How a Nuclear Power Plant Accident Influences Acceptance of Nuclear Power: Results of a Longitudinal Study Before and After the Fukushima Disaster

Major nuclear accidents, such as the recent accident in Fukushima, Japan, have been shown to decrease the public's acceptance of nuclear power. However, little is known about how a serious accident affects people's acceptance of nuclear power and the determinants of acceptance. We conducted a longitudinal study (N= 790) in Switzerland: one survey was done five months before and one directly after the accident in Fukushima. We assessed acceptance, perceived risks, perceived benefits, and trust related to nuclear power stations. In our model, we assumed that both benefit and risk perceptions determine acceptance of nuclear power. We further hypothesized that trust influences benefit and risk perceptions and that trust before a disaster relates to trust after a disaster. Results showed that the acceptance and perceptions of nuclear power as well as its trust were more negative after the accident. In our model, perceived benefits and risks determined the acceptance of nuclear power stations both before and after Fukushima. Trust had strong effects on perceived benefits and risks, at both times. People's trust before Fukushima strongly influenced their trust after the accident. In addition, perceived benefits before Fukushima correlated with perceived benefits after the accident. Thus, the nuclear accident did not seem to have changed the relations between the determinants of acceptance. Even after a severe accident, the public may still consider the benefits as relevant, and trust remains important for determining their risk and benefit perceptions. A discussion of the benefits of nuclear power seems most likely to affect the public's acceptance of nuclear power, even after a nuclear accident.     

Public Response to the Tokai Nuclear Accident

This article discusses the influence of the September 30, 1999 nuclear accident in Tokai village (Japan) on the public's attitudes toward nuclear power in Japan. The data used in this report were taken from the results of two surveys conducted mainly to measure the attitudes of the Japanese public with regard to the use of nuclear power in Japan. The first survey was done before the accident in District 23 in Tokyo and also in Osaka and Nagoya. The second survey, which took place after the accident in District 23 in Tokyo and in Osaka and Nagoya, also included residents in a number of other cities of various sizes throughout Japan. The results of the two surveys showed that (1) acceptability of and trust in nuclear power operation had decreased, (2) perceived accident likelihood and public interest had significantly increased, and (3) there had been neither significant nor even a small change in the public's self-rated knowledge about nuclear power or their distrust of the government. The results also showed that the ratio of nuclear power generation opponents to total respondents had considerably increased (7% to 23%) whereas nuclear power generation supporters had moderately decreased (1% to 12%).     

The Impact of Accident Attention,Ideology, and Environmentalism on American Attitudes Toward Nuclear Energy

This study involves the analysis of three waves of survey data about nuclear energy using a probability‐based online panel of respondents in the United States. Survey waves included an initial baseline survey conducted in early 2010, a follow‐up survey conducted in 2010 following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, and an additional follow‐up conducted just after the 2011 Fukushima, Japan, nuclear accident. The central goal is to assess the degree to which changes in public views following an accident are contingent on individual attention and respondent predispositions. Such results would provide real‐world evidence of motivated reasoning. The primary analysis focuses on the impact of Fukushima and how the impact of individual attention to energy issues is moderated by both environmental views and political ideology over time. The analysis uses both mean comparisons and multivariate statistics to test key relationships. Additional variables common in the study of emerging technologies are included in the analysis, including demographics, risk and benefit perceptions, and views about the fairness of decisionmakers in both government and the private sector.     

