Morality and Nuclear Energy: Perceptions of Risks and Benefits,Personal Norms,and Willingness to Take Action Related to Nuclear Energy

We examined factors underlying people's willingness to take action in favor of or against nuclear energy from a moral perspective. We conducted a questionnaire study among a sample of the Dutch population (N = 123). As expected, perceptions of risks and benefits were related to personal norms (PN), that is, feelings of moral obligation toward taking action in favor of or against nuclear energy. In turn, PN predicted willingness to take action. Furthermore, PN mediated the relationships between perceptions of risk and benefits and willingness to take action. In line with our hypothesis, beliefs about the risks and benefits of nuclear energy were less powerful in explaining PN for supporters compared to PN of opponents. Also, beliefs on risks and benefits and PN explained significantly more variance in willingness to take action of opponents than of supporters. Our results suggest that a moral framework is useful to explain willingness to take action in favor of and against nuclear energy, and that people are more likely to protest in favor of or against nuclear energy when PN are strong.     

Values,Perceived Risks and Benefits,and Acceptability of Nuclear Energy

We examined how personal values and perceptions of risks and benefits are associated with the acceptability of nuclear energy (NE). A theoretical model is tested in which beliefs about the risks and benefits of NE mediate the relationship between values and acceptability. The results showed that egoistic values are positively related to the perceived benefits and acceptability of NE. In contrast, altruistic and biospheric values were positively related to the perceived risks of NE. Although it has been argued that NE may help to combat climate change through lower CO₂ emissions, these environmental benefits were not acknowledged by people with strong biospheric values. Furthermore, results confirmed that the more risks respondents perceived, the less they were inclined to accept NE. In contrast, the more a person believed that NE has beneficial consequences, the more acceptable NE was. Finally, as expected, perceived risks and benefits were found to partly mediate the relationship between personal values and acceptability. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.     

Effects of Risk Representation and Scope on Willingness to Pay for Reduced Risks: Evidence from Tokyo Bay, Japan

When applying the contingent valuation method (CVM) in risk reduction studies, some studies report that willingness to pay (WTP) is insensitive to the magnitude of risk reduction while other studies do not. On the other hand, social-psychological research has shown that the affect heuristic biases judgments on probability, relative frequency, and risk. This article examines both magnitude (or scope) effect and affect heuristic (or representation) effect on WTP for risk reduction measures against tsunamis by introducing two experimental (i.e., absolute and relative) systems with four different representations to evaluate public behaviors in two different scenarios of risk reduction. Two common denominators (100 and 10,000) are introduced into absolute risk reduction representation (i.e., "of every 100 persons, from present 2 deaths to 1") to form different formats (i.e., "of every 10,000 persons from 200 to 100," and "of every 100,000 persons from 2,000 deaths to 1,000"). There is little evidence that WTP estimates are sufficiently sensitive to the magnitude of risk reduction, but relative risk reduction representations may be better than the absolute one given in CVM mail surveys when the risk is small. There is a statistically insignificant effect of risk reduction representations on respondent frequency, but mixed effects on the monetary values of WTP at the level of 0.05. The representation effect of absolute risk reduction on the WTP value varies with the common denominator. The larger the common denominator, the less the WTP to reduce the risk of tsunamis, and the significance probability is improved to less than the level of 0.05 when the common denominator becomes large enough. The findings suggest that improved methods are required for estimating the rates of tradeoff between fatality risk and other goods among consumers.     

Efficacy,Action, and Support for Reducing Climate Change Risks

A growing body of research demonstrates that believing action to reduce the risks of climate change is both possible (self‐efficacy) and effective (response efficacy) is essential to motivate and sustain risk mitigation efforts. Despite this potentially critical role of efficacy beliefs, measures and their use vary wildly in climate change risk perception and communication research, making it hard to compare and learn from efficacy studies. To address this problem and advance our understanding of efficacy beliefs, this article makes three contributions. First, we present a theoretically motivated approach to measuring climate change mitigation efficacy, in light of diverse proposed, perceived, and previously researched strategies. Second, we test this in two national survey samples (Amazon's Mechanical Turk N = 405, GfK Knowledge Panel N = 1,820), demonstrating largely coherent beliefs by level of action and discrimination between types of efficacy. Four additive efficacy scales emerge: personal self‐efficacy, personal response efficacy, government and collective self‐efficacy, and government and collective response efficacy. Third, we employ the resulting efficacy scales in mediation models to test how well efficacy beliefs predict climate change policy support, controlling for specific knowledge, risk perceptions, and ideology, and allowing for mediation by concern. Concern fully mediates the relatively strong effects of perceived risk on policy support, but only partly mediates efficacy beliefs. Stronger government and collective response efficacy beliefs and personal self‐efficacy beliefs are both directly and indirectly associated with greater support for reducing the risks of climate change, even after controlling for ideology and causal beliefs about climate change.     

