Common Coding of Observation and Execution of Action in 9‐Month‐Old Infants

Do 9‐month‐old infants motorically simulate actions they perceive others perform? Two experiments tested whether action observation, like overt reaching, is sufficient to elicit the Piagetian A‐not‐B error. Infants recovered a toy hidden at location A or observed an experimenter recover the toy. After the toy was hidden at location B, infants in both conditions perseverated in reaching to A, demonstrating that active search by the infant is not necessary for the A‐not‐B error. Consistent with prior research, infants displayed an ipsilateral bias when reaching, the so‐called mysterious midline barrier. A similar ipsilateral bias was also observed depending on the manner in which the experimenter reached; infants perseverated following observation of ipsi‐ but not contralateral reaches by the experimenter. Thus, infants perseverated only following observation of actions they themselves were able to perform, suggesting that they coded others' actions in terms of motor simulation.     

The Effect of Simulated Self Versus Object Movement in a Nonsearch Task

This study examined 6‐month‐old infants' abilities to use the visual information provided by simulated self‐movement through the world, and movement of an object through the world, for spatial orientation. Infants were habituated to a visual display in which they saw a toy hidden, followed by either rotation of the point of observation through the world (simulated self‐movement) or movement of the object itself through the world (object movement). Following habituation, infants saw test displays in which the hidden toy reappeared at the correct or incorrect location, relative to the earlier movements. Infants habituated to simulated self‐movement looked longer at the recovery of the toy from an incorrect, relative to correct location. In contrast, infants habituated to object movement showed no differential looking to either correct or incorrect test displays. These findings are discussed within a theoretical framework of spatial orientation emphasizing the availability and use of spatial information.     

Limits on Infants' Ability to Dynamically Update Object Representations

Like adults, infants use working memory to represent occluded objects and can update these memory representations to reflect changes to a scene that unfold over time. Here we tested the limits of infants' ability to update object representations in working memory. Eleven‐month‐old infants participated in a modified foraging task in which they saw 2 quantities of crackers sequentially hidden in buckets and then were allowed to choose between them. We manipulated the working memory demands of the task by either hiding crackers in direct succession (i.e., infants saw all of the crackers hidden in the first location, then saw all of the crackers hidden in the second location), or hiding them in alternation (i.e., infants saw some crackers hidden in the first location, then saw some crackers hidden in the second location, then saw more crackers hidden in the first location). Across 6 experiments we found that infants successfully updated their representations of the hidden arrays when crackers were presented in succession. However, when crackers were hidden in alternation and infants had to reupdate an array that was no longer in the current focus of attention, infants showed a striking pattern of failure. These results suggest that, for infants as well as for adults, the flexibility of working memory is subject to processing constraints.     

Decalage in Infants' Search for Mothers Versus Toys Demonstrated With a Delayed Response Task

Thirty‐one infants, 7 to 14 months of age, were tested on object and mother permanence using a delayed response task (Diamond, 1985), in which a delay period is enforced before infants are allowed to search for hidden objects. Infants were tested in 2 separate conditions in which they searched for their mothers and a large toy, both of which were hidden under curtained tables. The delay period before search was allowed was incremented after each successful trial until infants either failed to search or searched in the wrong location. Infants were scored for the maximum delay preceding a successful search. The results from 17 infants showed that infants were able to withstand significantly longer delays before successful search for the mother than for the toy. These results support previous studies showing that mother permanence precedes object permanence in infants older than 8 months.     

18‐Month‐Olds Predict Specific Action Mistakes Through Attribution of False Belief,Not Ignorance,and Intervene Accordingly

This study employed a new “anticipatory intervening” paradigm to tease apart false belief and ignorance‐based interpretations of 18‐month‐olds’ helpful informing. We investigated in three experiments whether 18‐month‐old infants inform an adult selectively about one of the two locations depending on the adult’s belief about which of the two locations held her toy. In experiments 1 and 2, the adult falsely believed that one of the locations held her toy. In experiment 3, the adult was ignorant about which of the two locations held her toy. In all cases, however, the toy had been removed from the locations and the locations contained instead materials which the adult wanted to avoid. In experiments 1 and 2, infants spontaneously and selectively informed the adult about the aversive material in the location the adult falsely believed to hold her toy. In contrast, in experiment 3, infants informed the ignorant adult about both locations equally. Results reveal that infants expected the adult to commit a specific action mistake when she held a false belief, but not when she was ignorant. Further, infants were motivated to intervene proactively. Findings reveal a predictive action‐based usage of “theory‐of‐mind” skills at 18 months of age.     

