Ethical grounds for public relations as organizational rhetoric

Organizational rhetoric is critically questioned for ethics of its strategic processes and aspirational goal of persuasive, inescapably self-interested influence. Such critique pits strategic engagement needed for self-governance against self-interested framing (spin) and other dysfunctions. This theoretical essay takes stock of research literature to evaluate the ethics of organizational rhetoric, as rationale for public relations, and justify shifting from a strategic functional to an ontological, agonistic view of public relations. Relevant literature justifies the ethics of fairness (which features regard for others’ interests) to guide rhetorical processes and prefer outcomes as societally responsible. From classical Greece to postmodern theory of agonism, analysis of rhetoric centers on self-governance: achieved by stakeholders addressing rhetorical problems in rhetorical situations to deliberate strategic legitimatization. The discursive role of public relations intersects ethics of fairness and rhetorical citizenship, advocacy and dialogue, discourse and engagement at individual and societal levels. Public relations should be linked to an ontological ethics regarding strategic means of rhetorical influence toward ends accomplished collectively by agonistic pursuit.     

The dialogic ladder: Toward a framework of dialogue

This paper articulates the existence of different forms of ‘dialogue’, ranging from the conduct of simple two-way communication through more interactive forms culminating in true (or capital D) Dialogue. The importance of, and rationale for, the making of these distinctions is discussed in relation to the theorizing and practice of dialogue in public relations. A framework encompassing variations on the theme of dialogue is proposed in the form of a dialogic ladder that reflects the everyday usage of the term, while also preserving the existence and distinction of the normative form.The clearer and more consistent conceptualization of dialogue resulting from the dialogic ladder will assist in developing teaching curricula and associated materials that enable future researchers and practitioners to distinguish between true Dialogue and other forms. The dialogic ladder contributes to the development of dialogue theory that either expands to include dialogue-in-name-only (Kent & Theunissen, 2016), or narrows its focus to consider only true Dialogue. It will also allow identification of situations in practice where two-way communication falls short of true Dialogue, and stimulate efforts to consider why this shortfall occurs and how it might be addressed—if the conduct of true Dialogue is deemed necessary and possible. Finally, the dialogic ladder provides an alternative perspective on the role of dialogue in the two-way symmetric model of public relations.     

Immigration and the ethics of choice

"This paper begins by developing a language for ethical discourse on immigration and then examining the extent to which choices may be made at the micro-level and at the macro-level. States and individuals are examined as actors who are variously described as making choices or being choiceless. The concepts of cultural distance, reciprocity, the role of the individual and of the state and their interrelationships are evaluated in the perspective of choice. Whether an ethics of immigration can be successfully developed hinges on the degree of choice that individuals and state have or perceive themselves to have."     

Not to Be Hungry Is Not Enough: An Insight Into Contours of Inclusion and Exclusion in Affluent Western Societies

In its view of the contemporary world, social theory—and particularly its postmodern trends and proponents—attributes a dominant role to the realm of consumption and consumerism in shaping both individual lifeworlds and the system of social hierarchies as a whole. In this article, building on the case of middle‐aged to late‐middle‐aged post–Soviet Jewish immigrants in contemporary Germany and illuminating a particular condition that I call “condemned to consume,” I seek to reexamine this tendency to celebrate consumption and consumerism while downplaying and marginalizing realm of work and employment. I interconnect this examination with questions regarding the distribution of resources and the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. Drawing on the “condemned to consume” condition, I seek to claim that in affluent Western societies, which are able to provide relative material well‐being or at least subsistence even to those at the margins, the main contours of inclusion and exclusion are not grounded primarily in one's ability to enter the realm of consumption but, rather, in one's ability to participate equally in the realm of work and employment. I underscore this idea by connecting lack of regular, meaningful employment with the concept of exclusive inclusion.     

Mum's the Word: Intersubjectivity,Alterity, and the Maternal Subject

Where motherhood and ethics are brought together, it is usually under the rubric of an “ethic of care,” with the mother-child relationship figured as a paradigmatic example of such an ethic. In this article I make use of Levinas' account of ethics as first philosophy to flesh out a notion of “maternal alterity” as an alternative to a maternal ethics based on the various complex mental and emotional tasks that make up care. This represents an attempt to recuperate something for the mother out of her often bewildering encounter with the enigmatic otherness of her child. Situating Levinas alongside a dialogue between Jessica Benjamin and Judith Butler on intersubjectivity, I attempt to disentangle maternal subjectivity from the developing subjectivity of the child and offer an account of the maternal subject as an ethical subject situated, perhaps, “otherwise” to a discourse of care.     

