The effect of altitude on fertility in Andean countries

Abstract In papers previously published in this journal J. M. Stycos and D. M. Heer have shown that fertility is lower in the economically underdeveloped Indian-speaking parts of Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia than in the more prosperous Spanish-speaking parts. Stycos concluded that the reason for the fertility difference in Peru is the greater marital instability of the Indian speakers which decreased their total exposure to the risk of conception. Heer suggested instead that the causes of the difference may be voluntary. The present paper questions Heer's analysis, and offers the explanation that the difference may be attributed to the physiological effects of altitude.     

A further note on the relation between economic development and fertility

The relationship between economic development and fertility has been examined by several scholars. In particular Heer, using data from 41 nations (24 developing and 17 developed) tested three hypotheses. His objective was to reconcile the two prevailing views in this context, namely, that economic development on one hand promotes and on the-other inhibits fertility. However, when we reran Heer’s data separately for the two groups of countries in his list, the pattern of relationships between the variables that he used changed significantly. On this basis, we restricted this study to a further examination of his three hypotheses using data from developing nations only but for two points in time. The evidence from this study seems to support two of the hypotheses in Heer’s study. In other words, whether the analysis of this relationship is restricted to developing nations or includes both developed and developing nations, it remains true that increased economic development implies a decreased illiteracy and a decreased IMR; a decreased illiteracy and IMR are optimal conditions of low fertility. Nonetheless, the data examined here do not seem to resolve the question of whether increased economic development implies a decreased fertility. Accordingly, continued testing of the hypothesis at further points in time with more accurate data is in order.     

Fertility differences in Peru: A reconsideration

Abstract In a series of articles by Stycos, Heer and W. H. James, predominantly Indian areas of Peru were reported to have significantly lower levels of fertility than the economically better developed Spanish-speaking areas. Heer and James reported similar findings for Bolivia and Ecuador as well as Peru.     

Rural-Urban fertility differentials in Southern Nigeria: An assessment of some available evidence

The dearth of information on fertility in Nigeria has hitherto impeded efforts to arrive at a consistent pattern of rural-urban fertility differentials in Nigeria. Attempts were made from the mid-sixties onwards to analyse the pattern of rural-urban fertility differentials in some parts of Southern Nigeria from a few independent sources. One such attempt was made by Olusanya; in his study of Western Nigeria in 1966 and in 1969 he reported a higher urban than rural fertility for that region. This result was supported by Ekanem on the basis of data from his 1972 survey of parts of Eastern Nigeria. Given the relatively wider range of available data presently available for Southern Nigeria, this paper examines the Olusanya — Ekanem data together with recent statistics collected from Western, Mid-Western, and Eastern parts of Nigeria by other workers and points out certain inconsistencies and contradictions in the data and conclusions of Olusanya and Ekanem. It suggests that the bulk of available evidence to date suggests either that there is a trend towards the convergence of rural-urban fertility or a definite pattern of higher fertility in the countryside than in the towns. The conclusion also discusses some technical problems of comparing urban and rural fertility.     

Rural-Urban fertility differentials in Southern Nigeria: An assessment of some available evidence

Summary The dearth of information on fertility in Nigeria has hitherto impeded efforts to arrive at a consistent pattern of rural-urban fertility differentials in Nigeria. Attempts were made from the mid-sixties onwards to analyse the pattern of rural-urban fertility differentials in some parts of Southern Nigeria from a few independent sources. One such attempt was made by Olusanya; in his study of Western Nigeria in 1966 and in 1969 he reported a higher urban than rural fertility for that region. This result was supported by Ekanem on the basis of data from his 1972 survey of parts of Eastern Nigeria. Given the relatively wider range of available data presently available for Southern Nigeria, this paper examines the Olusanya - Ekanem data together with recent statistics collected from Western, Mid-Western, and Eastern parts of Nigeria by other workers and points out certain inconsistencies and contradictions in the data and conclusions of Olusanya and Ekanem. It suggests that the bulk of available evidence to date suggests either that there is a trend towards the convergence of rural-urban fertility or a definite pattern of higher fertility in the countryside than in the towns. The conclusion also discusses some technical problems of comparing urban and rural fertility.     

