The poor as a “perfect contraceptive population” and zero population growth

A goal of the federal family planning program is to enable women to have only those children they want, with priority given to the poor. Is that compatible with the goal of those who want zero population growth? This analysis shows that prevention of all unwanted births to women in low-income families would have yielded completed fertility much above that required for zero population growth.     

Future population growth: researchers in three countries quantify causes and propose policies

This article discusses Population Council analyses conducted by social scientists from India, Kenya, and the Philippines. These scientists agreed that population momentum would continue to increase population size, and that governments must strengthen and create a range of economic, health, and social programs and policies to slow population growth. Multiple approaches will be needed. John Bongaarts is credited with being the first to identify the key role of population momentum and to decompose growth into unwanted fertility, high desired fertility, and population momentum. Unwanted fertility is responsible for about 19% of projected population growth in India, 26% in Kenya, and 16% in the Philippines. High wanted fertility accounts for 20% of future growth in India, 6% in Kenya, and 19% in the Philippines. Population momentum can account for under 50% or over 90% of growth. Unwanted fertility can be addressed by fulfilling unmet need and increasing knowledge of methods, reducing the fear of side effects and disapproval, and eliminating poor service. Family planning programs need to be strengthened and integrated with maternal and child health services. Preferred and actual family sizes can be reduced by lowering infant mortality by means of increasing infant and child health services and girls' educational attainment. Population momentum can be addressed by delaying age at marriage and childbearing through improving social conditions. Investments in human development through education, training, and income generation can create the conditions for slowing population growth. Countries should decompose population growth into its components of unwanted and high wanted fertility and population momentum as a means of distributing resources most effectively.     

Does low fertility call for new policies in some Asian countries?

Over the past 2 decades, Japan, China, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea have completed a demographic transition from high birth and death rates and runaway population growth to reduced fertility and mortality and population growth approaching replacement levels. Among the outcomes of fertility decline, 3 have particularly far reaching effects: 1) Changes in family types and structures. Marriage and family formation are postponed, childbearing is compressed into a narrow reproductive span that begins later and ends earlier, and higher-order births become rare. Large families are replaced by small ones, and joint and extended families tend to be replaced by nuclear families. 2) Shifts in the proportions of young and old. Declining fertility means that the population as a whole becomes older. Decreases in the proportion of children provides an opportunity to increase the coverage of education. Increases in the proportion of the elderly means higher medical costs and social and economic problems about care of the aged. 3) Changes in the work force. There is concern that low fertility and shortages of workers will cause investment labor-intensive industries to shift to countries with labor surpluses. Another outcome may be an increase in female participation in the work force. The potential consequences of rapid fertility decline have sparked debate among population experts and policy makers throughout Asia. Current family planning programs will emphasize: 1) offering a choice of methods to fit individual preferences; 2) strengthening programs for sexually active unmarried people; 3) encouraging child spacing and reproductive choice rather than simply limiting the number of births; 4) making information available on the side effects of various family planning methods; 5) providing special information and services to introduce new methods; and 6) promoting the maternal and child health benefits of breast feeding and birth spacing.     

The difference in unwanted births between blacks and whites

Blacks are more likely than whites to have unwanted births. A common explanation for that difference is that blacks use less effective contraceptive methods, use contraception less effectively, and use contraception less often than whites. Analysis of data from 17 cities in our family planning evaluation project suggested that, among women living in low-income neighborhoods, the black-white difference in unwanted births was not due to (1) blacks reaching desired completed parity at younger ages than whites, (2) differences in age or parity in our black and white samples, (3) black-white differences in current use of physician-administered contraception, or (4) blacks being more likely than whites to adopt physician-administered contraception after having an unwanted birth. Black-white differences which might have contributed to relatively more unwanted births among blacks were (1) blacks desired fewer children, (2) blacks were less likely than whites to use nonphysician-administered methods and more likely than whites to use no contraception, and (3) blacks had higher failure rates than whites subsequent to the adoption of physician-administered methods and when not using those methods. Comparisons are made with the 1965 and 1970 National Fertility Studies, and program implications of the findings discussed.     

Family composition preferences in a developing culture: The case of Taiwan, 1973

Abstract As fertility comes increasingly under voluntary control in a developing society, it can be argued that individual desires or preferences about children will become more salient and more significant for eventual fertility. Hence, the study of preferences is increasingly important as contraceptive use is extended and results in decreasing the number of unwanted births.(1) Further changes in fertility then depend on changes in preferences. The assumption is that people will at least try to achieve the families they want, if the means to do so are available. The fact that contraception is used at all is some evidence of the soundness of this assumption, although it should be recognized that family size desires operate in a complex of preferences, under varying degrees of conflict and control. To expect a one-to-one relationship between attitudes or preferences and overt behaviour would be simplistic.     