The Risks of Using Nuclear Energy Sources in Space: Some Lay Activists'Perceptions

A combination of directive and nondirective techniques was used to study the mental models of 30 lay activists regarding the risks of nuclear energy sources in space. Respondents'perceptions were compared with an "expert model" of the processes generating and controlling these risks, in terms of both the substance of their beliefs and several statistical measures of their performance. These analyses revealed a complex pattern of strengths and weaknesses. Their details are used to derive recommendations for formulating messages about these risks.     

Efficacy Foundations for Risk Communication: How People Think About Reducing the Risks of Climate Change

Believing action to reduce the risks of climate change is both possible (self‐efficacy) and effective (response efficacy) is essential to motivate and sustain risk mitigation efforts, according to current risk communication theory. Although the public recognizes the dangers of climate change, and is deluged with lists of possible mitigative actions, little is known about public efficacy beliefs in the context of climate change. Prior efficacy studies rely on conflicting constructs and measures of efficacy, and links between efficacy and risk management actions are muddled. As a result, much remains to learn about how laypersons think about the ease and effectiveness of potential mitigative actions. To bring clarity and inform risk communication and management efforts, we investigate how people think about efficacy in the context of climate change risk management by analyzing unprompted and prompted beliefs from two national surveys (N = 405, N = 1,820). In general, respondents distinguish little between effective and ineffective climate strategies. While many respondents appreciate that reducing fossil fuel use is an effective risk mitigation strategy, overall assessments reflect persistent misconceptions about climate change causes, and uncertainties about the effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies. Our findings suggest targeting climate change risk communication and management strategies to (1) address gaps in people's existing mental models of climate action, (2) leverage existing public understanding of both potentially effective mitigation strategies and the collective action dilemma at the heart of climate change action, and (3) take into account ideologically driven reactions to behavior change and government action framed as climate action.     

Public Perception of Climate Change: The Importance of Knowledge and Cultural Worldviews

The importance of knowledge for lay people's climate change concerns has been questioned in recent years, as it had been suggested that cultural values are stronger predictors of concern about climate change than knowledge. Studies that simultaneously measured knowledge related to climate change and cultural values have, however, been missing. We conducted a mail survey in the German‐speaking part of Switzerland (N = 1,065). Results suggested that cultural worldviews and climate‐related knowledge were significantly related with people's concern about climate change. Also, cultural worldviews and climate‐relevant knowledge appeared important for people's willingness to change behaviors and to accept climate change policies. In addition, different types of knowledge were found to have different impacts on people's concern about climate change, their willingness to change behaviors, and their acceptance of policies about climate change. Specifically, causal knowledge significantly increased concern about climate change and willingness to support climate‐friendly policies. We therefore concluded that risk communication should focus on causal knowledge, provided this knowledge does not threaten cultural values.     

Societal Responses to Familiar Versus Unfamiliar Risk: Comparisons of Influenza and SARS in Korea

This study examines the connections between familiar (influenza) and unfamiliar (SARS) risks among the general public in a SARS affected society. Using a survey of 350 respondents in Chonju, we find that risk perceptions and a belief that influenza vaccination reduces the incidence of SARS explain behavioral intentions for influenza vaccination and purchase responses to a hypothetical SARS vaccine. Those respondents who believe that an influenza vaccination will very likely reduce SARS incidence have a high probability (79%) of intending to vaccinate, but a much lower WTP for a SARS vaccine than those without such a belief. This belief undoubtedly was influenced by a reframing of influenza vaccination as preventing SARS. Such reframing may lead to short-term improvements in vaccination rates to the detriment of long-term SARS vaccination development. When compared with a similar study in Taiwan, societal risk perceptions of SARS and WTP for a vaccine vary greatly according to the extent of a society's experience with SARS.     

