Change of marital fertility in China from 1964 to 1981]

In 1982 the Chinese National Family Planning Commission conducted a nationwide (excepting Taiwan and Tibet) .001 random sampling of the total population to gather data on the fertility and age structures of married women. In comparing general marital fertility and standardized fertility, findings show that from 1964 to 1970 both rates averaged 225.1/1000. When family planning work began on a wide scale in 1971, the rates steadily declined, reaching 116.7/1000 in 1980. However, in 1967-68 the standard fertility rate rose by 21.34% due to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and in 1980-81 the rate increased by 13.2%, indicating that problems still remain in family planning. The total marital fertility rate dropped 2.84/1000 from 1964 to 1981. The rate of decline in rural areas was greater than in the cities, but the cities had a larger percentage decline than the countryside. In the 5-year periods of 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1980, marital fertility rates tended to decline in 1970 and 1975 among women aged 30-40 years because during those periods greater control was placed on women having multiple children. For 1980 and 1975, combined total rates for 15-19 year olds dropped 17.1%, but the combined total rates of 30-49 year olds dropped by 61.2%, indicating that in recent years the drop in marital fertility is mostly among those over 30 years of age.     

Age at marriage,family planning practices,and other variables as correlates of fertility in Korea

The relationships between fertility and thirteen variables are examined in three groups of married Korean women, about 400 each from urban, rural, and semi-rural areas. Data were obtained by interview. Age at marriage and family planning practice are the strongest predictors of fertility and account for about 10 percent and 7 percent of the total variance, respectively. Other factors which accounted for lesser fractions of variability are ideal number of children, rural versus urban residence, education, aspiration for daughters, exposure to mass media, and economic status. Most of the relationships appear to be stable over time; others, which are associated with modernization, appear to be changing. The thirteen variables combined can account for a maximum of 40 percent of the variance in fertility.     

用孩次递进比模拟“全面二孩”政策调整初期的生育行为--以湖北省为例

以2014年湖北省卫生和计划生育委员会提供的包括“单独”、“双独”方面的数据为基础,描述了生育政策调整下被压抑的生育潜能释放的规律性和用孩次递进比的方法预测“全面二孩”政策调整初期的生育行为,与意愿分析方法相互比照,丰富了当下生育政策下生育行为预测研究。从分析结果可以看出,假定2016年“全面二孩”生育政策调整,湖北省第一年内会新增二孩出生量52621人,占湖北省2014年总出生量的7?41％;三年内最低会新增139262人的二孩生育量。城乡对比发现,农村新增二孩生育占到将近六成,且由抢生而导致的堆积主要集中在农村,40岁后的高龄抢生情况不严重。     

Target Fertility,Contraception, And Aggregate Rates: Toward A Formal Synthesis

This paper develops a stock adjustment model relating total expected births to conventional aggregate fertility rates for married women over 25. Each year, cohorts bear about 20 percent of their additional expected births. Aggregate U.S. rates have been consistent with expectations as expressed in surveys between 1955 and 1975; indeed, total expected births may be inferred from aggregate fertility behavior. A peculiar empirical finding is that the additional expected fertility of nonterminators has not changed since 1955, despite the dramatic decline in total expected and actual fertility. The model leads to a dynamic expression for the duration pattern of current and cumulative fertility and for the proportion of couples who have terminated childbearing. The model is also used to analyze the effects of changing contraceptive failure rates on fertility patterns. For example, a decline in “timing” failure rates increases duration-specific fertility five years later.     

