基金在中国上市公司中发挥治理作用了吗——基于影响高管非自愿变更与业绩之间敏感性的分析

基金作为重要的机构投资者在改善公司治理方面被寄予厚望,但是对基金能否在中国上市公司的治理中发挥积极作用则鲜有研究。本文首次按照基金监督对象的不同,将基金的监督作用分为"监督高管"和"监督大股东",从基金公司的治理状况出发检验在上市公司高管非自愿性变更决策中基金参与上市公司治理的途径。实证结果表明,在基金公司治理状况比较差的条件下,基金会与上市公司高管"合谋";而当基金公司治理状况比较好的条件下,基金公司在上市公司高管非自愿性变更决策中能够发挥"监督大股东"的治理作用;没有发现基金公司"监督高管"的证据。"监督大股东"假说的提出,既丰富了基金参与公司治理的理论,也是首次从企业微观决策层面发现基金在中国上市公司中发挥积极治理作用。     

我国上市公司女性高管对企业并购绩效的影响研究

并购作为企业追求规模效益、提高经济效率、合理配置资源的有效战略,在经济转型期日益频繁地被企业采用。企业高管承担着制订和实施企业并购战略的使命,与企业并购行为能否提升其绩效有着紧密的联系。近几年来,大量女性开始进入企业高管团队,在企业管理团队中发挥着重要作用。本文以207家中国A股上市企业为样本,分析了女性高管对企业并购绩效的影响。研究结果显示女性高管比例以及女性高管在其他单位兼职均与企业并购绩效之间存在着正相关关系,能够显著提高企业并购绩效。本研究对企业高管团队的配置和建设具有一定的启示作用,为企业并购提供理论指导,进一步拓宽了现有高层管理团队的研究范围,对政府制定有关促进女性发展政策提供参考,同时也希望借此研究打破无形"玻璃天花板"阻碍,为女性高管的发展提供帮助。     

浅谈内部审计在企业内部控制中扮演的重要角色

在当前形势下,内部控制作为现代企业正常生产经营的重要前提条件,对于企业各项生产经营活动的正常开展发挥着非常重要的作用。与此同时,在企业内部控制中,必要的监督也是非常必要的,通过内部审计工作,一方面可以科学有效地对于企业内部控制工作效果的好坏进行评估监督,另一方面,也可以形成内部控制部分机制,切实促进企业内部控制工作的进一步完善。基于此,在高度重视企业内部控制工作的过程中,也一定要搞好企业内部审计工作。本文深入地研究了内部审计在企业内部控制中扮演的重要角色,希望能够有助于改善我国企业内部控制审计工作。     

浅析我国国有企业高管薪酬管理的问题及对策

国有企业高管薪酬对国有企业吸引和保留优秀的高级管理人员具有重要作用,良好的薪酬管理有利于将高管的个人利益与企业利益相结合,推动企业的发展。目前,我国国企高管薪酬管理存在较大的问题,薪酬的吸引人才和激励等作用发挥受到限制。本文具体分析了我国国企高管薪酬管理存在的问题,并对于存在的问题,提出解决措施。     

战略型领导与高管团队成员创造力:基于高科技企业的实证分析

战略型领导对于高科技企业高管团队成员创造力具有重要的影响。本文以创造力组成理论为基础,结合中国文化典型性特征,构建了差序氛围背景下CEO战略型领导通过心理授权影响高管团队成员创造力的理论模型。利用来自57个高科技企业高管团队的57名CEO与176名团队成员的有效配对数据,实证检验了理论模型。研究结果表明:CEO实施战略型领导会有效提升高管团队成员的心理授权感知、继而促进创造力的发挥;心理授权在战略型领导与团队成员创造力之间起中介作用;团队成员的差序氛围感知在战略型领导的运营性维度与心理授权之间起调节作用,当团队成员感知到的差序氛围越浓厚,战略型领导的运营性维度越能强化其心理授权。     

