Intended and Ideal Family Size in the United States, 1970–2002

Cross‐nationally, observed fertility is well below mean levels of reported ideal family size and also usually well below survey respondents' fertility desires and intentions. The United States is an exception. In this article we: (1) discuss the importance of fertility ideals and intentions for understanding observed fertility levels, (2) propose a model that can account for variable attitude‐behavior consistency, and (3) use this model as a framework to examine trends in American women's fertility ideals, intentions, and actual fertility. Our study uses data from the General Social Surveys and the Current Population Surveys. We ask whether preferences and intentions for moderate family sizes have eroded with time. The answer is remarkably clear: the dominant American ideals and intentions are for two or three children, and these preferences have persisted across the last three decades. The unusual aggregate correspondence between fertility intentions and behavior in the United States is explained by an apparent offsetting of factors that increase/decrease fertility relative to intentions.     

Industrialization,family and fertility: A structural-psychological analysis of the Brazilian case

This paper addresses itself to some linkages between macro-social structure (industrialization, social class), social psychological variables (husband-wife decision making), psychological variables (attitudes), and fertility. A total of 726 currently mated women with proven fertility in five Brazilian communities were interviewed to determine various attitudes, their work experience, their participation in family decisions, their fertility ideals, and actual fertility. The five communities were selected along a rural-urban-industrialization continuum to include a village, two non-industrial cities, and two industrial cities (one of which was Sao Paulo). Family size in the industrial cities was small in all social strata, while in the non-industrial cities family size was large in the lower strata and declined in the upper strata. Further analysis revealed that smaller family size is associated with generally higher levels of status among women—higher educational levels, greater social contacts and more skilled employment, and equality in family decision making. Our analysis supports the hypotheses that industrialization influences fertility through shifts in the social status of women, both in their work and at home. New education and work opportunities facilitate the emergence of modern conceptions of the role of women in society and egalitarian decision making in the family. These attitudes and patterns of husband-wife interaction are related to smaller family size ideals and lower fertility.     

A comparison of the size of families of roman catholics and non-catholics in Great Britain

Abstract In a recent study of family size ideals in the D.S.A. it was found that in the 1960'S the mean ideal family size of Catholics was about half a child higher than the mean ideal size of non-Catholics. This note describes an analysis of similar data for married women in Great Britain, derived from an investigation undertaken in 1966 for the Population Investigation Committee. A difference in ideal family size, which was of the same order as the American difference, was found; and, in addition, the actual fertility of Catholics was compared with that of others.     

The Americanization of catholic reproductive ideals

Abstract This paper considers the attitude of Roman Catholics in the United States of America towards family size and suggests that large family ideals are still being put forward by the Church in publications and periodicals. The second part of the paper considers the attitudes of American Roman Catholics towards family size and shows that though there are indications that Roman Catholics regard slightly larger families as ideal than do members of other religions, the difference is not now very great.     

Another Child? Fertility Ideals,Resources and Opportunities

Low fertility in most developed countries has prompted policy concern in relation to labour market supply, pensions, and expenditure on health and welfare services as well as policy debate about both the cost of children and the opportunity costs of parenthood. The extent to which family policy interventions can be effective in slowing or reversing fertility decline is much debated. This paper, based on a fertility module of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2005, examines the current fertility, and ideal and expected fertility of a nationally representative sample of 455 parents of reproductive age and focuses on whether they plan to have another child. It compares the characteristics of those who intend to have another child with those who do not, and how parents with one child differ from those with more children. It addresses three questions about family size: (1) fertility ideals, (2) resources and the economic implications of childbearing, and (3) opportunities for childbearing and the effects of a late start on fertility expectations. It concludes that, despite a sustained period of low fertility in Scotland, childbearing ideals are robust and explanations of low fertility must derive from difficulties in realising those ideals. Difficulties in realising fertility aspirations are associated less with resources than with opportunities for childbearing, especially the timing of first birth. Those who delay their first birth are less likely to realise their ideal family size, and their lower fertility is associated with the opportunity costs of childbearing in terms of foregone qualifications, careers and earnings.     

The influence of first generation fertility and economic status on second generation fertility

This paper examines the impact of parental economic status and family size on the actual and expected fertility of adult children using longitudinal data from two generations of families participating in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. There was a modest positive relationship between first generation family size and second generation fertility. More importantly, the ideal family size of the parental family was more closely related to fertility behavior and plans in the second generation than was actual parental family size. In addition, the data revealed the hypothesized negative correlation between parental financial status and second generation fertility behavior and plans. Several mechanisms which could produce the correlation between parental characteristics and the fertility of their children are explored.The analysis reported in this paper was supported by Contract NO1-HD-42856 from the National Institute for Child Health and Human Development, Center for Population Research. Dr. Thornton is affiliated with the Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. Requests for reprints should be directed to him.     