The Goal Trumps the Means: Highlighting Goals is More Beneficial than Highlighting Means in Means‐End Training

Means‐end actions are an early‐emerging form of problem solving. These actions require initiating initial behaviors with a goal in mind. In this study, we explored the origins of 8‐month‐old infants’ means‐end action production using a cloth‐pulling training paradigm. We examined whether highlighting the goal (toy) or the means (cloth) was more valuable for learning to perform a well‐organized means‐end action. Infants were given the opportunity to both practice cloth‐pulling and view modeling of the action performed by an adult throughout the session. Infants saw either the same toy or the same cloth in successive trials, so that the goal or means were highlighted prior to modeling of the action. All infants improved throughout the session regardless of which aspect of the event was highlighted. Beyond this general improvement, repetition of goals supported more rapid learning and more sustained learning than did repetition of means. These findings provide novel evidence that, at the origins of means‐end action production, emphasizing the goal that structures an action facilitates the learning of new means‐end actions.     

Twelve‐Month‐Olds Understand Social Intentions Based on Prosody and Gesture Shape

Infants infer social and pragmatic intentions underlying attention‐directing gestures, but the basis on which infants make these inferences is not well understood. Previous studies suggest that infants rely on information from preceding shared action contexts and joint perceptual scenes. Here, we tested whether 12‐month‐olds use information from act‐accompanying cues, in particular prosody and hand shape, to guide their pragmatic understanding. In Experiment 1, caregivers directed infants’ attention to an object to request it, share interest in it, or inform them about a hidden aspect. Caregivers used distinct prosodic and gestural patterns to express each pragmatic intention. Experiment 2 was identical except that experimenters provided identical lexical information across conditions and used three sets of trained prosodic and gestural patterns. In all conditions, the joint perceptual scenes and preceding shared action contexts were identical. In both experiments, infants reacted appropriately to the adults’ intentions by attending to the object mostly in the sharing interest condition, offering the object mostly in the imperative condition, and searching for the referent mostly in the informing condition. Infants’ ability to comprehend pragmatic intentions based on prosody and gesture shape expands infants’ communicative understanding from common activities to novel situations for which shared background knowledge is missing.     

Detecting Transparent Barriers: Clear Evidence Against the Means‐End Deficit Account of Search Failures

The standard explanation of infants' search failures with hidden objects, despite an apparent sensitivity to them, is a deficit in the means‐end skill for retrieving objects from occluders. Studies equating means‐end demands for retrieving toys from transparent and opaque barriers challenge this account by showing that infants succeed more with visible objects. However, they suffer from a critical limitation: Infants may retrieve visible objects without noticing the transparent barriers in front of them. We addressed this concern by requiring infants to notice a barrier to retrieve a toy and specifically to pull down a rotating screen to retrieve a toy from behind it. Seven‐month‐olds used this means‐end skill more often with a transparent barrier than an opaque one. Thus, neither a means‐end deficit nor an ability to ignore transparent barriers fully accounts for search failures. Relations to other findings challenging the means‐end deficit account and implications for approaches to studying cognitive development are discussed.     

Infants' Individuation of Rigid and Plastic Objects Based on Shape

Recent research suggests that 12‐month‐old infants use shape to individuate the number of objects present in a scene. This study addressed the question of whether infants would also rely on shape when shape is only a temporary attribute of an object. Specifically, we investigated whether infants realize that shape changes reliably indicate identity changes only in the case of rigid objects, but not in the case of deformable plastic objects. Twelve‐month‐old infants observed how either a rigid or a plastic object was placed in a box. When searching the box, they retrieved either an object with the same (no‐switch event) or with a different shape (switch event). Infants correctly inferred two distinct objects in the switch event in the case of rigid objects, but not in the case of plastic objects. A control experiment confirmed that this result was not due to a lack of salience of the shape transformation. Thus, infants' re‐searching behavior indicated that they viewed shape as being diagnostic in the individuation process of rigid objects only.     

Why do Infants Look at and Use Positive Information from Some Informants Rather Than Others in Ambiguous Situations?

Three laboratory experiments on social referencing examined whether infants’ tendencies to look at and use positive information from the experimenter could be interpreted from a perspective of novelty or expertise. In Study 1, novelty was manipulated. Forty‐eight 12‐month‐old infants participated. In a between‐subject design, a more novel or a less novel experimenter presented an ambiguous object and provided positive information. The infants looked more at and regulated their behavior more in accordance with information coming from the less novel experimenter. In Study 2, expertise was manipulated. Forty‐eight 12‐month‐old infants were exposed to one experimenter who showed expertise about the laboratory situation and one experimenter who did not show such competence. The infants looked more at and regulated their behavior more in accordance with information coming from the expert. In Study 3, 40 12‐month‐old infants participated. The infants were exposed to a toy‐expert who was either novel or familiar. The infants, in both groups, looked as much at the toy‐experts and used the information regardless of whether the novel or familiar toy‐expert had provided information. The findings suggest that novelty does not increase looking in ambiguous situations. Instead, the results support the expertise perspective of infant looking preferences.     

