The Precautionary Principle Is Incoherent

This article argues that no version of the precautionary principle can be reasonably applied to decisions that may lead to fatal outcomes. In support of this strong claim, a number of desiderata are proposed, which reasonable rules for rational decision making ought to satisfy. Thereafter, two impossibility theorems are proved, showing that no version of the precautionary principle can satisfy the proposed desiderata. These theorems are directly applicable to recent discussions of the precautionary principle in medicine, biotechnology, environmental management, and related fields. The impossibility theorems do not imply, however, that the precautionary principle is of no relevance at all in policy discussions. Even if it is not a reasonable rule for rational decision making, it is possible to interpret the precautionary principle in other ways, e.g., as an argumentative tool or as an epistemic principle favoring a reversed burden of proof.     

The Precautionary Principle Has Not Been Shown to Be Incoherent: A Reply to Peterson

In this journal, I have objected to Peterson's 2006 claim that the precautionary principle is an incoherent decision rule. I defend my objections to Peterson's recent replies, and I still claim that the precautionary principle has not been shown to be incoherent.     

On the Limits of the Precautionary Principle

The precautionary principle (PP) is an influential principle of risk management. It has been widely introduced into environmental legislation, and it plays an important role in most international environmental agreements. Yet, there is little consensus on precisely how to understand and formulate the principle. In this article I prove some impossibility results for two plausible formulations of the PP as a decision‐rule. These results illustrate the difficulty in making the PP consistent with the acceptance of any tradeoffs between catastrophic risks and more ordinary goods. How one interprets these results will, however, depend on one's views and commitments. For instance, those who are convinced that the conditions in the impossibility results are requirements of rationality may see these results as undermining the rationality of the PP. But others may simply take these results to identify a set of purported rationality conditions that defenders of the PP should not accept, or to illustrate types of situations in which the principle should not be applied.     

Risk Management and the Precautionary Principle: A Fuzzy Logic Model

The aim of this article is to illustrate a procedure for applying the precautionary principle within a strategy for reducing the possibility of underestimating the effective risk caused by a phenomenon, product, or process, and of adopting insufficient risk reduction measures or overlooking their need. We start by simply defining risk as the product between the numerical expression of the adverse consequences of an event and the likelihood of its occurrence or the likelihood that such consequences will occur. Uncertainty in likelihood estimates and several key concepts inherent to the precautionary principle, such as sufficient certainty, prevention, and desired level of protection, are represented as fuzzy sets. The strategy described may be viewed as a simplified example of a precautionary decision process that has been chiefly conceived as a theoretical contribution to the debate concerning the precautionary principle, the quantification of its application, and the formal approach to such problems.     

Formalizing the Precautionary Principle Accounting for Strategic Interaction,Natural Factors,and Technological Factors

Four dimensions of the precautionary principle (PP), involving threat, uncertainty, action, and command, are formalized at the level of set theory and the level of individual players and natural and technological factors. Flow and decision diagrams with a feedback loop are developed to open up a new research agenda. The role of strategic interaction and games in the PP is underdeveloped or nonexistent in today's literature. To rectify this deficiency, six kinds of games are identified in the four PP dimensions. The games can be interlinked since player sets can overlap. Characteristics are illustrated. Accounting for strategic interaction, the article illustrates uncertainty in the PP regarding which game is played, which players participate in which game, strategy sets, payoffs, incomplete information, risk attitudes, and bounded rationality. The insurance and lottery games analyzed earlier for the safe minimum standard (SMS) for species extinction are revisited and placed into a broader context illustrating strategic interaction. Uncertainty about payoffs illustrates transformations back and forth between the chicken game, battle of the sexes, assurance game, and prisoner's dilemma.     

Application of the Precautionary Principle by Senior Policy Officials: Results of a Canadian Survey

