Biospheric values as predictor of climate change risk perception: A multinational investigation

Climate change is one of the big challenges of our time. A better understanding of how individuals form their evaluation of the risk related to climate change seems to be key to win broad support for climate change mitigation efforts. Extant research indicates that biospheric values (BV) are an important antecedent of individuals’ perception of the risk and consequences related to climate change. However, risk perception scholars have only recently started to study how BV relate to individuals’ climate change risk perception (CCRP) and much is still to be learned about this relationship. The present study contributes to this growing literature by studying the BV–CCRP relationship in a multinational context. The results suggest that the BV – CCRP relationship varies in strength between different countries. These differences can be explained in part by societies’ cultural leanings (i.e., individualism vs. collectivism) and societies’ wealth. The present research adds to our understanding of why individuals in different countries perceive climate change related risk differently and how this perception is shaped differently by biospheric values in different countries. In this way, the findings help to build a more nuanced theory of how CCRP are formed. The presented results also have implications for policymakers and NGOs who wish to increase individuals’ engagement with climate change and its consequences in different populations. In particular, the findings suggests that it might be necessary to use different strategies in different societies to achieve a greater awareness of climate change related risks.     

Efficacy,Action, and Support for Reducing Climate Change Risks

A growing body of research demonstrates that believing action to reduce the risks of climate change is both possible (self‐efficacy) and effective (response efficacy) is essential to motivate and sustain risk mitigation efforts. Despite this potentially critical role of efficacy beliefs, measures and their use vary wildly in climate change risk perception and communication research, making it hard to compare and learn from efficacy studies. To address this problem and advance our understanding of efficacy beliefs, this article makes three contributions. First, we present a theoretically motivated approach to measuring climate change mitigation efficacy, in light of diverse proposed, perceived, and previously researched strategies. Second, we test this in two national survey samples (Amazon's Mechanical Turk N = 405, GfK Knowledge Panel N = 1,820), demonstrating largely coherent beliefs by level of action and discrimination between types of efficacy. Four additive efficacy scales emerge: personal self‐efficacy, personal response efficacy, government and collective self‐efficacy, and government and collective response efficacy. Third, we employ the resulting efficacy scales in mediation models to test how well efficacy beliefs predict climate change policy support, controlling for specific knowledge, risk perceptions, and ideology, and allowing for mediation by concern. Concern fully mediates the relatively strong effects of perceived risk on policy support, but only partly mediates efficacy beliefs. Stronger government and collective response efficacy beliefs and personal self‐efficacy beliefs are both directly and indirectly associated with greater support for reducing the risks of climate change, even after controlling for ideology and causal beliefs about climate change.     

Cognitive Mapping Tools: Review and Risk Management Needs

Risk managers are increasingly interested in incorporating stakeholder beliefs and other human factors into the planning process. Effective risk assessment and management requires understanding perceptions and beliefs of involved stakeholders, and how these beliefs give rise to actions that influence risk management decisions. Formal analyses of risk manager and stakeholder cognitions represent an important first step. Techniques for diagramming stakeholder mental models provide one tool for risk managers to better understand stakeholder beliefs and perceptions concerning risk, and to leverage this new understanding in developing risk management strategies. This article reviews three methodologies for assessing and diagramming stakeholder mental models—decision‐analysis‐based mental modeling, concept mapping, and semantic web analysis—and assesses them with regard to their ability to address risk manager needs.     

Efficacy Foundations for Risk Communication: How People Think About Reducing the Risks of Climate Change

Believing action to reduce the risks of climate change is both possible (self‐efficacy) and effective (response efficacy) is essential to motivate and sustain risk mitigation efforts, according to current risk communication theory. Although the public recognizes the dangers of climate change, and is deluged with lists of possible mitigative actions, little is known about public efficacy beliefs in the context of climate change. Prior efficacy studies rely on conflicting constructs and measures of efficacy, and links between efficacy and risk management actions are muddled. As a result, much remains to learn about how laypersons think about the ease and effectiveness of potential mitigative actions. To bring clarity and inform risk communication and management efforts, we investigate how people think about efficacy in the context of climate change risk management by analyzing unprompted and prompted beliefs from two national surveys (N = 405, N = 1,820). In general, respondents distinguish little between effective and ineffective climate strategies. While many respondents appreciate that reducing fossil fuel use is an effective risk mitigation strategy, overall assessments reflect persistent misconceptions about climate change causes, and uncertainties about the effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies. Our findings suggest targeting climate change risk communication and management strategies to (1) address gaps in people's existing mental models of climate action, (2) leverage existing public understanding of both potentially effective mitigation strategies and the collective action dilemma at the heart of climate change action, and (3) take into account ideologically driven reactions to behavior change and government action framed as climate action.     

