THE COLLAPSE AND RECOVERY OF THE CAPITAL SHARE IN EAST GERMANY AFTER 1989

After the 1990 unification, East Germany's capital income share plunged to 15.2% in 1991, then increased to 37.4% by 2015. To account for these large changes in the capital share, I model an economy that gains access to a higher productivity technology embodied in new plants. As existing low productivity plants decrease production, the capital share varies due to the nonconvex production technology: plants require a minimum amount of labor to produce output. Two policies—transfers and government‐mandated wage increases—have opposite effects on output growth, but contribute to lowering the capital share early in the transition. (JEL E20, E25, O11)     

PRODUCTIVITY EFFECTS OF PUBLIC CAPITAL MAINTENANCE: EVIDENCE FROM U.S. STATES

This article assesses the productivity effects of infrastructure operation and maintenance (O&M) spending by state and local governments in the 48 contiguous U.S. states over the period 1978–2000. We explicitly account for transboundary spillovers of capital and O&M spending and follow a semiparametric methodology that allows us to estimate state‐specific output elasticities. We find strong evidence that in all 48 states the cross‐state spillover effects of O&M outlays on productivity exceed their within‐state impacts and are substantially higher than the spillover effects of capital expenditure. (JEL C14, E22, E62, H76, O11, O47, R11)     

PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN GOODS AND SERVICES ACROSS THE HETEROGENEOUS STATES OF AMERICA

In this study, we examine the importance of multifactor productivity (MFP) growth in goods and services for U.S. States during 1980–2007 by applying the dual growth accounting framework. We find that MFP growth was relatively high and converged in the goods sector, but was low and did not converge in services. Although low growth in MFP in services was due to declining real user cost, particularly in real estate services, the lack of convergence itself was due to variation in wage growth. We also document that while the gap between productivity and wage growth was higher in goods, the two series were more strongly correlated in services. Finally, states with higher initial human capital experienced higher growth in both sectors. (JEL O47, R11)     

RENT‐SEEKING AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

A general model incorporating rent‐seeking activities in the standard neoclassical model of capital accumulation is presented. The welfare of the representative agent is negatively affected by the efficiency of rent‐seeking activities. Although intuitive, this result is not obvious because long‐run income can be positively affected by more efficient rent‐seeking activities. The model is used to provide explanations for some recent experiences in developing countries, including the relative poor performance of economies that experience a move to a more decentralized system and the observed path of total factor productivity (TFP) in countries like Ireland and Venezuela. (JEL D23, D74, O40, O41, O47)     

DISCONTINUITY OF OUTPUT CONVERGENCE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES: WHY HAS THE COURSE CHANGED?

Has the progress of output convergence changed within the United States? This article examines the output convergence among U.S. states for the last five decades by making several improvements over the extant literature. By applying a battery of convergence tests designed to capture nonlinear transitional dynamics to real output per worker data (i.e., nominal values deflated by state‐level price), we find that output convergence has not been a feature of the continental United States since the 1970s. Instead, output convergence has proceeded among four subgroups within which constituent states have certain characteristics in common. Our regression analysis suggests that state‐level characteristics related to technology and human capital play a crucial role in accounting for the formation and composition of convergence clubs, in agreement with the recent theoretical models of growth and development (e.g., Aghion et al. 2009; Gennaioli et al. 2013b). The level of technology, proxied by patents, turns out to be a consistently significant determinant even after controlling for endogeneity, suggesting that frictions in the diffusion of technology and human capital may have led to clustering of states with different levels of productivity. Our results therefore cast doubt on the common view that diffusion of knowledge and technology across state borders is frictionless. (JEL O47, O51)     

THE MATCHING OF HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS AND POLITICIANS

We use a Chinese firm‐director panel dataset to examine the matching of heterogeneous firms and politicians. On the basis of 36,308 detailed biographies, we identify individuals who previously held bureaucratic positions and classify the rank of each position in the Chinese political hierarchy. Using this direct measure of political capital, we examine how firms with heterogeneous productivity match politicians with different political strength. Our results indicate a positive assortative matching in the political capital market. More productive firms are paired with more powerful politicians. Furthermore, the preference for political capital relative to conventional human capital increases in firms' dependence on external financing and the inefficiency of local governments. Conditional on the endogenous matching, new hires with political capital receive more compensation than their co‐workers in the same cohort. The marginal effect of a one‐step rise on the political ladder significantly exceeds the marginal effect of raising education attainment from, for example, high school to college. (JEL D21, D73, J24, J31, O12)     

ARE WORKERS WILLING TO PAY TO JOIN A BETTER TEAM?

