强制性约束下企业信息安全投资与网络保险的最优决策分析

研究了强制性约束下企业信息安全投资和网络保险的最优决策问题,对比了可观测企业损失和不可观测企业损失两种情形下基于破产概率约束的最优安全投资和网络保险保费厘定。研究结果表明：在可观测损失和公平保费情况下,当最大化单个企业的期望效用时,存在最优安全投资额,并且政府补贴和强制性约束都可以激励企业增加安全投资;但是当最大化所有企业效用时,只有强制性约束才能增加企业安全投资使得总效用最大化,并且企业的最优安全投资与损失的可观测程度无关。在不可观测损失情况下,当最大化单个企业期望效用时,企业的安全投资增大,而最大化所有企业效用时,存在正网络外部性,即任何企业均不敢轻易的减少安全投资,即使同在一个网络中的其他企业减少了安全投资。此外,在破产概率约束下,随着保费的增加,当损失可观测时,企业的安全投资也增加,但期望效用减少了;而当损失不可观测时,企业的安全投资和期望效用均减少。本文所得结论对政府设定强制性标准,以及企业利用安全投资和网络保险进行信息安全风险控制具有较好的参考价值。     

Security Investment in Contagious Networks

Security of the systems is normally interdependent in such a way that security risks of one part affect other parts and threats spread through the vulnerable links in the network. So, the risks of the systems can be mitigated through investments in the security of interconnecting links. This article takes an innovative look at the problem of security investment of nodes on their vulnerable links in a given contagious network as a game‐theoretic model that can be applied to a variety of applications including information systems. In the proposed game model, each node computes its corresponding risk based on the value of its assets, vulnerabilities, and threats to determine the optimum level of security investments on its external links respecting its limited budget. Furthermore, direct and indirect nonlinear influences of a node's security investment on the risks of other nodes are considered. The existence and uniqueness of the game's Nash equilibrium in the proposed game are also proved. Further analysis of the model in a practical case revealed that taking advantage of the investment effects of other players, perfectly rational players (i.e., those who use the utility function of the proposed game model) make more cost‐effective decisions than selfish nonrational or semirational players.     

突发信息影响下的投资、消费及风险溢价

本文在CCAPM模型及行为经济学理论基础上建立突发信息影响下的资产定价模型,借此探讨突发信息对投资者主观决策以及风险溢价的影响,并利用数值迭代法给出了风险溢价的数值解。研究结果表明:突发信息所产生的正面影响会提高风险溢价,反之则降低溢价值,为解释"追涨杀跌"现象提供新视角;同时发现,投资者先期投资决策的结果好坏与风险溢价呈正向关系。最后利用中美两国证券市场数据进行数据模拟,结果表明本模型较好的避免了"股权溢价之谜"和"无风险利率之谜"。     

Co‐opetition and Investment for Supply‐Chain Resilience

This paper considers the problem of disruption risk management in global supply chains. We consider a supply chain with two participants, who face interdependent losses resulting from supply chain disruptions such as terrorist strikes and natural hazards. The Harsanyi–Selten–Nash bargaining framework is used to model the supply chain participants' choice of risk mitigation investments. The bargaining approach allows a framing of both joint financing of mitigation activities before the fact and loss‐sharing net of insurance payouts after the fact. The disagreement outcome in the bargaining game is assumed to be the result of the corresponding non‐cooperative game. We describe an incentive‐compatible contract that leads to First Best investment and equal “gain” for all players, when the solution is “interior” (as it almost certainly is in practice). A supplier that has superior security practices (i.e., is inherently safer) exploits its informational advantage by extracting an “information rent” in the usual spirit of incomplete information games. We also identify a special case of this contract, which is robust to moral hazard. The role of auditing in reinforcing investment incentives is also examined.     

社保投入有利于企业提高劳动生产率吗？——基于“中国企业—劳动力匹配调查”数据的实证研究

现有文献认为,社保投入对企业劳动生产率存在成本效应、激励效应两种不同的影响。由于大样本数据的缺乏,现阶段对于社会保险企业投入的讨论大多停留在其对企业生产的抑制效应。然而,本文运用随机分层抽样的"中国企业-劳动力匹配调查"(CEES)数据,就社保投入对于企业劳动生产率的影响效应、影响机制进行了创新性地实证研究。基准回归表明,在充分剔除选择性偏误的前提下,社保投入对于劳动生产率的激励效应更强。随着人均社保投入每增加10%,企业劳动生产率平均提高3.5%。进一步地,实证研究发现:人力资本、创新精神与管理效率是社保投入对于企业劳动生产率产生激励效应的重要渠道;其中,与人力资本、创新精神相比,管理效率更为重要。与大部分基于发达经济体微观数据的实证研究有所不同,本文发现:对于现阶段我国经济而言,社保投入对企业生产要素投入的成本挤出效应并不明显,社会保险通过激励员工从而促进企业生产率的发展。     