Rural Nevada and Climate Change: Vulnerability,Beliefs, and Risk Perception

In this article, we present the results of a study investigating the influence of vulnerability to climate change as a function of physical vulnerability, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity on climate change risk perception. In 2008/2009, we surveyed Nevada ranchers and farmers to assess their climate change‐related beliefs, and risk perceptions, political orientations, and socioeconomic characteristics. Ranchers’ and farmers’ sensitivity to climate change was measured through estimating the proportion of their household income originating from highly scarce water‐dependent agriculture to the total income. Adaptive capacity was measured as a combination of the Social Status Index and the Poverty Index. Utilizing water availability and use, and population distribution GIS databases; we assessed water resource vulnerability in Nevada by zip code as an indicator of physical vulnerability to climate change. We performed correlation tests and multiple regression analyses to examine the impact of vulnerability and its three distinct components on risk perception. We find that vulnerability is not a significant determinant of risk perception. Physical vulnerability alone also does not impact risk perception. Both sensitivity and adaptive capacity increase risk perception. While age is not a significant determinant of it, gender plays an important role in shaping risk perception. Yet, general beliefs such as political orientations and climate change‐specific beliefs such as believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate change and connecting the locally observed impacts (in this case drought) to climate change are the most prominent determinants of risk perception.     

The Roles of Group Membership, Beliefs, and Norms in Ecological Risk Perception

Variability in ecological risk perceptions was investigated by surveying members of four stakeholder groups commonly involved in environmental policy debates. Fifty-six individuals from government, industry, environmental, and general-public groups completed a risk-perception survey in which they evaluated 34 environmental hazards on 17 attributes and also evaluated the riskiness and acceptability of each hazard. In addition, participants reported their environmental beliefs and norms using Dunlap et al.'s revised New Ecological Paradigm Scale and modified versions of Schwartz's Awareness of Consequences and Personal Norms Scales. Group membership was predictive of participants' scores on the belief and norm scales. Factor analysis of attribute ratings (averaged across participants) revealed the anticipated three oblique factors: ecological impacts, scientific understanding, and aesthetic impacts. Factor patterns were very similar for the four stakeholder groups. Factors from the aggregate analysis were predictive of individuals' riskiness judgments, but these relationships were moderated by participants' group membership, beliefs, and norms. Compared to members of other groups, members of the general public placed less emphasis on ecological impacts and more emphasis on the other two factors when judging the ecological riskiness of hazards. To our knowledge, these results represent the first formal tests of interactions between hazard characteristics and participant characteristics in determining riskiness judgments, and illustrate how traditional psychometric analyses can be successfully coupled with individual-difference measures to improve the understanding of risk perception.     

Identifying and Structuring the Objectives of Terrorists

The risk of terrorism is of great concern to many countries and significant resources are spent to counter this threat. A better understanding of the motivation of terrorists and their reasons for selecting certain modes and targets of attack can help improve the decisions to allocate resources in the fight against terrorism. The fundamental question addressed in this article is: “What do terrorists want?” We take the view that terrorists’ preferences for actions are based on their values and beliefs. An important missing piece in our knowledge of terrorists’ preferences is an understanding of their values. This article uses a novel approach to determine these values and state them as objectives, using principles from decision analysis and value‐focused thinking. Instead of interviewing decisionmakers and stakeholders, as would be normal in decision analysis, we extract the values of terrorists by examining their own writings and verbal statements. To illustrate the approach, we extract the values of Al‐Qaeda and structure them in terms of strategic, fundamental, and means objectives. These objectives are interrelated through a means‐ends network. This information is useful for understanding terrorists’ motivations, intent, and likely actions, as well as for developing policies to counter terrorism at its root causes.     