The formation and stability of ideal family size among young people

A sample of 1,123 sixth, ninth, and twelfth graders in two Southern counties was questioned to ascertain how many children they think is ideal. More than three-fourths of the students in each grade had given thought to an ideal number of children for themselves; fewer had thought about the ideal number for the average American couple. Two and three children were the modal responses; mean ideal sizes were 3.02 for self and 3.16 for the average couple. The range of acceptable fertility behavior, “too few” or “too many” children, is defined by medians of 1.56 and 5.96. Ideal and acceptable family sizes increase slightly in the higher grades. A sex difference in ideals appeared only at grade 12; girls wanted more children. Negroes wanted fewer children than did whites at grade 6, more at grade 12. Size of family of orientation was directly related to ideals at grades 6 and 9, but the relation was curvilinear at grade 12. The direct relation between ideals and socioeconomic status became more pronounced at grade 12. Ideal sizes were larger for Catholics than for other religious groups. The study lends at least minimal support to the notion that early socialization affects ideas about family size.     

Fertility patterns among religious groups in Canada

The U shape that has been traced out by the crude birth rate in the United States and Canada is well known. Falling birth rates reached a low point in the mid-1930’s; the rate rose to a peak in 1947 and remained high through the 1950’s. In terms of cohorts, completed family size was smallest for women born around 1910, whose childbearing was concentrated in the 1930’s. With data from the 1961 census of Canada, trends in cohort marital fertility by religion are examined. The U pattern appears for both Protestants and Jews. For Catholics, a reversal in the downward trend of family size had not appeared by 1961, although the U pattern can be discerned for some subgroups such as Catholics living in big cities and persons of Irish ancestry. In the United States, however, changes in family size for all three religious groups and both whites and nonwhites follow the U pattern. Religious differentials in family size in Canada have been decreasing, but they remain much larger than either religious or color differentials in the United States, which show no decrease. The distinctive features of Catholic fertility in Canada are most pronounced among the regionallyconcentrated French Canadians, suggesting an interplay of religious, regional, and ethnic influences.     

Factors in the Resolution of Adolescent Premarital Pregnancies

This article examines the effect of family background factors on first premarital pregnancy resolution for adolescents in the United States. Teenage fertility constitutes a sizable percentage of total fertility, and each outcome has a potentially different type of family structure associated with it. Not only are there marked racial/ethnic differences in the ways such pregnancies are resolved, but the effects of family structure, age at first conception, family size, and working mother also differ between blacks, whites, and Hispanics. Parental education is a highly significant predictor for all groups: the higher the level of education, the less likely the pregnancy will be carried to term.     

Estimating marital fertility rates by educational attainment using a survey of new mothers

Marital fertility rates by educational attainment of mother are estimated for the United States for 1963. These calculations are based upon information collected in a probability sample survey of women having births in 1963 and are prepared by relating birth estimates for educational attainment groups to estimates of married women in corresponding groups.The rates do not display a negative association between educational attainment and the annual level of fertility, thus differing from the pattern observed in other measures of period fertility. Women who completed some high school but did not graduate and women with one or more years of college had higher annual fertility rates than women in other attainment classes.Alternative estimation procedures are discussed which illustrate difficulties in obtaining satisfactory correspondence between two independent surveys which are used to obtain the rate calculation components.     

Self-selection and earnings assimilation: Immigrants from the former Soviet Union in Israel and the United States

Drawing on U.S. decennial census data and on Israeli census and longitudinal data, we compare the educational levels and earnings assimilation of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU) in the United States and Israel during 1968-2000. Because the doors to both countries were practically open to FSU immigrants between 1968 and 1989, when FSU immigrants were entitled to refugee visas in the United States, the comparison can be viewed as a natural experiment in immigrants' destination choices. The results suggest that FSU immigrants to the United States are of significantly higher educational level and experience significantly faster rates of earnings assimilation in their new destination than their counterparts who immigrated to Israel. We present evidence that patterns of self-selection in immigration to Israel and the United States--on both measured and unmeasured productivity-related traits--is the main reason for these results. When the immigration regulations in the United States changed in 1989, and FSU Jewish immigrants to the United States had to rely on family reunification for obtaining immigrant visas, the adverse effects of the policy change on the type of FSU immigrants coming to the United States were minor and short-lived As early as 1992, the gaps in the educational levels between FSU immigrants coming to Israel and to the United States returned to their pre-1989 levels, and the differences in earnings assimilation of post-1989 immigrants in the United States and Israel are similar to the differences detected in the 1980s.     