竞争环境下双边平台增值服务质量投资竞争研究

为了提高竞争环境下双边平台效益与竞争优势,讨论了平台企业对双边用户增值服务质量投资竞争决策问题。在考虑三种不同用户归属条件的基础上,构建了双边平台增值服务投资竞争模型。通过比较分析发现：当双边用户单归属时,无论对平台单边还是双边进行增值服务投资,投资高质量增值服务均是两平台的占优策略。当单边用户多归属时,若对消费者边进行增值服务投资,则投资低质量增值服务为平台的占优策略;若对供应商边或双边进行增值服务投资,则投资高质量增值服务为平台的占优策略。当双边用户多归属时,无论对平台单边还是双边进行增值服务投资,投资低质量增值服务均是两平台的占优策略。     

Optimal Security Investments and Extreme Risk

In the aftermath of 9/11, concern over security increased dramatically in both the public and the private sector. Yet, no clear algorithm exists to inform firms on the amount and the timing of security investments to mitigate the impact of catastrophic risks. The goal of this article is to devise an optimum investment strategy for firms to mitigate exposure to catastrophic risks, focusing on how much to invest and when to invest. The latter question addresses the issue of whether postponing a risk mitigating decision is an optimal strategy or not. Accordingly, we develop and estimate both a one‐period model and a multiperiod model within the framework of extreme value theory (EVT). We calibrate these models using probability measures for catastrophic terrorism risks associated with attacks on the food sector. We then compare our findings with the purchase of catastrophic risk insurance.     

中国证券投资基金的羊群行为分析

根据投资基金中报和年报中的投资明细数据,采用文献[1]和文献[2]的检验方法,从不同角度实证检验了中国投资基金的羊群效应,发现中国投资基金的羊群效应高于美国互助基金的羊群效应,中国投资基金并未表现出对大盘股、小盘股、新股以及信息技术行业样本股票的特别偏好。投资基金的交易以买为主。投资基金的投资重心有从小盘股向大盘股转变的趋势,这将有利于整个证券市场的稳定。投资基金的交易行为与股市走势密切相关。     

寿险定价的线性优化模型

实际的金融市场中存在多种不同期限的利率。在定义最大累积函数的基础上建立了一个称为“收支问题”的线性规划模型,这个模型的最优值刻画了合理安排保费资金的投资期限所能够达到的最大保险支付水平,从而给出了多利率条件下寿险费率的计算依据。使用局部优化方法证明了收支问题最优解的两个性质,这些性质说明在满足保险支出的条件下,保险收入资金应该优先考虑期限较长（即利率较大）的投资。对于典型的寿险产品模型,给出了最优解的结构,针对两个具体实例列出了计算结果。结果表明,在保险费率的计算中,起主要作用的是最大期限的利率,其次是不同利率的一个综合水平。     

Externalities in the wildland–urban interface: Private decisions,collective action,and results from wildfire simulation models for California

Property damage from wildfires occurs from spread into built-up areas, the wildland–urban interface. Fire spread occurs as embers from one burning structure ignite neighboring ones—but mitigation reduces the chances that fire spreads. In this study, we use a simulation model with realistic parameters for a neighborhood in California to illustrate patterns of marginal benefit from mitigation. We extend existing models of fire spread in two novel ways. We show how to describe the no-regulation equilibrium and social optimal levels of mitigation by incorporating data on a key factor, the distribution of house values in the community. We incorporate insurance in the model and show that it improves homeowner decision-making and insurance premium regulation. The fire spread simulations show that under plausible parameter values, there is a pattern in which mitigation's marginal benefit is low at low levels of community mitigation, rises to a maximum, and then falls quickly to a low level. We argue that the maximum marginal benefit is a guide to achieving optimal mitigation in a community. Owner mitigation decisions will depend on the distribution of house values in the neighborhood and other factors. In an illustration, we use the distribution of house values in a California community to illustrate the mitigation owners will choose under independent (Nash) investment decisions, and the efficiency-improving actions involving regulations or insurance premium subsidies that can lead to the social optimum.     