Mortality level,desired family size,and population increase: Comment

In this paper an attempt is made to elaborate on the behavioral assumptions underlying a simulation model published in a previous volume of this journal (Heer and Smith, 1968). The present paper contains a discussion of the ways in which a fall in the death rate of children will affect the desirability of another birth if the family's objective is to have a son surviving to the father's sixty-fifth birthday. The death rate affects both the expected costs of and benefits from an additional birth. An examination of the effects of a decline in child mortality indicates that the benefits from an additional birth fall and the expected costs rise as a result of the decline. Thus a death rate will eventually be reached where costs exceed benefits, and parents will not desire an additional pregnancy.     

Deliberate birth spacing before the fertility transition in Europe: evidence from nineteenth-century Belgium

Many scholars have argued that deliberate birth spacing may have played a role before and during the modern fertility transition. There are good historical and theoretical reasons for this view, but it has proved to be hard to demonstrate convincingly that birth intervals were in fact partly determined by attempts at deliberate fertility control. This paper suggests a method of securing evidence on the issue for married couples. The method is applied to three cohorts living in a Belgian town in the nineteenth century. The findings indicate that, even before the fertility transition, couples in the working class were controlling their fertility by deliberate spacing.     

Gender Equity in Theories of Fertility Transition

Recent theoretical discussion has postulated that low fertility in advanced countries is attributable to low levels of gender equity. Low gender equity is evidenced in the lack of support for women to combine paid employment and childrearing; tax‐transfer systems that remain based on the male‐breadwinner model of the family; and the retention of gender‐oriented roles within the family. Hence, it is argued that an increase in gender equity is a precondition of a rise in fertility from very low levels. At the same time, theorists argue that, in less developed countries, higher levels of gender equity are a necessary condition for achieving lower fertility. The article addresses this apparent contradiction by distinguishing two types of gender equity: gender equity in individual‐oriented institutions and gender equity in family‐oriented institutions. The argument is made that the transition from very high fertility to replacement‐level fertility has been associated with a gradual increase in gender equity primarily within the family itself. In contrast, the further movement to very low fertility is associated with a rapid shift toward high levels of gender equity in individual institutions such as education and market employment, in combination with persistent low levels of gender equity within the family and in family‐oriented institutions.     

From low to high fertility in Sulawesi (Indonesia) during the colonial period: explaining the 'first fertility transition'

This paper examines the past transition from low to high fertility which, in Indonesia as elsewhere, preceded the return to lower birth rates. Data from two parts of the island of Sulawesi where fertility rose during the colonial period are used to explain both why it rose, and why it was originally low. Economic conditions, it is argued, were the most important factors, affecting fertility via the supply of income and the demand for labour. Two schematic models of the 'first fertility transition' are proposed. In areas with low population densities and area-extensive forms of agriculture responsive to commercial stimuli, birth rates rose as the growth of commerce raised levels of prosperity, facilitated marriage, and undermined institutions such as debt-slavery which had previously acted to restrict marital fertility. In densely populated areas with labour-intensive agriculture and heavy state taxation in labour, fertility rose in response to demands for women's (and possibly child) labour that did not necessarily lead to gains in income.     

The economic explanation of fertility changes in the United States

Abstract It is widely assumed that fertility varies positively with economic conditions. Actually this assumption receives little support from the historical record. For a century before 1930 fertility declined while the economy expanded and real incomes rose. Then for nearly three decades fertility and incomes fell and rose together. Since 1960 they have again moved in opposite directions. Clearly, no simple generalization about their relation will hold water. More sophisticated explanations are based on relative rather than absolute incomes. Banks suggested that the downturn in English fertility in the 1870's might have occurred because standards of middle-class consumption rose faster than middle-class incomes, but he found the evidence inconclusive. To reconcile the post-war baby boom in the United States with earlier experience, Easterlin has argued that fertility is determined by the relationship between the income of couples in their twenties and the income of their parents ten to fifteen years earlier. Among the weaknesses of this theory as applied to U.S. experience are its failure to explain the sharp drop in fertility, including that of native white urban women, in the 1920's; the fact that fertility rose most in the baby boom at the higher socio-economic levels where incomes rose least; and the sharp decline of fertility after 1962 in spite of the favourable trend of incomes, including those of younger people. The broad conclusion is that while couples no doubt do consider income, employment opportunities, etc. in deciding how many children to have, such considerations have had a relatively minor influence on changes in fertility, which for the most part have been the result of changes in attitudes. Even the post-war baby boom was a result not only of higher incomes and full employment but also of a shift in attitudes toward family size, particularly among the better-educated, economically better-off sections of society.     