Six‐Month‐Old Infants Predict Agents’ Goal‐Directed Actions on Occluded Objects

Infants can infer agents’ goals after observing agents’ goal‐directed actions on objects and can subsequently make predictions about how agents will act on objects in the future. We investigated the representations supporting these predictions. We familiarized 6‐month‐old infants to an agent who preferentially reached for one of two featurally distinct objects following a cue. At test, the objects were sequentially occluded from the infant in the agent's presence. We asked whether infants could generate action predictions without visual access to the relevant objects by measuring whether infants shifted their gaze to the location of the agent's hidden goal object following the cue. We also examined what infants represented about the hidden objects by removing one of the occluders to reveal either the original hidden object or the unexpected other object and measuring infants’ looking time. We found that, even without visual access to the objects, infants made predictive gazes to the location of the agent's occluded goal object, but failed to represent the features of either hidden object. These results suggest that infants make goal‐based action predictions when the relevant objects in the scene are occluded, but doing so may come at the expense of maintaining representations of the objects.     

The Effect of the Number of A Trials on Performance on the A‐Not‐B Task

The A‐not‐B error (Piaget, 1954), which occurs when infants search perseveratively on reversal trials in a delayed‐response task, is one of the most widely studied phenomena in developmental psychology. Nonetheless, the effect of A‐trial experience on the probability and magnitude of this error remains unclear. In this study, 9‐month‐old infants were tested at location A until they searched correctly on 1, 6, or 11 A trials. Results revealed an effect of A trials on the proportion of infants who erred on the first B trial, and on the number of errors prior to a correct search at B (i.e., the error run). These effects were asymptotic, or U‐shaped, consistent with a dual‐process model according to which A‐trial experience increases habit strength but also provides opportunities for reflection on task structure.     

Infants' Rapid Learning About Self‐Propelled Objects

Six experiments investigated 7‐month‐old infants' capacity to learn about the self‐propelled motion of an object. After observing 1 wind‐up toy animal move on its own and a second wind‐up toy animal move passively by an experimenter's hand, infants looked reliably longer at the former object during a subsequent stationary test, providing evidence that infants learned and remembered the mapping of objects and their motions. In further experiments, infants learned the mapping for different animals and retained it over a 15‐min delay, providing evidence that the learning is robust and infants' expectations about self‐propelled motion are enduring. Further experiments suggested that infants' learning was less reliable when the self‐propelled objects were novel or lacked faces, body parts, and articulated, biological motion. The findings are discussed in relation to infants' developing knowledge of object categories and capacity to learn about objects in the first year of life.     

Onset of Voluntary Communication: Smiling Looks to Mother

Playing infants often direct smiling looks toward social partners. In some cases the smile begins before the look, so it cannot be a response to the sight or behavior of the social partner. In this study we asked whether smiles that anticipate social contact are used by 8‐ to 12‐month‐old infants as voluntary social signals. Eighty infants—20 at each of 8, 9, 10, and 12 months of age—completed 5 tasks. The tasks assessed anticipatory smiling during toy play, means‐end understanding (2 tasks), intentional communication via gesture and vocalizations, and memory for mother's location. Across all ages, anticipatory smiling was strongly predicted by intentional gestural and vocal communication and by means‐end understanding. The findings are discussed in terms of the nature and origins of infants' voluntary communications.     

Factors affecting infant toy preferences: Age,gender, experience,motor development,and parental attitude

In contrast to the anecdotal claim that “male infants like cars and female infants like dolls,” previous studies have reported mixed findings for gender‐related toy preferences in infancy. In Experiment 1, we explored the emergence of gender‐related preferences using face–car pairs (Experiment 1a, n = 51, 6–20 months) or face–stove pairs (Experiment 1b, n = 54, 6–20 months). In Experiment 2 (n = 42, 14–16 months), we explore the effect of toy properties, infants' past toy exposure, activity levels, and parental attitudes on such preferences using a wider range of toys. For both studies, infants demonstrated a general preference for faced stimuli over other objects, except for male infants who showed no preference between dolls and cars at around 15 months. Infants' prior experience participating in motor‐intensive activities, with wheeled toys and parental attitudes appeared to relate to female infants' preferences for dynamic toys. These results indicate a range of factors influence gendered toy preferences and suggest that nurture plays an important role.     