统计工作的意义及在中国中铁管理中的作用

统计工作是对企业实行管理提供信息指导、咨询和监督实施的作用和意义。本文结合统计工作与中国中铁的管理，阐述了统计工作的意义和在企业管理中所发挥的重要作用。     

非国有股东治理与国企高管薪酬激励

如何改善国企高管激励机制是新时期全面深化国企改革成败的关键一环。本文以2008～2015年国有上市公司为样本,通过手工收集年报披露的前十大股东性质、持股比例与委派高管的数据,分别从股权结构和高层治理两个维度衡量非国有股东参与国企治理的程度,在此基础上,研究非国有股东治理如何影响国企高管的激励机制。研究发现:首先,单纯的非国有股东持股对高管薪酬业绩敏感性无显著影响,但非国有股东向国有企业委派高管有利于改善国企高管的薪酬业绩敏感性。其次,非国有股东对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的提升作用在竞争性国有企业和处于较低市场化程度地区的国有企业中更加显著。最后,非国有股东委派高管参与国企治理能有效抑制国企高管的超额薪酬和超额在职消费。以上结论表明,混合所有制改革不能仅停留在资本层面的混合,还需确保非国有股东在国企经营管理中具有一定的影响力,才能更好地发挥民营资本的监督和治理作用。     

高管团队断裂带对变革型领导与企业绩效关系的调节作用

当前,团队断裂带理论已成为学术界研究团队多样性构成和效能的一个重要基础。相关研究成果表明,高管团队多样化程度越高,团队断裂问题越容易出现。实证结果显示:变革型领导对提升企业绩效具有显著的正向影响;同时,社会分类断裂带对变革型领导与企业绩效关系具有显著的负向调节作用,而信息认知断裂带对变革型领导与企业绩效关系具有显著的正向调节作用。因此,企业要注重实施变革型领导,在组建和优化高管团队时,要努力降低高管团队社会分类断裂带水平,努力提升高管团队信息认知断裂带水平,这有利于更加显著地发挥变革型领导对提升企业绩效的积极作用。     

女性参与高管团队对企业绩效的影响:基于中国民营企业的实证研究

受传统观念的影响,女性在中国社会的地位长期受到轻视,其在商业中的作用更是一直为人们所忽视.然而,随着中国民营经济的蓬勃发展,不少女企业家取得了令人瞩目的商业成就,女性开始崛起为企业界的一股新的力量.那么,女性参与高管团队是否能为企业增加价值呢?性别差异是否能够成为一种优势而使女性管理者更好地进行决策和管理企业呢?本研究以关于企业高管团队的文献为基础,以中国民营企业为研究对象,采用2008年民营上市公司数据,探讨女性参与高管团队与企业绩效之间的关系,并且将这一关系置于女性高管的人力资本和社会资本两个调节变量的背景下,进一步探究影响女性参与高管团队与企业绩效之间关系的原因.研究结果表明,女性在高管团队中的参与能够提升企业绩效,这种时绩效的提升随着女性高管的人力资本和社会资本的提高而增强.本研究从高管团队成员性别差异的角度丰富了现有的高管团队理论体系,并且为中国处于蓬勃发展中的民营企业的成长提供了有意义的实践指导.     

高管团队稳定性与企业ESG责任履行

ESG已成为推动国家经济高质量发展的助推器，但有关ESG责任履行影响因素的研究仍方兴未艾。以2010—2020年A股上市公司相关数据为样本，考察高管团队稳定性对企业ESG责任履行的具体影响及作用机制。研究发现，高管团队稳定性正向影响企业ESG责任履行；通过作用机制检验，发现高管团队稳定性可以通过降低管理者的短视，进而促进企业ESG责任履行；在异质性分析中，发现高管预期任期、股权激励水平、媒体关注度会正向调节高管团队稳定性与企业ESG责任履行之间的关系。     

Aufsichtsratsverflechtungen und ihr Einfluss

This article examines the development of executive compensation of the German DAX corporations from 2001 to 2006. A higher executive compensation requires an approval of the supervisory board. Accordingly, we investigate the social network of the board of directors of these companies and use several variables describing the structure of this network as covariates of the development of the executive compensation in a panel analysis. Fixed and time effects panel estimations imply that a rising number of executives in the supervisory board of other companies results in increasing compensation. By contrast, executive compensation decreases when the supervisory board of the respective company is controlled by a growing number of executives from foreign companies.     

权威董事专业性、高管激励与创新活跃度研究

通过我国A股上市公司2007年～2015年的数据, 实证检验了权威专业董事通过高管激励影响创新活跃度的逻辑链条.发现权威专业董事通过影响高管激励的结构与水平增强了企业创新的活跃度, 且不同类别的权威专业董事均能够产生积极作用.这种影响不仅促进了企业的实质性创新, 提升了企业的创新效率, 并使之具有可持续性.研究结论在对主要变量采取不同度量方式以及控制了内生性等因素影响的情况下依然成立.本文的研究结论拓展了权威专业董事职能发挥的途径, 增补了上市公司高管激励的经验证据, 同时, 为董事会治理有效性的识别提供了新的视角.对于当前企业高管创新激励机制的匹配性设计, 以及监管部门完善董事会治理规则具有一定的借鉴意义.     