Family, fertility, and sex ratios in the British Caribbean

Abstract This paper re-evaluates the currently held view that unstable forms of conjugal unions depress fertility in the British Caribbean. It is shown that previous investigators overlooked the important variable of persistent male shortages at the mating ages caused by heavy male emigration. Fertility trends are observed and the conclusion reached that male emigration (independent variable) has not adversely affected fertility because the 'informal' polygynous character of the mating system acts as an intermediate variable mitigating the effect of the independent variable on fertility. Given these male shortages it is argued that a trend toward greater stability in conjugal relations would not, as previously assumed, result in higher fertility because permanent female celibacy and the average age of first entry into sexual unions for females would rise. Finally, the paper concludes by commenting on a recent discussion concerning the causal relationship between male shortages and the persistence of marital instability in the British Caribbean. The position is taken that both of these conditions are caused by social and economic factors which are not likely to change in the near future.     

Anchored narratives: the story and findings of half a century of research into the determinants of fertility

This paper reviews half a century of research into the determinants of fertility. It is argued that the quest for the determinants of fertility behaviour and change during that period can best be interpreted as the development of a series of sub-narratives from different disciplinary perspectives and orientations. These are normally based upon the initial narrative of the demographic transition and usually take the form of a verbal theory illustrated by a 'box and arrow' diagram. On occasions formalization has been attempted. Different parts of the initial narrative have been highlighted at different times depending on policy interest, improvements in technical skills, availability of data, changes in social setting, and the degree of satisfaction with the dominant sub-narrative of the day. There is every reason to believe that the research process identified will continue and will lead to a further accumulation of knowledge. In fact, all important variables have probably already been identified. That it will, ultimately, lead to a single, consolidated narrative fully satisfactory for all settings and for all time is, however, highly unlikely.     

A re-estimation of the multiplying factors for the Brass technique for determining childhood survivorship rates

Summary One of the truly significant contributions to practical demography is the procedure developed by William Brass for estimating life-table values from minimal data obtained in fertility surveys. Specifically, Brass designed a set of factors dependent on the shape of the fertility schedule, which convert proportions of children dead of women in standard age intervals into life table q(x)-values. Jeremiah Sullivan recently presented in this journal a method for simplifying the calculations involved in obtaining the multiplying factor in the Brass procedure. Both Brass and Sullivan employed restrictive fertility schedules to obtain their multiplying factors, and a rigorous test of either model has been hampered by the lack of numerous adequately recorded fertility schedules, especially those which begin early. Recently, a set of model fertility schedules which adequately duplicates empirical fertility schedules has been developed. These schedules were used to test the Brass and Sullivan procedures and to obtain new estimates of multiplying factors. Although the Brass and Sullivan procedures are shown to produce good estimators, new estimators, which prove superior to either, are developed and analysed.     

The fertility of two-generation urbanites

In this paper it is argued that in studies of urban fertility, the relationship between socio-economic variables and fertility has been obscured by the presence of rural migrants in the populations under investigation. Accordingly, data obtained from families of completed fertility in six probability samples of metropolitan Detroit are divided into two groups, farm migrants and two-generation urbanites.

In general, the socio-economic differences in fertility observed among the “pure” urban types in Detroit are found to be small and inconsistent, most of them being statistically insignificant. The inverse fertility pattern found in the total Detroit population is attributed to : (a) the overrepresentation of farm migrants (who have high fertility) in the lowest social and economic positions in the city, and (b) the pronounced inverse pattern of fertility among the farm migrants.