Libertarian collective decision-making: A new framework

A model of collective decision-making is presented which enables us to analyze the allocation of individual rights and liberties. The model broadens the traditional social choice framework. In social choice theory it is usually assumed that individuals have preferences over a set of feasible alternatives and that society reaches a decision on the basis of those preferences only. In the model presented in this paper, decision procedures do not only take information about individual preferences as input, but also information about individual freedom. The specific decision procedures we present and analyze can be characterized as libertarian.This paper was written while I was a visitor at the University of California, Riverside. The visit was made possible by financial support of the Netherlands Organization of Scientific Research (NWO). I am extremely grateful to Prasanta Pattanaik for many stimulating discussions on the subject. For helpful comments I also thank Ad van Deemen, Grahame Lock, Huib Pellikaan and Marcel Wissenburg. Finally, I express my thanks to Wulf Gaertner and two anonymous referees.     

Axiomatic foundations for fairness-motivated preferences

Much work in social choice theory takes individual preferences as uninvestigated inputs into aggregation functions designed to reflect considerations of fairness. Advances in experimental and behavioural economics show that fairness can also be an important motivation in the preferences of individuals themselves. A proper characterisation of how fairness concerns enter such preferences can enrich the informational basis of many social choice exercises. This paper proposes axiomatic foundations for individual fairness-motivated preferences that cover most of the models developed to rationalise observed behaviour in experiments. These models fall into two classes: Outcome-based models, which see preferences as defined only over distributive outcomes, and context-dependent models, which allow rankings over distributive outcomes to change systematically with non-outcome factors. I accommodate outcome-based and context-sensitive fairness concerns by modelling fairness-motivated preferences as a reference-dependent preference structure. I first present a set of axioms and two theorems that generate commonly used outcome-based models as special cases. I then generalise the axiomatic basis to allow for reference-dependence, and derive a simple functional form in which the weight on each person’s payoff depends on a reference vector of how much each person deserves.     

Local Rites and Body Politics

The growing awareness of violence against women has resulted in endorsement of various international codes and conventions relating to physical, psychological and sexual violence. Female genital mutilation is one form of violence against women that has polarized people within and across national borders. Here, I explore its popular representation, consider how activism against genital mutilation has been confounded by sex and race and how activism to eradicate the practice is understood by immigrant women in Australia. In doing this, I draw on research conducted with women immigrants to Australia from north Africa (the Sahel areas) and the Middle East, from countries where female genital mutilation is most common. These women are often frustrated by what they see as contradictions in hospital policy and practice that arise in response to their requests to be reinfibulated after childbirth. I tease out the dilemmas that emerge when refusal is contrasted with other permissible practices of the body, such as hymen reconstruction, and given the commodification of bodies and related issues of age and agency, the individual and the community. The perceived discrepancies suggest to these African women that rights discourse is discriminatory, racist and informed by sensational portrayals of traditional practices. I question the ethics, values and rights that inform public discourse about sexual and reproductive rights, when women’s rights and values are so discrepant from our own ideals.     

Pragmatic Thinking about Self,Society, and Natural Environment: Mead,Carson, and Beyond

An interactionist approach provides a relevant point of view on human—natural environment relations. This essay draws on an interactionist approach from a Meadian, pragmatic, social constructionist perspective. In the context of grounded distinctions for interpreting “natural environment,” this discussion considers instances of human intervention and levels of responses, for example, individual, social, cultural, historical, and utopian, as variant, even conflicting, reconstructions of the foundational relationship of human—natural environment interaction. Incorporating a pragmatic model derived from Rachel Carson, the work at hand focuses on knowledge and ethical claims, as discourse and action shift from preventing to mitigating and adjusting environmental outcomes.     

What is the Shortest Russian Joke? Communism. Russian Cultural Consciousness Expressed Through Soviet Humor

In an environment like Soviet Russia where it was difficult, if not impossible, to make assertions that contradicted the official Communist Party word, political humor can be used to challenge, subvert, or uphold official “truths.” The Russian Soviet anekdot—a politically subversive joke—provides an intimate view into the perspective of the Russian people living under Soviet rule. The anekdot serves as a discourse of “cultural consciousness,” connecting otherwise atomized people to a homeland, collective culture, and memory. In conducting a paired content and critical discourse analysis of 1,290 anekdoty collected from Russian archives, I explore how this oral folklore served to construct a Russian collective consciousness that (1) resists Party rhetoric, social policy, and ideology, but also (2) adopts and reifies social boundaries established by Soviet discourse by constructing particular groups as “other.” Those who are familiar with cultural folklore—and the historical context to which it refers—are taught who are the perpetrators responsible for injustices, who are the victims, and how we should feel about these different people; folklore also gives insight into the perspectives of those from the hegemonic '"center."     

