Skewed Sex Ratios at Birth and Future Marriage Squeeze in China and India, 2005–2100

I examine the potential impact of the anticipated future marriage squeeze on nuptiality patterns in China and India during the twenty-first century. I use population projections from 2005 to 2100 based on three different scenarios for the sex ratio at birth (SRB). To counteract the limitations of cross-sectional methods commonly used to assess the severity of marriage squeezes, I use a two-sex cohort-based procedure to simulate marriage patterns over the twenty-first century based on the female dominance model. I also examine two more-flexible marriage functions to illustrate the potential impact of changes in marriage schedules as a response to the marriage squeeze. Longitudinal indicators of marriage squeeze indicate that the number of prospective grooms in both countries will exceed that of prospective brides by more 50% for three decades in the most favorable scenario. Rates of male bachelorhood will not peak before 2050, and the squeeze conditions will be felt several decades thereafter, even among cohorts unaffected by adverse SRB. If the SRB is allowed to return to normalcy by 2020, the proportion of men unmarried at age 50 is expected to rise to 15% in China by 2055 and to 10% in India by 2065. India suffers from the additional impact of a delayed fertility transition on its age structures.     

Trends in age at marriage in postwar Ireland

Age at marriage in the Republic of Ireland has declined substantially from the very high level that prevailed in 1946. Between 1946 and 1969 the median age of grooms fell from 32 to 26 and of brides from 27 to 24. To some extent this is a reflection of the declining importance of the rural population but to a much greater extent it is due to the falling age at marriage among all sections of the population. Simultaneous with the decline in age at marriage, the frequency distributions of brides' and grooms' ages have become both more skewed and more peaked. Thus earlier marriage has also meant greater uniformity in age at marriage, but the phenomenon of first marriage at a fairly advanced age persists. There has been a marked trend towards greater equality between husbands' and wives' ages over the postwar period: the proportion of marriages in which there was less than five years' gap between the ages of the bride and groom rose from 49 percent in 1946 to 71 percent in 1969. The percentage of marriages in which the groom was ten or more years older than the bride has fallen from 22 to seven percent. The evidence suggests that the “marriage market” became less favourable to males (especially older males) over the period and that part of the narrowing in the gap in relative age of brides and grooms has been due to the greater willingness of younger males to marry. It also seems that changes in the age structure of the unmarried population has had an impact on the age distribution of grooms.     

New Evidence Against a Causal Marriage Wage Premium

Recent research has shown that men’s wages rise more rapidly than expected prior to marriage, but interpretations diverge on whether this indicates selection or a causal effect of anticipating marriage. We seek to adjudicate this debate by bringing together literatures on (1) the male marriage wage premium; (2) selection into marriage based on men’s economic circumstances; and (3) the transition to adulthood, during which both union formation and unusually rapid improvements in work outcomes often occur. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, we evaluate these perspectives. We show that wage declines predate rather than follow divorce, indicating no evidence that staying married benefits men’s wages. We find that older grooms experience no unusual wage patterns at marriage, suggesting that the observed marriage premium may simply reflect co-occurrence with the transition to adulthood for younger grooms. We show that men entering shotgun marriages experience similar premarital wage gains as other grooms, casting doubt on the claim that anticipation of marriage drives wage increases. We conclude that the observed wage patterns are most consistent with men marrying when their wages are already rising more rapidly than expected and divorcing when their wages are already falling, with no additional causal effect of marriage on wages.     

A multivariate analysis of homogamy in Montevideo,Uruguay

This paper develops multivariate models to describe homogamy or, more generally, marriage preferences, for corresponding characteristics of brides and grooms. The purpose of these models is to obtain interpretable measures of the degree of homogamy (or marriage preference) on one dimension and to adjust these measures for homogamy on other dimensions. The models are applied to a sample of marriages in Montevideo, Uruguay, with pairs of corresponding variables for the brides and grooms. The analysis estimates the unadjusted and adjusted levels of homogamy on previous marital status, age, education, religion, and location. Homogamy on location, or propinquity, is the single most important variable. Previous marital status and age describe the readiness or eligibility to marry and are associated in their effect on homogamy. Education and religion describe vertical and horizontal differentiation of marriage partners, respectively. The multivariate analysis verifies that these dimensions are largely independent of each other.     