It is suggested that the absence of an inverse fertility pattern among twogeneration urbanites and its presence among the farm migrants can be attributed to differences in family organization.     

D. V. Glass on the Problems of a Declining Population

During the past quarter century fertility has dropped below replacement levels in many parts of the world. According to United Nations estimates, in 2005 this was the case in 65 countries, comprising 43 percent of the world's population. In many cases, most notably in Europe and East Asia, the shortfall of fertility from the level that would be necessary in the long run to sustain a stationary population is substantial. In Europe, for example, the average total fertility rate for the period 2000–2005 was 1.4. Indefinite maintenance of such a level implies a shrinkage of the total population by one‐third over a generation–roughly every 30 years. Accompanying that rapid decline of total numbers would be an age structure containing a preponderance of the elderly, posing extreme adjustment difficulties for the economic and social system. Societies that wish to avoid radical depopulation would have to engineer a substantial rise infertility–if not to full replacement level (slightly more than two children per woman), then at least to a level that would moderate the tempo of population decline and make population aging easier to cope with. An additional counter to declining numbers, if not significantly to population aging, could come from net immigration. This is the demographic future assumed in the UN medium‐variant projections for countries and regions currently of very low fertility. Thus, for example, in Europe over the period up to 2050 fertility is assumed to rise to 1.85 and net immigration to amount to some 32 million persons. The UN projections also anticipate further improvement in average life expectancy–from its current level of 74 years to 81 years. This factor slows the decline in population size but accelerates population aging. Under these assumptions, Europe's population would decline from its present 728 million to 653 million by 2050. At that time the proportion of the population over age 65 would be 27.6 percent, nearly double its present share. Demographic change of this nature is not a novel prospect. It was envisioned in a number of European countries and in North America, Australia, and New Zealand in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Concern with the possible economic and social consequences generated much discussion at that time among demographers and social scientists at large and also attracted public attention. Possible policy measures that might reverse the downward trend of fertility were also debated, although resulting in only hesitant and largely inconsequential action. The article by D. V. Glass reproduced below is an especially lucid and concise treatment of demographic changes under conditions of low fertility and their economic and social implications. It appeared in Eugenics Review (vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 39–47) in 1937 when the author was 26 years old. Glass's line of argument is broadly representative of the main focus of demographic analysis in the mid‐1930s on aspects of population dynamics, applying the then still novel analytical tool of the stable population model. It also echoes the work of economists then witnessing the great difficulties capitalist economies faced in adjusting to structural changes in consumer demand and labor supply. While Glass addresses these issues primarily with reference to England and Wales, he sees the issues as affecting all industrialized countries. The Malthusian problem of relentless population growth he persuasively declares to be irrelevant for these countries. The Western world faces the opposite problem: population decline, a trend only temporarily masked by the effects of an age distribution that still has a relatively high proportion of women in the child‐bearing ages, reflecting the higher fertility level of the past. A stationary population, Glass cogently argues, is to be welcomed, and he considers the absolute size at which zero growth would be achieved relatively unimportant. In contrast, a continuous population decline would have “thoroughly disastrous” results in an individualist civilization and in “an unplanned economic system.” And, he concedes, somewhat quaintly, that sustained below‐replacement fertility would pose a great problem “even in a country in which the means of production were owned communally.” Glass's conclusions about the reversibility of low fertility are as pessimistic as those of most informed observers today. Still, he sees hope in a future “rationally planned civilization” that would “produce an environment in which high fertility and a high standard of life will both be possible.” In this context, high fertility means the level necessary to sustain the population in a stationary state. By present‐day standards the level Glass calculates as needed for long‐term zero growth is indeed fairly high: 2.87 children per woman. But that figure reflects the fact that, when he wrote, mortality up to age 50 was still fairly high and fertility occurred almost wholly within marriage; it also assumes zero net immigration. In the last 70 years much has changed in each of these three components of population dynamics, both in England and Wales and in the rest of Europe. Still, Glass's commentary remains highly relevant to the discussion of the problems of low fertility today. David Victor Glass (1911–78) was associated with the London School of Economics throughout much of his scientific career. He followed R. R. Kuczynski as reader in demography in 1945 and became professor of sociology in 1948. His work on demography, population history, and population policy had already made him one of the most influential demographers in pre‐World War II Britain. After the war he rose to international prominence through pioneering work on the Royal Commission of Population; through his research on historical demography, the history of demographic thought, and social mobility; and through founding, in 1947, the journal Population Studies, which he edited until his death.     

