Out of the Frying Pan into the Fire: Behavioral Reactions to Terrorist Attacks

A low-probability, high-damage event in which many people are killed at one point of time is called a dread risk. Dread risks can cause direct damage and, in addition, indirect damage mediated though the minds of citizens. I analyze the behavioral reactions of Americans to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and provide evidence for the dread hypothesis: (i) Americans reduced their air travel after the attack; (ii) for a period of one year following the attacks, interstate highway travel increased, suggesting that a proportion of those who did not fly instead drove to their destination; and (iii) for the same period, in each month the number of fatal highway crashes exceeded the base line of the previous years. An estimated 1,500 Americans died on the road in the attempt to avoid the fate of the passengers who were killed in the four fatal flights.     

A Decision Framework for Managing Risk to Airports from Terrorist Attack

This article presents an asset‐level security risk management framework to assist stakeholders of critical assets with allocating limited budgets for enhancing their safety and security against terrorist attack. The proposed framework models the security system of an asset, considers various threat scenarios, and models the sequential decision framework of attackers during the attack. Its novel contributions are the introduction of the notion of partial neutralization of attackers by defenders, estimation of total loss from successful, partially successful, and unsuccessful actions of attackers at various stages of an attack, and inclusion of the effects of these losses on the choices made by terrorists at various stages of the attack. The application of the proposed method is demonstrated in an example dealing with security risk management of a U.S. commercial airport, in which a set of plausible threat scenarios and risk mitigation options are considered. It is found that a combination of providing blast‐resistant cargo containers and a video surveillance system on the airport perimeter fence is the best option based on minimum expected life‐cycle cost considering a 10‐year service period.     

Adaptive Management: A Paradigm for Remediation of Public Facilities Following a Terrorist Attack

Terrorist actions are aimed at maximizing harm (health, psychological, economical, and political) through the combined physical impacts of the act and fear. Immediate and effective response to a terrorist act is critical to limit human and environmental harm, effectively restore facility function, and maintain public confidence. Though there have been terrorist attacks in public facilities that we have learned from, overall our experiences in restoration of public facilities following a terrorist attack are limited. Restoration of public facilities following a release of a hazardous material is inherently far more complex than in industrial settings and has many unique technical, economic, social, and political challenges. For example, there may be a great need to quickly restore the facility to full operation and allow public access even though it was not designed for easy or rapid restoration, and critical information is needed for quantitative risk assessment and effective restoration must be anticipated to be incomplete and uncertain. Whereas present planning documents have substantial linearity in their organization, the “adaptive management” paradigm provides a constructive parallel paradigm for restoration of public facilities that anticipates and plans for uncertainty, inefficiencies, and stakeholder participation. Adaptive management grew out of the need to manage and restore natural resources in highly complex and changing environments with limited knowledge about causal relationships and responses to restoration actions. Similarities between natural resource management and restoration of a public facility after a terrorist attack suggest that integration of adaptive management principles explicitly into restoration processes will result in substantially enhanced and flexible responses necessary to meet the uncertainties of potential terrorist attacks.     

The Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack on the U.S. Commercial Aviation System

We use data on air passenger travel expenditures per passenger as well as statistical analysis of the air traffic lost for the two-year aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks to estimate direct demand losses for air transportation services. These are used along with a national input-output model to assess the full costs of these losses. Depending on assumptions made, the full losses to the U.S. economy were between $214.3 and $420.5 billion. These estimates are similar to those from other studies of such an event, and suggest that the high costs of effective countermeasures may be justified.     