India's population in transition

This demographic profile of India addresses fertility, family planning, and economic issues. India is described as a country shifting from economic policies of self-reliance to active involvement in international trade. Wealth has increased, particularly at higher educational levels, yet 25% still live below the official poverty line and almost 66% of Indian women are illiterate. The government program in family planning, which was instituted during the early 1950s, did not change the rate of natural increase, which remained stable at 2.2% over the past 30 years. 1993 marked the first time the growth rate decline to under 2%. The growth rate in 1995 was 1.9%. The total population is expected double in 36 years. Only Nigeria, Pakistan, and Bangladesh had a higher growth rate and higher fertility in 1995. India is geographically diverse (with the northern Himalayan mountain zone, the central alluvial plains, the western desert region, and the southern peninsula with forest, mountains, and plains). There are regional differences in the fertility rates, which range from replacement level in Kerala and Goa to 5.5 children in Uttar Pradesh. Fertility is expected to decline throughout India due to the slower pace of childbearing among women over the age of 35 years, the increase in contraceptive use, and increases in marriage age. Increased educational levels in India and its state variations are related to lower fertility. Literacy campaigns are considered to be effective means of increasing the educational levels of women. Urbanization is not expected to markedly affect fertility levels. Urban population, which is concentrated in a few large cities, remains a small proportion of total population. Greater shifts are evident in the transition from agriculture to other wage labor. Fertility is expected to decline as women's share of labor force activity increases. The major determinant of fertility decline in India is use of family planning, which has improved in access and use during the 1980s. If India is to keep a stable population under 1.6 billion in the future, Indians may have to accept only one child per family.     

Recent trends in Tanzanian fertility

This paper provides an assessment of the nature and magnitude of Tanzania's recent fertility decline, using robust methods for the identification of fertility trends. A decline in Tanzanian fertility began some time in the late 1970s or early 1980s. The pattern of decline exhibits similarities to patterns identified some years ago in Zimbabwe and Kenya. The decline has been especially marked in urban areas. It has been accompanied by a rapid rise in contraceptive prevalence from the very low levels before 1990 to just under 20 per cent of currently married women of reproductive age. Although falling marital fertility associated with a rise in contraceptive use is the main contributor to the decline in fertility, a rise in the average age at marriage has also made a (smaller) contribution, as has the AIDS epidemic. The fact that fertility is declining in Tanzania raises questions about the social and economic requirements for fertility transitions to begin in sub-Saharan Africa.     

Theoretical explanation of rapid decline in China's fertility]

China's fertility decline is widely acknowledged. The 1982 census and a random survey of 1/1,000th of the nation's population set the total fertility rate at 2.6%. Bureau of statistics data collected in 1984 showed the nation's birth rate as 1.7% and total fertility rate 1.94%. Friendly observers call this a miracle; others blame the decline on forced government family planning policy. Scientific pursuit of the causes for the decline is an issue of practical and realistic value. First, favorable conditions for fertility decline have been fostered by the socialist system and are deeply rooted in the country's economic development. China's industrialization and urbanization have brought new lifestyles and liberated individuals and families from the constraints of traditional family life. Couples have chosen to limit the number of children, to enhance the quality of life and education potential of their children, thus altering the traditional high fertility in China. Education of women has played a role in raising women's consciousness; a 1982 census placed the fertility rate of women with high-school level education or above, lower than that for less or uneducated women. Neonatal mortality rate decline is also related to the spontaneous decline in fertility rate, as high fertility has historically been intended to compensate for high child mortality rates. Welfare and social security systems for the elderly have also helped change the traditional mentality of having many children as assurance of life support in old age. Social organizations have accelerated knowledge and methods of planned fertility. Later marriages are also a factor: in 1970 the average marriage age was 19 - 20 and had increased by 1976 to 22 - 23. Other favorable social factors include free birth control and the view of population planning as an essential part of national welfare.     

试论时期总和生育率、终身生育率与政策生育率的关系

通过对总和生育率(TFR)、终身生育率(CFR)与政策生育率(PFR)的概念及相关数据分析,论证总和生育率与政策生育率是完全不同的概念,不可直接比较。在特定条件下TFR、CFR和政策生育率会产生差异,在一个国家生育水平下降的历史时期,TFR必然小于当年49岁组女性的CFR;"超生率"、"未婚率"、"未育率"和"不孕率"的变化,决定了政策生育率与终身生育率的差异。借鉴日本经济与人口发展相关数据,可以相信由平均初婚年龄推迟、女性有偶率下降导致的生育水平下降很可能成为对我国人口均衡发展的最大潜在威胁。因此,当前以及今后相当的时期内,我国的政策生育率应高于1.8。     