The Future of Nuclear Power: Value Orientations and Risk Perception

Since the turn of the 21st century, there has been a revival of interest in nuclear power. Two decades ago, the expansion of nuclear power in the United States was halted by widespread public opposition as well as rising costs and less than projected increases in demand for electricity. Can the renewed enthusiasm for nuclear power overcome its history of public resistance that has persisted for decades? We propose that attitudes toward nuclear power are a function of perceived risk, and that both attitudes and risk perceptions are a function of values, beliefs, and trust in the institutions that influence nuclear policy. Applying structural equation models to data from a U.S. national survey, we find that increased trust in the nuclear governance institutions reduces perceived risk of nuclear power and together higher trust and lower risk perceptions predict positive attitudes toward nuclear power. Trust in environmental institutions and perceived risks from global environmental problems do not predict attitudes toward nuclear power. Values do predict attitudes: individuals with traditional values have greater support for, while those with altruistic values have greater opposition to, nuclear power. Nuclear attitudes do not vary by gender, age, education, income, or political orientation, though nonwhites are more supportive than whites. These findings are consistent with, and provide an explanation for, a long series of public opinion polls showing public ambivalence toward nuclear power that persists even in the face of renewed interest for nuclear power in policy circles.     

Energy Choices and Risk Beliefs: Is It Just Global Warming and Fear of a Nuclear Power Plant Accident?

A survey of 3,200 U.S. residents focused on two issues associated with the use of nuclear and coal fuels to produce electrical energy. The first was the association between risk beliefs and preferences for coal and nuclear energy. As expected, concern about nuclear power plant accidents led to decreased support for nuclear power, and those who believed that coal causes global warming preferred less coal use. Yet other risk beliefs about the coal and nuclear energy fuel cycles were stronger or equal correlates of public preferences. The second issue is the existence of what we call acknowledged risk takers, respondents who favored increased reliance on nuclear energy, although also noting that there could be a serious nuclear plant accident, and those who favored greater coal use, despite acknowledging a link to global warming. The pro‐nuclear group disproportionately was affluent educated white males, and the pro‐coal group was relatively poor less educated African‐American and Latino females. Yet both shared four similarities: older age, trust in management, belief that the energy facilities help the local economy, and individualistic personal values. These findings show that there is no single public with regard to energy preferences and risk beliefs. Rather, there are multiple populations with different viewpoints that surely would benefit by hearing a clear and comprehensive national energy life cycle policy from the national government.     

Who Would Be Willing to Accept Disaster Debris in Their Backyard? Investigating the Determinants of Public Attitudes in Post‐Fukushima Japan

In the wake of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami, the Ministry of Environment in Japan asked municipalities nationwide to accept and treat disaster waste. This call for cross‐jurisdictional waste treatment provoked considerable public controversy. To explore how the national and municipal governments can seek more public acceptance in the wake of future disasters, this study implemented a nationwide survey and addressed the question of what factors influence the public's willingness to support their municipalities’ plans to host disaster waste. Three strands of the literature—on risk perception, public dissent, and prosocial behavior—offer valuable insights into hypothesis building, although none has addressed the above question. Estimates from an ordered logistic regression (N = 1,063) reveal that the conditions of a nuclear accident and living with a small child in the household would lower the level of support for accepting disaster waste, although this does not mean that people would give their support in the absence of a nuclear accident. The results also suggest that the national and municipal governments should communicate more with the public about the risks, benefits, and costs associated with hosting disaster debris, and make efforts to improve public trust in the national government.     

Information Sources as Explanatory Variables for the Belgian Health‐Related Risk Perception of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

The media play an important role in risk communication, providing information about accidents, both nearby and far away. Each media source has its own presentation style, which could influence how the audience perceives the presented risk. This study investigates the explanatory power of 12 information sources (traditional media, new media, social media, and interpersonal communication) for the perceived risk posed by radiation released from the damaged Fukushima nuclear power plant on respondents’ own health and that of the population in general. The analysis controlled for attitude toward nuclear energy, gender, education, satisfaction with the media coverage, and duration of attention paid to the coverage. The study uses a large empirical data set from a public opinion survey, which is representative for the Belgian population with respect to six sociodemographic variables. Results show that three information sources are significant regressors of perceived health‐related risk of the nuclear accident: television, interpersonal communication, and the category of miscellaneous online sources. More favorable attitudes toward nuclear power, longer attention to the coverage, and higher satisfaction with the provided information lead to lower risk perception. Taken together, the results suggest that the media can indeed have a modest influence on how the audience perceives a risk.     

