ACQUISITION AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION IN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS

In imperfectly competitive markets, incentives for the acquisition and dissemination of information by prices is significantly affected by strategic considerations. Since prices reveal information, firms possessing market power may choose to set prices which are either biased or not adjusted to all available information so as to distort their information content. Even when information is costlessly available strategic considerations may lead firms to remain uninformed. These results are illustrated in a simple Stackelberg model with price-setting firms where the pricing game is preceded by an information acquisition game.     

NONLINEAR PRICING STRATEGIES AND COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

This paper empirically examines the effect of competitive conditions on nonlinear pricing strategies in the airline industry. We use a unique data set to analyze the impact of concentration and the competitive pressures generated by Southwest and other low cost carriers on the relative prices within a menu of fares. The menu orders tickets by quality based upon cabin and ticket restrictions. We analyze the ratio of fares charged for various qualities within the menu to the fares charged for the lowest quality nonrefundable, restricted tickets. We observe a fare compression for only the highest fares on only the most concentrated (i.e., monopoly) routes. This result is something of a puzzle given a monopolist's market power. We find, however, that actual and potential competition from Southwest reduces low end fares and generally leads to substantial fare compression throughout the fare menu. (JEL L11, L93)     

THE WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION IN COMPETITIVE INSURANCE MARKETS

I model a competitive insurance market with both moral hazard and adverse selection, and analyze the effect on welfare when both problems are present simultaneously. An examination of the interaction between these two problems leads to two hypotheses. First, the nature of the equilibrium contracts is such that each problem partially offsets the welfare loss associated with the other. And second, the degree to which this occurs increases as agents become more heterogeneous. Simulation results overwhelmingly support both hypotheses.     

THE COMPETITIVE RETURNS TO THE GLOBAL SEARCH FOR TALENT: PROFESSIONAL SPORTS MARKETS AND FOREIGNERS

We examine the geographical and racial diversity of a market's labor supply. While the likely impact of expanding supply is to increase the level of productivity, it is not obvious what impact the expansion would have on the overall level of competition. If the added labor increases productivity differentials or are disproportionately populated on high achieving firms, then the likely result would be greater imbalance. We find that while increases in the foreign‐born component are associated with an increase in the overall level of competition, the impact has diminished across time. (JEL C22, D23, D30)     

PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN RELATED MARKETS

The Pigou-Robinson pricing rule for third degree monopolistic price discrimination states that price ratios vary inversely with ratios of direct price elasticities of demand. The rule holds when markets are sealed, and cross price elasticities of demand are zero. We show how the rule can fail when imperfect sealing permits leakage. We also develop a general discriminatory pricing rule that holds when leakage causes market demands to be related. The general pricing rule is based on all direct price elasticities of demand, all cross price elasticities of demand, and the size distribution of the markets     

TESTING FOR EFFICIENCY IN LOTTO MARKETS

State-sponsored lotto games, because they are pari-mutuel and because jackpots with no winner are rolled over into the next drawing, present an excellent opportunity to test for market efficiency. Using data from Massachusetts, Kentucky, and Ohio, we investigate bettors' responses and test for weak-form efficiency. Lotto bets do not have positive net expected returns, thus weak-form efficiency exists. To evaluate strong-form efficiency we utilize the concept of a rational expectations equilibrium. We find that in general lotto bettors' decisions to play generate a level of sales that conform to their original forecasts of expected value.     

SUBURBAN LABOR MARKETS, URBAN LABOR MARKETS, AND GENDER INEQUALITY IN EARNINGS

This study focuses on the role of labor market location in generating gender inequality in earnings. Specifically, the article examines whether suburban versus urban labor market conditions differentially affect gender-based earnings inequality. Tel Aviv metropolitan area labor force data support the thesis that women's tendency to settle for jobs in the vicinity of home is an exchange between economic opportunities and convenience, to avoid conflict with traditional roles. The cost of staying in the suburban labor market is greater for women than men, and suburban exceeds urban labor market gender-linked economic discrimination.     

INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND COMPETITIVE BIDDING IN AUDITING

This article finds that clients with greater risk of fraud are less likely to engage prospective auditors in competitive bidding, consistent with the theory that these companies seek to limit access to information that might reveal their high-risk status. In contrast, we find no support for the expectation that companies with higher agency costs will seek competitive auditor bids, due to the need for better monitoring. Our results also show that bidding competition is more likely when the bidding firm is not an industry specialist, when clients have more active corporate governance, and when there are difficulties with the predecessor auditor.(JEL D44 , D82 , M42 )     

MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND DETERRENCE IN AIRLINE MARKETS

We use a longitudinal dataset from the U.S. airline industry to estimate three different models for entry games with very general forms of heterogeneity between U.S. carriers in airline markets: a simultaneous game with complete information and two sequential games with or without strategic entry deterrence. In a sequential game with entry deterrence, an incumbent decides whether to incur a cost to deter potential entrants. We show that the model with sequential games with strategic deterrence provides the best fit to the data. We conclude that the results reject the hypothesis of a static model and support the hypothesis of the existence of strategic entry deterrence. (JEL L1)     