Empirical Analysis of Farmers' Drought Risk Perception: Objective Factors,Personal Circumstances,and Social Influence

Drought‐induced water shortage and salinization are a global threat to agricultural production. With climate change, drought risk is expected to increase as drought events are assumed to occur more frequently and to become more severe. The agricultural sector's adaptive capacity largely depends on farmers’ drought risk perceptions. Understanding the formation of farmers’ drought risk perceptions is a prerequisite to designing effective and efficient public drought risk management strategies. Various strands of literature point at different factors shaping individual risk perceptions. Economic theory points at objective risk variables, whereas psychology and sociology identify subjective risk variables. This study investigates and compares the contribution of objective and subjective factors in explaining farmers’ drought risk perception by means of survey data analysis. Data on risk perceptions, farm characteristics, and various other personality traits were collected from farmers located in the southwest Netherlands. From comparing the explanatory power of objective and subjective risk factors in separate models and a full model of risk perception, it can be concluded that farmers’ risk perceptions are shaped by both rational and emotional factors. In a full risk perception model, being located in an area with external water supply, owning fields with salinization issues, cultivating drought‐/salt‐sensitive crops, farm revenue, drought risk experience, and perceived control are significant explanatory variables of farmers’ drought risk perceptions.     

Indiscriminate,Irrelevant, and Sometimes Wrong: Causal Misconceptions about Climate Change

Prior research demonstrates widespread persistence of beliefs about climate change causes and risks that are arguably misconceptions. They include believing pollution causes climate change, believing ozone depletion causes climate change, the combination of these two “green beliefs,” referred to as environmental problems, and believing natural climate variation significantly contributes to current climate trends. Each of these causal beliefs has the potential to weaken or divert support away from effective climate change risk mitigation policies. To assess this potential, we explore the nature and prevalence of these beliefs in the United States with a national sample of interviews (N = 77) and two national surveys (N = 1,013, N = 1,820), and apply regression and mediation analyses to explore whether they explain any of the variation in individuals’ concern or support for policy to mitigate climate change. Adherence to these beliefs—which reflect a variety of misconceptions illustrated in the interviews—differs by political ideology but is common, with over a third of interviewees mentioning one or more. Controlling for general knowledge, political ideology, and other factors, misconceptions about environmental problems are still associated directly with support for climate change policies. On average adherence to the belief that environmental problems cause climate change is associated with a 25% higher probability of policy support. In contrast, believing natural climate variability is a major recent cause of climate change is associated with a 7% lower probability of supporting climate policy, even after controlling for political ideology and other knowledge about climate change.     

Recollection Bias and Its Underpinnings: Lessons from Terrorism Risk Assessments

Recollection bias is the phenomenon whereby people who observe a highly unexpected event hold current risk beliefs about a similar event that are no higher than their recollection of their prior beliefs. This article replicates and extends the authors’ previous study of recollection bias in relation to individuals’ perceptions of the risks of terrorism attacks. Over 60% of respondents in a national U.S. sample of over 900 adults believe that the current risk of a future terrorist attack by either an airplane or in a public setting is no higher than they recall having believed, respectively, before the 9/11 attack and before the Boston Marathon bombing. By contrast, a rational Bayesian model would update to a higher currently assessed risk of these previously uncontemplated events. Recollection bias is a persistent trait: individuals who exhibited this bias for the 9/11 attack exhibited it for the Boston Marathon bombing. Only one‐fifth of respondents are free of any type of recollection bias. Recollection bias is negatively correlated with absolute levels of risk belief. Recollection bias in relation to highly unexpected terrorist events—the belief that perceived risks did not increase after the surprise occurrence—dampens support for a variety of anti‐terrorism measures, controlling for the level of risk beliefs and demographic factors. Persistent recollection bias for both 9/11 and the Boston Marathon bombing is especially influential in diminishing support for protective policy measures, such as surveillance cameras in public places. Given that public attitudes influence policy, educating the public about risk is critical.     

Climate Change Beliefs and Perceptions of Weather‐Related Changes in the United Kingdom

Public perception research in different countries has suggested that real and perceived periods of high temperature strengthen people's climate change beliefs. Such findings raise questions about the climate change beliefs of people in regions with moderate climates. Relatively little is known about whether public concerns about climate change may also be associated with perceived changes in other weather‐related events, such as precipitation or flooding. We examine the relationship between perceived changes in weather‐related events and climate change beliefs among U.K. residents at a time of below‐average winter temperatures and recent flooding. National survey data (n = 1,848) revealed that heat waves and hot summers were perceived to have become less common during respondents’ lifetimes, while flooding, periods of heavy rainfall, coastal erosions, and mild winters were perceived to have increased in frequency and cold winters were perceived to be unchanged. Although perceived changes in hot‐weather‐related events were positively associated with climate change beliefs, perceived changes in wet‐weather‐related events were found to be an even stronger predictor. Self‐reported experience of “flooding in own area” and “heat‐wave discomfort” also significantly contributed to climate change beliefs. These findings highlight the importance of salient weather‐related events and experiences in the formation of beliefs about climate change. We link our findings to research in judgment and decision making, and propose that those wishing to engage with the public on the issue of climate change should not limit their focus to heat.     