A Cross‐Cultural Study of Perceived Benefit Versus Risk as Mediators in the Trust‐Acceptance Relationship

Several recent studies have identified the significant role social trust in regulatory organizations plays in the public acceptance of various technologies and activities. In a cross‐cultural investigation, the current work explores empirically the relationship between social trust in management authorities and the degree of public acceptability of hazards for individuals residing in either developed or emerging Latin American economies using confirmatory rather than exploratory techniques. Undergraduates in Mexico, Brazil, and Chile and the United States and Spain assessed trust in regulatory authorities, public acceptance, personal knowledge, and the risks and benefits for 23 activities and technological hazards. Four findings were encountered. (i) In Latin American nations trust in regulatory entities was strongly and significantly (directly as well as indirectly) linked with the public's acceptance of any activity or technology. In developed countries trust and acceptability are essentially linked indirectly (through perceived risk and perceived benefit). (ii) Lack of knowledge strengthened the magnitude and statistical significance of the trust‐acceptability relationship in both developed and developing countries. (iii) For high levels of claimed knowledge, the impact on the trust‐acceptability relationship varied depending upon the origin of the sample. (iv) Confirmatory analysis revealed the relative importance of perceived benefit over perceived risk in meditating the trust‐acceptability causal chain.     

Insights into the Societal Risk of Nuclear Power Plant Accidents

The elements of societal risk from a nuclear power plant accident are clearly illustrated by the Fukushima accident: land contamination, long‐term relocation of large numbers of people, loss of productive farm area, loss of industrial production, and significant loss of electric capacity. NUREG‐1150 and other studies have provided compelling evidence that the individual health risk of nuclear power plant accidents is effectively negligible relative to other comparable risks, even for people living in close proximity to a plant. The objective of this study is to compare the societal risk of nuclear power plant accidents to that of other events to which the public is exposed. We have characterized the monetized societal risk in the United States from major societally disruptive events, such as hurricanes, in the form of a complementary cumulative distribution function. These risks are compared with nuclear power plant risks, based on NUREG‐1150 analyses and new MACCS code calculations to account for differences in source terms determined in the more recent SOARCA study. A candidate quantitative societal objective is discussed for potential adoption by the NRC. The results are also interpreted with regard to the acceptability of nuclear power as a major source of future energy supply.     

“What—Me Worry?”1“Why So Serious?”:2 A Personal View on the Fukushima Nuclear Reactor Accidents

Infrequently, it seems that a significant accident precursor or, worse, an actual accident, involving a commercial nuclear power reactor occurs to remind us of the need to reexamine the safety of this important electrical power technology from a risk perspective. Twenty‐five years since the major core damage accident at Chernobyl in the Ukraine, the Fukushima reactor complex in Japan experienced multiple core damages as a result of an earthquake‐induced tsunami beyond either the earthquake or tsunami design basis for the site. Although the tsunami itself killed tens of thousands of people and left the area devastated and virtually uninhabitable, much concern still arose from the potential radioactive releases from the damaged reactors, even though there was little population left in the area to be affected. As a lifelong probabilistic safety analyst in nuclear engineering, even I must admit to a recurrence of the doubt regarding nuclear power safety after Fukushima that I had experienced after Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. This article is my attempt to “recover” my personal perspective on acceptable risk by examining both the domestic and worldwide history of commercial nuclear power plant accidents and attempting to quantify the risk in terms of the frequency of core damage that one might glean from a review of operational history.     

