J. S. MILL'S REDISTRIBUTION POLICY: NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OR OLD?

This paper challenges the new view that J. S. Mill's redistribution policies share the same pro-poor philosophy of modern negative income tax advocates who stress the minimum injury to labour incentives. While they assume a progressive tax structure, Mill wanted a proportionate tax, and, in practice, if his actual tax proposals favoured any group it was the middle class. "The moderns" object to welfare schemes that impose a 100 percent tax on the welfare recipient's own earnings. The New Poor Law, that Mill supported, did just this. The Old Poor Law (under Gilbert's Act), that outraged him, came closest to modern NIT scheme. It provided outdoor relief in cash, whereas Mill wanted indoor relief in kind. And it answered the inefficiencies and indignities of conventional welfare (work-house) administration, a problem in which Mill showed no interest. His scheme did contain incentives; but these were directed to the needs of a future poor, educated according to Mill's own special design.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEW DEAL FISCAL FEDERALISM

While the introduction of federal matching grants to finance the New Deal relief programs is usually viewed as a mechanism to insure federal control over state relief spending, a careful study of the New Deal reveals that the reverse was the case: matching grants allowed the states to escape close federal control. The standard economic model of inter-governmental grants reveals that the federal government will, if allowed, prefer to use discretionary rather than matching grants. With discretion, however, came power; power that neither the states nor Congress wished to see concentrated in the Executive branch.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. WHEAT LEGISLATION

Both taxpayer subsidies to U.S. wheat producers and domestic deadweight losses increased as a result of the U.S. wheat program adopted in 1985. A calculation of the costs and benefits of alternative wheat policies shows that mandatory production controls with no taxpayer expense could have made wheat producers as well off as the adopted policy. Becker's theory of competition among interest groups and Peltzman's theory of the equilibrium amount of regulation are shown to be consistent with the observed policy choice if the list of fnfected interest groups includes agricultural input suppliers and grain marketing firms.     

THE NEW ECONOMY AND THE AMERICAN DREAM:

Recent decades have seen major changes in economic conditions in the United States, including large-scale layoffs and downsizing, erosion of job quality for some workers, and increased reliance on nonstandard workers. Researchers have investigated the objective contours of this new economy, but few have investigated the consequences of these changes for popular attitudes about economic opportunity. Using data from the 1998 Indiana Survey of Workers in a Polarized Economy (N = 853), I investigate this new economic landscape and its effects on people's views about economic opportunity. I find that job deterioration and experiences with layoffs and job threats are creating pessimism about the American Dream among Indiana workers.     

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE FEDERALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NPDES INSPECTIONS

This paper examines the consequences of the delegation of regulatory authority to local officials. The study evaluates three hypotheses of the role delegation plays in the implementation of regulatory policy: (1) the federal case, which predicts that delegation has no effect, (2) the state/local model predicts that delegation is, in fact, abdication, and (3) the full impact model predicts that both interests determine how environmental policy is implemented. The results provide evidence that while delegation does not completely remove national policy maker's ability to alter regulatory policy, it does allow local interests to alter national standards. (JEL L51, Q28)     

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE SOCIAL MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS: THE CASE OF THE MELTZER‐RICHARD ECONOMY

In previous studies on the social marginal cost of public funds (SMCF), the existing tax system has been assumed to be either arbitrary or optimal. This note explores another possibility: the existing tax system itself represents a political equilibrium. Our exploration proceeds in Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) political economy of redistributive taxation. An interesting feature of our finding is that the degree of income inequality as measured by the ratio of mean to median income can play an important role in estimating the SMCF and judging whether the level of redistribution is excessive or inadequate. (JEL D61, D72, H21)     

MARKET STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE: NEW DATA ON POLITICAL EXPENDITURES, ACTIVITY, AND SUCCESS

This paper utilizes new data to evaluate the determinants of the political influence of thirty-five manufacturing industries on the U.S. Congress during 1976–80. Several measures of influence serve to distinguish between political activity and success. Seller concentration and geopolitical dispersion increase both activity and success, but neither industry size nor leading-firm size proves significant. We test whether political expenditures facilitate obtaining the favors conferred on an industry by its market structure or by influence independent of that strurture; statistical inference strongly confirms both roles.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TIME IN THE INTERNET ERA: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES AND CHALLENGES

This paper examines the gender matrix of time, arguing for cross-disciplinary consideration of political economy, globalization and technology to achieve a detailed understanding of gendered hierarchies of time and the ways in which public/private identifications of social space and time have variously constructed and maintained them. It is argued that women are alienated from their own time, which is identified as most legitimately allocated to the service of others both in the home and at work. The inter-relationship of technologies and gendered identities is explored in relation to public/private divisions and the political-economic and scientific-technological knowledge processes that contribute to upholding them. ICTs reflect these historically established gendered patterns, but international projects such as 'Women on the Net' also demonstrate the capacities of these technologies for disrupting the gender matrix of time through their use by women for women.     