Aboriginal fertility: Trends and prospects

Estimates of Aboriginal fertility compiled from an analysis of 1981 and 1986 Census data on children ever borne by Aboriginal women reveal age-specific fertility rates slightly higher than those of other Australian women at ages above 25, but very much higher rates for younger women. The result is a total fertility ratio more than 50 per cent higher than in the total Australian population, with no more than slight variation between States and Territories. A differential analysis using standardized indices shows considerable differences in levels of fertility of categories of young Aboriginal women classified by education, labour force status and income, and also differences between urban and rural areas. Analysis of prospects for Aboriginal fertility levels confirms the likelihood of continuation in the downward drift in levels of fertility that has been established during the past decade. Comparison of the estimates with another recent set of estimates obtained using the own-children method shows broad conformity in levels of total fertility ratios over time, except in the most recent period, the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, the own-children estimates distort the recent trend and also the age distribution of Aboriginal fertility.     

Demographic aspects of fertility in Thailand

Abstract Data from a national rural and urban sample survey are analysed in order to examine various demographic aspects of fertility in Thailand. Marital fertility rates found for Thailand are among the highest in Asia. Particularly noteworthy is the persistence of high fertility at older ages of childbearing for rural women. Cumulative fertility shows a pronounced relationship with age at marriage and current marital status. Women who marry at an older age or who experience disruption of their marriages are clearly more likely to have fewer children ever born. Differences in both current and cumulative fertility are strongly associated with residence. Rural women who constitute the vast majority of Thai women, experience the highest fertility, Bangkok-Thonburi women experience the lowest fertility and provincial urban women are characterized by an intermediate fertility level which is closer, however, to the experience of their counterparts in the capital than in the countryside. Rural-urban fertility differences are mitigated but by no means eliminated by differences in infant mortality. In both rural and urban areas a positive association between cumulative fertility and infant morality is evident. Breast-feeding, commonly practised for extended periods-among both rural and urban Thai women, undoubtedly serves to some extent as an intervening variable in this relationship. A comparison of current fertility with cumulative fertility strongly suggests that a decline in marital fertility has been under way recently among urban women, especially those residing in the capital, but not at all among rural women. Although it seems safe to assume that the urban fertility decline results in large part from an increasing use of contraception among urban women, those still in the reproductive ages who were using or had previously used birth control were characterized by higher cumulative fertility than women who had never practised contraception. Evidently couples resort to family planning only late in the family building process after they have already achieved or exceeded the number of children they wish to have.     

Why are uneducated women in India using contraception? A multilevel analysis

While women's education continues to be strongly associated with lower fertility in India, an important feature of India's current fertility transition is the spread of contraceptive use among uneducated women. Indeed, changes in their fertility are now making the major contribution to the country's overall fertility decline. We use multilevel statistical procedures to investigate the variation in contraceptive use among uneducated women across India. The analysis suggests that, while many of the expected socio-economic variables play their part, there are also considerable diffusion effects in progress, many of which operate at levels beyond the uneducated women's own individual circumstances. For example, we find significant relationships with others' use of contraception and others' education. Mass media exposure also emerges as an important diffusion channel. The multilevel analysis also reveals significant clustering of contraceptive use at different levels, much of which is accounted for by the variables included in the models.     

Fertility trends in Pakistan--the decline that wasn't

The own-child method of fertility estimation was applied to data from 4 successive household surveys in Pakistan--the 1973 Housing, Economic, and Demographic Survey; the 1975 Pakistan Fertility Survey; the 1979 Population, Labor Force, and Migration Survey; and the 1981 Census. Results suggest large fertility oscillations 8-15 years before each survey, a sharp decline during the next 6 years, and a slight upturn in the year preceding the survey. However, when the 4 data sources are analyzed together, it becomes clear that the reported fertility declines are spurious. In fact, the results indicate that Pakistan's total fertility rate actually increased in the 2 decades preceding the 1981 Census, from slightly under to slightly above 7 children/women. This pattern is apparent when fertility data are aggregated over calendar years, allowing the tendency for errors from age misreporting to cancel one another out. Whatever fertility decline may have occurred has been confined to the very small group of Pakistan women with more than a primary education. It appears that births were misplaced away from the survey date, because of a pattern of exaggerations of children's ages that increases with age, thereby underestimating fertility in the 5-year period just before the survey. This analysis points to the value of juxtaposition of trends from multiple data sources. It further suggests a need for serious attention to family planning program performance in Pakistan if the Government's goal of achieving a birth rate of 36/1000 by 1988 is to be achieved.     