Though use of the controversial precautionary principle in risk management has increasingly been recommended as a guide for the construction of public policy in Canada and elsewhere, there are few data available characterizing its use in risk management by senior public policymakers. Using established survey methodology we sought to investigate the perceptions and terms of application of the precautionary principle in this important subset of individuals. A total of 240 surveys were sent out to seven departments or agencies in the Canadian government. The overall survey response rate was 26.6%, and our findings need to be interpreted in the context of possible responder bias. Of respondents, the overwhelming majority perceived the precautionary principle and the management of risk as complementary, and endorsed a role for the precautionary principle as a general guideline for all risk management decisions. However, 25% of respondents responded that the lack of clarity of the definition of the principle was a limitation to its effective use. The majority of respondents viewed their own level of understanding of the precautionary principle as moderate. Risk managers appeared to favor an interpretation of the precautionary principle that was based on the seriousness and irreversibility of the threat of damage, and did not endorse as strongly the need for cost effectiveness in the measures taken as a precaution against such threats. In contrast with its perceived role as a general guideline, the application of the precautionary principle by respondents was highly variable, with >60% of respondents reporting using the precautionary principle in one-quarter or less of all risk management decisions. Several factors influenced whether the precautionary principle was applied with the perceived seriousness of the threat being considered the most influential factor. The overwhelming majority of risk managers felt that "preponderance of evidence" was the level of evidence required for precautionary action to be instituted against a serious negative event. Overall, the majority of respondents viewed the precautionary principle as having a significant and positive impact on risk management decisions. Importantly, respondents endorsed a net result of more good than harm to society when the precautionary principle was applied to the management of risk.     

Trade-offs and the precautionary principle: A lexicographic utility approach

The precautionary principle is often argued to be irrational because it cannot adequately explain how resources should be distributed across multiple possible catastrophes or between catastrophic and noncatastrophic risks. We address this problem of trade-offs by extending a recently proposed formal interpretation of the precautionary principle (PP) within a lexical utility framework and using it to prove results about which distribution of resources maximizes lexical utility when several catastrophic risks exist, given different assumptions. We also explain how our lexical utility interpretation of PP can recommend balanced distributions of resources between disaster prevention and other concerns.     

Multi‐Case Review of the Application of the Precautionary Principle in European Union Law and Case Law

The precautionary principle was formulated to provide a basis for political action to protect the environment from potentially severe or irreversible harm in circumstances of scientific uncertainty that prevent a full risk or cost‐benefit analysis. It underpins environmental law in the European Union and has been extended to include public health and consumer safety. The aim of this study was to examine how the precautionary principle has been interpreted and subsequently applied in practice, whether these applications were consistent, and whether they followed the guidance from the Commission. A review of the literature was used to develop a framework for analysis, based on three attributes: severity of potential harm, standard of evidence (or degree of uncertainty), and nature of the regulatory action. This was used to examine 15 pieces of legislation or judicial decisions. The decision whether or not to apply the precautionary principle appears to be poorly defined, with ambiguities inherent in determining what level of uncertainty and significance of hazard justifies invoking it. The cases reviewed suggest that the Commission's guidance was not followed consistently in forming legislation, although judicial decisions tended to be more consistent and to follow the guidance by requiring plausible evidence of potential hazard in order to invoke precaution.     

The Precautionary Principle and/or Risk Assessment in World Trade Organization Decisions: A Possible Role for Risk Perception

Risk analysis has been recognized and validated in World Trade Organization (WTO) decision processes. In recent years the precautionary principle has been proposed as an additional or alternative approach to standard risk assessment. The precautionary principle has also been advocated by some who see it as part of postmodern democracy in which more power is given to the public on health and safety matters relative to the judgments of technocrats. A more cynical view is that the precautionary principle is particularly championed by the European Community as a means to erect trade barriers. The WTO ruling against the European Community's trade barrier against beef from hormone-treated cattle seemed to support the use of risk assessment and appeared to reject the argument that the precautionary principle was a legitimate basis for trade barriers. However, a more recent WTO decision on asbestos contains language suggesting that the precautionary principle, in the form of taking into account public perception, may be acceptable as a basis for a trade barrier. This decision, if followed in future WTO trade disputes, such as for genetically modified foods, raises many issues central to the field of risk analysis. It is too early to tell whether the precautionary principle will become accepted in WTO decisions, either as a supplement or a substitute for standard risk assessment. But it would undermine the value of the precautionary principle if this principle were misused to justify unwarranted trade barriers.     

Analyzing Precautionary Regulation: Do Precaution,Science, and Innovation Go Together?

In this article we argue that the precautionary principle, as applied to the regulation of science and technology, cannot be considered in any general manner inconsistent with the norms and methods of scientific knowledge generation and justification. Moreover, it does not necessarily curtail scientific‐technological innovation. Our argument flows from a differentiated view of what precaution in regulation means. We first characterize several of the most relevant interpretations given to the precautionary principle in academic debate and regulatory practice. We then use examples of actual precaution‐based regulation to show that, even though science can have varying functions in different circumstances and frames, all of those interpretations recur to scientific method and knowledge, and tend to imply innovation in methods, products, and processes. In fact, the interplay of regulation and innovation in precautionary policy, at least in the case of the interpretations of precaution that our analysis takes into account, could be understood as a way of reconciling the two fundamental science and technology policy functions of promotion and control.     

