Do Minimum Wages Fight Poverty?

We present evidence on the effects of minimum wages on family incomes. The results indicate that minimum wages increase both the probability that poor families escape poverty and the probability that previously nonpoor families fall into poverty. The estimated increase in the flow into poverty is larger, although this difference is not statistically significant. We also find that minimum wages tend to boost the incomes of poor families that remain below the poverty line. On net, the various trade-offs created by minimum wage increases more closely resemble income redistribution among low-income families than income redistribution from high- to low-income families.     

The minimum wage and poverty among full-time workers

V. Conclusions The empirical evidence is strong that minimum wages have had little or no effect on poverty in the U.S. Indeed, the evidence is stronger that minimum wages occasionally increase poverty. It also suggests that the minimum wage does not even lower poverty for the one group that, almost by definition, one would expect to be helped: full-time, year-round workers. While the empirical results suggest minimum wages do not achieve what is ostensibly their primary goal — relieving poverty among the working poor — minimum wages do seem to impose a real cost on society in terms of lost income and output. The empirical evidence on work hours suggests that a $1 increase in the minimum wage, far from being almost costless, could conceivably impose income losses to American workers in the $12-15 billion range per year — an amount equal to the “income deficit” of millions of persons counted as poor by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.     

The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Covered Teenage Employment

Unlike previous studies on the minimum wage, which focused on its effect on total teenage employment, we examine its effect on covered employment. A covered job was defined to be one paying the minimum wage or more. Using contemporary wages to classify workers this way may inflate the estimated effect of minimum wages on covered employment. To avoid this bias, covered jobs are identified using a logit procedure run over years in which the minimum age was not increased. We find that minimum wages reduced covered employment significantly more than total employment. We also show that covered employment may be overstated in the period following an increase in the minimum wage.     

Minimum Wages in a Segmented Labor Market: Evidence from South Africa

The segmented labor market model describes the impacts of minimum wages on covered and uncovered sectors. This paper examines the impacts of an industry-specific minimum wage in South Africa, a state characterized by high unemployment, a robust union movement, and the presence of a large informal sector. Under the industry-specific wage law, formal agricultural and household workers are covered, while workers in other sectors are not. The unique aspect of this paper lies in the ability to compare the impacts of minimum wage legislation on formal covered, informal covered, formal uncovered, and informal uncovered workers. This natural experiment allows us to test whether industry-specific minimum wage legislation leads to higher wages, whether wage increases are restricted solely to covered formal sectors or if there are spillover effects, and whether such legislation manifests in disemployment effects. We find evidence of higher wages yet disemployment among black workers in formal markets. In informal markets we find no employment effects, but higher wages in formal markets appear to have spilled over into informal markets in covered sectors.     

State minimum wage laws: Youth coverage and impact

Federal minimum wage statutes cover only 70 percent of the work force and 30 percent of all employers. State laws are designed to close some of these coverage gaps and in some cases to set higher wage floors. Hence, differences in state wage floors and coverage should affect employment rates and wage distributions, particularly among low-skilled workers. Evidence from the National Longitudinal Ssurveys of Youth is mixed, however: State wage floors appear to have no impact on youth employment or entry wages, but coverage exemptions appear to increase both employment and wages. These observations underscore the need to include state provisions in models of minimum wage impacts, particularly for later periods (e.g., 1988–1991) when state wage floors were relatively higher.     

The minimum wage and tipped employees

Using data from theCensus of Retail Trade, I estimate that allowing restaurants to use servers’ tipped income to satisfy minimum wage requirements would create at least 360,000 new high-paying jobs and increase total income for tipped workers by at least 8 percent. Conversely, if the minimum wage were increased 10 percent, tipped workers would experience a 4 percent decrease in employment and a 6 percent reduction in hours worked, and all servers (tipped and non-tipped) would experience a 3 to 5 percent decrease in total income because the tipped jobs lost paid more than the minimum wage. By not allowing employers to use all of a worker’s tipped income to meet the minimum wage, state and federal minimum wage laws inhibit the creation of hundreds of thousands of new jobs paying well above the minimum wage. Total elimination of this credit would decrease employment at least 10 percent.     

Noncitizen Employment and the Wages of Healthcare Support Workers in the US

This study examines the relative wages of citizens and noncitizens employed as healthcare support workers as well as examines the effect of noncitizen support worker employment on the wages of citizen support workers. Relative wage findings reveal noncitizen support workers with less than eight years of US residency receive a noncitizen-citizen wage discount statistically significantly greater than the legal maximum of 5% below the local prevailing wage. These low relative wage levels could contribute to lower wages for citizen support workers, however elasticity of substitution findings suggest noncitizen support workers are not close substitutes for healthcare support workers who are US citizens. In addition, wage effect findings do not reveal a negative influence of noncitizen employment on the wages of native born US citizen support workers, while these findings reveal a relatively small wage decline for naturalized support workers. These findings are consistent with the citizen status job heterogeneity hypothesis. Nonetheless, finding noncitizen-citizen wage differences does not allow for ruling out the possibility of weak enforcement of prevailing wage legislation and possible employment of undocumented workers.     