Should I Stay or Should I Go Now? Or Should I Wait and See? Influences on Wildfire Evacuation Decisions

As climate change has contributed to longer fire seasons and populations living in fire‐prone ecosystems increase, wildfires have begun to affect a growing number of people. As a result, interest in understanding the wildfire evacuation decision process has increased. Of particular interest is understanding why some people leave early, some choose to stay and defend their homes, and others wait to assess conditions before making a final decision. Individuals who tend to wait and see are of particular concern given the dangers of late evacuation. To understand what factors might influence different decisions, we surveyed homeowners in three areas in the United States that recently experienced a wildfire. The Protective Action Decision Model was used to identify a suite of factors previously identified as potentially relevant to evacuation decisions. Our results indicate that different beliefs about the efficacy of a particular response or action (evacuating or staying to defend), differences in risk attitudes, and emphasis on different cues to act (e.g., official warnings, environmental cues) are key factors underlying different responses. Further, latent class analysis indicates there are two general classes of individuals: those inclined to evacuate and those inclined to stay, and that a substantial portion of each class falls into the wait and see category.     

Salient Beliefs About Earthquake Hazards and Household Preparedness

Prior research has found little or no direct link between beliefs about earthquake risk and household preparedness. Furthermore, only limited work has been conducted on how people's beliefs influence the nature and number of preparedness measures adopted. To address this gap, 48 qualitative interviews were undertaken with residents in three urban locations in New Zealand subject to seismic risk. The study aimed to identify the diverse hazard and preparedness‐related beliefs people hold and to articulate how these are influenced by public education to encourage preparedness. The study also explored how beliefs and competencies at personal, social, and environmental levels interact to influence people's risk management choices. Three main categories of beliefs were found: hazard beliefs; preparedness beliefs; and personal beliefs. Several salient beliefs found previously to influence the preparedness process were confirmed by this study, including beliefs related to earthquakes being an inevitable and imminent threat, self‐efficacy, outcome expectancy, personal responsibility, responsibility for others, and beliefs related to denial, fatalism, normalization bias, and optimistic bias. New salient beliefs were also identified (e.g., preparedness being a “way of life”), as well as insight into how some of these beliefs interact within the wider informational and societal context.     

Risk and Climate Change: Perceptions of Key Policy Actors in Canada

This article examines factors that predict perceptions of risk associated with global climate change. The research focuses on the perceptions of those associated with climate change policy making in the prairie region of Canada. The data are from an online survey ( n = 851) of those policy actors. The analysis integrates several dominant approaches to the study of risk perception: psychometric approaches that examine the effects of cognitive structure; demographic assessments that examine, for example, differences in perception based on gender or family status; and political approaches that suggest that one's position in the policy process may affect his or her perceived risk. Attitudes toward climate change are to a degree predicted by all of these factors, but only when indirect effects are observed. Sociodemographic characteristics have little direct effect on perceived risk, but do affect general beliefs that affect risk perceptions. Perceived risk is related more strongly to these general beliefs or world views than to more specific beliefs about the effects of climate change on weather patterns. Position within the policy process also contributes to our understanding of perceptions, with industry and governmental actors demonstrating similar attitudes, which contrast with environmental groups and university researchers.     

The Politicization of Risk: Party Cues,Polarization, and Public Perceptions of Climate Change Risk

Previous research shows that public perceptions of climate change risk are strongly related to the individual willingness to support climate mitigation and adaptation policy. In this article, I investigate how public perceptions of climate change risk are affected by communications from political parties and the degree of polarization among them. Specifically, using survey data from Sweden, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand, I study the relationship between party source cues, perceived polarization, and public perceptions of climate change risk. The results reveal a positive relationship between party cues and perceptions of climate change risk, indicating that individuals adjust their risk perceptions to align with their party preference. Furthermore, a negative relationship between perceived polarization and individual risk perceptions is also discovered, showing that individuals tend to be less concerned with climate change the more polarization they perceive. However, the effect of perceived polarization is found to be limited to more abstract perceptions of risk, while being unrelated to perceptions of concrete risks. Even with some contextual variance, the results generally hold up well across the four countries.     

