弥合文化鸿沟“空降”高管如何跨文化管理？

中国企业“走出去”的跨国并购案例越来越多,也面临着并购后“空降”高管如何跨文化管理的难题。弥合文化鸿沟成为“空降,,高管上任后必须迈过的第一道难关。     

高管持股、高管的私有收益与公司的并购行为

探讨公司高管发动的并购行为与谋取个人私有收益行为之间的关联性,并尝试从高级管理层的私有收益角度对公司高管的并购行为进行研究.基于代理成本理论及中国高管薪酬管制和公司并购的特殊制度背景,以1999年～2007年全部A股上市公司为样本,采用固定效应回归、随机效应回归和分层回归的实证方法,得到一些重要结论.实证结果表明,中国上市公司并购已经成为高管谋取私有收益的机会主义行为,通过发动并购行动高管获得更高的薪酬和在职消费,而高管发动并购事件谋求在职消费的私有收益动机最为明显.通过分层回归还发现,目前中国的制度环境下管理者持股水平虽然相对较低,但这一股权激励的确能够适当缓解高管以谋取私有收益为目的而发动毁损股东价值的并购行为.     

什么是企业核心竞争力？

2月初，微软（中国）有限公司总裁唐骏正式辞职，结束了他长达10年的微软职业生涯，并立即空降到新东家——上海盛大网络公司任总裁一职。盛大网络董事长兼总裁陈开桥将辞去总裁职务，只留任盛大董事长一职。假如盛大成功上市，唐骏将成为股东之一。唐骏离开微软空降盛大，你看好吗？     

国企高管政治晋升对企业并购行为的影响——基于企业成长压力理论的实证研究

虽然企业成长压力是所有高管都要面临的重要课题,但对我国具有"准官员"性质的国企高管而言,却有着更为"与众不同"的意义:由于国企承担着较多的政策性负担,使得"企业成长速度"指标取代了包含很多噪音的"企业绩效"指标(即国企普遍采用的"规模导向型"发展方式),成为国企高管政治晋升中的一个重要评判筹码。当然,这也意味着对于具有不同政治晋升机会的高管而言,他们面临的成长压力会有所差异:与那些政治晋升机会较低的高管相比,政治晋升机会较高的高管面临的成长压力相对较大。并购作为企业实现快速成长的重要方式之一,自然成为那些追求政治晋升高管的最佳选择。有鉴于此,本文拟基于企业成长压力理论考察国企高管政治晋升对企业并购行为的影响。文章基于2004~2013年国有上市公司的并购数据,研究发现:与政治晋升机会较低的国企高管相比,当国企高管面临的政治晋升机会较高时,企业选择并购成长方式的可能性较高,在并购交易中支付的溢价水平相对较高,并购后取得的短期并购绩效虽无显著差异,但长期并购绩效却显著较差。当企业自身内生成长速度特别是相对自身历史的内生成长速度较慢(即高管面临的内生成长压力较大)时,高管政治晋升对上述并购行为(并购成长方式选择、并购交易价格支付、并购绩效)的影响就会越强。     

高管报酬激励、战略并购重组与公司绩效——来自中国A股上市公司的实证

本文运用结构方程模型探究了高管报酬激励、战略并购重组与公司绩效间的作用关系路径。研究发现,高管年薪报酬对公司绩效的直接正向作用显著,高管持股报酬对公司绩效的直接正向作用不显著;在激励契约完备与不完备的前提下,不同高管报酬激励、战略并购重组、公司绩效之间作用路径及其显著水平不同,战略并购重组的中介作用及公司规模与公司性质调节作用也不相同。研究结果为为中国企业选择高管报酬激励方式、进一步完善公司治理结构提供实证支持。     

向文波创新“三大战役” 他总能制造爆炸式管理事件

从年初并购大象普茨迈斯特,起诉美国总统奥巴马,到再创四项产品"第一",三一都冲上了风口浪尖。三一重工股份有限公司总裁向文波,再一次成为聚光灯下的人物。无论是并购大象、起诉奥巴马和带领企业创新,向文波都是决策和执行者。然而,三一今年每一件大事的背后,向文波到底有什么战略驱动?     

并购后高管变更、合法性与并购绩效——基于制度理论的视角

并购后的高管变更对于企业的并购绩效具有重要的影响,但目前的研究结论没有取得一致性。本文基于制度理论的视角引入合法性的概念,通过123份并购样本实证分析了并购后高管变更、合法性以及并购绩效之间的关系。研究结果显示:并购后高管变更与并购的外部合法性和内部合法性之间均存在显著的负相关;而外部合法性和内部合法性对于并购绩效具有显著的积极作用。本研究结论对于我国企业的并购后高管变更决策以及如何提升并购绩效具有理论指导意义。     

