to be trapped in temporary employment relationships. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Pedro Albarrán-Pérez provided excellent research assistance.     

THE IMPACT OF LABOR CONTRACTS: EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL

The conventional Keynesian model suggests that frictions created by nominal wage contracts generate a positive relationship between inflation and output. On the other hand, the New Classical/Real Business Cycle theory claims that firms and workers base their employment behavior, and hence output, on the marginal product of labor ignoring the efficiencies of fixed nominal wage contracts. Using Brazilian data, where nominal wages were indexed by law, tests show that fixed nominal wage contracts insignificantly affected output. Thus, the data support the view that fixed nominal wages play an insignificant role in determining the evolution of output. ( JEL E31)     

THE EFFECTS OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION ON LABOR TURNOVER: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN

This paper investigates the effects of employment protection legislation on the rates of hiring, separation, worker flows, job reallocation, and churning flows for the case of Taiwan. Our empirical identification takes advantage of a reform created by Taiwan's enactment of Labor Standards Law, which has substantially increased the costs of firing, and the implementation of the law's enforcement measures. Moreover, our identification also exploits the fact that the stringency of the law's provisions and the intensity of the law's enforcement vary with establishment size. On the basis of the monthly data at the establishment level for the period 1983–1995, we find that Taiwan's Labor Standards Law and its enforcement measures have dampened labor turnover for medium‐sized and large establishments, while that of small establishments was not affected. (JEL J65, J63, J88)     

OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF NONCOMPETE COVENANTS

Noncompete covenants or covenant not to compete (CNC) are clauses in employment contracts in which the employee agrees not to gain employment with a competitor firm. In this article, we study the efficiency aspects of such contracts by incorporating the effect of labor mobility restrictions on knowledge transfer across firms, investment decisions by firms, and investment by workers. Following research that shows state‐wise variations in the degree of CNC enforcement, we allow the strength of CNC enforcement to vary as a matter of regulatory policy and derive the optimal strength of enforcement. We also look at how regulations around CNCs should be optimally designed when employers can use collusive agreements, such as “no poaching” agreements, as an alternative to noncompete clauses. Given recent allegations of employer collusion among large Silicon Valley firms, we argue for a cautious approach in designing policies on CNC enforcement. (JEL J24, J41, J63, K31)     

BACK-LOADED WAGES AND ON-THE-JOB TRAINING IN A FRICTIONAL LABOR MARKET

This paper analyzes the coexistence of on-the-job (general) training and on-the-job search in a frictional labor market where firms post skill-dependent labor contracts to preemptively back-load compensation after training. The back-loaded compensation scheme discourages trained workers' efficient job-to-job transition, as if they accumulated relationship-specific capital, which induces overintensified training among more productive firms. The quantitative analysis predicts that the market equilibrium, relative to the efficiency benchmark, gets more skilled workers (training inefficiency) and less output (allocation inefficiency). It further demonstrates that efficiency loss is moderate due to positive externality and can be improved, as search friction is mitigated. (JEL J24, J31, J64)     

Does the early bird always get the worm? market institutions and the timing of employment decisions

Unravelling of appointment dates can be observed in some entry-level labor markets but not in others. A comparison of different markets shows how the costs of breaking contracts and being rematched can affect the timing of appointments and market behavior. If contracts can be terminated at any time by workers and if rematching costs are relatively small compared to the benefits from changing matches, early appointments in an entry-level labor market confers no benefit on firms. Firms then have no incentives to make early offers. However, if the costs offset the benefits from changing employment, firms that cannot compete with their principal competitors may prefer to make offers before some critical information becomes available rather than wait for the time when employment can actually start. Such a labor market may experience early appointments. But if the most desirable firms do not issue early offers, other firms may be rejected in any early period. Therefore, the most desirable firms can work together to halt unravelling. I am indebted to Esquire Donna Gerson and Koh Song Hui who extended help in writing this paper. My special thanks should be given to Alvin Roth for his suggestions and comments.     