OPTIMAL COMPETITIVE BALANCE IN A SEASON TICKET LEAGUE

Theory predicts that a planner maximizing the sum of fan and owner surpluses from a league dominated by season ticket sales may prefer more, less, or the same level of competitive balance produced by a league of profit‐maximizing owners. The optimal level of balance depends on the relationship between marginal impacts of talent rearrangements in larger‐revenue and smaller‐revenue markets. Ultimately, then, judging whether an increase in balance enhances welfare rests on careful and thorough empirical investigation. Our reading of the literature and the policy debate shows that this careful work remains to be done. (JEL D6, L83)     

COMPETITIVE FIRM BEHAVIOR UNDER RISK IN DISEQUILIBRIUM TRADING

The objective of this paper is to study the behavior of the purely competitive firm in a market in which traders' plans may not be realized each period. The emphasis of the study is motivated by a desire to introduce explicit price-makers into the theory of competitive markets. The method of introducing price-makers may lead to situations in which markets are not cleared each period and shortages may arise with the realization of plans being in doubt. In this environment traders learn to adjust decisions to offset periodic disappointment. Multiperiod models are introduced to analyze the decision process of the competitive firm in the market and stochastic dynamic programming methods are used to obtain characteristics of optimal plans. Results are compared to the situation in which plans are always realized.     

COOPERATION SPILLOVERS AND PRICE COMPETITION IN EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS

Firms often cooperate explicitly through activities such as research joint ventures, while competing in other markets. Cooperation in research and development can allow firms to internalize the external benefits of knowledge creation and increase the returns from research and development (R&D) expenditures. Such cooperation may spill over to facilitate collusion in the market, however, potentially lowering welfare and efficiency. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine if sellers successfully coordinate to fund a joint research project to reduce their costs, and how this collaboration affects their pricing behavior. The experiment includes control treatments with separate R&D cooperation and markets. Our results show that although participants usually cooperate when given an opportunity, cooperation is observed less frequently when they also compete in the market. Communication improves cooperation in all environments, particularly when the market is present. Nevertheless, the data provide no evidence of seller collusion in the market. (JEL D43, D71, H40, O3)     

ANTI‐POACHING AGREEMENTS IN LABOR MARKETS

We analyze competition for experienced workers among wage‐setting firms. The firms can design poaching offers with higher wages to workers who switch from rivals relative to wages paid to their own existing employees. We evaluate the profit and welfare effects of anti‐poaching agreements that eliminate poaching offers as a recruiting method. Anti‐poaching agreements increase industry profits, whereas workers are made worse off. We show that the effects of anti‐poaching agreements on total welfare are determined by the magnitude of workers' switching costs and the productivity change associated with switching employers. (JEL L41, L40, J42)     

OPTIMAL PRICES AND ANIMAL CONSUMERS IN CONGESTED MARKETS

We argue that congestion, when it affects the consumption of a commodity, ought to be measured by the product of the number of trips made to a seller and consumption per visit. When intensity of consumption is measured this way, uniform entry fees, the most common way of pricing congested goods, become nonoptimal. A strict user charge can be Pareto efficient. If a uniform entry fee is practiced, we present a model along with experimental data from diverse species subject groups that show consumers reduce visits and consume more per visit; this behavior may intensify the congestion problem.     

UNDEREMPLOYMENT AND RACIAL COMPETITION IN LOCAL LABOR MARKETS

The primary concern in this paper is to analyze the effects of black population concentration on black and white men's relative and absolute underemployment levels in labor market areas while controlling for the degree of occupational segregation by race. We draw hypotheses from two primary bodies of research; one literature focuses on general racial competition and the other considers competition to be more limited. Our findings that racial inequality in underemployment levels increases with blacks' population share are most consistent with the general competition model. However, we also find some support for the limited competition model which holds that not all whites benefit from increased competition with blacks. Finally, we find that occupational segregation helps to determine the form that racial discrimination in employment adequacy takes. Where occupational segregation is high, black men hold relatively more low-wage jobs, but where occupational segregation is low, they experience higher levels of unemployment and more disadvantage relative to whites.     

CHANGES IN THE COMOVEMENT OF EUROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS

This paper investigates the impact that the removal of exchange controls within major European economies has had on the interdependence of European equity markets. For five years prior to the removal of exchange controls and five years following their removal, we use impulse responses and variance decompositions from vector autoregressions to illustrate that European equity markets have become substantially more integrated after the removal of exchange controls. We undertake further tests that demonstrate that, even if we allow for parallel macroeconomic harmonization, the removal of exchange controls has been a major cause of increased equity market integration within Europe. ( JEL F33, F36, G15)     

INFORMATION SHARING AND TACIT COLLUSION IN LABORATORY DUOPOLY MARKETS

This paper reports 45 laboratory duopoly markets that examine the importance of information sharing in facilitating tacit collusion under conditions of demand uncertainty. Sellers in these repeated laboratory markets generally shared information when possible to reduce their demand uncertainty, which led to output reductions in some demand states. Risk aversion is a likely explanation for this sharing, but some sellers also appeared to employ a strategy of information concealment to punish non-colluding rivals. Nevertheless, output choices were similar in control treatments that forced sellers to share or conceal information, so the information sharing itself did not substantially increase tacit collusion. ( JEL C92, D80, L13)