Risk Communication,Public Engagement,and Climate Change: A Role for Emotions

This article discusses the potential role that emotions might play in enticing a lifestyle that diminishes climate change. Climate change is an important challenge for society. There is a growing consensus that climate change is due to our behavior, but few people are willing to significantly adapt their lifestyle. Empirical studies show that people lack a sense of urgency: they experience climate change as a problem that affects people in distant places and in a far future. Several scholars have claimed that emotions might be a necessary tool in communication about climate change. This article sketches a theoretical framework that supports this hypothesis, drawing on insights from the ethics of risk and the philosophy of emotions. It has been shown by various scholars that emotions are important determinants in risk perception. However, emotions are generally considered to be irrational states and are hence excluded from communication and political decision making about risky technologies and climate change, or they are used instrumentally to create support for a position. However, the literature on the ethics of risk shows that the dominant, technocratic approach to risk misses the normative‐ethical dimension that is inherent to decisions about acceptable risk. Emotion research shows that emotions are necessary for practical and moral decision making. These insights can be applied to communication about climate change. Emotions are necessary for understanding the moral impact of the risks of climate change, and they also paradigmatically provide for motivation. Emotions might be the missing link in effective communication about climate change.     

Risk and Climate Change: Perceptions of Key Policy Actors in Canada

This article examines factors that predict perceptions of risk associated with global climate change. The research focuses on the perceptions of those associated with climate change policy making in the prairie region of Canada. The data are from an online survey ( n = 851) of those policy actors. The analysis integrates several dominant approaches to the study of risk perception: psychometric approaches that examine the effects of cognitive structure; demographic assessments that examine, for example, differences in perception based on gender or family status; and political approaches that suggest that one's position in the policy process may affect his or her perceived risk. Attitudes toward climate change are to a degree predicted by all of these factors, but only when indirect effects are observed. Sociodemographic characteristics have little direct effect on perceived risk, but do affect general beliefs that affect risk perceptions. Perceived risk is related more strongly to these general beliefs or world views than to more specific beliefs about the effects of climate change on weather patterns. Position within the policy process also contributes to our understanding of perceptions, with industry and governmental actors demonstrating similar attitudes, which contrast with environmental groups and university researchers.     

An Evaluation of the Treatment of Risk and Uncertainties in the IPCC Reports on Climate Change

Few global threats rival global climate change in scale and potential consequence. The principal international authority assessing climate risk is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Through repeated assessments the IPCC has devoted considerable effort and interdisciplinary competence to articulating a common characterization of climate risk and uncertainties. We have reviewed the assessment and its foundation for the Fifth Assessment Reports published in 2013 and 2014, in particular the guidance note for lead authors of the fifth IPCC assessment report on consistent treatment of uncertainties. Our analysis shows that the work carried out by the ICPP is short of providing a theoretically and conceptually convincing foundation on the treatment of risk and uncertainties. The main reasons for our assessment are: (i) the concept of risk is given a too narrow definition (a function of consequences and probability/likelihood); and (ii) the reports lack precision in delineating their concepts and methods. The goal of this article is to contribute to improving the handling of uncertainty and risk in future IPCC studies, thereby obtaining a more theoretically substantiated characterization as well as enhanced scientific quality for risk analysis in this area. Several suggestions for how to improve the risk and uncertainty treatment are provided.     

Effect of Climate Change on the Concentration and Associated Risks of Vibrio Spp. in Dutch Recreational Waters

Currently, the number of reported cases of recreational‐ water‐related Vibrio illness in the Netherlands is low. However, a notable higher incidence of Vibrio infections has been observed in warm summers. In the future, such warm summers are expected to occur more often, resulting in enhanced water temperatures favoring Vibrio growth. Quantitative information on the increase in concentration of Vibrio spp. in recreational water under climate change scenarios is lacking. In this study, data on occurrence of Vibrio spp. at six different bathing sites in the Netherlands (2009–2012) were used to derive an empirical formula to predict the Vibrio concentration as a function of temperature, salinity, and pH. This formula was used to predict the effects of increased temperatures in climate change scenarios on Vibrio concentrations. For Vibrio parahaemolyticus, changes in illness risks associated with the changed concentrations were calculated as well. For an average temperature increase of 3.7 °C, these illness risks were calculated to be two to three times higher than in the current situation. Current illness risks were, varying per location, on average between 10^?4 and 10^?2 per person for an entire summer. In situations where water temperatures reached maximum values, illness risks are estimated to be up to 10^?2 and 10^?1. If such extreme situations occur more often during future summers, increased numbers of ill bathers or bathing‐water‐related illness outbreaks may be expected.     