A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives

I prove that under each strategy-proof and unanimous social choice correspondence, there is at least one agent who is decisive. Because the result is established on a weak requirement on preferences over sets, the existence of a decisive agent is an underlying feature of most strategy-proof and unanimous social choice correspondences. Moreover, I consider a restriction on the space of preferences over alternatives. I prove that circular sets of preferences over alternatives are sufficient for the existence of a decisive agent.     

Consistency between tastes and values: A universalization approach

The object of this paper is to propose a consistency test for an individual involved in collective choice process. Collective choice processes considered in the paper are those that transform individuals ‘tastes’– which reflect the self-interested view point of the individuals – into (social) ranking of alternatives. In addition to her tastes, an individual has values about the way by which collective decision should be made. We distinguish two categories of such values. First, there are end-values that restrict the class of social rankings that the individual considers ethically acceptable. Second there are aggregation-values that specify the way by which the social ranking should depend upon the individuals tastes. The consistency test stands on an hypothetical operation of universalization of the individual tastes to everyone. Five illustrations of the potential usefulness of our approach for interpreting social choice theory and welfare economics are proposed. These illustrations deal with utilitarian aggregation in the presence of income inequality aversion, the so-called ‘ethics of responsibility’ and the aggregation of individual ranking of opportunity sets based on their freedom of choice. A discussion of the relevance of the consistency test for addressing the problem of ‘laundering’ individual preferences is also provided. Received: 25 June 1998/Accepted: 16 March 1999     

Mandating dialogue? International perspectives on differences between theory and practice

This paper replicates an Australian study (Lane, 2018) into how public relations practitioners understand dialogue in practice. The original study found practitioners believed they were carrying out dialogue legally required by government, but what they were doing was no more than two-way communication. It also found practitioners’ operating environments meant they could never actually undertake dialogue, even if mandated to do so. These empirically-based insights revealed the existence of gaps between theory and practice in dialogue in public relations. The study was repeated in Austria to determine if these findings were consistent internationally, and to consider what this might mean for the place of dialogue in public relations. Examples of so-called mandated ‘dialogue’ provided by Austrian public relations practitioners in semi-structured interviews were analyzed using Kent and Taylor’s (2002) five principles of dialogue. This analysis showed that despite the Austrian practitioners’ familiarity with the work of Habermas on dialogue, the mandated communication they carried out was not dialogue. The Austrian experience also showed that the nature of the underlying context of mandated communication—the need to achieve agreement between parties in varying levels of conflict; and conducting communication within boundaries of time and non-negotiable pre-existing decisions—meant dialogue could never occur. Comparing the two studies demonstrated high levels of similarity between the countries’ results, which we hope can provide the starting point for the development of a longitudinal and international perspective. This paper concludes that the place of dialogue in the theory and practice of public relations is dependent on the education of practitioners in its implementation; and a re-thinking of the role of the aspirational in situations where it can never be attained.     

Beyond common factors: multilevel-process models of therapeutic change in marriage and family therapy

A number of scholars have proposed the common factors perspective as the future direction of marriage and family therapy (MFT). Although intuitively appealing, the case for the common factors perspective is not as clear-cut as proponents portray. In its current form, the common factors perspective overlooks the multilevel nature of practice, the diversity of clients and settings, and the complexity of therapeutic change. In contrast, comprehensive process-based change models are an alternative to the limitations of common factors. In this article, we consider the limitations of the common factors perspective and propose the necessary and sufficient components and processes that might comprise comprehensive, multilevel, process-based therapeutic change models in MFT.     

Participation Structures as a Mediational Means: Learning Balinese Gamelan in the United States Through Intent Participation,Mediated Discourse,and Distributed Cognition

Participation has presented a complex unit of analysis for interactional sociolinguistics. In this study I add another dimension to participation by considering recent theories related to sociocultural activity theory—mediated discourse analysis and distributed cognition. Drawing on examples from maguru panggul, the traditional pedagogy of Balinese Gamelan music, I argue that participation structures are a mediational means that enable students to augment their learning. Focusing on two participation structures that involve keen observation and listening-in, I also consider how intent participation is a part of these participation structures and maguru panggul pedagogy. What emerges is an understanding of how participation structures used as mediational means can have an effect on the division of cognitive labor within a classroom.     

