The Multilinear Extension and the Symmetric Coalition Banzhaf Value

Alonso-Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro (2002, Annals of Operations Research 109, 213–227) proposed a modification of the Banzhaf value for games where a coalition structure is given. In this paper we present a method to compute this value by means of the multilinear extension of the game. A real-world numerical example illustrates the application procedure. MSC (2000) Classification: 91A12     

Olson VS. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict

We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and – in case they win – later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios: equidistant preferences with varying relative strengths, and varying vicinity of preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that the commonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect.     

On Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games

We present a unified look at myopic stability concepts for hedonic games, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition structures always exist, and present a sufficient condition for the existence of contractually Nash stable coalition structures on the class of separable games. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (D. Dimitrov)“by “D. Dimitrov gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.     

Advocacy Coalitions and Health Politics in Korea

This article analyses the political dynamics underlying health care reform in Korea after the Asian economic crisis. The reform was a significant volte‐face in respect of the social policy paradigm, which now aims to enhance equity in National Health Insurance. The article pays special attention to the evolution of the advocacy coalition for equity in health policy and how it developed the two attributes required for successful policy change: institutional strength and the elaboration of policy rationale for reform. This process was not a simple linear development but a combination of setbacks and advances. The article also takes into consideration the structural conditions that set the policy environment over the course of the advocacy coalition's evolution since the 1960s. In short, the policy reform of 2000 was not a simple policy change in response to the economic crisis, but rather the outcome of the long‐term evolution of the advocacy coalition for equity in health policy.     

Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games

This paper shows that altruism may be beneficial in bargaining when there is competition for bargaining partners. In a game with random proposers, the most altruistic player has the highest material payoff if players are sufficiently patient. However, this advantage is eroded as the discount factor increases, and if players are perfectly patient altruism and spite become irrelevant for material payoffs.     

A Banzhaf share function for cooperative games in coalition structure

A cooperative game with transferable utility–or simply a TU-game– describes a situation in which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation. A value function for these games assigns to every TU-game a distribution of payoffs over the players. Well-known solutions for TU-games are the Shapley and the Banzhaf value. An alternative type of solution is the concept of share function, which assigns to every player in a TU-game its share in the worth of the grand coalition. In this paper we consider TU-games in which the players are organized into a coalition structure being a finite partition of the set of players. The Shapley value has been generalized by Owen to TU-games in coalition structure. We redefine this value function as a share function and show that this solution satisfies the multiplication property that the share of a player in some coalition is equal to the product of the Shapley share of the coalition in a game between the coalitions and the Shapley share of the player in a game between the players within the coalition. Analogously we introduce a Banzhaf coalition structure share function. Application of these share functions to simple majority games show some appealing properties.     

An Alternative Model of the Formation of Political Coalitions

Most models of the formation of political coalitions use either Euclidean spaces or rely purely on game theory. This limits their applicability. In this article, a single model is presented which is more broadly applicable. In principle any kind of set can be used as a policy space. The model is also able to incorporate different kinds of party motivations: both rent-seeking and idealism. The model uses party preferences and power to identify stable coalitions and predict government policy as well as to indicate which member of the opposition will be able to break up the governing coalition if no stable coalition exists. In the latter case it will also indicate on which issue the government is likely to split. Parties may have preferences over issues such as the composition of cabinet and/or the governing coalition as well as the more traditional issues of government formation. The model also provides a rationale for log-rolling.     

为什么跨小区的业主组织联盟存在差异 ——一项基于治理结构与政治机会（威胁）的城市比较分析

本文结合社会运动联盟理论和城市治理理论,比较了上海和广州两个城市跨小区的业主组织联盟形态,提出一个基于治理结构与政治机会（威胁）的比较分析框架来理解两个城市业主组织联盟形态的差异。研究发现,与广州相比,上海的物业管理制度更加完善,基层治理组织架构也更加健全,体制内支持者相对缺乏,从而降低了社会冲突发生以及冲突激化为社会性公共议题的可能性。考虑到都市抗争的反应性特征以及中国社会管理体制所具有的社会控制和利益表达双重功能,都市抗争研究应该具体分析行动限制的制度根源、国家在预防社会抗争出现以及在抗争过程中的多重角色。     

论"虚假人类中心论"与"真实人类中心论"

伴随着生态环境的恶化,人与自然关系的紧张,从而引发了对以往“人类中心论”的反思与批判,应该说,这是人类面临生态环境危机,在理论和实践基础上进行的自我反思与批判。反思的结果是有些人把问题简单而武断地归结为“人类中心论”,进而提出“非人类中心论”。实际上,生态环境的恶化,并不能简单笼统地归结为是“人类中心论”问题的症结是以往的“虚假人类中心论”。因此,要从根本上解决问题,不能以“非人类中心论”代替“人类中心论”,而是抛弃“虚假人类中心论”,建构“真实人类中心论”。     