Public Acceptance of Fully Automated Driving: Effects of Social Trust and Risk/Benefit Perceptions

Automated driving (AD) is one of the most significant technical advances in the transportation industry. Its safety, economic, and environmental benefits cannot be realized if it is not used. To explain, predict, and increase its acceptance, we need to understand how people perceive and why they accept or reject AD technology. Drawing upon the trust heuristic, we tested a psychological model to explain three acceptance measures of fully AD (FAD): general acceptance, willingness to pay (WTP), and behavioral intention (BI). This heuristic suggests that social trust can directly affect acceptance or indirectly affect acceptance through perceived benefits and risks. Using a survey (N = 441), we found that social trust retained a direct effect as well as an indirect effect on all FAD acceptance measures. The indirect effect of social trust was more prominent in forming general acceptance; the direct effect of social trust was more prominent in explaining WTP and BI. Compared to perceived risk, perceived benefit was a stronger predictor of all FAD acceptance measures and also a stronger mediator of the trust–acceptance relationship. Predictive ability of the proposed model for the three acceptance measures was confirmed. We discuss the implications of our results for theory and practice.     

Determinants and Mapping of Collective Perceptions of Technological Risk: The Case of the Second Nuclear Power Plant in Taiwan

Nuclear power is a highly controversial and salient example of environmental risk. The siting or operating of a nuclear power plant often faces widespread public opposition. Although studies of public perceptions of nuclear power date back to 1970s, little research attempts to explain the spatial heterogeneity of risk attitude toward nuclear power among individuals or communities. This article intends to improve the knowledge about the major factors contributing to nuclear power plant risk perceptions by mapping the geographical patterns of local risk perception and examining the determinants in forming the nature and distribution of the perceived risk among potentially affected population. The analysis was conducted by a case study of the Second Nuclear Power Plant (SNPP) in Taiwan by using a novel methodology that incorporates a comprehensive risk perception (CRP) model into an ethnographic approach called risk perception mapping (RPM). First, we examined the determinants of local nuclear power risk perceptions through the CRP model and multivariate regression analysis. Second, the results were integrated with the RPM approach to map and explain the spatial pattern of risk perceptions. The findings demonstrate that the respondents regard the nuclear power plant as an extremely high‐risk facility, causing them to oppose the SNPP and reject the compensation payment to accept its continuing operation. Results also indicate that perceptions of nuclear power risk were mainly influenced by social trust, psychological and socioeconomic attributes, proximity, and the perceived effects of the SNPP on the quality of everyday life.     

The Influence of Trust and Perceptions of Risks and Benefits on the Acceptance of Gene Technology

A causal model explaining acceptance of gene technology was tested. It was hypothesized that trust in institutions using gene technology or using modified products has a positive impact on perceived benefit and a negative influence on perceived risk of this technology. Furthermore, perceived benefit and perceived risk determine acceptance of biotechnology. In other words, trust has an indirect influence on the acceptance of the technology. The postulated model was tested using structural equation modeling procedures and data from a random quota sample of 1001 Swiss citizens between 18 and 74 years old. Results indicated that the proposed model fits the data very well. The same causal model explains females' and males' acceptance of gene technology. Gender differences were found for the latent variables trust, perceived benefit, and acceptance of gene technology. Females indicated more trust, perceived less benefit, and demonstrated less acceptance than did males. No significant difference was observed for perceived risk. The implications of the results are discussed.     

Assessment of Instructions on Protection Against Food Contaminated with Radiocesium in Japan in 2011

The Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) has published instructions for radiological protection against food after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in 2011. Following the instructions, the export and consumption of food items identified as being contaminated were restricted for a certain period. We assessed the validity of the imposed restriction periods for two representative vegetables (spinach and cabbage) grown in Fukushima Prefecture from two perspectives: effectiveness for reducing dietary dose and economic efficiency. To assess effectiveness, we estimated the restriction period required to maintain consumers’ dose below the guidance dose levels. To assess economic efficiency, we estimated the restriction period that maximizes the net benefit to taxpayers. All estimated restriction periods were shorter than the actual restriction periods imposed on spinach and cabbage from Fukushima in 2011, which indicates that the food restriction effectively maintained consumers’ dietary dose below the guidance dose level, but in an economically inefficient manner. We also evaluated the response of the restriction period to the sample size for each weekly food safety test and the instructions for when to remove the restriction. Stringent MHLW instructions seemed to sufficiently reduce consumers’ health risk even when the sample size for the weekly food safety test was small, but tended to increase the economic cost to taxpayers.     