Using data from the Major League Baseball free‐agent market, this study is the first to show that the productivity expected of the team a worker will join produces a significant, negative compensating wage differential. The younger workers in the sample drive this result, trading 25% of their wages to join teams with an expected productivity one standard deviation higher. This investment can be recouped if a reasonable increase in human capital occurs. These results are robust to contract length‐wage simultaneity and indicate that investment in human capital motivates the observed tradeoff, suggesting a new pathway through which human capital accumulation can affect wages. Reliable measures of workers' own past productivity and the productivity expected of a worker's future team provide key advantages to identifying these effects. (JEL J31, J24, M54)     

OLIGARCHIES AND DEVELOPMENT IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: A TALE OF TWO ELITES

This paper studies how comparative advantage and the political elites' endowments shape long‐run performance in economies with imperfect political institutions. The trade regime interacts with industrial policy and regulations on capital mobility in governing capital accumulation. In a capital‐scarce economy, capitalist oligarchs striving for import substitution industrialization (ISI) initially shelter the economy from trade, while promoting industrial policies that promote total factor productivity growth in the manufacturing sector. This gradually shifts the comparative advantage toward manufacturing and renders the economy attractive to foreign investors. Allowing for trade and foreign capital inflows are thus complementary policies that spur growth in the capital oligarchy. By contrast, landed oligarchs in a capital‐scarce economy favor openness to trade at an early stage of development, neglect industrial policies, and block foreign capital to maximize extractable rents. The policy mix causes the economy to stagnate. Consistent with the experiences of South Korea and Argentina in the postwar era, the model predicts that the success of ISI policies depends crucially on the conditions governing the incentives for capital accumulation. (JEL F10, F20, P40, P50, O10, O24)     

ON THE EVOLUTION OF TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA

Because of several policy distortions, including import‐substitution industrialization, widespread government intervention, and both domestic and international competitive barriers, there has been a general presumption that Latin America has been much less productive than the leading economies in the last decades. In this paper we show, however, that until the late 1970s Latin American countries had high productivity levels relative to the United States. It is only after the late 1970s that we observe a fast decrease of relative total factor productivity (TFP) in Latin America. We also show that the inclusion of human capital in the production function makes a crucial difference in the TFP calculations for Latin America. (JEL O11, O47, O54)     

GROWTH AND CONVERGENCE WHEN TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN CAPITAL ARE COMPLEMENTS

This article presents a model of endogenous growth, in which a firm's technology and a country's human capital stock are complementary in the production of output. Production technologies are created by costly research and development (R&D) and are owned by firms that can freely choose where in the world to produce. Both production and R&D have a positive effect on a country's human capital stock. While all countries typically grow at the same rate in the long run, they differ in their levels of human capital, per capita output, and the quality of the technologies that are used in production. A country's relative position in terms of productivity is history dependent. Countries that start out with a lower human capital stock or industrialize later end up with a lower per capita GDP in long‐term equilibrium. (JEL O4, O33, O47)     

IQ IN THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION: EVIDENCE FROM IMMIGRANT EARNINGS

We show that a country’s average IQ score is a useful predictor of the wages that immigrants from that country earn in the United States, whether or not one adjusts for immigrant education. Just as in numerous microeconomic studies, 1 IQ point predicts 1% higher wages, suggesting that IQ tests capture an important difference in cross‐country worker productivity. In a cross‐country development accounting exercise, about one‐sixth of the global inequality in log income can be explained by the effect of large, persistent differences in national average IQ on the private marginal product of labor. This suggests that cognitive skills matter more for groups than for individuals. (JEL J24, J61, O47)     

DEPRECIATION IN PRODUCTION ANALYSIS AND IN INCOME AND WEALTH ACCOUNTS: RESOLUTION OF AN OLD DEBATE

In this article, I propose a resolution for the long-standing controversy over depreciation. I develop, from capital theory, income and wealth accounting capital concepts and compare them with those from production analysis and productivity measurement. I conclude that depreciation in economic accounts is exactly the same measurement as in production analysis. As for empirical implications, market-based measures of depreciation are appropriate for economic accounts, provided they are appropriate empirical measures of economic depreciation.     

RENT CREATION AND RENT SHARING: NEW MEASURES AND IMPACTS ON TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY

This analysis proposes new measures of rent creation and rent sharing and assesses their impact on productivity on cross‐country‐industry panel data. We find first that: (1) anticompetitive product market regulations positively affect rent creation and (2) employment protection legislation boosts hourly wages, particularly for low‐skill workers. However, we find no significant impact of this employment legislation on rent sharing, as the hourly wage increases are offset by a negative impact on hours worked. Second, using regulation indicators as instruments, we find that rent creation and rent sharing both have a substantial negative impact on total factor productivity. (JEL E22, E24, O30, L50, O43, O47, C23)     

A CENTURY OF HUMAN CAPITAL AND HOURS

An average person born in the United States in the second half of the 19th century completed 7 years of schooling and spent 58 hours a week working in the market. In contrast, an average person born at the end of the 20th century completed 14 years of schooling and spent 40 hours a week working. In the span of 100 years, completed years of schooling doubled and working hours decreased by 30%. What explains these trends? We consider a model of human capital and labor supply to quantitatively assess the contribution of exogenous variations in productivity (wage) and life expectancy in accounting for the secular trends in educational attainment and hours of work. We find that the observed increase in wages and life expectancy accounts for 80% of the increase in years of schooling and 88% of the reduction in hours of work. Rising wages alone account for 75% of the increase in schooling and almost all the decrease in hours in the model, whereas rising life expectancy alone accounts for 25% of the increase in schooling and almost none of the decrease in hours of work. In addition, we show that the mechanism emphasized in the model is consistent with other trends at a more disaggregate level such as the reduction in the racial gap in schooling and the decrease in the cross‐sectional dispersion in hours. (JEL E1, I25, J11, O4)     