The Effects of Prevailing Wage Laws: A Comparison of Individual Workers'' Wages Earned on and off Prevailing Wage Construction Projects

I evaluate the effects of prevailing wage laws using a unique data set that shows the wages paid to workers on prevailing wage projects and the wages paid to the same workers during the same time period for work on projects not covered by prevailing wage regulations. The wage comparison shows that workers are generally paid more for work on prevailing wage projects than they are for work on non-prevailing wage projects. Thus, prevailing wage laws likely do increase the cost of public construction. In addition, to the extent that the quality of construction is improved, prevailing wage laws appear to be an inefficient mechanism by which to achieve additional quality, as the regulations often result in workers being paid more than they earn in the private market.     

Can a minimum wage increase have an adverse impact on inequality? Evidence from two Latin American economies

This paper uses a semiparametric model to analyze the impact of an increase in the real minimum wage on inequality in Colombia between 1995 and 1999 and in Paraguay between 1993 and 2000–2001. Simulations suggest that if the employment effects of the minimum wage increase are ignored, the underlying policies would contribute to reduce earnings inequality in Colombia and would be inequality neutral in Paraguay. By considering the drop in wages of those who lost their jobs, simulations suggest that in both countries the policy in question would increase earnings inequality under some assumptions about the employment elasticity of the minimum wage and the new level of earnings unemployed workers rely upon. While these findings do not mean that minimum wage increases in LDCs (Less Developed Countries) necessarily have adverse distributional affects, they suggest that minimum wage policy should be implemented with care depending on how sensitive employment is to wage increases. An erratum to this article can be found at     

The (Non) Impact of Minimum Wages on Poverty: Regression and Simulation Evidence for Canada

We estimate the effect of minimum wages on poverty for Canada using data from the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) for 1997 to 2007 and find that minimum wages do not have a statistically significant effect on poverty and this finding is robust across a number of specifications. Our simulation results, based on the March 2008 Labour Force Survey (LFS), find that only about 30?% of the net earnings gain from minimum wage increases goes to the poor while about 70?% ??spill over?? into the hands of the non-poor. Furthermore, we find that job losses are disproportionately concentrated on the poor. Our results highlight that, political rhetoric not-withstanding, minimum wages are poorly targeted as an anti-poverty device and are at best an exceedingly blunt instrument for dealing with poverty.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION

Two questions are addressed in this paper. (A) Why do labor unions and certain employer organizations respectively promote and impede minimum wage legislation? (B) Do these groups have significant impacts on minimum wages? Question (A) is examined in the context of models that identify the economic self-interest of unionized skilled workers and capitalists in legal wage floors. Question (B) is approached by a median legislator utility maximization model that leads to Tobit estimation of the relationship between state minimum wage rates and measures of statewide organized labor and capital and average hourly earnings.     

The effects of prevailing wage laws: A comparison of individual workers’ wages earned on and off prevailing wage construction projects

I evaluate the effects of prevailing wage laws using a unique data set that shows the wages paid to workers on prevailing wage projects and the wages paid to the same workers during the same time period for work on projects not covered by prevailing wage regulations. The wage comparison shows that workers are generally paid more for work on prevailing wage projects than they are for work on nonprevailing wage projects. Thus, prevailing wage laws likely do increase the cost of public construction. In addition, to the extent that the quality of construction is improved, prevailing wage laws appear to be an inefficient mechanism by which to achieve additional quality, as the regulations often result in workers being paid more than they earn in the private market. This research was done originally for the Program Review and Investigations Committee of the Kentucky State Legislature. I thank the staff of the Program Review and Investigations Committee and the Legisla-tive Research Commission for assistance with data collection and Mark Berger for helpful comments. Due to confidentiality requirements, the data cannot be made available.     

MINIMUM WAGE EFFECTS WITH OUTPUT STABILIZATION

What are the effects of legal minimum wage rates on the U.S. economy? Does minimum wage legislation promote the economic self-interest of high wage union labor and impede the economic self-interest of capitalists as our earlier research [Cox and Oaxaca 1982] suggested? This paper uses a nine sector econometric/simulation model of U.S. industry from 1975–1978 to answer these questions in the context of stabilization policies which hold aggregate real output constant. While most simulated percentage effects are small, those for the unskilled workers themselves are not. A 15.7 percent increase in the average nominal wage rate of unskilled labor, as a result of minimum wage legislation, produced an 11 percent decrease in unskilled employment, 2.2 million jobs lost, while increasing the real wage of unskilled workers by 15 percent. Simulated changes in several key variables support our earlier observations that the self-interests of labor unions, with skilled workers, conflict with those of capitalists over the issue of minimum wage legislation.     