Communicating with the Public About Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attacks: Results from a Survey Experiment on Factors Influencing Intention to “Run,Hide, Tell” in the United Kingdom and Denmark

Effective risk communication is an integral part of responding to terrorism, but until recently, there has been very little pre‐event communication in a European context to provide advice to the public on how to protect themselves during an attack. Following terrorist attacks involving mass shootings in Paris, France, in November 2015, the U.K. National Police Chiefs’ Council released a Stay Safe film and leaflet that advises the public to “run,” “hide,” and “tell” in the event of a firearms or weapons attack. However, other countries, including Denmark, do not provide preparedness information of this kind, in large part because of concern about scaring the public. In this survey experiment, 3,003 U.K. and Danish participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: no information, a leaflet intervention, and a film intervention to examine the impact of “Run, Hide, Tell” advice on perceptions about terrorism, the security services, and intended responses to a hypothetical terrorist firearms attack. Results demonstrate important benefits of pre‐event communication in relation to enhancing trust, encouraging protective health behaviors, and discouraging potentially dangerous actions. However, these findings also suggest that future communications should address perceived response costs and target specific problem behaviors. Cross‐national similarities in response suggest this advice is suitable for adaptation in other countries.     

Informing Ex Ante Event Studies with Macro‐Econometric Evidence on the Structural and Policy Impacts of Terrorism

Economic consequence analysis is one of many inputs to terrorism contingency planning. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are being used more frequently in these analyses, in part because of their capacity to accommodate high levels of event‐specific detail. In modeling the potential economic effects of a hypothetical terrorist event, two broad sets of shocks are required: (1) physical impacts on observable variables (e.g., asset damage); (2) behavioral impacts on unobservable variables (e.g., investor uncertainty). Assembling shocks describing the physical impacts of a terrorist incident is relatively straightforward, since estimates are either readily available or plausibly inferred. However, assembling shocks describing behavioral impacts is more difficult. Values for behavioral variables (e.g., required rates of return) are typically inferred or estimated by indirect means. Generally, this has been achieved via reference to extraneous literature or ex ante surveys. This article explores a new method. We elucidate the magnitude of CGE‐relevant structural shifts implicit in econometric evidence on terrorist incidents, with a view to informing future ex ante event assessments. Ex post econometric studies of terrorism by Blomberg et al . yield macro econometric equations that describe the response of observable economic variables (e.g., GDP growth) to terrorist incidents. We use these equations to determine estimates for relevant (unobservable) structural and policy variables impacted by terrorist incidents, using a CGE model of the United States. This allows us to: (i) compare values for these shifts with input assumptions in earlier ex ante CGE studies; and (ii) discuss how future ex ante studies can be informed by our analysis.     

A Risk and Economic Analysis of Dirty Bomb Attacks on the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach

This article analyzes possible terrorist attacks on the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach using a radiological dispersal device (RDD, also known as a "dirty bomb") to shut down port operations and cause substantial economic and psychological impacts. The analysis is an exploratory investigation of a combination of several risk analysis tools, including scenario generation and pruning, project risk analysis, direct consequence modeling, and indirect economic impact assessment. We examined 36 attack scenarios and reduced them to two plausible or likely scenarios using qualitative judgments. For these two scenarios, we conducted a project risk analysis to understand the tasks terrorists need to perform to carry out the attacks and to determine the likelihood of the project's success. The consequences of a successful attack are described in terms of a radiological plume model and resulting human health and economic impacts. Initial findings suggest that the chances of a successful dirty bomb attack are about 10-40% and that high radiological doses are confined to a relatively small area, limiting health effects to tens or at most hundreds of latent cancers, even with a major release. However, the economic consequences from a shutdown of the harbors due to the contamination could result in significant losses in the tens of billions of dollars, including the decontamination costs and the indirect economic impacts due to the port shutdown. The implications for countering a dirty bomb attack, including the protection of the radiological sources and intercepting an ongoing dirty bomb attack are discussed.     

Fusion of Intelligence Information: A Bayesian Approach

The attack that occurred on September 11, 2001 was, in the end, the result of a failure to detect and prevent the terrorist operations that hit the United States. The U.S. government thus faces at this time the daunting tasks of first, drastically increasing its ability to obtain and interpret different types of signals of impending terrorist attacks with sufficient lead time and accuracy, and second, improving its ability to react effectively. One of the main challenges is the fusion of information, from different sources (U.S. or foreign), and of different types (electronic signals, human intelligence. etc.). Fusion thus involves two very distinct and separate issues: communications, i.e., ensuring that the different U.S. and foreign intelligence agencies communicate all relevant and accurate information in a timely fashion and, perhaps more difficult, merging the content of signals, some "sharp" and some "fuzzy," some dependent and some independent into useful information. The focus of this article is on the latter issue, and on the use of the results. In this article, I present a classic probabilistic Bayesian model sometimes used in engineering risk analysis, which can be helpful in the fusion of information because it allows computation of the posterior probability of an event given its prior probability (before the signal is observed) and the quality of the signal characterized by the probabilities of false positive and false negative. Experience suggests that the nature of these errors has been sometimes misunderstood; therefore, I discuss the validity of several possible definitions.     