Domestic Outsourcing in an Ultra-Low Fertility Context: Employing Live-in Domestic Help and Fertility in Hong Kong

The fertility rate in Hong Kong has been very low for decades. Because work–family conflict is one of the major barriers for married couples in actualizing their fertility ideals, domestic outsourcing that relieves women from the burden of domestic labor may help reduce the gap between ideal and actual fertility. Hiring live-in domestic helpers, who co-reside with the hiring families and work on a full-time basis, is gaining popularity in Hong Kong. However, past studies neither inside nor outside of East Asia have examined how employing live-in helpers affects fertility. This study investigates the relationship between live-in helpers and fertility by analyzing retrospective event-history data we collected from a representative survey of married couples in Hong Kong (n?=?1697). Our results show that married couples employing live-in helpers tend to have more children than couples not employing live-in helpers. Specifically, the practice is associated with higher odds of first childbirth and of second childbirth, with no evidence of a positive effect beyond bearing a second child. The findings have implications for other East Asian societies, which share similar backgrounds of ultra-low fertility rates, rising female labor force participation rates, rigid gender inequalities in domestic labor, and demanding work cultures.

     

Family structure and and fertility behavior in Taiwan

The present analysis is based on the 1990 Taiwan Human Resources Survey to study the relationships between family structure, women's complete fertility and birth spacing. Imputed family size, as measured by either the ideal number of children expressed by a married woman or the number of actual surviving children whichever is larger, is used as a proxy of a woman's complete fertility. The results indicate a majority of married couples in Taiwan begin married life living with the husband's parents and later move out to establish a nuclear unit. This limited experience in the extended family exerts an upward pressure on imputed family size even when other relevant variables are statistically controlled. Further, the effect of living with the husband's parents on shorter duration of birth spacing is only limited to the time when the parents provide free child- care for married couples.     

Impact of population changes on education cost

This paper has two principal aims: (1) to analyze and measure how the demographic variables—mortality, fertility, and im migration — affect the cost of education; (2) to evaluate what possibilities developing countries, such as those of Latin America, have for a rapid educational improvement. The paper relates demographic and educational variables of three different populations: Sweden, 1840–1965; the United States, 1850–1960; and Latin America, 1930–2000. Three educational variables are also considered: (a) school attendance rates by sex and age; (b) distribution of students of same age by grade; and (c) cost of student by grade. Demographic changes in countries such as Sweden and the United States were favorable for the development of education. For the future, unless an increase of fertility occurs, mortality and fertility changes will not have a significant effect on the cost of education in these countries. In current less developed countries the demographic changes during the past were less favorable to educational development. A future reduction of fertility will significantly help them to achieve a higher educational level.     

Evidence bearing on the construct validity of "ideal family size"

George Gallup polled "ideal family size" in 1936 and introduced a concept which subsequently appeared in many polls and fertility surveys. Previous research shows that ideal is a poor measure of respondent's personal fertility plans or behavior and that among researchers there is little agreement about what ideal family size does measure, if anything. Construct validity analysis based on historical, trend, and cross-sectional data suggests that the late 1960s saw ideal politicized as preoccupation with the "population problem" grew. Ideal family size is now appropriately regarded as a measure of a societal pronatalist norm and not merely a projected fertility preference.A version of this paper was presented at the meetings of the Society for Applied Anthropology, Merida, Mexico, 5 April 1978. Data on ideal family size from Blake (1974) are used with permission of the editors ofDemography. Other data come from the 1965 and 1970 National Fertility Studies co-directed by N.B. Ryder and C.F. Westoff (under contract No. PH-43-65-1048 with the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development).     

How High is Hispanic/Mexican Fertility in the United States? Immigration and Tempo Considerations

In this article, I demonstrate that the apparently much higher fertility of Hispanic/Mexican women in the United States is almost exclusively the product of period estimates obtained for immigrant women and that period measures of immigrant fertility suffer from three serious sources of bias that together significantly overstate fertility levels: difficulties in estimating the size of immigrant groups; the tendency for migration to occur at a particular stage in life; and, most importantly, the tendency for women to have a birth soon after migration. When these sources of bias are taken into consideration, the fertility of native Hispanic/Mexican women is very close to replacement level. In addition, the completed fertility of immigrant women in the United States is dramatically lower than the level obtained from period calculations. Findings are consistent with classical theories of immigrant assimilation but are a striking departure from the patterns found in previous studies and published statistics. The main implication is that without a significant change in immigration levels, current projections based on the premise of high Hispanic fertility are likely to considerably exaggerate Hispanic population growth, its impact on the ethno-racial profile of the country, and its potential to counteract population aging.     