INTERMARRIAGE AND THE LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES OF ASIAN WOMEN

The impact of intermarriage with natives, on labor market outcomes of immigrants, is not homogeneous across ethnic groups. Wages of Asian women are compared with non‐Asians. Both ordinary least squares and instrumental variables estimates of the effects of intermarriage on the wages of Asian women are negative and significant. Non‐Asian women earn a wage premium that becomes insignificant when controls for selection into marriage are introduced. One possible explanation for the intermarriage penalty for Asians is an income effect of having a high‐earning native husband. Intermarriage penalties rise with husband's education. Assimilation patterns of intermarried Asians indicate that they have lower initial wages, market hours, and employment, but exhibit faster rates of growth over their years of stay. The results are robust across Asian subgroups and husband's ethnicity. (JEL J16, J12, J31, J61)     

STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION OF LABOR ADJUSTMENT COSTS WITH TEMPORALLY DISAGGREGATED DATA

I estimate a dynamic optimization model of labor adjustment of establishments based on data that permit: specifying any desired adjustment frequency; estimating the model based on net and on gross employment flows; and allowing for simultaneous hirings and separations. The unit of observation is an establishment. Results for adjustment costs depend crucially on the model specification. Only a monthly adjustment model yields cost parameters in a reasonable range, while estimates from quarterly and annual adjustment models imply negative or excessive adjustment costs. Estimating the model on net employment changes implies hiring and separation costs of four annual median salaries, while the model on gross changes implies costs on the order of 1.7 annual median salaries. (JEL C25, D22, J23)     

Information and communication technology adoption in micro and small firms: Can internet access improve labour productivity?

The rapid spread of information and communication technologies (ICT) may increase firms’ productivity with important consequences for job creation and for economic growth. This article contributes to this discussion by analysing the impact of internet adoption on labour productivity and the mechanisms shaping this relationship in Peruvian micro and small manufacturing firms over the period 2011–2013. The article estimates a reduced form where labour productivity is a function of internet adoption and other explanatory factors. Internet adoption is instrumented using a measure of the availability of financial opportunities for micro and small firms in Peru. Findings indicate that internet adoption: (a) increases firms’ labour productivity; (b) reallocates employment away from temporary administrative workers and non‐remunerated workers and expands employment of permanent production workers; (c) leads to the formalization of labour relationships, to the implementation of new organizational practices and to the improvement of training measures. While changes in employment and formalization of workers are linked to labour productivity gains, increases in training measures and organizational changes do not generate any additional productivity increase. Policies oriented to promote the adoption of ICT in micro and small firms can be beneficial to close the productivity gap with larger firms in Peru. Moreover, policies directed to the formalization of the workforce can provide an extra benefit, i.e. additional labour productivity gains in firms adopting the internet. Finally, policies oriented to the development of digital skills are also important to ease the re‐employment of those workers losing their jobs and the achievement of additional productivity gains that new organizational practices can provide.     

A Note on Dual Internal Labor Markets and Wages of Temporary Workers: Evidence from Linked-Employer-Employee Data

I use linked employer-employee data from the German Federal Statistical Office to estimate within-firm wage differentials between temporary workers with fixed-term contracts and workers with permanent contracts in the context of dual internal labor markets. Wage-tenure profiles of permanent workers are estimated separately for each firm to obtain a proxy for the prevalence of internal labor markets. Temporary workers earn significantly lower wages in firms with steeper wage-tenure profiles. This finding is consistent with the segmentation in a primary permanent workforce with high wages and a secondary temporary workforce with low wages, if internal labor markets are more prevalent.     

