The psychological distance of climate change

Avoiding dangerous climate change is one of the most urgent social risk issues we face today and understanding related public perceptions is critical to engaging the public with the major societal transformations required to combat climate change. Analyses of public perceptions have indicated that climate change is perceived as distant on a number of different dimensions. However, to date there has been no in-depth exploration of the psychological distance of climate change. This study uses a nationally representative British sample in order to systematically explore and characterize each of the four theorized dimensions of psychological distance--temporal, social, and geographical distance, and uncertainty--in relation to climate change. We examine how each of these different aspects of psychological distance relate to each other as well as to concerns about climate change and sustainable behavior intentions. Results indicate that climate change is both psychologically distant and proximal in relation to different dimensions. Lower psychological distance was generally associated with higher levels of concern, although perceived impacts on developing countries, as an indicator of social distance, was also significantly related to preparedness to act on climate change. Our findings clearly point to the utility of risk communication techniques designed to reduce psychological distance. However, highlighting the potentially very serious distant impacts of climate change may also be useful in promoting sustainable behavior, even among those already concerned.     

Risk or Efficacy? How Psychological Distance Influences Climate Change Engagement

Construal-level theory suggests that high-level abstract features weigh more in people's decision-making at farther distance, while low-level concrete features weigh more at closer distance. Based on this, we propose that psychological distance will influence the effect of risk versus efficacy framing on climate change engagement. In particular, risk perception related to the end-state expectancy of climate change mitigation should influence people's climate change engagement at farther distance. In contrast, efficacy perception related to the perceived feasibility of attaining end-state goals should influence engagement at closer distance. Results from an experimental survey based on a national sample that is both demographically and geographically representative (N = 1,282) supported our proposition. At closer spatial distance, perceived efficacy boosted by efficacy framing increased participants’ intention to perform climate mitigation behaviors. In contrast, at farther distance, risk framing increased behavioral intention through heightened risk perception. Based on these findings, we suggest that when communicating distant and abstract risks, highlighting their disastrous impacts may better motivate action. In contrast, when communicating impending and concrete risks, stressing the feasibility of action may have stronger motivational potential.     

Public Perception of Uncertainties Within Climate Change Science

Climate change is a complex, multifaceted problem involving various interacting systems and actors. Therefore, the intensities, locations, and timeframes of the consequences of climate change are hard to predict and cause uncertainties. Relatively little is known about how the public perceives this scientific uncertainty and how this relates to their concern about climate change. In this article, an online survey among 306 Swiss people is reported that investigated whether people differentiate between different types of uncertainty in climate change research. Also examined was the way in which the perception of uncertainty is related to people's concern about climate change, their trust in science, their knowledge about climate change, and their political attitude. The results of a principal component analysis showed that respondents differentiated between perceived ambiguity in climate research, measurement uncertainty, and uncertainty about the future impact of climate change. Using structural equation modeling, it was found that only perceived ambiguity was directly related to concern about climate change, whereas measurement uncertainty and future uncertainty were not. Trust in climate science was strongly associated with each type of uncertainty perception and was indirectly associated with concern about climate change. Also, more knowledge about climate change was related to less strong perceptions of each type of climate science uncertainty. Hence, it is suggested that to increase public concern about climate change, it may be especially important to consider the perceived ambiguity about climate research. Efforts that foster trust in climate science also appear highly worthwhile.     

Efficacy Foundations for Risk Communication: How People Think About Reducing the Risks of Climate Change

Believing action to reduce the risks of climate change is both possible (self‐efficacy) and effective (response efficacy) is essential to motivate and sustain risk mitigation efforts, according to current risk communication theory. Although the public recognizes the dangers of climate change, and is deluged with lists of possible mitigative actions, little is known about public efficacy beliefs in the context of climate change. Prior efficacy studies rely on conflicting constructs and measures of efficacy, and links between efficacy and risk management actions are muddled. As a result, much remains to learn about how laypersons think about the ease and effectiveness of potential mitigative actions. To bring clarity and inform risk communication and management efforts, we investigate how people think about efficacy in the context of climate change risk management by analyzing unprompted and prompted beliefs from two national surveys (N = 405, N = 1,820). In general, respondents distinguish little between effective and ineffective climate strategies. While many respondents appreciate that reducing fossil fuel use is an effective risk mitigation strategy, overall assessments reflect persistent misconceptions about climate change causes, and uncertainties about the effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies. Our findings suggest targeting climate change risk communication and management strategies to (1) address gaps in people's existing mental models of climate action, (2) leverage existing public understanding of both potentially effective mitigation strategies and the collective action dilemma at the heart of climate change action, and (3) take into account ideologically driven reactions to behavior change and government action framed as climate action.     