Environmental Factors,Managerial Processes,and Information Technology Investment Strategies

Although significant research attention has been directed at understanding the value of information technology (IT) investments for firms, very little attention has been paid to understand the IT investment behavior of firms. This article seeks to fill this void. We introduce the concept of IT investment strategy, defined by dimensions of intensity and proactiveness, to characterize the IT investment behavior of firms. Synthesizing the environmental deterministic and strategic choice perspectives of a firm's strategic decision making, we examine the effects of environmental factors, managerial processes, and the interplay between them on IT investment strategy. Specifically, we examine the impact of environmental factors such as industry clockspeed and information intensity on IT investment strategy. We also incorporate the strategic choice perspective to argue that managerial processes such as frequent chief executive officer—chief information officer communications and collective information systems planning play a critical role in shaping the firm's IT investment strategy. The empirical results show that the environmental variables are related to IT investment strategy. Besides, managerial processes serve as a means to understand the environment and thus moderate the relationships between the environmental variables and the various facets of IT investment strategy. The conceptualization of IT investment strategy and the focus on both environmental determinism and strategic choice should enrich our understanding of firms’ IT investing behavior.     

基于实物期权的基础设施投资担保负担测度及其风险管理研究

从项目筹资模式、基础设施投资担保现状及其运营模式视角出发,研究我国基础设施投资担保负担测度及其风险管理的问题。利用或有负债思想,分析了下限式担保、上下限式担保、比例上下限式担保三类担保的期权特性及其影响因素;运用实物期权方法,在不同担保方式下构建了担保负担评估模型,并对相应的项目投资担保负担进行了评估,结果显示,投资收益担保是担保负担最直接、最主要的来源,也是政府方的或有负债,基于此,在融资谈判中,政府方可以通过调整项目投资担保水平和项目投资担保方式来控制担保负担和锁定担保风险。     

Cyber Security Risk Management: Public Policy Implications of Correlated Risk,Imperfect Ability to Prove Loss,and Observability of Self‐Protection

The correlated nature of security breach risks, the imperfect ability to prove loss from a breach to an insurer, and the inability of insurers and external agents to observe firms’ self‐protection efforts have posed significant challenges to cyber security risk management. Our analysis finds that a firm invests less than the social optimal levels in self‐protection and in insurance when risks are correlated and the ability to prove loss is imperfect. We find that the appropriate social intervention policy to induce a firm to invest at socially optimal levels depends on whether insurers can verify a firm's self‐protection levels. If self‐protection of a firm is observable to an insurer so that it can design a contract that is contingent on the self‐protection level, then self‐protection and insurance behave as complements. In this case, a social planner can induce a firm to choose the socially optimal self‐protection and insurance levels by offering a subsidy on self‐protection. We also find that providing a subsidy on insurance does not provide a similar inducement to a firm. If self‐protection of a firm is not observable to an insurer, then self‐protection and insurance behave as substitutes. In this case, a social planner should tax the insurance premium to achieve socially optimal results. The results of our analysis hold regardless of whether the insurance market is perfectly competitive or not, implying that solely reforming the currently imperfect insurance market is insufficient to achieve the efficient outcome in cyber security risk management.     

The Effect of Liability and Patch Release on Software Security: The Monopoly Case

An abundance of flawed software has been identified as the main cause of the poor security of computer networks because major viruses and worms exploit the vulnerabilities of such software. As an incentive mechanism for software security quality improvement, software liability has been intensely discussed among both academics and practitioners for a long time. An alternative approach to managing software security is patch release, which has been widely adopted in practice. In this paper, we examine these two different ways of mitigating customer risk in the software market: liability and patch release. We study the impact of both mechanisms on a monopolistic software vendor's decision on security quality. We find the conditions under which each mechanism is effective in terms of improving security quality and increasing social surplus. The heterogeneous nature of loss is identified to be a key factor for the effectiveness of the liability mechanism. On the other hand, patch release can be effective and welfare‐enhancing regardless of the nature of loss as long as customers incur low patching cost, and/or the vendor incurs low patch development cost. We also examine the impact of customer misperception of the outcome from vulnerable software on the effectiveness of liability.     

规避农副产品原材料产出不确定风险的商业保险策略

为了保证产品质量、降低生产成本，许多农副产品制造商选择自己种植原材料以满足农副产品的加工生产。然而，农作物的产出易受不利事件（如各种自然灾害）的影响而具有不确定性。这种不确定性可能导致最终产品产出不足，严重时甚至引发财务危机。为了应对潜在风险，农副产品制造商可向金融机构购买商业保险。本文建立了单周期农副产品制造商的计划产量决策模型，通过研究制造商购买商业保险的边界条件及最优商业保险策略，分析商业保险策略在制造商规避原材料产出不确定风险时所具有的价值。研究结果表明：（1）只有保费的安全因子低于外部融资的单位惩罚成本时，制造商才会购买商业保险；（2）最优商业保险策略与计划产量无关；（3）最终产品单位净收益越低，商业保险的价值反而越高。     