STOCK OWNERSHIP AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MUTUAL FUND REVOLUTION

We find that higher stock ownership rates are linked to an upward shift in the Republican share of the House popular vote since the late 1980s, consistent with theories that property interests affect voting. To proxy for discontinuous stock ownership rates, we use equity mutual fund costs, which have fallen, are negatively correlated with stock ownership rates and the Republican vote share in the long run, and help explain short‐run changes along with midterm elections, economic conditions, and presidential popularity. Findings suggest that the major parties’ shares of the House popular vote will fluctuate around 50% until other factors trigger a political realignment. (JEL D72, G11)     

BRIDGING THE NATURAL AND THE SOCIAL: SCIENCE AND CHARACTER IN JEVONS'S POLITICAL ECONOMY

A common characterization of the "marginalist revolution" is that it focused on individuals, depicted economics as the universal application of behavioral laws of choice, and made a clear distinction between the analyses of "pure" economic theory and economic policy. This characterization effaces a number of important differences between the work of W. Stanley Jevons and later supply and demand theories. Using Jevons's discussion of reductions in working hours to illustrate the analysis, the paper shows how he used the Victorian language of "civilization" and "character" to designate class and race behavior in the Theory of Political Economy.     

THE NEW MEDIA AND OUR POLITICAL COMMUNICATION DISCONTENTS: DEMOCRATIZING CYBERSPACE

This article argues that the new interactive media have a 'vulnerable potential' to enhance public communications and enrich democracy, which can be realized only through appropriate policy support and imaginative institution building. After outlining the main shortcomings of the prevailing political communication system, certain elements of redemptive potential, inherent in distinctive features of the Internet, are identified. The policy implications of this analysis are then drawn for the public-service obligations of mainstream media, to ensure open access to new media platforms, and to create a 'civic commons' in cyberspace.     

ALLOCATING INFECTION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SWINE FLU (H1N1) VACCINE

Previous research has isolated the effect of “congressional dominance” in explaining bureaucracy‐related outcomes. This analysis extends the concept of congressional dominance to the allocation of H1N1, or swine flu, vaccine doses. States with Democratic United States Representatives on the relevant House oversight committee received roughly 60,000 additional doses per legislator during the initial allocation period, though this political advantage dissipated after the first 3 weeks of vaccine distribution. As a result political factors played a role in determining vaccine allocation only when the vaccine was in particularly short supply. At‐risk groups identified by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), such as younger age groups and first responders, do not receive more vaccine doses, and in fact receive slightly fewer units of vaccine. (JEL D72, D73, I18)     

CARBON GEOGRAPHY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEGISLATION INTENDED TO MITIGATE GREENHOUSE GAS PRODUCTION

Over the last 5 years, the U.S. Congress has voted on several pieces of legislation intended to sharply reduce the nation's greenhouse gas emissions. Given that climate change is a world public bad, standard economic logic would predict that the United States would “free ride” and wait for other nations to reduce their emissions. Within the Congress, there are clear patterns to who votes in favor of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. This paper presents a political economy analysis of the determinants of “pro‐green” votes on such legislation. Conservatives consistently vote against such legislation. Controlling for a representative's ideology, representatives from richer districts and districts with a lower per‐capita carbon dioxide footprint are more likely to vote in favor of climate change mitigation legislation. Representatives from districts where industrial emissions represent a larger share of greenhouse gas emissions are more likely to vote no. (JEL Q54, Q58, R50)     

DYNASTIC POLITICAL PRIVILEGE AND ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CASE OF U.S. GOVERNORS, 1950–2005

This paper examines the impact of dynastic political privilege on the behavior of incumbents. Incumbents have opportunities to serve themselves at the expense of voters, but society can design political institutions to mitigate these principal‐agent problems. Dynastic political privilege may be one such mechanism. We argue that the possibility that opportunistic behavior in office may damage family members' political prospects disciplines incumbents. We test this hypothesis using data for 1950–2005 on U.S. governors, including a new data set on the family relationships of politicians, and find that dynastic political privilege increases incumbent accountability. (JEL H71, H10)     

REAL EXCHANGE RATE,MONETARY POLICY,AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: EVIDENCE FROM A FAVAR MODEL

This paper examines the effects of exchange rate depreciation to the U.S. economy in a factor‐augmented vector autoregression model using monthly data of 148 variables for the post–Bretton Woods period of 1973–2017. Exchange rate shock is identified to reflect exogenous disturbances to the foreign exchange market, and movements in exchange rate that are not accounted for by changes in the U.S. monetary policy. We find that depreciation is expansionary and inflationary to the broad U.S. economy, the current account improves over time conforming to the J‐curve theory, and monetary policy is leaning against the wind. (JEL E3, E5, F31, F32, F41)     

U.S. COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING THROUGH 2008:Q4: NEW EVIDENCE FROM GROSS CREDIT FLOWS

What was hiding behind the aggregate commercial bank loans through the end of 2008? We use balance sheet data for every insured U.S. commercial bank from 1999:Q1 to 2008:Q4 to construct credit expansion and credit contraction series and provide new evidence on changes in lending. Until 2008:Q3 net credit growth was not dissimilar to the 1980 and 2001 recessions. However, between the third and fourth quarter credit contraction grew larger than credit expansion across all types of loans and for the largest banks. With the inclusion of 2008:Q4 data our series most resemble the intensification of the Savings and Loan crisis. (JEL E44, E51, G21)