A new look at the marriage market and nuptiality rates, 1915–1958

The system of nuptiality probabilities for never married males and females, the “marriage regime,” is viewed as a population transformation, which operates on a population thereby changing the composition. The marriage regime has many properties common to other population transformations, but embodies a constraint such that, in general, the marriage regime cannot be strictly stable over time. The approach is applied to study the “marriage squeeze,” the alteration in marriage patterns that results from an imbalance in the “marriage market” or numbers of never married males and females at the usual marriage ages. Using data on age at first marriage for the 1960 American white population, nuptiality probabilities by single year of age and sex are estimated for the years 1915–58. Annual estimates also are made of the relative number of eligible mates (never married of the usual marriage ages) for never married persons of a given age and sex. No close correspondence is found between annual fluctuations in the marriage market and in the nuptiality probability, possibly because of the crudeness of the estimates. Alternatively, response to the imbalance may take another form such as marriage postponement or a redefinition of eligibility.     

The Gendered Double Standard of Aging in US Marriage Markets

Using data on marriages collected in most US states between 1970 and 1988, we show that the older men are when they marry, the more years senior to their brides they are, whether it is a first or higher‐order marriage. While older men with more education marry down in age slightly more than less educated older men, the pattern of men marrying further down if they marry later holds strongly for all education groups. We consider several possible explanations for the tendency of men to marry further down in age if they are older at marriage. While we have no direct measure of physical attractiveness, we argue that the most compelling interpretation is that men, more than women, evaluate potential spouses on the basis of appearance. Because the prevailing standard of beauty favors young women, the older men are when they marry, the less they find women their own age attractive relative to younger women, leading them to marry further down in age if they are older at marriage. The consequence for women of men's preference for youth is more often that they remain unmarried than that they end up married to much older or less educated men.     

Demography of the marriage market in the United States

In this paper, a new index designed to measure the relative availability of unmarried men and women is introduced. Termed the "Availability Ratio," the measure is defined as the number of suitable persons divided by the average competition. Suitability, in turn, is defined in terms of race, age and education. After various experimental tests, particular age and eeducational constraints were empirically derived from marriage data. Persons of opposite sex sharing living quarters are tested as unavailable. Estimates are also made of those presumed to be unsuitable on the basis of the % of persons aged 45-74 who have never married. Adjustments for the census undercount are given. 1980 and 1970 estimates are presented for the US population. Subsequent analyses will focus on metropolitan areas, which are more likely to function as actual marriage markets in contrast to the nation as a whole. The substantive evidence indicates that women under 25 are in a good position to find a mate, but that after this age, their prospects deteriorate rapidly. The outlook is especially poor for the more educated women at older ages, especially black women. At ages 40-49, for example, there are fewer than 3 suitable men available for every 10 college-educated women. The results suggest that the combination of preferences of women for older men (or men's tastes for younger women), combined with higher survival rates for women at older ages, results in a very unbalanced market situationn for all but the youngest cohorts of men and women.     

Intermarriage: Opportunity and Preference

The two-sex problem in the analysis of nuptiality can be reduced to the problem of separating factors that determine the opportunity to choose a certain category of marriage partner from factors representing preference for the same type of partner. A theory that enables opportunity factors to be separated from preference factors is presented in this paper, in the context of analysing the phenomenon of intermarriage. An index called ‘the marital index of social distance’ is derived and its properties discussed. The index, representing preference factors free of opportunity factors, can be calculated easily from marriage statistics detailing group affiliations of brides and grooms. The theory is applied to data on in-marriage of Australian sub-populations defined by birthplace, for the period 1954–83. It is shown that marital indices of social distance have remained relatively constant over time compared with in-marriage rates which have fluctuated according to representation in the marriage market.     

How Does the Age Gap Between Partners Affect Their Survival?

I use hazard regression methods to examine how the age difference between spouses affects their survival. In many countries, the age difference between spouses at marriage has remained relatively stable for several decades. In Denmark, men are, on average, about three years older than the women they marry. Previous studies of the age gap between spouses with respect to mortality found that having a younger spouse is beneficial, while having an older spouse is detrimental for one’s own survival. Most of the observed effects could not be explained satisfactorily until now, mainly because of methodological drawbacks and insufficiency of the data. The most common explanations refer to selection effects, caregiving in later life, and some positive psychological and sociological effects of having a younger spouse. The present study extends earlier work by using longitudinal Danish register data that include the entire history of key demographic events of the whole population from 1990 onward. Controlling for confounding factors such as education and wealth, results suggest that having a younger spouse is beneficial for men but detrimental for women, while having an older spouse is detrimental for both sexes.     

The marital satisfaction of differently aged couples

We investigate how the marital age gap affects the evolution of marital satisfaction over the duration of marriage using household panel data from Australia. We find that men tend to be more satisfied with younger wives and less satisfied with older wives. Interestingly, women likewise tend to be more satisfied with younger husbands and less satisfied with older husbands. Marital satisfaction declines with marital duration for both men and women in differently aged couples relative to those in similarly aged couples. These relative declines erase the initial higher levels of marital satisfaction experienced by men married to younger wives and women married to younger husbands within 6 to 10 years of marriage. A possible mechanism is that differently aged couples are less resilient to negative shocks compared to similarly aged couples, which we find some supportive evidence for.     