Community Connections: Social Capital and Community Success1

This article examines the impact of two types of community social capital—ties between civic organizations formed through shared members and ties between residents formed through socializing in local gathering places—on residents’ subjective appraisals of community success. Community social capital studies tend to focus on the first of these types of ties, networks of civic engagement, while the second, gathering place networks, has received relatively little scholarly attention. Studying both allows me to assess the formal and informal arenas of community sociability, providing a more thorough understanding of social capital and community life. I assess the effects of community‐level social capital networks on the individual‐level experience of residing in the community using survey data on 9,962 residents from 99 small towns in Iowa. This rich data set allows me to avoid two shortcomings common in social capital research: I construct genuine network measures of social capital (rather than infer network structure from community attributes) and conduct multi‐level analyses (rather than rely on disaggregation). My findings indicate both types of social capital are positively and significantly associated with resident ratings of community success, suggesting community networks—in both the formal and informal sectors—have important consequences for small towns and their residents.     

WHO QUITS NEXT? FIRM GROWTH IN GROWING ECONOMIES

We document novel facts about the relationship between aggregate growth and firm dynamics using a large set of countries. We argue that firm employment patterns are not necessarily informative about cross‐country differences in aggregate growth because they are induced by changes in the productivity of a firm relative to others. In contrast, aggregate growth is linked to average firm‐level productivity growth and firm age. We formalize this intuition through a tractable model of endogenous aggregate growth and firm dynamics where firms realize positive returns to investment with some probability. We find that cross‐country disparities in this probability can account for two‐thirds of the variation in aggregate growth. (JEL D21, D22, E23, O4)     

THE HETEROGENEITY OF IMMIGRANTS,HOST COUNTRIES' INCOME AND PRODUCTIVITY: A CHANNEL ACCOUNTING APPROACH

This article exploits changes in the distribution of immigrants across 20 Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development countries from 1960 to 2005 in order to assess their contribution to income of destination countries. The non‐random sorting of immigrants across countries is addressed by using an instrumental variable strategy. The instrument is built by estimating a bilateral migration model incorporating exogenous origin country determinants of migration. Aggregate results reveal that immigrants have a positive effect on income that works primarily through total factor productivity (TFP). We further construct a novel dataset from censuses and labor force surveys to explore the information on the age of immigrants. Contrasting income effects are found across age groups: a higher share of immigrants among the youth has a negative impact on aggregate income, while a higher share of immigrants among prime‐aged workers has a positive effect. We interpret this disparity as short‐term versus medium‐term effects. Adjustments over time involve changes in TFP but also in the human capital of the native‐born. (JEL F22, J24, J31, O31)     

LEARNING ABOUT EDUCATION

Limited human capital investment is a common characteristic of low‐income countries despite the fact that estimated returns to educational investment in low‐income countries are generally higher than those in high‐income countries. Empirical evidence suggests that income and credit constraints can only account for a part of this underinvestment. Recent experimental evidence shows that families' misperceptions about the returns to education play a role in their low‐investment levels. This paper builds a heterogeneous‐agent model of human capital and growth that incorporates an adaptive learning mechanism to capture the way agents form perceptions about returns to education. We find natural conditions guaranteeing existence of stable equilibria. Along transition paths, agents' misperceptions about returns to education depress realized returns, which serves to reenforce and perpetuate low human‐capital investment. If human capital investments have both private and public returns, we find multiple stable equilibria, including those which are characterized by low investment and low returns. (JEL D83, O10, I25)     

FIRMS AND FLEXIBILITY

The United States and France have very similar labor productivity levels while there are considerable differences between the firm‐size distributions and firm dynamics in the two countries. To reconcile these observations we introduce a joint model of endogenous entrepreneurship and firm‐size dynamics with firing costs, unemployment benefits, entry costs, and a tax wedge between wages and labor costs. We use our model to analyze the role of these rigitidies in explaining firm dynamics and productivity patterns in the United States and France. We find that our model with all rigidities goes a long way in accounting for firm‐size differentials between the United States and France while generating similar labor productivity outcomes. (JEL C78, D21, E24, J6)     

IS THERE A “DOUBLE BONUS” FROM REDUCING INEQUALITY?

We study the effect of inequality on growth in an overlapping generations (OLG) model where inequality affects growth through accumulation of human capital and endogenous fertility. In contrast to much of the existing literature, we argue that the effect of inequality on growth might be non‐monotonic. Our model suggests that the effect depends on the demographic stage of development: inequality impedes growth in low‐fertility (high human capital) economies, but enhances growth in high‐fertility (low human capital) economies. Our finding casts doubt on a “double bonus” from reducing inequality in developing countries which are typically characterized by high fertility. (JEL O40, J13, O15)