American Risk Perceptions: Is Climate Change Dangerous?

Public risk perceptions can fundamentally compel or constrain political, economic, and social action to address particular risks. Public support or opposition to climate policies (e.g., treaties, regulations, taxes, subsidies) will be greatly influenced by public perceptions of the risks and dangers posed by global climate change. This article describes results from a national study (2003) that examined the risk perceptions and connotative meanings of global warming in the American mind and found that Americans perceived climate change as a moderate risk that will predominantly impact geographically and temporally distant people and places. This research also identified several distinct interpretive communities, including naysayers and alarmists, with widely divergent perceptions of climate change risks. Thus, "dangerous" climate change is a concept contested not only among scientists and policymakers, but among the American public as well.     

Climate Change Risk Perception and Communication: Addressing a Critical Moment?

Climate change is an increasingly salient issue for societies and policy‐makers worldwide. It now raises fundamental interdisciplinary issues of risk and uncertainty analysis and communication. The growing scientific consensus over the anthropogenic causes of climate change appears to sit at odds with the increasing use of risk discourses in policy: for example, to aid in climate adaptation decision making. All of this points to a need for a fundamental revision of our conceptualization of what it is to do climate risk communication. This Special Collection comprises seven papers stimulated by a workshop on “Climate Risk Perceptions and Communication” held at Cumberland Lodge Windsor in 2010. Topics addressed include climate uncertainties, images and the media, communication and public engagement, uncertainty transfer in climate communication, the role of emotions, localization of hazard impacts, and longitudinal analyses of climate perceptions. Climate change risk perceptions and communication work is critical for future climate policy and decisions.     

Public Perception of Climate Change: The Importance of Knowledge and Cultural Worldviews

The importance of knowledge for lay people's climate change concerns has been questioned in recent years, as it had been suggested that cultural values are stronger predictors of concern about climate change than knowledge. Studies that simultaneously measured knowledge related to climate change and cultural values have, however, been missing. We conducted a mail survey in the German‐speaking part of Switzerland (N = 1,065). Results suggested that cultural worldviews and climate‐related knowledge were significantly related with people's concern about climate change. Also, cultural worldviews and climate‐relevant knowledge appeared important for people's willingness to change behaviors and to accept climate change policies. In addition, different types of knowledge were found to have different impacts on people's concern about climate change, their willingness to change behaviors, and their acceptance of policies about climate change. Specifically, causal knowledge significantly increased concern about climate change and willingness to support climate‐friendly policies. We therefore concluded that risk communication should focus on causal knowledge, provided this knowledge does not threaten cultural values.     

Loss/Gain Framing,Dose, and Reactance: A Message Experiment

Whether a loss or gain frame has a persuasive advantage in communicating health risks is a matter of ongoing debate. Findings reported in the literature are mixed, suggesting that framing effects are likely complex and may be influenced by a combination of factors. This study examined reactance as a mediator and dose as a moderator of loss/gain framing effects. Adults (N = 1,039) read framed messages about the health consequences of physical (in)activity in varying message doses (i.e., number of framed statements). Compared to loss frames, gain frames generated more threat to freedom and reactance. Dosage exerted significant influence at the extremes; the one‐dose messages invoked less intentions to exercise compared to the four‐dose messages. Planned contrasts revealed significant frame × dose interactions. Notably, the one‐dose gain‐framed messages triggered significantly more freedom threat and less intentions to engage in physical activity—a situation that changed when the information was loss‐framed or when the dosage was increased.     