Worldwide fertility declines do not rely on stopping at ideal parities

A key demographic hypothesis has been that fertility declines rely on stopping at target parities, but emerging evidence suggests that women frequently reduce fertility without specific numeric targets. To assess the relative importance of these two paths to fertility decline, we develop a novel mixture model to estimate: (1) the proportion of women who stop at a target parity; and (2) mean completed fertility among those who do not. Applied to Demographic and Health Survey data from women aged 45–49 in 84 low- and middle-income countries, and to United States Census cohorts, the model shows considerable variation in the proportion stopping at specific parities (1–84?per cent). The estimates also show that declines in completed fertility are largely attributable to women who do not stop at target parities, suggesting that stopping at ideal parities may be less important than parity-independent decisions for a wide range of fertility transitions.     

Reference groups and family size norms

The concept of reference groups is introduced as a theoretically useful mechanism involved in diffusing collective norms and values about family size and in formation of family size ideals of individual family members. Data were gathered via self-administered questionnaires from a random sample of 140 urban and 55 rural families in the Lansing, Michigan metropolitan area. Findings show major variations by sex. Conformity to a two-child family norm in the family size ideals of wives depends on the extent to which they are exposed to this norm through reference group interaction and on the size of their families of origin. Husbands' family size ideals are influenced by size of family of origin but not by reference group interaction. In further exploring this pattern of findings, important differences emerge by controlling for educational attainment and residential location.Revised version of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Session "Population: Fertility Behavior," Chicago, September 5–9, 1977. This research was supported by the Michigan Agricultural Experiment Station, Project 3152, "Functioning of the Family Ecosystem in a World of Changing Energy Availability" through the Institute for Family and Child Study and the Department of Sociology. Acknowledgements are due to Shirley Foster Hartley, Nan E. Johnson, Harry Perlstadt, Harry K. Schwarzweller, and the referees of this journal, all of whom made helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Michigan State Agricultural Experiment Station Journal Article Number 8245. Requests for reprints should be sent to Daniel C. Clay, Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824.     

Some aspects of the use of birth expectations data from sample surveys for population projections

The value of national sample survey data relating to birth expectations for projecting births is reassessed in the light of data limitations pointed out by Ryder and Westoff among others and of the methods of projection used by the United States Bureau of the Census. The annual level of fertility under the cohort-fertility projection method depends on the assumptions regarding completed fertility, about which the available survey data are fairly informative, and on the assumptions regarding the timing of births, about which the survey data tell us very little. Test calculations suggest that Ryder and Westoff have overstated the significance of timing relative to completed family size for the level of future births. We believe that the fall in the annual total fertility rate in the first half of the sixties is to be explained only in part by a general delay in childbearing; a moderate to substantial decrease in completed family size has also occurred. Analysis of the latest set of fertility projections of the Census Bureau also suggests that the assumptions about completed fertility are a much more important determinant of the level of future births than timing, both in the short and long term. Although the available expectations data cannot help in predicting short-term annual changes in fertility, they appear useful for making long-term projections of annual fertility. Expansion of the size, frequency, and content of the sample surveys and incorporation of parity and birth interval into the projection method may improve projections.     

Do Cross-National Differences in the Costs of Children Generate Cross-National Differences in Fertility Rates?

Parity-specific probabilities of having a next birth are estimated from national fertility data and are compared with nation-specific costs of having children as measured by time-budget data, by attitude data from the International Social Survey Program, and by panel data on labor earnings and standard of living changes following a birth. We focus on five countries (the United States, the former West Germany, Denmark, Italy, and the United Kingdom), whose fertility rates span the observed fertility range in the contemporary industrialized world and whose social welfare and family policies span the conceptual space of standard welfare-state typologies. Definitive conclusions are difficult because of the multiple dimensions on which child costs can be measured, the possibility that child costs affect both the quantum and the tempo of fertility, the relatively small fertility differences across industrialized nations, and the inherent small-N problem resulting from nation-level comparisons. Empirical analysis, however, supports the assertion that institutionally driven child costs affect the fertility patterns of industrialized nations.