Organizational Uncertainty and Labor Contracts in China's Economic Transition

Lifetime employment was a cornerstone of the Chinese socialist system constructed under Mao. In this system, organizations served the function of social security, and as a result, many organizations were overburdened with bloated work forces and retirees that drew from organizational coffers well into old age. Labor contracts fundamentally alter this system, as they allow firms to end the socialist institution of lifetime employment. Yet there is significant variation on the institutionalization of labor contracts in organizations. Based on a sample of 81 firms in industrial Shanghai, I show that organizations that are experiencing uncertainty in the economic transition are more likely to institutionalize labor contracts on an organizationwide basis. There are two types of organizational uncertainty in the economic transition: economic uncertainty and administrative uncertainty. In cases of economic uncertainty, firms that lost money in 1990 and firms that are burdened by large forces of retired workers are more likely to place their workers on labor contracts. In the case of administrative uncertainty, firms that are at the highest levels of the industrial hierarchy are also significantly more likely to place their workers on labor contracts. Although these upper level firms were the most protected under the command economy, they are being forced to handle the greatest among the responsibilities in the economic transition, and as a result, they experience the greatest sense of being set adrift by the state.     

ROUTINIZATION‐BIASED TECHNICAL CHANGE AND GLOBALIZATION: UNDERSTANDING LABOR MARKET POLARIZATION

There is now ample evidence that jobs and wages have been polarizing at the extremes of the skill distribution since the early 1990s. Possible explanations include, among others, routinization‐biased technical change (technical progress substituting more easily for labor in performing routine rather than nonroutine tasks) and globalization (more specifically, offshore outsourcing by multinational firms). In this article, we develop a unified theoretical general equilibrium model and examine the implications of each competing hypotheses for labor market polarization. (JEL J21, J23, J24, F66)     

THE LONG‐TERM EFFECTS OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS ON CHILD LABOR AND SCHOOL ENROLLMENT

This paper investigates the long‐term effects of conditional cash transfers on school attainment and child labor. To this end, we construct a dynamic heterogeneous agent model, calibrate it with Brazilian data, and introduce a policy similar to the Brazilian Bolsa Família. Our results suggest that this type of policy has a very strong impact on educational outcomes, sharply increasing primary school completion. The conditional transfer is also able to reduce the share of working children from 22% to 17%. We then compute the transition to the new steady state and show that the program actually increases child labor over the short run, because the transfer is not enough to completely cover the schooling costs, so children have to work to be able to comply with the program's schooling eligibility requirement. We also evaluate the impacts on poverty, inequality, and welfare. (JEL O11, I25, J24)     

LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF DISCRIMINATION AND LOSS OF SKILL

We examine the impact of discrimination on labor market performance when workers are subject to a risk of losing skills during an unemployment experience. Within a search and matching framework, we show that both natives and immigrants are affected by discrimination. Discrimination in one sector has positive spillovers, inducing employment to increase in the other sector and the effect on labor market performance therefore depends on whether discrimination is present in only one sector or in both. Discrimination may induce workers to train more or less than natives after having lost their skills, dependent upon in which sector there is discrimination. Net output tends to be most negatively affected by discrimination among high‐skilled workers. (JEL J15, J31, J61, J64, J71)     

WORKFORCE COMPOSITION AND FIRM PRODUCTIVITY: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN

We study the relationship between workforce composition and firm productivity based on a new employee‐employer‐matched data set, using an array of workforce characteristics and three alternative measures of firm productivity. While firm age is not essential for the performance of firms, those of smaller size and those in the steel and transportation industries outperform others. Moreover, labor quality, particularly the middle‐aged with higher education, contributes significantly to firms' productivity. Furthermore, economic incentives and market competition both play important roles in the performance of firms. Finally, there is an employer‐size premium with larger firms paying higher wages and nonwage benefits. (JEL C33, D20, J30)     

Measuring employment vulnerability in Europe

Two of the most notable trends in labour markets in Europe are the rise in the number of atypical job contracts (e.g. fixed‐term contracts and temporary work) and the increase in job turnover. The concept of “employment vulnerability” can be used to describe these trends, which weaken the employer–employee relationship. In this article, the authors measure this employment vulnerability, for individual European countries, by creating two indices – an “employer‐related vulnerability index” and a “job‐related vulnerability index” – which are then aggregated to form an overall employment vulnerability index.