Climate Change Beliefs and Perceptions of Weather‐Related Changes in the United Kingdom

Public perception research in different countries has suggested that real and perceived periods of high temperature strengthen people's climate change beliefs. Such findings raise questions about the climate change beliefs of people in regions with moderate climates. Relatively little is known about whether public concerns about climate change may also be associated with perceived changes in other weather‐related events, such as precipitation or flooding. We examine the relationship between perceived changes in weather‐related events and climate change beliefs among U.K. residents at a time of below‐average winter temperatures and recent flooding. National survey data (n = 1,848) revealed that heat waves and hot summers were perceived to have become less common during respondents’ lifetimes, while flooding, periods of heavy rainfall, coastal erosions, and mild winters were perceived to have increased in frequency and cold winters were perceived to be unchanged. Although perceived changes in hot‐weather‐related events were positively associated with climate change beliefs, perceived changes in wet‐weather‐related events were found to be an even stronger predictor. Self‐reported experience of “flooding in own area” and “heat‐wave discomfort” also significantly contributed to climate change beliefs. These findings highlight the importance of salient weather‐related events and experiences in the formation of beliefs about climate change. We link our findings to research in judgment and decision making, and propose that those wishing to engage with the public on the issue of climate change should not limit their focus to heat.     

Consumer trust in B2C e-Commerce and the importance of social presence: experiments in e-Products and e-Services

Reducing social uncertainty—understanding, predicting, and controlling the behavior of other people—is a central motivating force of human behavior. When rules and customs are not sufficient, people rely on trust and familiarity as primary mechanisms to reduce social uncertainty. The relative paucity of regulations and customs on the Internet makes consumer familiarity and trust especially important in the case of e-Commerce. Yet the lack of an interpersonal exchange and the one-time nature of the typical business transaction on the Internet make this kind of consumer trust unique, because trust relates to other people and is nourished through interactions with them.This study validates a four-dimensional scale of trust in the context of e-Products and revalidates it in the context of e-Services. The study then shows the influence of social presence on these dimensions of this trust, especially benevolence, and its ultimate contribution to online purchase intentions.     

Adaptive Governance,Uncertainty, and Risk: Policy Framing and Responses to Climate Change,Drought, and Flood

As climate change impacts result in more extreme events (such as droughts and floods), the need to understand which policies facilitate effective climate change adaptation becomes crucial. Hence, this article answers the question: How do governments and policymakers frame policy in relation to climate change, droughts, and floods and what governance structures facilitate adaptation? This research interrogates and analyzes through content analysis, supplemented by semi‐structured qualitative interviews, the policy response to climate change, drought, and flood in relation to agricultural producers in four case studies in river basins in Chile, Argentina, and Canada. First, an epistemological explanation of risk and uncertainty underscores a brief literature review of adaptive governance, followed by policy framing in relation to risk and uncertainty, and an analytical model is developed. Pertinent findings of the four cases are recounted, followed by a comparative analysis. In conclusion, recommendations are made to improve policies and expand adaptive governance to better account for uncertainty and risk. This article is innovative in that it proposes an expanded model of adaptive governance in relation to “risk” that can help bridge the barrier of uncertainty in science and policy.     

Efficacy,Action, and Support for Reducing Climate Change Risks

A growing body of research demonstrates that believing action to reduce the risks of climate change is both possible (self‐efficacy) and effective (response efficacy) is essential to motivate and sustain risk mitigation efforts. Despite this potentially critical role of efficacy beliefs, measures and their use vary wildly in climate change risk perception and communication research, making it hard to compare and learn from efficacy studies. To address this problem and advance our understanding of efficacy beliefs, this article makes three contributions. First, we present a theoretically motivated approach to measuring climate change mitigation efficacy, in light of diverse proposed, perceived, and previously researched strategies. Second, we test this in two national survey samples (Amazon's Mechanical Turk N = 405, GfK Knowledge Panel N = 1,820), demonstrating largely coherent beliefs by level of action and discrimination between types of efficacy. Four additive efficacy scales emerge: personal self‐efficacy, personal response efficacy, government and collective self‐efficacy, and government and collective response efficacy. Third, we employ the resulting efficacy scales in mediation models to test how well efficacy beliefs predict climate change policy support, controlling for specific knowledge, risk perceptions, and ideology, and allowing for mediation by concern. Concern fully mediates the relatively strong effects of perceived risk on policy support, but only partly mediates efficacy beliefs. Stronger government and collective response efficacy beliefs and personal self‐efficacy beliefs are both directly and indirectly associated with greater support for reducing the risks of climate change, even after controlling for ideology and causal beliefs about climate change.     