An analysis of the fertility of Chinese women]

The 1982 census provided detailed information on fertility in China. It recorded 20,689,704 births in 1981, producing a birth rate of 2.1%, a decrease, respectively, of 43% and more than 50% in comparison with 1952 and 1963. The birth rate has varied widely over the last 30 years, from 3.6% in the early 1950's, to 1.8% in 1961, after a planned birth program was begun, to a record high of 3.7% in 1962 following the economic recovery, to 3.3% in 1970, after a gradual decline through the 1960's. By 1981 the birth rate had declined to 2.1%, clearly resulting from the intense planned fertility promotion begun in the early 1970's. In the mid- and late 50's, urban birth rate was consistently higher than rural, with the mass move to the cities at the beginning of the People's Republic. General economic development after 1957 brought simultaneous declines of both urban and rural rates, both reaching a low point in 1961. Age structure of the population also has an influence, depending on the proportion of childbearing women in the population. In 1981, the fertility of China's childbearing women was 8.3%, lower than that of the developing countries, but higher than the developed countries. By age group, the fertility rates reached 14.7% and 23.9% respectively in women between 20-24 and 25-29 years of age; the legal marriage age is 20. The fertility rate in large cities is generally lower than that of provinces. Higher educational and socio-economic level also exert an inverse influence on fertility rates; in low socio-economic areas the rate reached 3.5%, and in more advanced areas it was held to 2.2%. In all professions with the exception of agriculture, fishing, and forestry, the percentage of families with 1 child was 81.8%. Since planned fertility was implemented, the overall fertility rate has dropped from 3% to 2%. China's fertility mode has changed to that of developed countries, with high intensity between 20 and 29 years of age. Appropriate measures should be taken to lower the fertility rate in different regions.     

Migration and fertility in Puerto Rico

Abstract In an investigation based on special tabulations of the 25 per cent sample from the 1960 Census of Population for Puerto Rico, it is found that migration experience tends to be associated with fertility for various marital statuses, including consensual unions, and for rural, urban and metropolitan residence. The findings cannot be attributed to variations in age composition among the various categories as age standardization and age-specificcomparisons yield similar results. However, it is also found that rural-urban and consensually-legally mated differentials in fertility cannot be accounted for by variations in the migration variables that are examined. Thus, consistently higher fertility is found for non-migrants than for migrants; for consensually mated than for legally married and for rural than for urban or metropolitan residents. With a single exception, women in consensual unions, fertility is lower for women in the San Juan metropolitan area than in the other urban areas.     

Population trends and differentials in countries of the ESCAP region

The total population of the ESCAP region reached 2.4 billion in 1979, up from 2 billion in 1970. 6 of the 10 largest countries are in the region: China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. East Asia contains 1.1 billion; Middle South Asia contains 923 million; Eastern South Asia, 354 million; and Oceania, 22 million. The crude birth rate for the total region dropped by 5 points from 1970-9; the crude death rate dropped by 2 points, resulting in a decline in the annual growth rate of .3 percentage points, from 2.1% in 1970 to 1.8% in 1979. Overall, the total fertility rate decreased by 15% from 4.8 to 4.1. The total fertility rate in Australia fell 33% from 2.8 to 1.9 and in New Zealand from 3.0 to 1.9, or 37%. Generally fertility is lower in urban areas than in rural with some exceptions. A strong negative relationship between level of education and fertility exists in all countries of Asia and the Pacific, however, the parity of women with some primary education exceeds that of women with no schooling. Life expectancy at birth for both sexes in the region increased from 55.1 years in 1970 to 58.7 years in 1979, or by 7%. The highest life expectancy is in Japan at 75.2 years. The infant mortality rate in the ESCAP region in 1979 was estimated to be 78/1000. World Fertility Survey data indicate that the mean age of first marriage is generally very low but gradually increasing.     

