中国人口迁移与生育率关系研究

本文利用2000年人口普查数据,考察了中国人口迁移与生育率的关系。通过比较农村本地人口、城市本地人口和流动迁移人口三个人口群体在生育率上的差异,并进行多元统计分析,结果表明,流动迁移对生育率有着非常显著影响,城市外来人口的生育率不仅显著低于农村本地人口,而且也低于城市本地人口;远期流迁人口的生育率要低于近期流迁人口的生育率。中国人口迁移与生育率的关系出现了与已有的迁移生育率理论的不一致。1990年代中国的迁移生育率发生了转变。     

生育理性和生育决策与我国低生育水平稳定机制的转变

自改革开放以来 ,我国人口生育率水平出现了迅速的转变 ,特别是 1 992年我国确立了市场经济为目标的经济改革以来 ,生育率水平更是进一步降低到更替水平以下。如果说 ,生育率的迅速转变是在国家计划生育政策干预下启动的 ,那么 ,在 1 990年代生育率的下降应该主要是社会和经济发展的结果。以市场经济为导向的经济改革和经济的迅速发展 ,已经为稳定我国城市地区人口低生育率水平提供了必要的经济条件 ,同时 ,制度、技术和文化等因素的变革已经为我国个人生育决策理性化创造了条件 ,低生育水平的稳定机制已经开始从政策控制为主转向群众自我控制为主的转变     

试论时期总和生育率、终身生育率与政策生育率的关系

通过对总和生育率(TFR)、终身生育率(CFR)与政策生育率(PFR)的概念及相关数据分析,论证总和生育率与政策生育率是完全不同的概念,不可直接比较。在特定条件下TFR、CFR和政策生育率会产生差异,在一个国家生育水平下降的历史时期,TFR必然小于当年49岁组女性的CFR;"超生率"、"未婚率"、"未育率"和"不孕率"的变化,决定了政策生育率与终身生育率的差异。借鉴日本经济与人口发展相关数据,可以相信由平均初婚年龄推迟、女性有偶率下降导致的生育水平下降很可能成为对我国人口均衡发展的最大潜在威胁。因此,当前以及今后相当的时期内,我国的政策生育率应高于1.8。     

Legacy,Policy, and Circumstance in Fertility Transition

Divergent fertility trends in the course of development are commonly ascribed to differences in state action—that is, to government policy, deliberate or inadvertent. However, fertility outcomes can also, often more persuasively, be traced to differences in cultural and institutional inheritance and in the supply and growth potential of human capital. These are materials that states and societies find themselves endowed with—in brief, their legacy. In reality, legacy and policy are interwoven: policy actions build on some legacy elements and attempt to combat others. And there is a third set of factors influencing fertility outcomes, covering distinctive features of the economic and geopolitical environment and essentially fortuitous events—together termed circumstance. Legacy and circumstance can shrink or shift the policy space, helping to explain past failures in policy achievement. These broad considerations are the basis for a sketch of East Asian/sub‐Saharan African contrasts in fertility transition over the last 50 years. The sketch points to missing avenues of policy action in the African case in seeking to overcome legacy obstacles.     

Fertility,Employment, and Child-Care Costs

A sample of labor-market and birth histories is used to estimate the effects of child-care costs on employment and fertility decisions. A reduced-form empirical analysis is performed, which is based on hazard functions for transitions among various fertility--employment states. Higher child-care costs result in a lower birth rate for nonemployed women but not for employed women. Higher child-care costs also lead to an increase in the rate of leaving employment and a reduction in the rate of entering employment. The results suggest that potential behavioral effects of child-care subsidies could be significant and should be taken into account when alternative child-care policies are being debated.     

Relative Income,Race, and Fertility

If a white husband's income is higher than expected for men of his age, race, education, job characteristics, and region, economic theory predicts higher complete fertility for his wife. In the present study one per cent public use samples from the 1970 Census for California and Hawaii were used to examine the effect of relative income on Japanese, Chinese, and black fertility. Relative income was defined in two ways: (1) with regard to earnings of husbands of the same race, education, employment, and state; (2) with regard to earnings of white husbands of the same education, employment, and state. High relative incomes defined in each way were associated with increased completed fertility of Japanese and Chinese in Hawaii, where Orientals form a majority. Neither definition of high relative income was associated with the completed fertility of Japanese, Chinese, or blacks in California, where non-whites form a minority. The results suggest that the effect of relative income on fertility for a racial group will be positive only where there are few racial barriers to their attainment of high incomes.     

Mobility,Non-Familial Activity,and Fertility

In this analysis of fertility data from a sample of non-Catholic faculty couples in an American university, temporal patterns and variations in education, employment, marriage, and parenthood of the husbands and wives are discussed in reference to (1) the social mobility-fertility hypothesis and (2) a non-familial activity-fertility hypothesis.The couples are divided into four groups on the basis of family size and mobility status: (1) mobile-small, (2) non-mobile-small, (3) mobile-large, and (4) non-mobile-large. Whatever their mobility status, the four groups of husbands successfully completed requirements for the doctoral degree at about the same age and became established at about the same time in life and within the profession. Whatever their husbands' social origins, the wives also differ little with respect to educational attainment and in their work experiences in prematrimonial days. However, a different pattern is found in the work experiences of the wives since marriage. Those with two children are more likely to be employed after marriage and parenthood.On the other hand, a good many more wives with four or more children not only never worked before marriage but also remained outside the labor force after marriage (in the earlier years of marriage as well as after the tenth anniversary). The present data thus seem to support an analytically useful distinction between the "working wives" and the "working mothers."     