Personal Efficacy, the Information Environment, and Attitudes Toward Global Warming and Climate Change in the United States

Despite the growing scientific consensus about the risks of global warming and climate change, the mass media frequently portray the subject as one of great scientific controversy and debate. And yet previous studies of the mass public's subjective assessments of the risks of global warming and climate change have not sufficiently examined public informedness, public confidence in climate scientists, and the role of personal efficacy in affecting global warming outcomes. By examining the results of a survey on an original and representative sample of Americans, we find that these three forces—informedness, confidence in scientists, and personal efficacy—are related in interesting and unexpected ways, and exert significant influence on risk assessments of global warming and climate change. In particular, more informed respondents both feel less personally responsible for global warming, and also show less concern for global warming. We also find that confidence in scientists has unexpected effects: respondents with high confidence in scientists feel less responsible for global warming, and also show less concern for global warming. These results have substantial implications for the interaction between scientists and the public in general, and for the public discussion of global warming and climate change in particular.     

Risk Perceptions,General Environmental Beliefs,and Willingness to Address Climate Change

The research reported here examines the relationship between risk perceptions and willingness to address climate change. The data are a national sample of 1225 mail surveys that include measures of risk perceptions and knowledge tied to climate change, support for voluntary and government actions to address the problem, general environmental beliefs, and demographic variables. Risk perceptions matter in predicting behavioral intentions. Risk perceptions are not a surrogate for general environmental beliefs, but have their own power to account for behavioral intentions. There are four secondary conclusions. First, behavioral intentions regarding climate change are complex and intriguing. People are neither nonbelievers who will take no initiatives themselves and oppose all government efforts, nor are they believers who promise both to make personal efforts and to vote for every government proposal that promises to address climate change. Second, there are separate demographic sources for voluntary actions compared with voting intentions. Third, recognizing the causes of global warming is a powerful predictor of behavioral intentions independent from believing that climate change will happen and have bad consequences. Finally, the success of the risk perception variables to account for behavioral intentions should encourage greater attention to risk perceptions as independent variables. Risk perceptions and knowledge, however, share the stage with general environmental beliefs and demographic characteristics. Although related, risk perceptions, knowledge, and general environmental beliefs are somewhat independent predictors of behavioral intentions.     

Weighing the Risks of Nuclear Energy and Climate Change: Trust in Different Information Sources,Perceived Risks,and Willingness to Pay for Alternatives to Nuclear Power

We examined how individuals perceive nuclear energy in the context of climate change mitigation and how their perceptions are associated with trust in different risk information sources. We analyzed the interrelationships between trust, perceived risk of nuclear power, climate change concern, perception of nuclear energy as an acceptable way to mitigate climate change, and willingness to pay (WTP) for alternatives to nuclear power. A nationwide survey (N = 967) collected in Finland was analyzed with structural equation modeling. The associations between trust and perceived risk of nuclear power, climate change concern, and perception of nuclear power as a way to mitigate climate change varied by the type of information source. Political party support and other background variables were associated with trust in different information sources. The effect of trust in information sources on WTP was mediated by perceived risks and benefits. The results will increase our understanding of how individuals perceive nuclear energy as a way to cut CO₂ emissions and the role of trust in different information sources in shaping nuclear risk perceptions and energy choices.     