Uncertain Risk Assessment and Management: Case Studies of the Application of the Precautionary Principle in Portugal

This study intends to clarify how the precautionary principle (PP) has been interpreted and applied by the courts in Portugal in the analysis of conflicts associated with uncertain and serious potential risks to human health and the environment. It also aims to contribute to the debate of when and how to apply precautionary measures. To this end, recent court cases in the areas of waste incineration, high-voltage power lines, as well as dam and wind farm construction were considered. The degree of consistency in the courts’ decisions and their reasons in the different judicial bodies was analyzed with the support of a theoretical framework based on three attributes: the level of seriousness of potential hazards, level of evidence required, and the severity of precautionary actions taken. Different positions among courts were observed, with contradictory arguments in the same case or in similar cases. A greater propensity for favorable decisions in the acceptance of restraining orders was verified in the courts of lower instances, where human health could be threatened. However, the decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court, which were always unfavorable to the restraining orders, seem to reflect the priority given to national economic and political interests over local or regional environmental interests. They may also reflect the Supreme Court's reluctancy to apply the PP in the absence of a firm legally binding PP in national legislation. To address this situation, more explicit legal requirements and criteria for the analysis of uncertain risks and the weighting of interests by area of activity are needed.     

Understanding the Risk of an Avian Flu Pandemic: Rational Waiting or Precautionary Failure?

The precautionary principle (PP) has been proposed as the proper guide for the decision-making criteria to be adopted in the face of the new catastrophic risks that have arisen in the last decades. This article puts forward a workable definition of the PP based on the so-called alpha-maximin expected utility approach, applying it to the possible outbreak of the avian flu disease among humans. Moreover, it shows how the shortage and/or lack of effective drugs against the infection of the virus A(H5N1) among humans can be considered a precautionary failure.     

Precautionary Regulation in Europe and the United States: A Quantitative Comparison

Much attention has been addressed to the question of whether Europe or the United States adopts a more precautionary stance to the regulation of potential environmental, health, and safety risks. Some commentators suggest that Europe is more risk-averse and precautionary, whereas the United States is seen as more risk-taking and optimistic about the prospects for new technology. Others suggest that the United States is more precautionary because its regulatory process is more legalistic and adversarial, while Europe is more lax and corporatist in its regulations. The flip-flop hypothesis claims that the United States was more precautionary than Europe in the 1970s and early 1980s, and that Europe has become more precautionary since then. We examine the levels and trends in regulation of environmental, health, and safety risks since 1970. Unlike previous research, which has studied only a small set of prominent cases selected nonrandomly, we develop a comprehensive list of almost 3,000 risks and code the relative stringency of regulation in Europe and the United States for each of 100 risks randomly selected from that list for each year from 1970 through 2004. Our results suggest that: (a) averaging over risks, there is no significant difference in relative precaution over the period, (b) weakly consistent with the flip-flop hypothesis, there is some evidence of a modest shift toward greater relative precaution of European regulation since about 1990, although (c) there is a diversity of trends across risks, of which the most common is no change in relative precaution (including cases where Europe and the United States are equally precautionary and where Europe or the United States has been consistently more precautionary). The overall finding is of a mixed and diverse pattern of relative transatlantic precaution over the period.     

Is the Precautionary Principle Really Incoherent?

The Precautionary Principle has been an increasingly important principle in international treaties since the 1980s. Through varying formulations, it states that when an activity can lead to a catastrophe for human health or the environment, measures should be taken to prevent it even if the cause‐and‐effect relationship is not fully established scientifically. The Precautionary Principle has been critically discussed from many sides. This article concentrates on a theoretical argument by Peterson (2006) according to which the Precautionary Principle is incoherent with other desiderata of rational decision making, and thus cannot be used as a decision rule that selects an action among several ones. I claim here that Peterson's argument fails to establish the incoherence of the Precautionary Principle, by attacking three of its premises. I argue (i) that Peterson's treatment of uncertainties lacks generality, (ii) that his Archimedian condition is problematic for incommensurability reasons, and (iii) that his explication of the Precautionary Principle is not adequate. This leads me to conjecture that the Precautionary Principle can be envisaged as a coherent decision rule, again.     