Erosion of purchasing power and labor supply

This paper presents three studies on the labor market in Italy, carried out using questionnaires over the course of time (1990–2002). The main result is that, if real wages decline to a certain extent, employed workers increase their labor supply, in order to recoup their lost purchasing power and to redress, perhaps unconsciously, the decline in their economic and social hierarchical position.As long as real wages grew at a satisfactory rate, in the early 90s, workers were unwilling to change their work schedules in either direction—exchanging income for leisure time at the current hourly wage or vice versa—whatever were their work time and wages. During the last decade workers—who suffered a decrease in real wages—have been willing to work more hours. As a result, workers did not demand more leisure time despite the fact that it had become cheaper as predicted by traditional theory. Thus, employers may expect a not-insignificant increase in labor supply if real wages decrease.     

Minimum wage violation in central and eastern Europe

This article analyses minimum wage violations over the period 2003–12 in ten central and eastern European countries which all have national statutory minimum wages. Using European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU‐SILC) data and the methodology proposed by Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet (2013), the authors measure the incidence and depth of violation. In addition, they conduct regression analyses on individual, workplace and macro‐level determinants of non‐compliance. While the incidence of violation remains relatively low, the workers that minimum wage policies seek to protect appear to be the most likely to be affected by non‐compliance. Over time, higher minimum to average wage ratios are related to a higher incidence of violation.     

MINIMUM WAGES AND TIPPED SERVERS

Tips allow restaurants to pay servers lower wages. As more servers are hired, each serves fewer meals and earns less in tips. As a result, restaurants must pay a higher wage. This gives them monopsony power over wages. Over some range, a higher minimum wage should increase employment. Empirically, we found the full "reverse C" monopsony pattern of employment for restaurants, with employment first going up and then down as the minimum wage is increased.     

WHITE, BLACK, AND HISPANIC FEMALE YOUTHS IN CENTRAL CITY LABOR MARKETS

Data from the 1% 1980 Census Public Use Sample are used to estimate the determinants of employment and wage rates for out-of-school female youths residing in central cities. Separate analyses are performed for white/Anglo, black, and Hispanic youths. Independent variables include individual, family background, and local labor market characteristics. The authors find that central city female youths have employment and wage rates substantially below their male counterparts. Their employment rates, however, are responsive to many of the same forces as for other sociodemographic groups in general, and central city male youths in particular. For Anglo females, wage rates are also responsive to many of the effects found for other groups, although they do not follow Anglo male youths in gaining from the "minority threat" effect. On the other hand, the wages for minority females are unresponsive to the usual variables. That is, these workers receive the minimum wage in an essentially undifferentiated manner. Thus, the triple disadvantage of being female, minority, and from a poor household is very much in evidence within 1980 census data.     

The minimum wage and productivity differentials

A firm’s ability to adjust its production process to economize on low-skilled labor when faced with a minimum wage increase will differ greatly depending on industry or occupation. For example, more capital-intensive means of cleaning hotel rooms or serving customers at restaurants may not be readily available without degrading service quality. In such situations, the productivity of labor is essentially capped, and firms have few options when the minimum wage increases. This simple observation has implications for studies that rely on microdata to examine the effects of minimum wage increases. If firms only increase prices in response to a minimum wage increase, employment effects are likely small. If the goal of the minimum wage is to redistribute income from firms and consumers to workers, minimum-wage increases targeted at industries and occupations where such rigidities result in an inelastic demand for labor may achieve the desired goal at a lower cost than across-the-board increases. However, such a scheme causes an inefficient allocation of labor and would be subjected to substantial political pressures that may lead to anomalous results. Additionally, it is unreasonable to conclude that policy makers have the necessary information to skillfully set the minimum wage. I thank Brian E. Chezum and Jeff Waddoups for helpful comments. All mistakes, of course, are my own.     

Auswirkungen Der Familiengründung Auf Den Berufsverlauf Von Männern

In this article we use longitudinal data from the German socio-economic Panel to examine the relationship between parenthood and labour market outcomes for men. Both traditional sociological and economical perspectives predict a positive effect of fatherhood on wages, whereas the spreading idea of a modern fatherhood suggests that, at least, fathers of the younger generation tend to reduce their working hours and thus accept wage reductions. Our focus is on the effect of fatherhood on wage growth, hours worked and interfirm mobility. We find that fathers receive higher wages than married men without children, even when controlling for selection into fatherhood. The positive income effect of fatherhood results from greater on-the-job wage growth. However, fathers are not likely to increase their wage by working longer hours or leaving their current employer for a better paid position.     

The effect of the extent of unionism on union and nonunion wages

This paper provides estimates, derived from micro wage equations, of the effects of unionism on the wages for both union and nonunion labor. These equations control not only for union status, but also include measures of the extent of unionism in product and labor markets. The results suggest,inter alia, that an increase in the extent of unionization in an industry has substantial positive effects on the wages of nonunion as well as union workers. Increases in the extent of union coverage within an occupation, however, have little or no effect on nonunion wages.