The Interplay Between Knowledge,Perceived Efficacy,and Concern About Global Warming and Climate Change: A One‐Year Longitudinal Study

If the long‐term goal of limiting warming to less than 2°C is to be achieved, rapid and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions are required. These reductions will demand political leadership and widespread public support for action on global warming and climate change. Public knowledge, level of concern, and perceived personal efficacy, in positively affecting these issues are key variables in understanding public support for mitigation action. Previous research has documented some contradictory associations between knowledge, personal efficacy, and concern about global warming and climate change, but these cross‐sectional findings limit inferences about temporal stability and direction of influence. This study examines the relationships between these three variables over a one‐year period and three waves with national data from New Zealand. Results showed a positive association between the variables, and the pattern of findings was stable and consistent across the three data points. More importantly, results indicate that concern mediates the influence of knowledge on personal efficacy. Knowing more about global warming and climate change increases overall concern about the risks of these issues, and this increased concern leads to greater perceived efficacy and responsibility to help solving them. Implications for risk communication are discussed.     

Indiscriminate,Irrelevant, and Sometimes Wrong: Causal Misconceptions about Climate Change

Prior research demonstrates widespread persistence of beliefs about climate change causes and risks that are arguably misconceptions. They include believing pollution causes climate change, believing ozone depletion causes climate change, the combination of these two “green beliefs,” referred to as environmental problems, and believing natural climate variation significantly contributes to current climate trends. Each of these causal beliefs has the potential to weaken or divert support away from effective climate change risk mitigation policies. To assess this potential, we explore the nature and prevalence of these beliefs in the United States with a national sample of interviews (N = 77) and two national surveys (N = 1,013, N = 1,820), and apply regression and mediation analyses to explore whether they explain any of the variation in individuals’ concern or support for policy to mitigate climate change. Adherence to these beliefs—which reflect a variety of misconceptions illustrated in the interviews—differs by political ideology but is common, with over a third of interviewees mentioning one or more. Controlling for general knowledge, political ideology, and other factors, misconceptions about environmental problems are still associated directly with support for climate change policies. On average adherence to the belief that environmental problems cause climate change is associated with a 25% higher probability of policy support. In contrast, believing natural climate variability is a major recent cause of climate change is associated with a 7% lower probability of supporting climate policy, even after controlling for political ideology and other knowledge about climate change.     

Resilience and Climate Change Adaptation: The Importance of Framing

In the Australian policy context, there has recently been a discernible shift in the discourse used when considering responses to the impacts of current weather extremes and future climate change. Commonly used terminology, such as climate change impacts and vulnerability, is now being increasingly replaced by a preference for language with more positive connotations as represented by resilience and a focus on the ‘strengthening’ of local communities. However, although this contemporary shift in emphasis has largely political roots, the scientific conceptual underpinning for resilience, and its relationship with climate change action, remains contested. To contribute to this debate, the authors argue that how adaptation is framed—in this case by the notion of resilience—can have an important influence on agenda setting, on the subsequent adaptation pathways that are pursued and on eventual adaptation outcomes. Drawing from multi-disciplinary adaptation research carried out in three urban case studies in the State of Victoria, Australia (‘Framing multi-level and multi-actor adaptation responses in the Victorian context’, funded by the Victorian Centre for Climate Change Adaptation Research (2010–2012)), this article is structured according to three main discussion points. Firstly, the importance of being explicit when framing adaptation; secondly, this study reflects on how resilience is emerging as part of adaptation discourse and narratives in different scientific, research and policy-making communities; and finally, the authors reflect on the implications of resilience framing for evolving adaptation policy and practice.     

Nurse safety: How is safety climate related to affect and attitude?

Occupational accidents and injuries continue to be a critical concern for nurses, given the hazardous healthcare environment. This study advances the research on workplace safety by studying the process variables (i.e. job-related negative affect (JRNA) and job satisfaction) in explaining the relationship between safety climate and various safety criteria in nurses. Based on survey data from 326 nurses, our findings suggest that psychological safety climate is negatively related to JRNA, turnover intentions, safety workarounds, and workplace hazards. In addition, structural equation modelling indicated general support for a model in which psychological safety climate influences employee strain through job attitudes, including JRNA and job satisfaction. More specifically, job attitudes were found to mediate the relationship between psychological safety climate and turnover intentions, experience of hazards, and injuries. Safety workarounds did not significantly relate to injuries. The present study contributes to the ongoing improvement of interventions aimed at mitigating nurses’ injuries by integrating job attitudes into the safety climate–safety outcome framework.