股权制衡对并购中合谋行为经济后果的影响

以模型构建和实证检验相结合的方式,探讨股权制衡对并购活动中控股股东与高管人员合谋行为所产生的经济后果的影响。通过大股东效用模型论述股权制衡的治理功效,构建以Shapley指数计算的股权制衡度变量,以沪深A股上市公司1999年至2006年的并购事件作为样本,采用回归分析对模型推论进行检验。研究结果表明,当控股股东尝试以并购手段掏空上市公司时,将采取向高管人员提供利益回报的方式与其合谋。如果公司中存在制衡股东,高管人员获取私有收益的空间将被压缩,低效并购造成公司业绩损失的情况也会减少。实证结果显示,当控股股东与高管人员合谋时,上市公司的股权制衡程度越高,高管人员通过并购获取的私有收益越少,公司的并购绩效也越好。     

我国上市公司女性高管对企业并购绩效的影响研究

并购作为企业追求规模效益、提高经济效率、合理配置资源的有效战略,在经济转型期日益频繁地被企业采用。企业高管承担着制订和实施企业并购战略的使命,与企业并购行为能否提升其绩效有着紧密的联系。近几年来,大量女性开始进入企业高管团队,在企业管理团队中发挥着重要作用。本文以207家中国A股上市企业为样本,分析了女性高管对企业并购绩效的影响。研究结果显示女性高管比例以及女性高管在其他单位兼职均与企业并购绩效之间存在着正相关关系,能够显著提高企业并购绩效。本研究对企业高管团队的配置和建设具有一定的启示作用,为企业并购提供理论指导,进一步拓宽了现有高层管理团队的研究范围,对政府制定有关促进女性发展政策提供参考,同时也希望借此研究打破无形"玻璃天花板"阻碍,为女性高管的发展提供帮助。     

高达60%并购失败率的真相

<正>近些年,中国企业的海外并购遇到了较大的挑战和阻碍。在一些特定的市场和行业内,海外并购已经不再是能否做好的问题,而是能否被环境允许的问题。从全球统计范围来看,企业并购失败概率超过50%;在中国,企业并购失败概率超过60%,跨国并购失败概率超过80%。过去几年,百年变局和世纪疫情交织叠加,全球金融市场受到一定程度的影响;作为亚太第一经济体,中国并购交易发展亦然,市场进入全新的战略调整期。那么,为什么中国企业并购失败率这么高？进入后疫情时代,     

Does owner CEO narcissism promote exporting SMEs' market spreading strategy? Joint effects of asset-specific investments and firm exporting experience

This study explores the influence of owner chief executive officer (CEO) narcissism on the market spreading strategy of exporting small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs). Combining insights from the literature on CEO narcissism and trait activation theory, it is argued that SMEs with narcissistic owner CEOs are more likely to prefer a market spreading strategy, depending on firm-level asset-specific investments and exporting experience. The empirical analysis of a sample of 248 exporting SMEs in China supports the theoretical prediction that owner CEO narcissism has a positive impact on the preference toward a market spreading strategy. In addition, the results show that asset-specific investments weaken the positive influence of owner CEO narcissism on the preference of a market spreading strategy, but this negative moderating effect becomes less significant as SMEs gain more exporting experience. This paper contributes to the emerging research on the role of owner CEO narcissism in firm internationalization decisions, offering a more complete understanding of the extent to which owner CEO narcissism can influence exporting SMEs' tendency toward market spreading, and delineating how such influence may be dependent on organizational-level situational factors.     

CEO humility,narcissism and firm innovation: A paradox perspective on CEO traits

We examine how two seemingly contradictory yet potentially complementary CEO traits—humility and narcissism—interact to affect firm innovation. We adopt a paradox perspective and propose that individuals can have paradoxical traits and that, in particular, humility and narcissism can coexist harmoniously, especially among the Chinese, whose philosophical tradition embraces paradoxical thinking and behaving. CEOs that are both humble and narcissistic are hypothesized to be more likely to have socialized charisma, to cultivate an innovative culture, and to deliver innovative performance. Two studies using multisource data involving 63 CEOs, 328 top managers, and 645 middle managers in Study 1 and 143 CEOs and 190 top managers in Study 2 support the hypotheses and point to new directions for studying CEO traits and their effects on firm outcomes.     

The physician executive "arrives"--a new generation prepares for the future

The recent rise in the number of physician executives in the health care industry vividly demonstrates that a genuinely new generation of physician executives is seeking to combine the sensitivity of their clinical skills with the business acumen that today's health care organizations need to prosper and grow. But physicians who are preparing themselves to be selected one day as chief executive officers by hospitals, integrated systems, and managed care organizations should understand that the CEO role is radically different from that of the CEO of a physician practice. The corporate CEO role requires the management of managers and responsiveness to the organization's board. Those who imagine that the corporate CEO role bears any resemblance to the autonomous, independent existence of the practitioner are certain to have a rough time.     

Do transformational CEOs always make the difference? The role of TMT feedback seeking behavior

In the present paper, we raise the question whether CEO transformational leadership invariably makes a difference for team performance and change effectiveness. Since in general, CEOs are surrounded by a team of highly influential top managers, we argue that the effectiveness of CEO transformational leadership is contingent on the feedback seeking behavior of their top management team (TMT). Data from 38 TMTs and their CEOs demonstrated that transformational leadership was positively related to both TMT performance and effectiveness of organizational change, but only when the TMT engaged in low levels of feedback seeking behavior. As predicted, there was no relationship between CEO transformational leadership and performance and change effectiveness for teams exhibiting high levels of feedback seeking behavior. These findings suggest that for high-feedback seeking TMTs, organizational results can be achieved without a transformational CEO.     