Defender–Attacker Decision Tree Analysis to Combat Terrorism

We propose a methodology, called defender–attacker decision tree analysis, to evaluate defensive actions against terrorist attacks in a dynamic and hostile environment. Like most game‐theoretic formulations of this problem, we assume that the defenders act rationally by maximizing their expected utility or minimizing their expected costs. However, we do not assume that attackers maximize their expected utilities. Instead, we encode the defender's limited knowledge about the attacker's motivations and capabilities as a conditional probability distribution over the attacker's decisions. We apply this methodology to the problem of defending against possible terrorist attacks on commercial airplanes, using one of three weapons: infrared‐guided MANPADS (man‐portable air defense systems), laser‐guided MANPADS, or visually targeted RPGs (rocket propelled grenades). We also evaluate three countermeasures against these weapons: DIRCMs (directional infrared countermeasures), perimeter control around the airport, and hardening airplanes. The model includes deterrence effects, the effectiveness of the countermeasures, and the substitution of weapons and targets once a specific countermeasure is selected. It also includes a second stage of defensive decisions after an attack occurs. Key findings are: (1) due to the high cost of the countermeasures, not implementing countermeasures is the preferred defensive alternative for a large range of parameters; (2) if the probability of an attack and the associated consequences are large, a combination of DIRCMs and ground perimeter control are preferred over any single countermeasure.     

Terrorism Risks and Cost‐Benefit Analysis of Aviation Security

We evaluate, for the U.S. case, the costs and benefits of three security measures designed to reduce the likelihood of a direct replication of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. To do so, we assess risk reduction, losses, and security costs in the context of the full set of security layers. The three measures evaluated are installed physical secondary barriers (IPSB) to restrict access to the hardened cockpit door during door transitions, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), and the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) Program. In the process, we examine an alternate policy measure: doubling the budget of the FFDO program to $44 million per year, installing IPSBs in all U.S. aircraft at a cost of $13.5 million per year, and reducing funding for FAMS by 75% to $300 million per year. A break‐even cost‐benefit analysis then finds the minimum probability of an otherwise successful attack required for the benefit of each security measures to equal its cost. We find that the IPSB is costeffective if the annual attack probability of an otherwise successful attack exceeds 0.5% or one attack every 200 years. The FFDO program is costeffective if the annual attack probability exceeds 2%. On the other hand, more than two otherwise successful attacks per year are required for FAMS to be costeffective. A policy that includes IPSBs, an increased budget for FFDOs, and a reduced budget for FAMS may be a viable policy alternative, potentially saving hundreds of millions of dollars per year with consequences for security that are, at most, negligible.     

Benchmark Analysis for Quantifying Urban Vulnerability to Terrorist Incidents

We describe a quantitative methodology to characterize the vulnerability of U.S. urban centers to terrorist attack, using a place-based vulnerability index and a database of terrorist incidents and related human casualties. Via generalized linear statistical models, we study the relationships between vulnerability and terrorist events, and find that our place-based vulnerability metric significantly describes both terrorist incidence and occurrence of human casualties from terrorist events in these urban centers. We also introduce benchmark analytic technologies from applications in toxicological risk assessment to this social risk/vulnerability paradigm, and use these to distinguish levels of high and low urban vulnerability to terrorism. It is seen that the benchmark approach translates quite flexibly from its biological roots to this social scientific archetype.     

Is It Safer to Fly or Drive?