Consistency between fertility attitudes and behaviour: A conceptual model

Abstract The consistency (or lack of it) between attitude and behaviour has been a controversial issue in social psychology for the past several decades,(1) and more recently has become a focus of considerable controversy in the field of population studies.(2) In accordance with Freedman, Hermalin and Chang,(3)it is argued here that this controversy will not be resolved by theoretical discussions, and evidence is needed from many countries at several time points to resolve this issue. This paper presents evidence on consistency between fertility attitudes and behaviour from survey data from Venezuela and, based upon analysis of the present data, suggests a conceptual model for the study of consistency between fertility attitudes and behaviour.     

Perspectives on family and fertility in developing countries

Abstract Two aspects of the family in relation to fertility in developing countries are discussed: set stratification within the family and extended family networks. As both these are central to J. C. Caldwell's theory of fertility transition, the paper is structured as a critique of his position. Drawing on examples and data from Asia, it is argued that the causal significance of sex stratification for fertility lies in the economic risks it imposes on women, deriving from their dependence on men, rather than, as Caldwell suggests, in the disproportionate gain that men derive from their dominant position within families. While Caldwell and others associate strong extended family networks of mutual obligation and support with persistent high fertility, it is argued here that such systems should, instead, facilitate fertility decline. Close-knit and strong kin networks can be viewed as alternatives to children as sources of insurance, and may facilitate fertility decline by preventing children from becoming the focal point of parental concerns for security.     

Shifting shares of the population and U.S. fertility

American fertility, as measured by the total fertility rate, apparently has been climbing since 1988 and could approach replacement level in 1990. Three possible explanations are explored: incorrect denominators, actual fertility increase, and changing ethnic proportions of the population. Using California data as a surrogate for the nation, it is found that at least part of the gain in fertility is attributable to what is called "shifting shares." Given that minorities have higher fertility than the majority, as these groups increase their share of the population, the nation's fertility can be expected to continue climbing. Any attempt to attain zero population growth must therefore be postponed indefinitely.     

The rising share of nonmarital births: Fertility choice or marriage behavior?

Much of the sharp rise in the share of nonmarital births in the United States has been attributed to changes in the fertility choices of unmarried and married women-in response, it is often argued, to public policy. In contrast, we develop and test a model that attributes the rise to changes in marriage behavior, with no necessary changes infertility. A variety of empirical tests strongly support this conclusion and invites focused attention to issues related to marriage behavior as well as to the interactions between marriage and fertility.     

A further look at catholic fertility

The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which suburbanization has influenced the traditional fertility differences observed between Catholics and Protestants. It is hypothesized that suburbanization has served to decrease religious differences in fertility, since in the more advanced stages of urbanism, that is, suburbanization, the Catholic population is likely to adopt the fertility patterns of the larger and more secularized society. Attention is focused on two objectives: (1) to examine selected aspects of fertility for Catholic8 and Protestants living in metropolitan areas and (2) to analyze religious differentials in fertility among residents in different parts of the metropolitan community.The data, consisting of a sample of households in six metropolitan areas in three population size classes, supported the general findings pertaining to religious differences in fertility that have been reported in the literature. Catholics had larger families, shorter average spacing between children, and longer fertility spans when compared to Protestants, even when a number of control variables were employed. Examining fertility differences between Catholics and Protestants in central city and suburban segments of large and small metropolitan areas, we found that the data indicated that marked Catholic-Protestant differences are still found in central cities. However, fertility differences between the two religious groups tended largely to disappear among suburban residents. The convergence in the fertility patterns of suburbanites is due to combined effects of higher fertility among Protestant suburban residents when compared to central city Protestants and the tendency of suburban Catholics to have fewer children than those who live in the city. The net result is convergence in suburban fertility.