On Different Types of Uncertainties in the Context of the Precautionary Principle

Few policies for risk management have created more controversy than the precautionary principle. A main problem is the extreme number of different definitions and interpretations. Almost all definitions of the precautionary principle identify “scientific uncertainties” as the trigger or criterion for its invocation; however, the meaning of this concept is not clear. For applying the precautionary principle it is not sufficient that the threats or hazards are uncertain. A stronger requirement is needed. This article provides an in‐depth analysis of this issue. We question how the scientific uncertainties are linked to the interpretation of the probability concept, expected values, the results from probabilistic risk assessments, the common distinction between aleatory uncertainties and epistemic uncertainties, and the problem of establishing an accurate prediction model (cause‐effect relationship). A new classification structure is suggested to define what scientific uncertainties mean.     

How Much Uncertainty is Too Much and How Do We Know? A Case Example of the Assessment of Ozone Monitor Network Options

Limited time and resources usually characterize environmental decision making at policy organizations such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. In these climates, addressing uncertainty, usually considered a flaw in scientific analyses, is often avoided. However, ignoring uncertainties can result in unpleasant policy surprises. Furthermore, it is important for decisionmakers to know how defensible a chosen policy option is over other options when the uncertainties of the data are considered. The purpose of this article is to suggest an approach that is unique from other approaches in that it considers uncertainty in two specific ways-the uncertainty of stakeholder values within a particular decision context and data uncertainty in the light of the decision-contextual data-values relationship. It is the premise of this article that the interaction between data and stakeholder values is critical to how the decision options are viewed and determines the effect of data uncertainty on the relative acceptability of the decision options, making the understanding of this interaction important to decisionmakers and other stakeholders. This approach utilizes the recently developed decision analysis framework and process, multi-criteria integrated resource assessment (MIRA). This article will specifically address how MIRA can be used to help decisionmakers better understand the importance of uncertainty on the specific (i.e., decision contextual) environmental policy options that they are deliberating.     

Communicating Earthquake Preparedness: The Influence of Induced Mood,Perceived Risk,and Gain or Loss Frames on Homeowners’ Attitudes Toward General Precautionary Measures for Earthquakes

Despite global efforts to reduce seismic risk, actual preparedness levels remain universally low. Although earthquake‐resistant building design is the most efficient way to decrease potential losses, its application is not a legal requirement across all earthquake‐prone countries and even if, often not strictly enforced. Risk communication encouraging homeowners to take precautionary measures is therefore an important means to enhance a country's earthquake resilience. Our study illustrates that specific interactions of mood, perceived risk, and frame type significantly affect homeowners’ attitudes toward general precautionary measures for earthquakes. The interdependencies of the variables mood, risk information, and frame type were tested in an experimental 2 × 2 × 2 design (N = 156). Only in combination and not on their own, these variables effectively influence attitudes toward general precautionary measures for earthquakes. The control variables gender, “trait anxiety” index, and alteration of perceived risk adjust the effect. Overall, the group with the strongest attitudes toward general precautionary actions for earthquakes are homeowners with induced negative mood who process high‐risk information and gain‐framed messages. However, the conditions comprising induced negative mood, low‐risk information and loss‐frame and induced positive mood, low‐risk information and gain‐framed messages both also significantly influence homeowners’ attitudes toward general precautionary measures for earthquakes. These results mostly confirm previous findings in the field of health communication. For practitioners, our study emphasizes that carefully compiled communication measures are a powerful means to encourage precautionary attitudes among homeowners, especially for those with an elevated perceived risk.     

Defining Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference: The Role of Science, the Limits of Science

Defining "dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" in the context of Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) presents a complex challenge for those developing long-term climate policy. Natural science has a key role to play in quantifying vulnerabilities of elements of the Earth system and estimating the risks from a changing climate. But attempts to interpret Article 2 will inevitably draw on understanding from social science, psychology, law, and ethics. Here I consider the limits of science in defining climate "danger" by focusing on the potential disintegration of the major ice sheets as an example of an extreme impact. I show that considerations of timescale, uncertainty, and learning preclude a definition of danger drawn purely from natural science. Decision makers will be particularly challenged by one characteristic of global problems: answers to some scientific questions become less accurate over decadal timescales, meandering toward the wrong answer, a feature I call negative learning. I argue for a precautionary approach to Article 2 that would be based initially on current, limited scientific understanding of the future of the ice sheets.     

Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case

This paper extends the revelation principle to environments in which the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism. We show that he may optimally use a direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strategy for the agent. In contrast with the conventional revelation principle, however, the agent may not use this strategy with probability one. Our results apply to contracting problems between a principal and a single agent. By reducing such problems to well‐defined programming problems they provide a basic tool for studying imperfect commitment.