In attempts to soothe the nascent fear of the scheduled airline traveler, passengers waiting takeoff are sometimes reminded of the cliche that they may have already completed the most dangerous part of their trip — the drive to the airport. The objective of this paper is to communicate under what conditions air travel is indeed safer than highway travel and vice versa. The conventional wisdom among risk communicators that air travel is so much safer than car travel arises from the most widely quoted death rates per billion miles for each — 0.6 for air compared to 24 for road. There are three reasons why such an unqualified comparison of aggregated fatality rates is inappropriate. First, the airline rate is passenger fatalities per passenger mile, whereas the road rate is all fatalities (any occupants, pedestrians, etc.) per vehicle mile. Second, road travel that competes with air travel is on the rural interstate system, not on average roads. Third, driver and vehicle characteristics, and driver behavior, lead to car-driver risks that vary over a wide range. Expressions derived to compare risk for drivers with given characteristics to those on airline trips of given distance showed that 40-year-old, belted, alcohol-free drivers of cars 700 pounds heavier than average are slightly less likely to be killed in 600 miles of rural interstate driving than in airline trips of the same length. Compared to this driver, 18-year-old, unbelted, intoxicated, male drivers of cars 700 pounds lighter than average have a risk over 1000 times greater. Furthermore, it is shown that the cliche above is untrue for a group of drivers having the age distribution of airline passengers.     

The Impact of Process Variation on Customer Dissatisfaction: Evidence from the U.S. Domestic Airline Industry

This paper investigates how process variation reduction affects customer dissatisfaction in the context of the U.S. domestic airline industry. We use quarterly data on all major carriers, available since the introduction of required reporting of service indicators to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). Specifically, we investigate how both average performance and variation performance (consistency) of certain processes affect customer dissatisfaction. Our empirical results show that the relationship between process variation and customer dissatisfaction is contingent upon a company's average performance with regard to each process. Consistency is at least as important as average performance for high performers, while it has limited impact for low performers.     

Smallpox vaccine policy: the national debate

As a result of the 2001 anthrax attacks, the U.S. government is trying to forge a plan to handle something much worse: an outbreak of smallpox due to terrorist activity. Here's a look at where the debate stands today.     

A Macro-Economic Framework for Evaluation of Cyber Security Risks Related to Protection of Intellectual Property

The article is based on the premise that, from a macro-economic viewpoint, cyber attacks with long-lasting effects are the most economically significant, and as a result require more attention than attacks with short-lasting effects that have historically been more represented in literature. In particular, the article deals with evaluation of cyber security risks related to one type of attack with long-lasting effects, namely, theft of intellectual property (IP) by foreign perpetrators. An International Consequence Analysis Framework is presented to determine (1) the potential macro-economic consequences of cyber attacks that result in stolen IP from companies in the United States, and (2) the likely sources of such attacks. The framework presented focuses on IP theft that enables foreign companies to make economic gains that would have otherwise benefited the U.S. economy. Initial results are presented.     

A Note on the Inoperability Input-Output Model

In this note, we propose some comments and some extensions of the inoperability input-output model (IIOM), as recently proposed by Santos and Haimes (2004). In particular, we propose the use of some analytic tools capable of providing information on the reaction of sectors subsequent to a terrorist attack on infrastructure service sectors. These tools, namely, the field of influence and the multiplier product matrix, provide information on the way sectors react to a shock on the aggregate demand and/or to a (temporary or permanent) change of production function coefficients. Finally, using the 2003 65 sectors input-output matrix for the U.S. economy, a simple empirical example is presented.     