Replacement Migration: A Questionable Tactic for Delaying the Inevitable Effects of Fertility Transition

This article critiques a recent U.N. Population Division report, Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations? The report explores the use of increased immigration to bolster future population size and change age distribution patterns in a group of developed countries. Fertility rate declines and lengthening life expectancies associated with demographic transition inevitably yield an aging population and a falling potential support ratio (PSR), a situation which some demographers and economists view with alarm. As the U.N. report itself suggests, replacement migration can only temporarily delay population aging and decline. These issues are ultimately better addressed through changes in retirement policy. Population projections should be used only with great caution in designing long-term demographic policy. In particular, some assumptions used to make the U.N. projections are questionable, and even minor changes in those assumptions would yield substantially different policy conclusions. Replacement migration also raises difficult environmental questions by moving large numbers of people from low to high per-capita consumption nations. Modest population decline, particularly in more developed countries, may have significant local and global environmental and climate policy benefits.

     

Sex,Breastfeeding, and Marital Fertility in Pretransition China

Coital frequency is at the heart of the debate over low marital fertility in pretransition China. This study argues that coital frequency in contemporary China is indicative of sexual behavior in an earlier era. Frequency of intercourse is low in China relative to Europe, a natural outgrowth of a traditional family system and related sexual culture only partially transformed by a century of family revolution. Customary sexual behaviors and breastfeeding practices together shaped the Chinese historical fertility regime as they did the European. As explanations for China's low marital fertility, these proximate determinants leave little scope for the operation of fecundity‐reducing malnutrition on the one hand, or deliberate fertility control on the other. The fertility regimes of other pretransition agrarian societies more closely resemble China's than Europe's, seeming to confirm a pattern of European demographic exceptionalism.     

Resources, Fertility, and Parental Investment in Mao's China

During the first three decades of the People's Republic of China, income differences across social classes were compressed. Formal education was not an important determinant of personal income. In this study, there was no difference in income between white-collar and blue-collar families, although white-collar parents had more education than blue-collar parents. In urban China, where population density was high, couples of different occupational status appeared to make different trade-offs between quantity and quality of children. Urban white-collar couples had fewer, but better-educated, children than their blue-collar counterparts. In rural areas, white-collar couples still had better educated children than blue-collar couples, but no difference was found in lifetime reproductive success. High population density and an occupational structure that incidentally helped reinforce unequal distribution of cultural capital in the population encouraged urban couples with different levels of resources (i.e., cultural capital rather than income in this case) to adopt different reproductive strategies.     

Land,Fertility, and the Population Establishment

Attempts to demonstrate the dependence of fertility decline in the Third World on radical change have often depended on simplistic statistical analyses. Here some of the data used to explore the relationship between fertility, and land size and ownership, are re-examined. It is concluded that the land-fertility hypotheses of Stokes and Schutjer are not supported by the evidence, but that such analyses are inherently inconclusive and ambiguous. Instead, an understanding of the wider institutional context is called for. The Population Establishment – foreign and international donors supporting population programmes and research – recruits an intelligentsia to validate its activities. The philosophy of this intelligentsia is examined and rejected through an analysis of ideas it derives from the World Fertility Survey and the Matlab family planning project. It is concluded that the Establishment perpetuates rapid population growth by legitimizing unpopular and elitist governments, and by misleading them to believe that fertility decline can, indeed, occur in a political economy of inequality and injustice.     

Fertility transition,conscious choice,and numeracy

One of the preconditions of the fertility transition, as stated by A.J. Coale, is that reproductive decisions must be within the calculus of conscious choice. It is suggested that the change in mentality which leads to family limitation includes "numeracy about children," a clear notion of what family size ought to be and the awareness of individuals of where they stand with respect to the norm. The article explores the hypothesis that numeracy about children appeared historically in various times and places, and that the conceptualization of family size was a necessary condition for adopting family limitation.     

Fertility timing,wages, and human capital

Women who have first births relatively late in life earn higher wages. This papers offers an explanation of this fact based on a simple life-cycle model of human capital investment and timing of first birth. The model yields conditions (that are plausibly satisfied) under which late childbearers will tend to invest more heavily in human capital than early childbearers. The empirical analysis finds results consistent with the higher wages of late childbearers arising primarily through greater measurable human capital investment.Helpful comments were provided by Claudia Goldin, Paul Taubman, by seminar participants at Baruch College, CUNY Graduate Center, Queens College, Rutgers University, and the University of Pennsylvania, and anonymous referees. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the March 1989 annual meetings of the Population Association of America.     