The Effects of Graded Occlusion on Manual Search and Visual Attention in 5‐ to 8‐Month‐Old Infants

Young infants may be limited in searching for hidden objects because they lack the means‐end motor skill to lift occluders from objects. This account was investigated by presenting 5‐ to 8‐month‐old infants with objects hidden behind transparent, semitransparent, and opaque curtains. If a means—end deficit explains search limitations, then infants should search no more for an object behind a transparent curtain than for objects behind semitransparent or opaque curtains. However, level of occlusion had a significant effect on manual search and visual attention. Infants retrieved and contacted the object more, contacted the curtain more, and looked away less with the transparent curtain than with the semi transparent or opaque curtains. Adding a time delay before allowing search and presenting a distraction after occlusion further depressed infants' behavior. The findings fail to support the means—end deficit hypothesis, but are consistent with the account that young infants lack object permanence.     

Means‐End Behavior in Young Infants: The Interplay of Action Perception and Action Production

In 2 experiments, the interplay of action perception and action production was investigated in 6‐month‐old infants. In Experiment 1, infants received 2 versions of a means‐end task in counterbalanced order. In the action perception version, a preferential looking paradigm in which infants were shown an actor performing means‐end behavior with an expected and an unexpected outcome was used. In the action production version, infants had to pull a cloth to receive a toy. In Experiment 2, infants' ability to perform the action production task with a cloth was compared to their ability to perform the action production task with a less flexible board. Finally, Experiment 3 was designed to control for alternative low‐level explanations of the differences in the looking times toward the final states presented in Experiment 1 by only presenting the final states of the action perception task without showing the initial action sequence. Results obtained in Experiment 1 showed that in the action perception task, infants discriminated between the expected and the unexpected outcome. This perceptual ability was independent of their actual competence in executing means‐ end behavior in the action production task. Experiment 2 showed no difference in 6‐month‐olds' performance in the action production task depending on the properties of the support under the toy. Similarly, in Experiment 3, no differences in looking times between the 2 final states were found. The findings are discussed in light of theories on the development of action perception and action production.     

Early Theory of Mind Competencies: Do Infants Understand Others’ Beliefs?

Recent studies suggest that even infants attend to others’ beliefs in order to make sense of their behavior. To warrant the assumption of early belief understanding, corresponding competences need to be demonstrated in a variety of different belief‐inducing situations. The present study provides corresponding evidence, using a completely nonverbal object‐transfer task based on the general violation‐of‐expectation paradigm. A total of n = 36 infants (15‐month‐olds) participated in one of three conditions. Infants saw an actor who either observed an object’s location change, did not observe it, or performed the location change manually without seeing it (i.e., variations in the actor’s information access). Results are in accordance with the assumption that 15‐month‐old infants master different belief‐inducing situations in a highly flexible way, accepting visual as well as manual information access as a proper basis for belief induction.     

Interacting Socially With Human Hands at 24 Months of Age

This experiment explored whether or not 2‐year‐olds would engage in synchronic imitation with human hands. Sixty‐four 24‐month‐old infants participated. In a test of synchronic imitation, infants were given a toy while a model simultaneously performed novel actions on an identical toy. Infants were randomly assigned to 1 of 4 model conditions: a familiar person, an unfamiliar person, disembodied human hands, and disembodied robotic pincers. Infants were as likely to synchronically imitate disembodied hands as a person. Imitation of the pincers was significantly lower. This pattern suggests that 2‐year‐olds will engage socially with human hands in the absence of the rest of the body.     

Infants' Use of Constraints to Speed Information Processing and to Anticipate Events

Two experiments were conducted with 28‐week‐old infants using a modification of the Visual Expectation Paradigm. The first sought to determine whether speed of information processing (SIP) could be assessed in infants using a reaction time (RT) measure and approach that is widely used to measure SIP in adults. Infants saw a center fixation cue followed by a peripheral target that could appear in 1, 2, or 4 locations. There was a linear increase in RT of eye movements as the number of locations increased from 1 to 2 and to 4 targets, suggesting that the paradigm does measure SIP. The second experiment asked whether varying the number of cue‐target pairings would augment or impair infant's SIP in the trade‐off between the benefit of additional information and the liability of additional memory load. The findings showed that the presence of cue information can eliminate the difference in RT between the 1‐ and 2‐location conditions, whereas no benefit of cue was obtained for the 4‐location condition.