Recollection Bias and Its Underpinnings: Lessons from Terrorism Risk Assessments

Recollection bias is the phenomenon whereby people who observe a highly unexpected event hold current risk beliefs about a similar event that are no higher than their recollection of their prior beliefs. This article replicates and extends the authors’ previous study of recollection bias in relation to individuals’ perceptions of the risks of terrorism attacks. Over 60% of respondents in a national U.S. sample of over 900 adults believe that the current risk of a future terrorist attack by either an airplane or in a public setting is no higher than they recall having believed, respectively, before the 9/11 attack and before the Boston Marathon bombing. By contrast, a rational Bayesian model would update to a higher currently assessed risk of these previously uncontemplated events. Recollection bias is a persistent trait: individuals who exhibited this bias for the 9/11 attack exhibited it for the Boston Marathon bombing. Only one‐fifth of respondents are free of any type of recollection bias. Recollection bias is negatively correlated with absolute levels of risk belief. Recollection bias in relation to highly unexpected terrorist events—the belief that perceived risks did not increase after the surprise occurrence—dampens support for a variety of anti‐terrorism measures, controlling for the level of risk beliefs and demographic factors. Persistent recollection bias for both 9/11 and the Boston Marathon bombing is especially influential in diminishing support for protective policy measures, such as surveillance cameras in public places. Given that public attitudes influence policy, educating the public about risk is critical.     

Psychometric and Demographic Predictors of the Perceived Risk of Terrorist Threats and the Willingness to Pay for Terrorism Risk Management Programs

A 2009 national telephone survey of 924 U.S. adults assessed perceptions of terrorism and homeland security issues. Respondents rated severity of effects, level of understanding, number affected, and likelihood of four terrorist threats: poisoned water supply; explosion of a small nuclear device in a major U.S. city; an airplane attack similar to 9/11; and explosion of a bomb in a building, train, subway, or highway. Respondents rated perceived risk and willingness to pay (WTP) for dealing with each threat. Demographic, attitudinal, and party affiliation data were collected. Respondents rated bomb as highest in perceived risk but gave the highest WTP ratings to nuclear device. For both perceived risk and WTP, psychometric variables were far stronger predictors than were demographic ones. OLS regression analyses using both types of variables to predict perceived risk found only two significant demographic predictors for any threat—Democrat (a negative predictor for bomb) and white male (a significant positive predictor for airline attack). In contrast, among psychometric variables, severity, number affected, and likelihood were predictors of all four threats and level of understanding was a predictor for one. For WTP, education was a negative predictor for three threats; no other demographic variables were significant predictors for any threat. Among psychometric variables, perceived risk and number affected were positive predictors of WTP for all four threats; severity and likelihood were predictors for three; level of understanding was a significant predictor for two.     

Travel Risks in a Time of Terror: Judgments and Choices

Shortly after the 2002 terrorist attacks in Bali, readers of Conde Nast Traveler magazine were surveyed regarding their views on the risks of travel to various destinations. Their risk estimates were highest for Israel, and lowest for Canada. Estimates for the different destinations correlated positively with (1) one another, (2) concern over aspects of travel that can make one feel at risk (e.g., sticking out as an American), (3) worries about other travel problems (e.g., contracting an infectious disease), and (4) attitudes toward risk. Respondents' willingness to travel to a destination was predicted well by whether their estimate of its risk was above or below their general threshold for the acceptability of travel risks. Overall, the responses suggest orderly choices, based on highly uncertain judgments of risks. Worry played a significant role in these choices, even after controlling for cognitive considerations, thereby supporting the recently proposed "risk as feelings" hypothesis. Thus, even among people who have generally consistent and defensible beliefs, emotions may affect choices. These results emerged with people selected for their interest in and experience with the decision domain (travel), but challenged to incorporate a new concern (terror).     

How does homeland security affect U.S. firms' international competitiveness?

This paper frames the issue of homeland security and its relationship to the international competitiveness of U.S. firms in general. This is largely a conceptual statement, identifying the areas of national security (homeland security) that are key to business, and exploring the management concerns of business to the new threats and opportunities that have arisen.We establish the point that homeland security is a purposeful, conscious, and rational response to terrorist events that is an emergent and evolving systems phenomenon. This systems approach is an especially useful way to look at the implications of homeland security in its relation to business. We then look specifically at the kinds of costs and risks that are generated for U.S. international business (exports, imports, incoming and outgoing investments) as a result of this phenomenon. Management strategies for dealing with these costs and risks are explored for U.S. firms.Our conclusion is to demonstrate the scope of analysis that is needed to understand and to managerially cope with the homeland security problem. We show the value of using theory from various disciplines for analyzing a multi-dimensional problem like this. And finally we are able to recommend some policy dimensions for both companies and the U.S. Government toward mitigating the negative impacts of the homeland security problem.