Migration, trade and wages

This paper analyses the impact of immigration on the UK labour market using the GNP function approach. We find that an increase in the number of unskilled immigrants reduces the wages of unskilled domestic workers, though the quantitative impact of this increase is small. No discernible impact of migration is found for skilled native workers. The results also suggest that unskilled immigrant workers and imports are substitutes in production, whilst skilled immigrant workers and imports are complements.     

Migration, fertility, and aging in stable populations

Fertility is below replacement level in all European countries, and population growth is expected to decline in the coming decades. Increasing life expectancy will accentuate concomitant aging of the population. Migration has been seen as a possible means to decelerate aging. In this article, I introduce a stable, open-population model in which cohort net migration is proportional to births. In this case, the migration-fertility trade-off can be studied with particular ease. I show that although migration can increase the growth rate, which tends to make the age distribution younger, it also has an opposite effect because of its typical age pattern. I capture the effect of the age pattern of net migration in a migration-survivor function. The effect of net migration on growth is quantified with data from 17 European countries. I show that some countries already have a level of migration that will lead to stationarity. For other countries with asymptotically declining population, migration still provides opportunities for slowing down aging of the population as a whole.     

人口迁移对延边朝鲜族育龄妇女生育行为差异的影响程度分析

利用2011年国家人口计生委流动人口及其影响因素监测调查数据,通过比较农村未迁出朝鲜族育龄妇女、城市未迁出朝鲜族育龄妇女和迁出的朝鲜族育龄妇女三个人口群体在生育行为上的差异,考察人口迁移对朝鲜族妇女生育行为的影响。结果显示,几种类型的朝鲜族育龄妇女生育行为存在一定的差异,流动迁移对朝鲜族育龄妇女是否选择生育的生育行为有显著影响,但对朝鲜族育龄妇女选择生育二胎的生育行为影响不完全显著。     

External Shocks,Household Consumption and Fertility in Indonesia

This paper examines the impact of idiosyncratic income shocks on household consumption, educational expenditure and fertility in Indonesia, and assesses whether the investment in human capital of children and fertility are used to smooth household consumption. Using four different kinds of self-reported economic hardships, our findings indicate that coping mechanisms are rather efficient for Indonesian households that perceive an economic hardship. Only in case of unemployment do we find a significant decrease in consumption spending and educational expenditure while fertility increases. These results indicate that households that perceive an unemployment shock use children as a means for smoothing consumption. Regarding the death of a household member or natural disaster we find that consumption per person even increases. These results are consistent with the argument that coping mechanisms even over-compensate the actual consumption loss due to an economic hardship. One important lesson from our findings is that different types of income shock may lead to different economic and demographic behavioral adjustments and therefore require specific targeted social insurance programs.     

Fertility,social mobility and urban migration in Brazil

In the course of a sample survey of the adult population of eight cities in southcentral Brazil conducted in 1959 and early 1960, material was obtained respecting total family size after ten or more years of marriage. This was analysed in order to determine what variations in mean family size could be observed in relation to class status and social mobility. The results generally corroborate those of J. Berent for England and Wales–that is, that fertility is inversely related to class status, and that for a given class, the lower the class of origin, the higher the fertility. There was no confirmation, however, of J. Goldberg's findings in Detroit that the inverse relationship between class and fertility is due to the presence in urban populations of the rural-born, and suggestions are put forward which may explain this result in Brazil. A tentative estimate suggests that the net effect of social mobility had been to reduce the sample's total births by something of the order of 3 per cent.     

人力资本、生育率与经济增长

本文通过对人口学与经济学共同关注的几个领域最新研究的回顾,阐明了经济学与人口学两个学科在研究对象和研究方法上的联系.同时,将这些研究成果与中国的发展现状结合起来进行分析,对更深刻地认识社会经济发展过程和相应的政策取向也大有裨益.     

Child Underreporting,Fertility, and Sex Ratio Imbalance in China

Child underreporting is often neglected in studies of fertility and sex ratio imbalance in China. To improve estimates of these measures, I use intercensal comparisons to identify a rise in underreporting, which followed the increased enforcement and penalization under the birth planning system in 1991. A new triangulation of evidence indicates that about 19% of children at ages 0–4 were unreported in the 2000 census, more than double that of the 1990 census. This evidence contradicts assumptions underlying the fertility estimates of most recent studies. Yet, the analysis also suggests that China’s fertility in the late 1990s (and perhaps beyond) was below officially adjusted levels. I then conduct a similar intercensal analysis of sex ratios of births and children, which are the world’s highest primarily because of prenatal sex selection. However, given excess underreporting of young daughters, especially pronounced just after 1990, estimated ratios are lower than reported ratios. Sex ratios in areas with a “1.5-child” policy are especially distorted because of excess daughter underreporting, as well as sex-linked stopping rules and other factors, although it is unclear whether such policies increase use of prenatal sex selection. China’s sex ratio at birth, once it is standardized by birth order, fell between 2000 and 2005 and showed a continuing excess in urban China, not rural China.