投资机会变动与风险收益关系实证研究

应用跨期资本资产定价模型研究股市投资机会变动时的风险收益关系和跨期风险对冲策略。以25个规模-账面市值比组合以及扩展组合作为检验资产,以经济、情绪和市场指标作为状态变量反映投资机会,以DCC-MVGARCH方法估计的资产超额收益与市场超额收益的条件协方差衡量市场风险,以DCC-MVGARCH方法估计的资产超额收益与状态变量新息的条件协方差衡量跨期风险,应用面板回归方法检验资产超额收益与风险的关系。研究结果表明,在单状态变量中,货币供应增长率、房地产投资增长率、宏观经济景气指数、规模溢价等新息降低,投资机会出现不利变动,与这些新息负相关的资产能对冲投资机会的不利变动;存贷差增长率、利率、股市波动等新息增加时,投资机会出现不利变动,与这些新息正相关的资产能对冲投资机会的不利变动;各模型具有良好的解释能力,其中规模溢价、股市波动和货币供应的解释能力较高。还对多状态变量进行检验、比较,并提供了相应投资策略。     

Marketing as an Investment in Shareholder Value

We present resource‐based and capability‐based arguments of marketing investment intensity to offer a strategic view of marketing as an investment in shareholder value. We find that marketing investment intensity has a U‐shaped quadratic effect on shareholder value creation (Tobin's q) that calls for marketing investment to be protected and increased, not surrendered. We show how marketing investments interact with investments in R&D, human capital and operations to reveal how strategic co‐investments can alter the shareholder value of marketing. Finally, we show how competitive intensity and failings in the firm's investment productivity (its ability to convert investment expenditure into sales) point to malaise in the firm's own strategic architecture as a fault for perceived poor returns from marketing investments. Our findings suggest that marketing investment should not be scapegoated when its contributions to shareholder value are not as expected. When invested in strategically and in combination with other investments, marketing can unlock exciting improvements in shareholder value.     

The Strategic Management of IT Investment Decisions: A Research Note

The concept that Information Technology can be used as part of an organization's strategy changes its role in the organization. Whilst investments associated with current or ‘more of the same’ computer systems are proposed by the DP manager, requests for investments associated with the use of IT as a competitive weapon come from a much wider audience. Since the size of the investment may be large and its potential impact on the organization profound there is a need to objectively analyze and manage such investments at the strategic level. Sophisticated models exist in the literature (Butler, 1988; Porter, 1988; Marsden, 1988; Synott, 1987) and there is much research to support the view that IT and corporate strategic models need to be aligned (Feeney & Brownlee, 1986; Haffenden, 1988 and Brewer, 1987). However the results from in-depth interviews with highly placed managers suggest that the decisions are based on more informal processes and that there exists differing views on the relationship between IT and corporate strategies.     

风险溢价、不确定性与专利投资的多阶段性

本文研究风险溢价、不确定性和专利投资的多阶段性三者之间的关系,揭示投资决策理论的内在机理。利用最优控制模型给出了两阶段情况下的风险溢价的解析表达式,在多阶段的复杂情形下利用动态规划的数值迭代法给出了风险溢价的数值解。研究发现风险溢价在专利投资完成前后有很大差异,在专利投资完成后风险溢价仅随市场风险的增大而增大,但在专利投资完成前风险溢价不仅随着专利长度、已完成阶段数和未来的预期利润流的增大而降低、而且随着市场风险的增大而增大。这些结论是现有理论的创新和进一步完善,有利于在实践中做出更加合理的投资决策。     

Investment attributes and learning from failure in foreign direct investments

This study examines the learning effect of multinational enterprises' (MNEs) failure experience in foreign direct investment (FDI). We also examine the contingent effects of two key investment attributes: cultural distance between the host countries and the MNE's home country and entry mode. Using a longitudinal dataset of Korean foreign direct investments during 1990–2011, we find that an MNE's prior FDI failure experience is negatively related to the failure likelihood of a focal subsequent FD, indicating a learning effect of FDI failure experience. Our results show that this learning effect weakens, as the cultural distance between the host countries of prior failed FDIs and South Korea, or the joint venture percentage among prior failed investments increases; however, those interaction effects become insignificant when a focal subsequent FDI is in a culturally different country, or a JV. This study enriches the literature on learning from failure and research on experiential learning in FDI by demonstrating the boundary conditions of the learning effect of the FDI failure experience of MNEs.