Measuring years of inactivity,years in retirement,time to retirement,and age at retirement within the Markov model

Retirement-related concepts are treated as random variables within Markov process models that capture multiple labor force entries and exits. The expected number of years spent outside of the labor force, expected years in retirement, and expected age at retirement are computed—all of which are of immense policy interest but have been heretofore reported with less precisely measured proxies. Expected age at retirement varies directly with a person’s age; but even younger people can expect to retire at ages substantially older than those commonly associated with retirement, such as age 60, 62, or 65. Between 1970 and 2003, men allocated most of their increase in life expectancy to increased time in retirement, but women allocated most of their increased life expectancy to labor force activity. Although people can exit and reenter the labor force at older ages, most 65-year-old men who are active in the labor force will not reenter after they eventually exit. At age 65, the probability that those who are inactive will reenter the labor force at some future time is .38 for men and .27 for women. Life expectancy at exact ages is decomposed into the sum of the expected time spent active and inactive in the labor force, and also as the sum of the expected time to labor force separation and time in retirement.     

On Measuring the Marriage Squeeze

During the 1960's, single men have been marrying at an increasing rate, and single women at a decreasing rate. These trends can be explained almost entirely by disproportions between the sexes at the prime ages of marriage-that is, by what is commonly called the "marriage squeeze." The disproportions arose from the increase in births during the period 1939-47, coupled with the fact that women marry earlier than men.These changes in marriage patterns must certainly have some effect on the birth rate and on household formation, although perhaps a secondary one. The consequences of these changes are a project for further inquiry.     

New household projections for the united states

This paper reviews the methods used to prepare the new household projections for the United States that were recently issued by the Bureau of the Census and examines the effect on the resulting number of households of the assumptions made about future marriages and future proportions of household heads in the population.One population projection series was used, since all series are identical for the adult population. Marriage assumptions were generated by assuming various outcomes of the marriage squeeze (defined as the excess of females relative to the number of males in the main ages at marriage in the next few years). Assumptions about proportions of household heads were generated by assuming, in varying degrees, continuation of recent trends in these proportions.Projected changes in marriage and in the proportions of household heads in the population account for one-fourth to one-third of the projected increase in the number of households; the remaining increase is attributable to projected changes in the size and structure of the adult population. Varying the assumed proportions of household heads produces greater differences in the projected total number of households than does varying the marriage assumptions used here. Nevertheless, the various possible outcomes of the marriage squeeze, as represented by the assumptions used, produce significantly different projections of increases in the number of young husband-wife households.The most striking finding is that by 1985, proportions of household heads among the population not "married, spouse present" may well rise to such a level that over the long term, the smaller the number of persons who marry, the larger will be the number of households.     

Demography of brideprice and dowry: Causes and consequences of the Indian marriage squeeze

The paper investigates whether past declines in mortality could have created a huge deficit of eligible men in the marriage market, and whether the ensuing competition for mates could be responsible for the coercive character the dowry system of marriage has assumed in India. New indices have been developed to measure the trends in bridegroom availability that aid in the inquiry into the demographic origins of marriage squeeze. It is contended that the marriage squeeze against women was particularly intense in India because mortality decline, in addition to age structural changes, drastically reduced the number of widowers in the population who once accounted for about one-fifth of the annual supply of bridegrooms. Our projections indicate that, as a result of recent declines in fertility, the marriage squeeze against females will ease substantially by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, and that marriages of men will begin to be delayed more than those of women.     

On the Survival of Centenarians and the Span of Life

It has been argued in the literature that the observed mortality crossover among older black Americans relative to the white population is a result of ‘differential early mortality which selects the least robust persons from the disadvantaged population at relatively earlier ages so that, at advanced ages, the disadvantaged population has proportionately more robust persons’ (Kenneth G. Manton). The authors examine the plausibility of the observed black mortality crossover and the heterogeneity argument supporting its existence. In addition to citing evidence from the literature, they use life tables from various countries known to have good mortality data to explore the relation between mortality in childhood and at younger adult ages and mortality in old age for cohorts and periods. Analysis suggests that the association between childhood and old-age mortality for cohorts is positive, implying that observed mortality crossovers are produced by deficient data rather than population heterogeneity.     