The estimation of Unwanted Fertility

The estimation of unwanted fertility is a major objective of demographic surveys, including DHS surveys conducted in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Levels and trends in unwanted fertility are important input to the formulation of population policy and the evaluation of family planning programs. Yet existing methods for estimating unwanted fertility are known to be defective, among other reasons because they rely on subjective data whose validity and reliability are questionable. In this article, we propose a new estimator of unwanted fertility-the "aggregate prospective estimator"--so named because it depends on the stated preference for another child at the time of the survey, the fertility-desires item consistently shown to possess the highest validity and reliability. Under reasonable assumptions, the aggregate prospective estimator produces less biased estimates of unwanted fertility than the most widely used existing methods. The new estimator has the limitation of generating only aggregate-level estimates, but such estimates are the primary data for policy formulation and program evaluation. The new estimator is presented in this article, along with an evaluation of its underlying assumptions and its sensitivity to several sources of error. In an illustrative application to recent DHS data from six countries, the new estimator yields substantially higher estimates of unwanted fertility than existing methods in all six countries.     

Another Gendered Demographic Dividend: Adjusting to a Future without Sons

Sonless families may pose a gendered demographic dividend. As fertility declines, families with only daughters are likely to grow. In turn, patriarchal family systems may weaken when many families are unable to engage in patriarchal practices. I examine some of these theorized dynamics in India. Sonless families did grow as fertility declined, reaching 10 percent in India as a whole in 2015 and approaching 20 percent in states with earlier fertility declines. I also identify a substantial influence of children's sex on mothers’ expectations of old-age support. Using panel data from the India Human Development Survey, I compare women's expectations after they had children to earlier expectations when they did not yet have children. Women with sons kept or further embraced patriarchal expectations that a son would provide support. Sonless mothers largely gave up patriarchal expectations, turning to daughters or away from children altogether.     

Sex preference and fertility: what is the link?

It is argued that investment in programs for changing attitudes toward sex preference may not have the greatest impact on reducing fertility or increasing fertility control. Arnold's new method of analysis of determining sex preference was applied to data from a 1977 Egyptian survey of 36,000 rural households in Menoufia Governorate. Findings indicated that couples increased their use of modern contraceptives in direct proportion to an increase in the number of sons. Arnold determined that a large majority of all couples would have at least one boy early in their childbearing years. Thus sex preference would not have a large effect on fertility. Arnold's analysis among 27 countries found that without any sex preference, contraceptive usage would increase by an average of less than 3.7 percentage points. Arnold found that sex preference was strongest in Asia, particularly in South Korea and Taiwan that already have reduced fertility levels. In Africa, where fertility is high, the total elimination of sex preference would have only a 2.9 percentage point difference in contraceptive use. Sex preference had small effects on the percent of women who practice contraception, the percent who desire no more children, and the average number of additional children wanted. For example, in Bangladesh having no sex preference would show a percentage difference of 1.6 percentage points for contraceptive use, 4.7 percentage points difference for women desiring no more children, and -0.1 percentage point difference for the average number of additional children wanted. The effect of having no sex preference was strongest in India compared with Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, Thailand, Ghana, Kenya, Costa Rica, Haiti, Paraguay, and Peru. The effect of no sex preference in India would have the respective percentage point effect of 3.7, 8.9, and -0.2. Public policy should be directed to information, education, and communication with other social goals.     

Fertility and eugenics: Singapore's population policies

Singapore, after serving for two decades as a model for Third World birth control and economic development programs, is now abandoning its earlier population policies in favor of encouraging dramatic population growth. The initial eugenics-based program introduced in 1984 sought increased fertility for university-educated women and provided major subsidies for the voluntary sterilization of poor and uneducated parents. These much publicized and internationally discussed programs have now been abandoned in favor of new population programs seeking to encourage fertility in lower as well as better educated groups. A forty percent population increase is being set as a goal. To accomplish this the effective Singapore Family Planning and Population Board has been abolished and Housing Development Board policies are in the process of being reversed to encourage rather than discourage fertility.The research reported here was partially funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and by a grant from the Population Council's International Research Awards Program on the Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries, a program funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.     