The influence of top management corporate networks on CEO succession

We analyze empirically how supervisory board members with multiple directorships affect the decision to hire an inside or outside CEO successor. While a growing number of both theoretical and empirical studies analyze the influence of corporate performance and size or the ownership structure on this decision, the role of multiple board memberships within the CEO recruitment process has been widely neglected so far. The present study is based on panel data of the largest German companies covering the period from 1996 to 2008. Applying competing risk estimations we find a weak and positive association between the number of external directorships of the supervisory board members and internal CEO replacements. Distinguishing between different groups of external board positions, we find that external executives on the supervisory board increase the likelihood of external CEO replacements. In line with empirical findings for the US we argue that external executives improve the assessment of potential CEO successors leading to more outside CEO replacements. In contrast, we find evidence that external supervisory board mandates of the supervisory board members cause more internal CEO replacements. This finding indicates a substitution of external expertise of the executives by multiple supervisory board mandates but could also reflect a reduction of the monitoring intensity of the supervisory board.     

Corporate governance and credit rating in Islamic banks: Does Shariah governance matters?

We investigate whether Islamic banks with strong corporate governance benefit from higher credit ratings relative to Islamic banks with weaker governance and whether Shariah governance can affect the credit ratings of Islamic banks or not. We document, after controlling for Islamic bank-specific risk characteristics, that credit ratings are negatively associated with the number of blockholders, CEO power, the supervisory role of the Shariah board and investment deposits; and positively associated with share listing ownership, board independence, women directors, board directors expertise and Shariah board expertise. As well as, credit rating is higher for Southeast Asian Islamic banks and weaker for GCC Islamic banks.     

Why and when female directors are less engaged in their board duties: An interface perspective

Female representation on boards is perhaps one of the most studied topics in board-governance research. At the same time, much is unknown about female directors' task engagement within boards. Drawing from psychological theory on societal gender beliefs, our study tests whether the impact of director gender on supervisory task engagement hinges on status dynamics in two relational interfaces: the director–board interface and the director–CEO interface. According to this perspective, female directors show less task engagement because gender is a diffuse status cue that creates status differentiation within the director–board interface. Multi-source board survey data (n = 61 boards, n = 315 directors) confirms that, within the confines of the boardroom, female directors do, indeed, receive lower-status ratings than male directors. This effect is weaker when boards have a female chair. Furthermore, lower status explains perceived lower task engagement of female directors, but this link critically hinges on the CEO–director interface. The impact of status differences is more pronounced when directors intersect with a relatively dominant CEO. All in all, the results demonstrate that relational interfaces play a key role for female directors’ task engagement in their board duties.     

产权性质、管理层权力与薪酬差距激励效应——基于政府补助的中介作用

 薪酬差距激励效应一直是理论研究和实证研究的热点。锦标赛理论和行为理论忽略了管理层权力的影响，因而对薪酬差距激励效应的解释能力有限。        将管理层权力引入研究框架，以政府补助为中介变量，检验管理层权力通过政府补助作用于薪酬差距的具体过程和经济后果，以及公司内外部机制的治理作用。特别地，考虑中国特殊的制度环境，国有企业改革导致管理层权力不断提升和膨胀，基于产权性质的视角展开对比研究。以2010年至2014年沪深A股上市公司7 999个观测值为样本，运用SAS 9.2和多元回归方法进行实证研究。        研究结果表明，在管理层权力的作用下，政府补助加剧高管与普通员工之间的薪酬差距，与民营企业相比，国有企业获得的政府补助更能加大薪酬差距；进一步地，将薪酬差距分解为管理层从政府补助中攫取的权力性薪酬差距和剔除政府补助影响后的薪酬差距后发现，权力性薪酬差距起负向激励效应，降低企业未来绩效，并且在国有企业中权力性薪酬差距的负向激励效应更强；剔除政府补助影响后的薪酬差距能够起到正面激励效应，提高企业未来绩效，并且该效应不因产权性质的不同而改变。        深入研究还发现，以董事会和政府干预为代表的内外部机制能够起到有效的治理作用，董事会规模越小、独立董事比例越高、董事会会议次数越多、政府干预程度越高，权力性薪酬差距的负向激励效应越弱。        研究结论不仅为薪酬差距激励效应的研究提供理论上的补充，也为上市公司制定更优的薪酬契约和完善的治理机制提供理论依据和指导。     