Personal Efficacy, the Information Environment, and Attitudes Toward Global Warming and Climate Change in the United States

Despite the growing scientific consensus about the risks of global warming and climate change, the mass media frequently portray the subject as one of great scientific controversy and debate. And yet previous studies of the mass public's subjective assessments of the risks of global warming and climate change have not sufficiently examined public informedness, public confidence in climate scientists, and the role of personal efficacy in affecting global warming outcomes. By examining the results of a survey on an original and representative sample of Americans, we find that these three forces—informedness, confidence in scientists, and personal efficacy—are related in interesting and unexpected ways, and exert significant influence on risk assessments of global warming and climate change. In particular, more informed respondents both feel less personally responsible for global warming, and also show less concern for global warming. We also find that confidence in scientists has unexpected effects: respondents with high confidence in scientists feel less responsible for global warming, and also show less concern for global warming. These results have substantial implications for the interaction between scientists and the public in general, and for the public discussion of global warming and climate change in particular.     

Uncertainties in the Link Between Global Climate Change and Predicted Health Risks from Pollution: Hexachlorobenzene (HCB) Case Study Using a Fugacity Model

Industrial societies have altered the earth's environment in ways that could have important, long-term ecological, economic, and health implications. In this paper, we examine the extent to which uncertainty about global climate change could impact the precision of predictions of secondary outcomes such as health impacts of pollution. Using a model that links global climate change with predictions of chemical exposure and human health risk in the Western region of the United States of America (U.S.), we define parameter variabilities and uncertainties and we characterize the resulting outcome variance. As a case study, we consider the public health consequences from releases of hexachlorobenzene (HCB), a ubiquitous multimedia pollutant. By constructing a matrix that links global environmental change both directly and indirectly to potential human-health effects attributable to HCB released into air, soil, and water, we define critical parameter variances in the health risk estimation process. We employ a combined uncertainty/sensitivity analysis to investigate how HCB releases are affected by increasing atmospheric temperature and the accompanying climate alterations that are anticipated. We examine how such uncertainty impacts both the expected magnitude and calculational precision of potential human exposures and health effects. This assessment reveals that uncertain temperature increases of up to 5°C have little impact on either the magnitude or precision of the public-health consequences estimated under existing climate variations for HCB released into air and water in the Western region of the U.S.     

Attenuating Initial Beliefs: Increasing the Acceptance of Anthropogenic Climate Change Information by Reflecting on Values

Anthropogenic climate change information tends to be interpreted against the backdrop of initial environmental beliefs, which can lead to some people being resistant toward the information. In this article (N = 88), we examined whether self‐affirmation via reflection on personally important values could attenuate the impact of initial beliefs on the acceptance of anthropogenic climate change evidence. Our findings showed that initial beliefs about the human impact on ecological stability influenced the acceptance of information only among nonaffirmed participants. Self‐affirmed participants who were initially resistant toward the information showed stronger beliefs in the existence of climate change risks and greater acknowledgment that individual efficacy has a role to play in reducing climate change risks than did their nonaffirmed counterparts.     

Perceived Risks from Radiation and Nuclear Testing Near Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan: A Comparison Between Physicians, Scientists, and the Public

Determining the difference in perception of risk between experts, or more educated professionals, and laypeople is important so that a potential hazard can be effectively communicated to the public. Many surveys have been conducted to better understand the difference between expert and public opinions, and often laypeople exhibit higher perceptions of risk to hazards in comparison to experts. This is especially true when health risk is due to radiation, nuclear power, and nuclear waste. This article focuses on one section of a risk perception survey given to two groups of individuals with a more specialized education (scientists and physicians) and laypeople (villagers) in the Semipalatinsk region of Kazakhstan. All of these groups live near the former Soviet nuclear test site. Originally, it was expected that the scientists and physicians would have similar perceptions of radiation risk, while the public perceptions would be higher, but this was not always the case. For example, when perceptions of risk pertain to the health impacts of nuclear testing or the dose-response nature of radiation exposure, the physicians tend to agree with the laypeople, not the scientists. The villagers are always the most risk-averse group, followed by the physicians and then the scientists. These differences are likely due to different frames of reference for each of the populations.     