Major Psychological Factors Affecting Acceptance of Gene-Recombination Technology

The purpose of this study was to verify the validity of a causal model that was made to predict the acceptance of gene-recombination technology. A structural equation model was used as a causal model. First of all, based on preceding studies, the factors of perceived risk, perceived benefit, and trust were set up as important psychological factors determining acceptance of gene-recombination technology in the structural equation model. An additional factor, "sense of bioethics," which I consider to be important for acceptance of biotechnology, was added to the model. Based on previous studies, trust was set up to have an indirect influence on the acceptance of gene-recombination technology through perceived risk and perceived benefit in the model. Participants were 231 undergraduate students in Japan who answered a questionnaire with a 5-point bipolar scale. The results indicated that the proposed model fits the data well, and showed that acceptance of gene-recombination technology is explained largely by four factors, that is, perceived risk, perceived benefit, trust, and sense of bioethics, whether the technology is applied to plants, animals, or human beings. However, the relative importance of the four factors was found to vary depending on whether the gene-recombination technology was applied to plants, animals, or human beings. Specifically, the factor of sense of bioethics is the most important factor in acceptance of plant gene-recombination technology and animal gene-recombination technology, and the factors of trust and perceived risk are the most important factors in acceptance of human being gene-recombination technology.     

Risk Perception Among Nuclear Power Plant Personnel: A Survey

This study investigated risk perception, well-being, and organizational commitment among nuclear power plant personnel. The study group, 428 employees from a nuclear power plant, completed a questionnaire which included the same questions as those in previous surveys on risk perception of lay persons and industrial workers. Hazards at work were not seen as a sizable problem by nuclear power plant personnel. The study group estimated the safety of nuclear power plants better and the possibility of a serious nuclear accident as more unlikely than the general public. Compared to employees in other industrial companies, the overall perceived risks at work among plant personnel did not exceed the respective perceptions of the reference groups. Risk-related attitudes did not explain well-being among plant personnel, but the relationship between the perceived probability of a serious nuclear accident at work and organizational commitment yielded to a significant correlation: Those plant workers who estimated the likelihood of an accident higher were less committed to the organization.     

Weighing the Risks of Nuclear Energy and Climate Change: Trust in Different Information Sources,Perceived Risks,and Willingness to Pay for Alternatives to Nuclear Power

We examined how individuals perceive nuclear energy in the context of climate change mitigation and how their perceptions are associated with trust in different risk information sources. We analyzed the interrelationships between trust, perceived risk of nuclear power, climate change concern, perception of nuclear energy as an acceptable way to mitigate climate change, and willingness to pay (WTP) for alternatives to nuclear power. A nationwide survey (N = 967) collected in Finland was analyzed with structural equation modeling. The associations between trust and perceived risk of nuclear power, climate change concern, and perception of nuclear power as a way to mitigate climate change varied by the type of information source. Political party support and other background variables were associated with trust in different information sources. The effect of trust in information sources on WTP was mediated by perceived risks and benefits. The results will increase our understanding of how individuals perceive nuclear energy as a way to cut CO₂ emissions and the role of trust in different information sources in shaping nuclear risk perceptions and energy choices.     