CAPITAL,LABOR, AND THE FIRM: A STUDY OF GERMAN CODETERMINATION

Under the German corporate governance system of codetermination, employees are legally allocated control rights over corporate assets through seats on the supervisory board—that is, the board of nonexecutive directors. The supervisory board oversees the management board—the board of executive directors—approves or rejects its decisions, and appoints its members and sets their salaries. We empirically investigate the implications of this sort of labor participation in corporate decision making. We find that companies with equal representation of employees and shareholders on the supervisory board trade at a 31% stock market discount as compared with companies where employee representatives fill only one‐third of the supervisory board seats. We show that under equal representation, management board compensation provides incentives that are not conducive to furthering shareholders' interests, possibly because labor maximizes a different objective function than shareholders. We document that, under equal representation, companies have longer payrolls than their one‐third representation peers have. Finally, we provide evidence that shareholders respond to the allocation of control rights to labor by linking supervisory board compensation to firm performance and by leveraging up the firm. (JEL: G32, G34)     

Board attributes and foreign shareholdings in Malaysian listed firms

This study examines the association between foreign shareholdings and several characteristics of board of directors in the context of a developing capital market. Using data of 777 listed firms on Bursa Malaysia for the financial year 2008, the study predicts that foreign shareholdings are positively related to board independence, multiple directorships, and financial literacy of the board of directors. The study finds a strong positive relationship between multiple directorships and foreign shareholdings. Contrary to our expectation, the association between board financial literacy and foreign shareholdings is negative and significant. With regard to the link between board independence and foreign shareholdings, we find weak evidence to support our prediction that there is positive relationship between board independence and foreign shareholdings. The multivariate results also show strong positive relationships between foreign shareholdings and number of foreign directors on boards, and between foreign shareholdings and audit quality. The study also documents a significant negative association between foreign shareholdings and firm size, and between foreign shareholdings and book-to-market ratio. The findings of the study supports the view that multiple directorships is an important asset to firms in emerging markets partly due to limited pool of potential talents and experts which in turn could signal reputational capital and quality of directors. Since there is a mandated presence of finance and accounting qualified director on the audit committee, foreign shareholders can somewhat rely on the oversight of audit committee instead of depending entirely on the board of directors for the quality of financial statements and financial reporting oversight. Finally, the presence of foreign directors on a board of directors may signal a firm’s commitment to adopt good corporate governance practices. It is also possible that foreign investors can influence corporate governance through their participation on the board of directors.     

外资参股、董事会特征与商业银行经营绩效——基于中国121家商业银行的实证分析

董事会是公司治理的核心,本文首次从外资股东参与董事会治理的视角,在运用固定效应模型和手工收集面板数据的基础上,使用分组比较研究方法,实证检验了2007-2016年121家商业银行外资参股、董事会特征与经营绩效的关系,结果发现引入外资参股的商业银行中：（1）董事会规模、非执行董事占比、董事会会议频率、专业委员会数目均与经营绩效之间存在显著正相关关系;（2）董事会中外资董事占比的增加,董事会规模、董事会会议频率、专业委员会数目与经营绩效之间的正相关关系均会显著减弱,然而非执行董事占比与经营绩效之间的正相关关系则会显著增强。据此,本文建议商业银行引入外资参股后：（1）应鼓励外资参与董事会治理,适当扩大董事会规模;向外资股东提供适量的非执行董事席位;适度增加董事会会议频率;积极完善专业委员会体系。（2）控制董事会中外资董事占比的不合理增加,确保外资董事与独立董事之间的实质性独立。     

Board age and corporate financial fraud: An interactionist view

Unlike past studies which have focused on either executives or boards of directors, this study takes an interactionist view to investigate the determinants of corporate financial fraud. We propose that CEOs evaluate the opportunities for financial fraud according to both situational stimuli and their own personal characteristics. As older directors are often more experienced and have more to lose if they fail in their monitoring duties, we expect them to be more capable and to have stronger motivation for monitoring CEOs closely. As such, we propose that a CEO is less likely to engage in corporate financial fraud when the average age of the board of directors increases (i.e., board age). However, when the CEO is older than the board, the CEO may attach less importance to board age when deciding whether to commit fraud. Therefore, we further propose that the CEO–board directional age difference can weaken the effect of board age. Our empirical analyses provide strong support for these hypotheses. Our study contributes to the literature on corporate governance by highlighting the often neglected roles of board age and CEO–board directional age difference in deterring corporate financial fraud.