基于调研数据的总和生育率发展趋势及影响因素分析——来自湖北鄂州、黄石、仙桃的调查数据

文章基于5490份有效问卷的调查数据对湖北省总和生育率（TFR）进行分析。结论表明,自1985年以来年龄别生育率下降主要原因是计生政策严格控制生育数量,而非生育行为的推迟。TFR呈现先快速下降后缓慢上升的趋势,其变化与高生育水平育龄妇女占比无关。与政策生育率变化有关。通过对湖北省总出生人数进行估算和分析,结论表明1985—2008年总和生育率对总出生人数的影响程度要大于高生育水平育龄妇女占比的影响;外推预测表明2009～2014年出生人数趋势稳定,2015年以后呈下降趋势。利用Logit模型对实际生育水平的影响因素进行分析,发现有显著影响的因素为：受访者文化程度、户口性质、出生年代、工作状态、丈夫工作状态、放宽的计生政策和奖励少生的计生政策。     

The Effect of Urbanization on China’s Fertility

The relationship between urbanization and fertility decline is known to be inverse in developed countries. However, the nature of this relationship in developing countries that already have relatively low fertilities is not well-understood. This study aims to illustrate how much urbanization contributed to China’s fertility decline between 1982 and 2008 and forecasts how much it can contribute to future reductions in fertility. The study examines changes in the total fertility rate (TFR) at both the national and provincial levels, given regional differences in the urbanization rate. The results show that changes in rural fertility behavior accounted for most of the decline in the national TFR between 1982 and 2008. This finding suggests that official birth control policies were instrumental in curbing China’s population growth. However, urbanization was responsible for about 22% of the decrease in TFR during this period, and its effect was especially important during the latter years (2001–2008). In most provinces, urbanization associated with a decline in provincial-level fertility. The forecasts indicate that urbanization will become the primary factor behind future declines in national fertility. Given the negative effect of urbanization on the TFR, it is possible to relax the one-child policy without having adverse implications for population growth.     

How Far Has Fertility in China Really Declined?

According to births in the last year as reported in China's 2000 census, the total fertility rate (TFR) in the year 2000 in China was 1.22 children per woman. This estimate is widely considered to be too low, primarily because some women who had out‐of‐quota births according to China's one‐child family policy did not report those births to the census enumerator. Analysis of fertility trends derived by applying the own‐children method of fertility estimation to China's 1990 and 2000 censuses indicates that the true level of the TFR in 2000 was probably between 1.5 and 1.6 children per woman. A decomposition analysis of change in the TFR between 1990 and 2000, based on our best estimate of 1.59 for the TFR in 2000, indicates that about two‐fifths of the decline in the conventional TFR between 1990 and 2000 is accounted for by later marriage and less marriage, and three‐fifths by declining fertility within marriage. The analysis also applies the birth history reconstruction method of fertility estimation to the two censuses, yielding an alternative set of fertility estimates that are compared with the set derived by the own‐children method. The analysis also includes estimates of trends in fertility by urban/rural residence, education, ethnicity, and migration status. Over time, fertility has declined sharply within all categories of these characteristics, indicating that the one‐child policy has had large across‐the‐board effects.     

The demography of words: The global decline in non-numeric fertility preferences, 1993–2011

This paper examines the decline in non-numeric responses to questions about fertility preferences among women in the developing world. These types of response—such as ‘don’t know’ or ‘it’s up to God’—have often been interpreted through the lens of fertility transition theory as an indication that reproduction has not yet entered women’s ‘calculus of conscious choice’. However, this has yet to be investigated cross-nationally and over time. Using 19?years of data from 32 countries, we find that non-numeric fertility preferences decline most substantially in the early stages of a country’s fertility transition. Using country-specific and multilevel models, we explore the individual- and contextual-level characteristics associated with women’s likelihood of providing a non-numeric response to questions about their fertility preferences. Non-numeric fertility preferences are influenced by a host of social factors, with educational attainment and knowledge of contraception being the most robust and consistent predictors.