Examining Public Trust in Risk‐Managing Organizations After a Major Disaster

This research investigates the public's trust in risk‐managing organizations after suffering serious damage from a major disaster. It is natural for public trust to decrease in organizations responsible for mitigating the damage. However, what about trust in organizations that address hazards not directly related to the disaster? Based on the results of surveys conducted by a national institute, the Japanese government concluded, in a White Paper on Science and Technology, that the public's trust in scientists declined overall after the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake. Because scientists play a key role in risk assessment and risk management in most areas, one could predict that trust in risk‐managing organizations overall would decrease after a major disaster. The methodology of that survey, however, had limitations that prevented such conclusions. For this research, two surveys were conducted to measure the public's trust in risk‐managing organizations regarding various hazards, before and after the Tohoku Earthquake (n = 1,192 in 2008 and n = 1,138 in 2012). The results showed that trust decreased in risk‐managing organizations that deal with earthquakes and nuclear accidents, whereas trust levels related to many other hazards, especially in areas not touched by the Tohoku Earthquake, remained steady or even increased. These results reject the assertion that distrust rippled through all risk‐managing organizations. The implications of this research are discussed, with the observation that this result is not necessarily gratifying for risk managers because high trust sometimes reduces public preparedness for disasters.     

Of Disasters and Dragon Kings: A Statistical Analysis of Nuclear Power Incidents and Accidents

We perform a statistical study of risk in nuclear energy systems. This study provides and analyzes a data set that is twice the size of the previous best data set on nuclear incidents and accidents, comparing three measures of severity: the industry standard International Nuclear Event Scale, the Nuclear Accident Magnitude Scale of radiation release, and cost in U.S. dollars. The rate of nuclear accidents with cost above 20 MM 2013 USD, per reactor per year, has decreased from the 1970s until the present time. Along the way, the rate dropped significantly after Chernobyl (April 1986) and is expected to be roughly stable around a level of 0.003, suggesting an average of just over one event per year across the current global fleet. The distribution of costs appears to have changed following the Three Mile Island major accident (March 1979). The median cost became approximately 3.5 times smaller, but an extremely heavy tail emerged, being well described by a Pareto distribution with parameter α = 0.5–0.6. For instance, the cost of the two largest events, Chernobyl and Fukushima (March 2011), is equal to nearly five times the sum of the 173 other events. We also document a significant runaway disaster regime in both radiation release and cost data, which we associate with the “dragon‐king” phenomenon. Since the major accident at Fukushima (March 2011) occurred recently, we are unable to quantify an impact of the industry response to this disaster. Excluding such improvements, in terms of costs, our range of models suggests that there is presently a 50% chance that (i) a Fukushima event (or larger) occurs every 60–150 years, and (ii) that a Three Mile Island event (or larger) occurs every 10–20 years. Further—even assuming that it is no longer possible to suffer an event more costly than Chernobyl or Fukushima—the expected annual cost and its standard error bracket the cost of a new plant. This highlights the importance of improvements not only immediately following Fukushima, but also deeper improvements to effectively exclude the possibility of “dragon‐king” disasters. Finally, we find that the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) is inconsistent in terms of both cost and radiation released. To be consistent with cost data, the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters would need to have between an INES level of 10 and 11, rather than the maximum of 7.     

Perceived Risk and Benefit of Nuclear Waste Repositories: Four Opinion Clusters

Local public resistance can block the site‐selection process, construction, and operation of nuclear waste repositories. Social science has established that the perception of risks and benefits, trust in authorities, and opinion on nuclear energy play important roles in acceptance. In particular, risk and benefit evaluations seem critical for opinion formation. However, risks and benefits have rarely been studied independently and, most often, the focus has been on the two most salient groups of proponents and opponents. The aim of this exploratory study is to examine the often‐neglected majority of people holding ambivalent or indifferent opinions. We used cluster analysis to examine the sample (N = 500, mailed survey in German‐speaking Switzerland) in terms of patterns of risk and benefit perception. We reveal four significantly different and plausible clusters: one cluster with high‐benefit ratings in favor of a repository and one cluster with high‐risk ratings opposing it; a third cluster shows ambivalence, with high ratings on both risk and benefit scales and moderate opposition, whereas a fourth cluster seems indifferent, rating risks and benefits only moderately compared to the ambivalent cluster. We conclude that a closer look at the often neglected but considerable number of people with ambivalent or indifferent opinions is necessary. Although the extreme factions of the public will most probably not change their opinion, we do not yet know how the opinion of the ambivalent and indifferent clusters might develop over time.