双重委托代理下独立董事治理效应研究

为深入理解独立董事在双重委托代理关系下的治理功用,并为构建具有中国特色的公司治理结构提供理论借鉴,运用双重委托代理理论对独立董事治理效应进行分析,结果表明:一方面为监督CEO而提高董事会中独立董事比例,CEO会越不愿意与董事会共享公司内部信息,使得独立董事难以直接降低第1类代理成本;另一方面,为监督大股东侵占而必须进行的独立董事"独立化"有可能在抑制第2类代理问题的同时,削弱大股东治理机制的有效性,诱发严重的股东与经理层之间的利益冲突,间接增加第1类代理成本。     

Family firms and high technology Mergers & Acquisitions

We examine whether family firms undertake value creating high technology M&A. We also examine whether level of ownership, diversification, agency issues and CEO type matter. Our sample consists of high-technology M&A undertaken by Canadian firms over the period 1997–2006. Canada offers a setting with many family firms and the use of control enhancing mechanisms such as dual class shares and pyramid structures. We find a positive relationship between family ownership and announcement period abnormal returns. This relationship, however, starts to decrease at higher levels of ownership but remains overall positive. We also show that the agency conflict between shareholders and professional managers has a detrimental impact on announcement period abnormal returns whereas the conflict between controlling and minority shareholders via control enhancing mechanisms does not. Finally, we document that founder CEO undertake better high tech M&A than descendant or hired CEO.     

The value circle. A profile of J. Richard Gaintner, MD.

This article describes how the arrival of CEO J. Richard Gaintner, MD, at Shands HealthCare signaled a time for refocusing the organization's direction and helping physicians to cope with the changes buffeting the industry. He saw angst and disenfranchisement, sentiments that characterized not only Shands and the University of Florida Health Science Center, but also the entire establishment of American scientific medicine. Gaintner believes--and continually preaches--that practicing medicine in a cost-effective manner will improve, not harm, the quality of care. His willingness to face reality objectively is perhaps his greatest asset in helping physicians deal with managed care. He conveys heartfelt empathy with the day-to-day conflicts they face. But he does not allow himself the temporary luxury of cynicism, and he refuses to accept negativity and pessimism in others. Rather, he asks that physicians and managers understand the system and develop the capacity to work within it and take responsibility for improving it. Beyond exhorting physicians to be accountable for the success of the enterprise, Gaintner creates mechanisms for meaningful physician participation in enterprise management.     

The new class of chief executive officer

This article summarizes the results of research into the ways in which environmental forces are changing the management task of chief executive officers of large corporations. The article comments on the changing business environment; on the time spent by managers on environmental forces; changes in the basic strategies of managers concerned with major social and political environmental forces; the characteristics which chief executive officers believe their successors must have to be effective managers; major ways in which the impact of environment on the CEO is changing the infra-structure and decision-making process; and, finally, a brief look at the future.     

Do Compensation Consultants Drive Up CEO Pay? Evidence from UK Public Firms

Do compensation consultants drive up CEO pay for the benefit of managers, or do they design pay packages to benefit firm owners? Using a large sample of UK firms from the FTSE All‐Share Index over the 2003–2011 period, we show a positive correlation between the presence of compensation consultants and CEO pay. Importantly, isolating this effect is somewhat dependent on the endogenous selection of consultants and the statistical modelling strategy deployed. We find evidence that compensation consultants improve CEO compensation design when their expertise is of greater importance (e.g. during the post‐financial crisis period, or for firms that have particularly weak compensation policies). In addition, our findings show that compensation consultants increase CEO pay–performance sensitivity. The balance of evidence supports optimal contracting theory more than managerial power theory, but the authors caution the limits to this verification. We are careful to note that the more compelling evidence for the positive effect of pay consultants on CEOs is based on advanced methods (such as propensity score matching and difference‐in‐differences), and that more standard approaches (such as OLS and fixed effects) are unlikely to reveal the same level of causality of consultants on CEO pay.     

CEO childhood trauma,social networks,and strategic risk taking

Childhood trauma has been recognized as an important aspect of an individual’s early life experiences. However, in research on the upper echelons of organizations, the impact of childhood trauma exposure on CEOs’ strategic decision-making is not well understood. By integrating child trauma theory and upper echelons theory, we develop a framework for exploring how CEO childhood trauma influences strategic risk taking. We suggest that CEO childhood trauma has a negative exponential association with strategic risk taking because of the long-term effects of post-traumatic stress (PTS). In addition, we propose that moderating effects of social networks on the effects of PTS arising from CEO childhood trauma are driven by the two competing functions of social networks: social support and social pressure. We use data on China’s Great Famine to test our theory. By examining CEO childhood trauma and strategic risk taking, our study has important implications for child trauma theory and upper echelons theory.