Dynamic multilevel governance for sustainable transformation as postnational configuration

Modern societies are increasingly having to cope with profound socio-political transformations, such as the transition from fossil energy production and consumption to more sustainable energy systems. Transformations ignite dynamics, processes, and forces, which induce new challenges for traditional structures and orders because major changes in society and politics are shifting from established manners, customs, and modes of behavior to new norms and values. Transformations cause epistemological uncertainty and complexity and challenge ontological fundaments and ethical convictions. National structures alone are not adequate to the task of handling the corresponding challenges because the capacity of domestic politics and regulations is too weak to achieve eligible political outcomes that can guide and structure transformations. In this light, I argue for a form of dynamic multilevel governance as a postnational configuration that has the capability and power to reform and transfigure institutions, structure and agency, hierarchies, cultural fabrics, socio-technical systems, and infrastructures toward new social and political orders. I theoretically and normatively conceptualize and justify three major governance framework conditions as hallmarks of dynamic multilevel governance, namely inclusiveness, adaptiveness, and distributed and differentiated deliberation. These capabilities produce reflexive authority with transformative and structuring power to tackle transformation issues. My notion of dynamic multilevel governance relies on thoughts in new institutionalism, network theory, deliberative democracy theory, discourse ethics, and different concepts of governance. I combine theory, normative justification, and institutional feasibility.     

The meaning of “fundamental preferences”

We present the definition and meaning of “fundamental preferences” that are interpersonally comparable, ordinal and endemonistic. We also dispel a number of misunderstandings concerning them. In the article “A cause of preference is not on object of preference” (Soc Choice Welfare (1993) 10: 57–68), Professor Broome misinterprets the notion of “fundamental preferences” in confusing an observer's device for a psychological transformation of the observed (as if an economist studying wealth meant that he becomes wealthy, or if physicians had to be sick — this is well shown in his interpretation of a sentence of mine in p 65 where the crucial switch to the first person is his own). Considering a new set of variables that includes both structural parameters and former variables, hence variables of different kinds, assumes nothing new concerning the observed object; namely, it says neither that the consumption of bread becomes “a cause” of the taste for jam, nor that the individual likes (or dislikes) his own tastes, or anything like this (the accusation of “fantasy”). We shall suggest that certain other views receive a similar treatment in this paper. This misunderstanding is regrettable, since the consideration of fundamental preferences is unavoidable in social ethics, both when one has to compare all-encompassing individual situations, and for the preferences of the hypothetical identical individuals in an Original Position device where they evaluate at once what they might have and what they might be I wish to thank Professor Broome for comments on an earlier version of this note. . Therefore, perhaps the full argument must be stated again (see the works in references). To begin with, we should face the issue relevant for social ethics directly, rather than dealing with it in devious ways. The question arises if: (1) distributive justice is a question (he who says it is not wants to impose his own view of it), (2) individual happiness has any relevance for the quality of society (imagine a society of despaired people). Then, one can show that the relevant issue turns out to be: can one say that a person is happier than another? These persons are in specific situations.     

On strategy-proof social choice under categorization

I consider social choice problems such that (i) the set of alternatives can be partitioned into categories based on a prominent and objective feature and (ii) agents have strict preferences over the alternatives. Main results are characterizations of the structure of the strategy-proof social choice functions. I prove that each social choice function is strategy-proof if and only if it is decomposable into “small” strategy-proof social choice functions; one of them chooses one category and each of the others chooses one alternative from a category.     

Rights and the liberal paradoxes

Traditional social choice theory does not distinguish between the choices and the preferences of an individual. However, it is often rational for an individual to make choices that do not follow his preferences, e.g. when he makes compromises with other individuals. A social choice format is introduced with separate representations for choice and preference. It is shown how different types of rights and other legal positions can be expressed in this format. Definitions are given of what it means for rights to be compatible and for a set of rights to be respected. Further, it is shown that much weaker (and fully plausible) conditions are needed to avoid Sen's paradox (the impossibility of a Paretian liberal) in this social choice format than in a traditional format that does not distinguish between choices and preferences. As an example of this, Sen's paradox can be avoided if each individual, ceteris paribus, prefers that her choices be respected in matters that belong to her own personal sphere.An earlier version of this paper has been discussed at a Swedish-English Symposium on Rights and Rationality. I would like to thank the participants, Peter Gärdenfors, William Hart, Stig Kanger, David Kelsey, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Robert Sugden for valuable comments.     

Extended preferences and freedom of choice

The common choice theory in economics is based on the assumption that an individual is defined in terms of a binary preference relation. This preference relation is defined over alternatives without taking into account menu dependence and, in particular, freedom of choice or, more generally, the set that contains the alternatives. In this study we clarify the nature and the significance of freedom of choice which may positively or negatively affect the individual's welfare. Our proposed extended preference relation of the individual takes into account both the particular alternative and the opportunity set that he faces. This extended relation does not induce ranking of opportunity sets. Its restriction to a particular opportunity set is the paradigmatic preference relation and it can capture the dependence of preferences on freedom of choice. Our main result establishes the inconsistency between dependence of extended preferences on freedom of choice and the existence of a utility that represents the paradigmatic preference relation and any of its restrictions. Received: 30 December 1997/Accepted: 6 September 1999