浅谈高职会计电算化课程的教学改革研究

财务软件设置为高等职业教育三年制会计电算化专业必须开设的专业核心课程,是会计从业资格考试的必考内容。本文旨在对财务软件课程性质、目标及设计思路的整体研究,并紧密结合会计从业资格取证教学,从而提高教学质量,以就业为导向,培养和社会、企业直接对接的岗位人才。     

浅谈会计信息化下财务软件的功能设计

会计信息化是会计与信息技术融合的过程,以实现会计业务的信息化管理为目标.而财务软件是会计信息化的平台,相对于会计电算化下的财务软件,应该增加设计一些新的功能,以适应会计信息化的实施要求.本文重点讨论了开发可高效率实施会计信息化的财务软件所需要注重的功能设计.     

基于金蝶KIS视角的会计信息化课程实务操作考核评分自动化的设计

在金蝶KIS财务软件环境下,利用报表函数的强大功能,可以设计和实现会计信息化课程实务操作考核评分的自动化,取得改革的新突破.     

会计信息系统理论课程建设

一、总述会计信息系统,是会计电算化专业的必修课程。从教学体系来看,会计信息系统教学分为三类;一类是主要讲述会计电算化系统的分析、设计、开发、实施、维护与操作的基本原理(即理论型),另一类是按财务会计的核算模式讲述会计电算化应用系统的程序设计(即设计型),第三类通过上机实操让学生掌握一种财务软件的使用(实务型)。对于第二、第三类教学,可开设会计软件设计与会计电算化实操课程完成,会计信息系统课程的教学主要完成第一类任务,即主要是理论学习。会计信息的理论学习对于学生在会计电算化领域的进一步发展非常重要,但从教学实践…     

基础会计模拟实验的全新设计

基础会计模拟实验的重要性不言而喻,虽然其开设时间最久,但仍有不少问题有待改进.同时,因其开设范围最广,在如今专业模拟实验远未普及、综合模拟实验几近空白的情况下.所有财经院校均开设有此课程,故其改进的影响也最为深远.而要完善基础会计模拟实验,就其设计而言.关键在于实验目标的正确定位.之后才是围绕新目标重新设计实验内容和实验方法等.     

会计信息化下财务软件的特点分析

会计信息化是会计与信息技术融合的过程,以实现会计业务的信息化管理为目标,是企业管理信息化实施的基础。财务软件是会计信息化的平台,相对于会计电算化下的财务软件,在会计信息化下财务软件增加了新的功能,具有了鲜明的特征,包括:财务软件的管理功能加强;财务软件的一些功能模块设计为会计决策支持系统以及专家系统;财务软件的会计信息处理功能增强;财务软件以大型数据库为数据存储的基础,高度实现数据的共享;财务软件的硬件环境是网络,可以实现数据的网上传递,而且财务软件往往设计有网络财务功能等等。     

会计电算化课程建设研究

随着计算机在我国的普及,财务软件的不断推广,各个高校都纷纷推出了会计电算化课程。作者认为会计电算化课程应该是以企业运用财务软件为目的,即提高会计信息的质量为目的。本文将就此目的谈会计电算化课程的建设。     

会计信息系统课程实验教学存在的问题及对策研究

随着经济与信息技术的发展,计算机在会计领域的应用越来越广泛.各高校会计专业普遍开设了会计信息系统课程.该课程是会计学专业的一门专业必修课程,具有综合性强、理论与实践结合紧密等特点,因此大部分高校都开设了本课程的实验教学课程.但目前的会计信息系统课程无论实验内容、实验教材、教学方式还是师资队伍建设等方面都存在着一定的问题,因此有必要对会计信息系统课程的实验教学进行探讨.使之符合社会的需要.为社会培养既精通计算机又熟谙会计的复合型人才.本文首先介绍了会计信息系统课程实验教学的内客.接着指出本课程实验教学过程存在的问题,最后探讨了如何改进该课程的实验教学.     

会计电算化课程实务操作的问题解析——基于用友ERP-U8.72的分析

会计电算化课程是高职院校会计类专业的核心课程,讲授应用财务软件进行会计信息的输入、处理、传递和输出.本文以用友ERP-U8.72为载体,结合笔者多年的教学经验,对应用过程中出现的典型问题加以汇总,并在分析的基础上,提出解决办法,以进一步提高学生的操作应用能力.     

高职院校会计信息系统课程整体设计探讨

本文通过对会计信息系统课程的地位、教学总目标、人才培养模式的进一步分析,提出了课程整体设计的思想,从整改教学大纲、理论教学设计、实践教学环节设计、教学设施及实训环境、职业能力培训等5个方面,阐明了课程整体设计的框架.探讨了高职院校会计信息系统课程理论与实践教学体系改革的内容和基本思路.     