New strategies for slowing population growth

Growth of world population over the next 100 years, until the year 2100, will produce an estimated 11.5 billion people. The past focus on reducing rapid population growth exclusively through family planning has not been sufficient. Population policy needs to be broadened to include health care, education, and poverty reduction. The population policy recommendations of Population Council Vice-President John Bongaarts and Senior Associate Judith Bruce were to reduce unwanted pregnancies by expanding services that promote reproductive choice and better health, to reduce the demand for large families by creating favorable conditions for small families, and to invest in adolescents. The Population Council 1994 publication "Population Growth and Our Caring Capacity" outlined these issues. Another similar article by John Bongaarts appeared in the journal "Science" in 1994. In developing countries, excluding China, about 25% of all births are unwanted; 25 million abortions are performed for unwanted pregnancies. The provision of comprehensive family planning programs will go a long way toward achieving a reduction in unwanted pregnancies. In addition, changes are needed in male control over female sexuality and fertility and in cultural beliefs that are obstacles to use of contraception. Stabilization of population at 2 children per family will not occur unless there is a desire for small families. In most less developed countries, large family sizes are preferred. Governments have an opportunity to adopt policies that reduce economic and social risks of having small families. This can be accomplished through the widespread education of children, a reduction in infant and child mortality, improvement in the economic and social and legal status of women, and provision of equitable gender relations in marriage and child rearing. The rights of children to be wanted, planned, and adequately cared for need to be supported. These aforementioned measures will help to reduce fertility, provide support for small families, and justify investment in social development. Population momentum will keep population growing for some time even with replacement level fertility. Investment in adolescents through enhancement of self-esteem and promotion of later childbearing can lengthen the span between generations and slow population momentum. Population policies will be more effective when human rights are protected.     

The Effect on Fertility of the 2003–2011 War in Iraq

This article provides the first detailed account of recent fertility trends in Iraq, with a particular focus on the changes resulting from the 2003–2011 war and the factors underlying them. The study is based on retrospective birth history data from the 2006 and 2011 Iraq Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (I‐MICS). Estimates from the two surveys indicate that total fertility remained stable from 1997 to 2010, at about 4.5 children per woman. However, examination of the age patterns of fertility reveals an abrupt shift in the timing of births, with adolescent fertility rising by over 30 percent soon after the onset of the war. A decomposition analysis shows that the rise in early childbearing is due to an increased prevalence of early marriage among less‐educated women. The prevalence of early marriage and childbearing among women with secondary or higher education is relatively low and has not increased after 2003.     

Does welfare reform affect fertility? Evidence from the UK

This paper provides evidence on the effect of welfare reform on fertility, focusing on UK reforms in 1999 that increased per-child spending by 50% in real terms. We use a difference-in-differences approach, exploiting the fact that the reforms were targeted at low-income households. The reforms were likely to differentially affect the fertility of women in couples and single women because of the opportunity cost effects of the welfare-to-work element. We find no increase in births among single women, but evidence to support an increase in births (by around 15%) among coupled women.     

The fertility of two-generation urbanites

In this paper it is argued that in studies of urban fertility, the relationship between socio-economic variables and fertility has been obscured by the presence of rural migrants in the populations under investigation. Accordingly, data obtained from families of completed fertility in six probability samples of metropolitan Detroit are divided into two groups, farm migrants and two-generation urbanites.

In general, the socio-economic differences in fertility observed among the “pure” urban types in Detroit are found to be small and inconsistent, most of them being statistically insignificant. The inverse fertility pattern found in the total Detroit population is attributed to : (a) the overrepresentation of farm migrants (who have high fertility) in the lowest social and economic positions in the city, and (b) the pronounced inverse pattern of fertility among the farm migrants.

It is suggested that the absence of an inverse fertility pattern among twogeneration urbanites and its presence among the farm migrants can be attributed to differences in family organization.     

The differential attainment of family size goals by Race

Summary The 1973 U.S. National Survey of Family Growth is used to examine the effects of removing number and timing failures from the reproductive histories of various cohorts of white and black married women. Blacks are more fertile than whites primarily because of their greater unwanted fertility. Removing number and timing failures from the past reproductive histories of American women would have reduced their fertility considerably. These reductions would have been greater for blacks than for whites and would be greater if some wanted pregnancies had continued to terminate in foetal loss.     

Modelling Households: A Synthesis

The 1973 U.S. National Survey of Family Growth is used to examine the effects of removing number and timing failures from the reproductive histories of various cohorts of white and black married women. Blacks are more fertile than whites primarily because of their greater unwanted fertility. Removing number and timing failures from the past reproductive histories of American women would have reduced their fertility considerably. These reductions would have been greater for blacks than for whites and would be greater if some wanted pregnancies had continued to terminate in foetal loss.     

Does welfare reform affect fertility? Evidence from the UK

This paper provides evidence on the effect of welfare reform on fertility, focusing on UK reforms in 1999 that increased per-child spending by 50% in real terms. We use a difference-in-differences approach, exploiting the fact that the reforms were targeted at low-income households. The reforms were likely to differentially affect the fertility of women in couples and single women because of the opportunity cost effects of the welfare-to-work element. We find no increase in births among single women, but evidence to support an increase in births (by around 15%) among coupled women.     