试论劳动价值论的适用范围

劳动价值论在解释现实经济现象时存在一定的困难 ,不是劳动价值论自身逻辑和体系问题 ,而是劳动价值论所研究的价值理论与价格理论、分配理论有联系也有区别 ,劳动价值论有其自身的适用范围 ,必须科学界定劳动价值论的适用范围 ,从历史唯物主义和经济学的角度重新认识劳动价值论的科学性和伟大意义     

Stochastic expected utility theory

This paper proposes a new decision theory of how individuals make random errors when they compute the expected utility of risky lotteries. When distorted by errors, the expected utility of a lottery never exceeds (falls below) the utility of the highest (lowest) outcome. This assumption implies that errors are likely to overvalue (undervalue) lotteries with expected utility close to the utility of the lowest (highest) outcome. Proposed theory explains many stylized empirical facts such as the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, common consequence effect (Allais paradox), common ratio effect and violations of betweenness. Theory fits the data from ten well-known experimental studies at least as well as cumulative prospect theory.

论何良俊的戏曲学理论——以其《曲论》为研究中心

何良俊的《曲论》是明代17种“戏曲论著”之一,其中所蕴舍的戏曲学理论主要表现在三个方面：一是注重戏曲文辞的“本色说”;二为提倡“情意独至”的“情辞说”;三即追求艺术精细度的“声律论”。     

大学英语合作学习与自主学习的建构主义视阈

贯彻落实教育部大学英语教学改革精神,运用建构主义学习理论探讨集成合作学习与自主学习的可行性,对于从实践上构建二者的整合模式,具有重要的指导意义.尽管建构主义学习理论的内涵可以划分为过程学说、体验学说和环境学说,但三者又紧密相连,融会贯通:没有对知识的建构、丰富和创新,体验就无从谈起;没有典型环境的创设与充分利用,体验也难以取得收获.大学英语的知识建构过程,即学习主体在适宜的环境中学习体验不断得到收获并不断积累的过程.实践证明,自主学习能力的培养必须有合作学习的引领,合作学习的旨归在于学习者自主学习能力的提升.基于此,在建构主义视闻下,构建"合作-自主学习模式"应采取的策略为:精心策划合作学习选题,激发学习者的主动探索性;善于创设学习情境,实现学习者主体与客体良性互动;总结交流学习体验,促进学习者群体多样化风格的形成.     

"人力资本论"中的劳工迁移观分析

二战结束后,随着美国科技革命的展开和经济结构中服务业的崛起,美国从20世纪50年代开始出现了经济繁荣和社会失业率并行攀升的趋势。对此,以西奥德.舒尔茨为代表的经济学家通过实践和潜心研究,提出了颇有影响的人力资本论,其中关于劳工迁移的精辟论述具有很强的历史和现实性价值,但是,其中的局限性也十分突出,尤其是强调区域工资差异的论述似有以偏概全之嫌。无论是在理论上,还是近现代史上的跨国移民以及二战后美国以劳工为核心的人口流动,都证明了该理论中的局限性。     

Toward a theory of myth

James Cresswell provides a thoughtful critique of my essay on a theory of myth (Mills) with a specific focus on the nature of theorizing that challenges the dogma of empirical frames of reference, concluding that scientific theories themselves are contemporary myths. Insofar as myth is an attempt to provide a narrative or discourse about phenomena, Cresswell's argument could apply to any theory. But he takes this point further: theory is synonymous with myth. In order to unpack this evocative claim, it may prove useful to revisit how theory and myth relate to the concepts of logos, truth, ontology and identity. In the end, I suggest theory is not myth because theory sets out to describe, interpret and explain phenomena and is scrutinized for its validity, generalizability and applied consequences, while the premises of myth are often historically and culturally presupposed or simply devolve into belief that may or may not be defensible.     

Alienation in a four factor world

This paper aims to reconstruct the concept of alienation as a live topic for active social theorizing. Joining Marxian and Simmelian ideas, it provides a multi‐dimensional, formal, and synthetic theory of alienation. The paper develops a set of theoretical tools for articulating formal elements of action that make alienation possible, without giving conceptual priority to alienation in the sphere of production, or within that sphere to the alienation of labor. These tools make it possible to derive classical notions of alienation as specific, contingent combinations of multiple elements, theorizing them as concrete socio‐historical configurations of a broader universe of possibilities. They also organize systematic reflection on various forms and relations of alienation; not only those between for instance labor and capital, but also among all four factors of production: land, labor, capital, and entrepreneurship. The paper accordingly develops an original, multi‐dimensional theorization of alienation for a complex, pluralistic world.     

对竞争理论演变的分析与评述

竞争理论作为经济学的核心理论,经历了漫长而曲折的演变过程。古典竞争理论和均衡竞争理论都是从静态角度来分析竞争,因此可归类为古典竞争理论。继而,克拉克实现了竞争理论由古典竞争理论向现代竞争理论的过渡。哈佛学派、芝加哥学派、新奥地利学派等现代竞争理论则是在动态环境下研究竞争。各学派的竞争理论各有自己的合理之处,同时也都存在着不同的缺陷。对这些理论进行分析和评述,对促进竞争理论的进一步发展和完善,具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。