Risk Perception and Disaster Preparedness in Immigrants and Canadian‐Born Adults: Analysis of a National Survey on Similarities and Differences

Research has documented that immigrants tend to experience more negative consequences from natural disasters compared to native‐born individuals, although research on how immigrants perceive and respond to natural disaster risks is sparse. We investigated how risk perception and disaster preparedness for natural disasters in immigrants compared to Canadian‐born individuals as justifications for culturally‐adapted risk communication and management. To this end, we analyzed the ratings on natural disaster risk perception beliefs and preparedness behaviors from a nationally representative survey (N = 1,089). Factor analyses revealed three underlying psychological dimensions of risk perception: external responsibility for disaster management, self‐preparedness responsibility, and illusiveness of preparedness. Although immigrants and Canadian‐born individuals shared the three‐factor structure, there were differences in the salience of five risk perception beliefs. Despite these differences, immigrants and Canadian‐born individuals were similar in the level of risk perception dimensions and disaster preparedness. Regression analyses revealed self‐preparedness responsibility and external responsibility for disaster management positively predicted disaster preparedness whereas illusiveness of preparedness negatively predicted disaster preparedness in both groups. Our results showed that immigrants’ risk perception and disaster preparedness were comparable to their Canadian‐born counterparts. That is, immigrant status did not necessarily yield differences in risk perception and disaster preparedness. These social groups may benefit from a risk communication and management strategy that addresses these risk perception dimensions to increase disaster preparedness. Given the diversity of the immigrant population, the model remains to be tested by further population segmentation.     

Attenuating Initial Beliefs: Increasing the Acceptance of Anthropogenic Climate Change Information by Reflecting on Values

Anthropogenic climate change information tends to be interpreted against the backdrop of initial environmental beliefs, which can lead to some people being resistant toward the information. In this article (N = 88), we examined whether self‐affirmation via reflection on personally important values could attenuate the impact of initial beliefs on the acceptance of anthropogenic climate change evidence. Our findings showed that initial beliefs about the human impact on ecological stability influenced the acceptance of information only among nonaffirmed participants. Self‐affirmed participants who were initially resistant toward the information showed stronger beliefs in the existence of climate change risks and greater acknowledgment that individual efficacy has a role to play in reducing climate change risks than did their nonaffirmed counterparts.     

Confluence and Contours: Reflexive Management of Environmental Risk

Government institutions have responsibilities to distribute risk management funds meaningfully and to be accountable for their choices. We took a macro‐level sociological approach to understanding the role of government in managing environmental risks, and insights from micro‐level psychology to examine individual‐level risk‐related perceptions and beliefs. Survey data from 2,068 U.K. citizens showed that lay people's funding preferences were associated positively with beliefs about responsibility and trust, yet associations with perception varied depending on risk type. Moreover, there were risk‐specific differences in the funding preferences of the lay sample and 29 policymakers. A laboratory‐based study of 109 participants examined funding allocation in more detail through iterative presentation of expert information. Quantitative and qualitative data revealed a meso‐level framework comprising three types of decisionmakers who varied in their willingness to change funding allocation preferences following expert information: adaptors, responders, and resistors. This research highlights the relevance of integrated theoretical approaches to understanding the policy process, and the benefits of reflexive dialogue to managing environmental risks.     

Adoption of Individual Flood Damage Mitigation Measures in New York City: An Extension of Protection Motivation Theory

This study offers insights into factors of influence on the implementation of flood damage mitigation measures by more than 1,000 homeowners who live in flood‐prone areas in New York City. Our theoretical basis for explaining flood preparedness decisions is protection motivation theory, which we extend using a variety of other variables that can have an important influence on individual decision making under risk, such as risk attitudes, time preferences, social norms, trust, and local flood risk management policies. Our results in relation to our main hypothesis are as follows. Individuals who live in high flood risk zones take more flood‐proofing measures in their home than individuals in low‐risk zones, which suggests the former group has a high threat appraisal. With regard to coping appraisal variables, we find that a high response efficacy and a high self‐efficacy play an important role in taking flood damage mitigation measures, while perceived response cost does not. In addition, a variety of behavioral characteristics influence individual decisions to flood‐proof homes, such as risk attitudes, time preferences, and private values of being well prepared for flooding. Investments in elevating one's home are mainly influenced by building code regulations and are negatively related with expectations of receiving federal disaster relief. We discuss a variety of policy recommendations to improve individual flood preparedness decisions, including incentives for risk reduction through flood insurance, and communication campaigns focused on coping appraisals and informing people about flood risk they face over long time horizons.