公理化设计基本理论及其应用模型

公理化设计是当前质量工程领域出现的一种新产品设计方法,该方法为新产品创新和已有产品诊断改进给出了基本原则和概念性框架,已引起了质量界的高度重视.本文对其基本理论和设计模型进行初步探讨的同时,介绍了其研究重点和热点,并对其优点和存在的一些问题进行了讨论.     

Robust Mechanism Design

The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying mechanism design on richer type spaces. We ask when ex post implementation is equivalent to interim (or Bayesian) implementation for all possible type spaces. The equivalence holds in the case of separable environments; examples of separable environments arise (1) when the planner is implementing a social choice function (not correspondence) and (2) in a quasilinear environment with no restrictions on transfers. The equivalence fails in general, including in some quasilinear environments with budget balance. In private value environments, ex post implementation is equivalent to dominant strategies implementation. The private value versions of our results offer new insights into the relationship between dominant strategy implementation and Bayesian implementation.     

以流程为中心的战略设计

以流程为中心的战略设计有三大特点以流程为中心、是一个持续动态过程、要求流程与战略相匹配;以流程为中心的战略设计的内容包括价值链设计、业务流程设计和作业流程设计.     

Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation

A growing number of school districts use centralized assignment mechanisms to allocate school seats in a manner that reflects student preferences and school priorities. Many of these assignment schemes use lotteries to ration seats when schools are oversubscribed. The resulting random assignment opens the door to credible quasi‐experimental research designs for the evaluation of school effectiveness. Yet the question of how best to separate the lottery‐generated randomization integral to such designs from non‐random preferences and priorities remains open. This paper develops easily‐implemented empirical strategies that fully exploit the random assignment embedded in a wide class of mechanisms, while also revealing why seats are randomized at one school but not another. We use these methods to evaluate charter schools in Denver, one of a growing number of districts that combine charter and traditional public schools in a unified assignment system. The resulting estimates show large achievement gains from charter school attendance. Our approach generates efficiency gains over ad hoc methods, such as those that focus on schools ranked first, while also identifying a more representative average causal effect. We also show how to use centralized assignment mechanisms to identify causal effects in models with multiple school sectors.     

Fairness and Contract Design

We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair‐minded players, but trust contracts that pay a generous wage up front are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts. These results are consistent with recently developed theories of fairness, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness, and incentives.     

Design and competition in engineering

This article considers the influence of good design as a factor in engineering innovation, and its effect on two sectors of industry in particular—agricultural implements and automobiles. In each case the authors point out how different aspects of design, or largely differing design philosophies, have had a marked influence on product performance and on competitive success.     

Reliable Supply Chain Network Design

Risk management in supply chains has been receiving increased attention in the past few years. In this article, we present formulations for the strategic supply chain network design problem with dual objectives, which usually conflict with each other: minimizing cost and maximizing reliability. Quantifying the total reliability of a network design is not as straightforward as total cost calculation. We use reliability indices and develop analytical formulations that model the impact of upstream supply chain on individual entities’ reliability to quantify the total reliability of a network. The resulting multiobjective nonlinear model is solved using a novel hybrid algorithm that utilizes a genetic algorithm for network design and linear programming for network flow optimization. We demonstrate the application of our approach through illustrative examples in establishing tradeoffs between cost and reliability in network design and present managerial implications.     

Design Principles for Flexible Systems

A fundamental aspect of designing systems with dedicated servers is identifying and improving the system bottlenecks. We extend the concept of a bottleneck to networks with heterogeneous, flexible servers. In contrast with a network with dedicated servers, the bottlenecks are not a priori obvious, but can be determined by solving a number of linear programming problems. Unlike the dedicated server case, we find that a bottleneck may span several nodes in the network. We then identify some characteristics of desirable flexibility structures. In particular, the chosen flexibility structure should not only achieve the maximal possible capacity (corresponding to full server flexibility), but should also have the feature that the entire network is the (unique) system bottleneck. The reason is that it is then possible to shift capacity between arbitrary nodes in the network, allowing the network to cope with demand fluctuations. Finally, we specify when certain flexibility structures (in particular chaining, targeted flexibility, and the “N” and “W” structures from the call center literature) possess these desirable characteristics.     

Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations

We study efficient, Bayes‐Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in a social choice setting that allows for informational and allocative externalities. We show that such mechanisms exist only if a congruence condition relating private and social rates of information substitution is satisfied. If signals are multi‐dimensional, the congruence condition is determined by an integrability constraint, and it can hold only in nongeneric cases where values are private or a certain symmetry assumption holds. If signals are one‐dimensional, the congruence condition reduces to a monotonicity constraint and it can be generically satisfied. We apply the results to the study of multi‐object auctions, and we discuss why such auctions cannot be reduced to one‐dimensional models without loss of generality.