Family sizes of children and family sizes of women

This paper demonstrates the relation that obtains between the average family size of women and the average family size of offspring of those women. It estimates the value of these two measures for cohorts of American women aged 45–49 in various years from 1890 to 1970. It shows that children born during the post-war baby boom actually derived from smaller families than those born during the low-fertility 1930’s; that under current patterns a woman would have to bear an average of almost two children fewer than were borne by her mother merely to keep population fertility rates constant from generation to generation; and that average family size for nonwhite children exceeds that for white by 50 percent, although the racial difference in family sizes of women is only 19 percent.     

Age distribution and the stable equivalent

Some populations, like that of the United States in the 1950's, have a smaller proportion of women of reproductive age than they would ultimately attain with continuance of their age-specific birth and deaths rates, a continuance which produces the condition known in demography as stability. Others, like that of the United States in the 1930's, have relatively more women of reproductive age than they would ultimately attain with stability. A way of studying ages is to calculate how many women of stable age distribution would be equivalent from the viewpoint of reproduction to the women observed. This stable equivalent was 69,535,000 or 16 percent below the observed United States female population in 1955, and 12 percent above the observed in 1935. The stable equivalent is a measure of fertility potential, closely related to R. A. Fisher's reproductive value. Calculations for four countries illustrate how a fall of the birth rate, for example in demographic transition, occasions an age distribution in which the stable equivalent is greater than the observed number of women. The notion of stable equivalent is useful for comparison because changes in it are nearly invariant with respect to the age-pattern of fertility used. The statement that the United States stable equivalent increased by 11 percent between 1960 and 1965 holds irrespective of whether the 1960 or the 1965 age-specific fertility and mortality rates are used as standard.     

The economic rationality of high fertility: An investigation illustrated with Nigerian survey data

Summary In much of the developing world, especially among rural populations who usually are the majority, field researchers find that fertility is high and fairly stable and that there is little evidence either that high-fertility parents are relatively economically disadvantaged or that they believe themselves to be so. On the other hand most of modern economic-demographic theory suggests that the members of large families should be worse off than the members of small families. It is argued that the 'hardest' data are those of high fertility and the relative well being of large families and that the proper social scientific approach should have been to base further investigation upon such findings. It is suggested that much of the economic theorizing has erred because of bad survey data and ethnocentric bias in the research. Data are analysed from research programmes in Ghana and Nigeria to show that high fertility is not as disadvantageous as is often suggested. The main source of evidence is Project 2 of the Nigerian segment of the Changing African Family Project, a 1973 sample survey of 1,499 females and 1,497 males, Yoruba and over 17 years of age, in the Western and Lagos States of Nigeria. It is concluded that the economic ends of a society are largely determined by its social ends and that the economic rationality of high fertility can be determined only within the context of a society's structure and ends. There can be no such thing as a purely economic theory of fertility. It is also concluded that the society studied is moving towards a condition where high fertility will be increasingly disadvantageous and that this is being brought about more by Westernization than modernization.     

The parental families of Americans in birth cohorts 1890–1955: A categorical,linear equation model estimated from the NORC general social survey

A linear, categorical statistical model with five variables, Father's Education, Father's occupation, Size of Place at Age 16, Mother's Employment, and Total Siblings, is estimated with data from the 1972–1978 NORC General Surveys to describe the parental families of Americans in the birth cohorts 1890 to 1955. The major substantive conclusions are: (1) The educational level of American parents increased at an accelerating rate from 1890 to 1955, (2) The proportion growing up in farm homes declined steadily. Farm fathers were less well educated but the educational difference grew steadily smaller, (3) The proportion of Americans growing up in cities of 50 000 or larger increased steadily, the trend being similar in both educational levels, (4) Metropolitan families increased at an accelerating rate, the acceleration being due to the acceleration in education attainment, (5) Farm families decreased at an approximately constant rate because two opposite trends — acceleration in Education and declining association between Education and Farm cancelled each other out, (6) Town Families —non farm families living in cities under 50 000 increased throughout the period, but faster before 1930 than afterwards, (7) Metropolitan families had consistently more children and more employment of mothers than Town families; farm families were slower in experiencing the trend toward working wives; farm families were about the same as town families in decreasing rates of fertility, so the urban/farm gap in fertility remained constant, (8) at the turn of the century higher status mothers were more likely to have small families and less likely to work. After 1910 the pattern changed, as better educated families opted for the pattern of working mothers and fewer children. By the birth cohort of 1955 the education difference in fertility had grown considerably while the education difference in maternal employment had reversed.