Valuation of childhood risk reduction: the importance of age, risk preferences, and perspective.

This article explores two problems analysts face in determining how to estimate values for children's health and safety risk reductions. The first addresses the question: Do willingness‐to‐pay estimates for health risk changes differ across children and adults and, if so, how? To answer this question, the article first examines the potential effects of age and risk preferences on willingness to pay. A summary of the literature reporting empirical evidence of differences between willingness to pay for adult health and safety risk reductions and willingness to pay for health and safety risk reductions in children is also provided. The second dimension of the problem is a more fundamental issue: Whose perspective is relevant when valuing children's health effects—society's, children's, adults‐as‐children, or parents'? Each perspective is considered, followed ultimately by the conclusion that adopting a parental perspective through an intrahousehold allocation model seems closest to meeting the needs of the estimation problem at hand. A policy example in which the choice of perspective affects the outcome of a regulatory benefit‐cost analysis rounds out the article and emphasizes the importance of perspective.     

基于成员特征及历史信息的合作意愿度迭代模型

本文从博弈论有关概念和心理学角度出发提出合作愿意度概念,并结合对群体成员特征和历史信息的考虑,构建了反映群体动态演化的合作意愿度模型;该模型克服了已有模型忽视历史信息、群体成员特征和自身的愿望以及对合作—竞争—冲突过程缺乏统一解释的局限性,揭示了群体成员达到稳定博弈均衡前调整、互动的过程;为了进一步体现模型的应用价值,我们对涉及环境和偶然(突发)事件的合作意愿度模型进行了仿真研究,并对仿真结果做了详细的分析。     

The Politicization of Risk: Party Cues,Polarization, and Public Perceptions of Climate Change Risk

Previous research shows that public perceptions of climate change risk are strongly related to the individual willingness to support climate mitigation and adaptation policy. In this article, I investigate how public perceptions of climate change risk are affected by communications from political parties and the degree of polarization among them. Specifically, using survey data from Sweden, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand, I study the relationship between party source cues, perceived polarization, and public perceptions of climate change risk. The results reveal a positive relationship between party cues and perceptions of climate change risk, indicating that individuals adjust their risk perceptions to align with their party preference. Furthermore, a negative relationship between perceived polarization and individual risk perceptions is also discovered, showing that individuals tend to be less concerned with climate change the more polarization they perceive. However, the effect of perceived polarization is found to be limited to more abstract perceptions of risk, while being unrelated to perceptions of concrete risks. Even with some contextual variance, the results generally hold up well across the four countries.     

Climate Change Beliefs and Perceptions of Weather‐Related Changes in the United Kingdom

Public perception research in different countries has suggested that real and perceived periods of high temperature strengthen people's climate change beliefs. Such findings raise questions about the climate change beliefs of people in regions with moderate climates. Relatively little is known about whether public concerns about climate change may also be associated with perceived changes in other weather‐related events, such as precipitation or flooding. We examine the relationship between perceived changes in weather‐related events and climate change beliefs among U.K. residents at a time of below‐average winter temperatures and recent flooding. National survey data (n = 1,848) revealed that heat waves and hot summers were perceived to have become less common during respondents’ lifetimes, while flooding, periods of heavy rainfall, coastal erosions, and mild winters were perceived to have increased in frequency and cold winters were perceived to be unchanged. Although perceived changes in hot‐weather‐related events were positively associated with climate change beliefs, perceived changes in wet‐weather‐related events were found to be an even stronger predictor. Self‐reported experience of “flooding in own area” and “heat‐wave discomfort” also significantly contributed to climate change beliefs. These findings highlight the importance of salient weather‐related events and experiences in the formation of beliefs about climate change. We link our findings to research in judgment and decision making, and propose that those wishing to engage with the public on the issue of climate change should not limit their focus to heat.