Pathways of Early Fatherhood,Marriage, and Employment: A Latent Class Growth Analysis

In the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), young fathers include heterogeneous subgroups with varying early life pathways in terms of fatherhood timing, the timing of first marriage, and holding full-time employment. Using latent class growth analysis with 10 observations between ages 18 and 37, we derived five latent classes with median ages of first fatherhood below the cohort median (26.4), constituting distinct early fatherhood pathways representing 32.4% of NLSY men: (A) Young Married Fathers, (B) Teen Married Fathers, (C) Young Underemployed Married Fathers, (D) Young Underemployed Single Fathers, and (E) Young Later-Marrying Fathers. A sixth latent class of men who become fathers around the cohort median, following full-time employment and marriage (On-Time On-Sequence Fathers), is the comparison group. With sociodemographic background controlled, all early fatherhood pathways show disadvantage in at least some later-life circumstances (earnings, educational attainment, marital status, and incarceration). The extent of disadvantage is greater when early fatherhood occurs at relatively younger ages (before age 20), occurs outside marriage, or occurs outside full-time employment. The relative disadvantage associated with early fatherhood, unlike early motherhood, increases over the life course.     

Traditional values prevail as education and contraception enter rural Bangladesh

This article discusses the findings of demographer Sajeda Amin, who examines the impact of large-scale social changes on family dynamics and living arrangements in two rural villages in Bangladesh. Amin focused on changes in dowry, education, living arrangements, and landlessness in 1991, 1995, and 1996. Education had the strongest impact on delaying marriage and childbearing and a weak impact on the adoption of contraception or desire for more children. Social changes did not effect traditional living arrangements. Dowry to the husband has replaced bride price, which is cash or valuables given to the wife's family. This shift is attributed to a marriage squeeze where the numbers of women outnumber men. Instead of shifting the age at marriage between girls and men, these communities continued to undervalue women and shifted the pricing system onto the girls' families. The dowry system has led to parents seeking grooms within the extended family, which custom dictates as worthy of a lower dowry, or within the village. The dowry system also leads to abuses, such as the prospects of multiple dowries through divorce. Amin's research finds that Bangladeshi girls benefit from advanced schooling through the delay in marriage and childbearing. Delays in marriage and childbearing have an immediate impact on population growth. However, the increased educational advancement for girls must include increased work opportunities. By combining education with work, the impact becomes long lasting and the economic benefits will encourage increased enrollment. Education serves an important role in defining women as valuable resources that can be a household asset rather than a liability.     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">Women’s Progress for Men’s Gain? Gender-Specific Changes in the Return to Education as Measured by Family Standard of Living, 1990 to 2009–2011</Emphasis>

This study investigates gender-specific changes in the total financial return to education among persons of prime working ages (35–44 years) using U.S. Census data from 1990 and 2000, and the 2009–2011 American Community Survey. We define the total financial return to education as the family standard of living as measured by family income adjusted for family size. Our results indicate that women experienced significant progress in educational attainment and labor market outcomes over this time period. Ironically, married women’s progress in education and personal earnings has led to greater improvement in the family standard of living for married men than for women themselves. Gender-specific changes in assortative mating are mostly responsible for this paradoxical trend. Because the number of highly educated women exceeds the number of highly educated men in the marriage market, the likelihood of educational marrying up has substantially increased for men over time while women’s likelihood has decreased. Sensitivity analyses show that the greater improvement in the family standard of living for men than for women is not limited to prime working-age persons but is also evident in the general population. Consequently, women’s return to education through marriage declined while men’s financial gain through marriage increased considerably.     

The life-cycle squeeze: The interaction of men’s occupational and family life cycles

This paper is concerned with analyzing one structural source of pressure for wives to contribute to family income. This is the "life-cycle squeeze"-the situation where a man's resources are inadequate to meet the needs engendered by the number and ages of his children. Studies of how economic needs vary by family life-cycle stage indicate that one high point of need occurs when men are in their forties and early fifties. However, 1960 Census data on earnings patterns by age indicate that in only relatively high-level professional, managerial and sales occupations do average earnings peak at the same time family income needs are peaking. For most blue-collar and many medium- and low-level white collar occupations, median earnings are highest for younger men, and men at an age when family costs are at their maximum are earning somewhat less, on the average. As a consequence, the families of such men run the risk of a deterioration in their level of living unless an additional income is brought into the household.     

性别失衡背景下大龄未婚男性的商业性行为——基于中国农村地区的研究发现

基于2008年安徽省CH市JC区的调查数据,通过与同年龄段已婚男性的对比,对性别失衡背景下中国农村大龄未婚男性的商业性行为、安全套使用情况及其影响因素进行分析。研究发现,在中国性别失衡背景下,男性婚姻挤压导致大龄未婚男性难以获取正常、稳定的性行为,商业性行为作为一种有效的替代和弥补方式,其发生率在农村地区的大龄未婚男性当中存在显著升高的可能性;相对于较高的商业性行为发生率而言,大龄未婚男性的安全套使用率处于较低的水平,使得大龄未婚男性的商业性行为具有高风险特征。